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Allahabad High Court · body

2021 DIGILAW 463 (ALL)

Ramraja Traders v. State of U. P.

2021-03-26

PRAKASH PADIA, SANJAY YADAV

body2021
JUDGMENT : Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Udayan Nandan, learned counsel appears on behalf of petitioner. Learned Standing Counsel appears on behalf of State- Respondents. 1. A Notice Advertisement was published on 13.09.2018 by District Magistrate, Banda for the settlement of mining leases of sand/moram under the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 for 5 mining Blocks, by e-tendering and as per Condition No. 13 (6) of the Government Order dated 14.08.2017 respective applicants had to deposit Rs.15,000/- as application fee and 25% of the bid amount as earnest money separately for each area. That term and condition no.19 and 22 (1) of the Advertisement stipulated that within three days from the date of acceptance of bid, the successful bidder shall deposit the requisites mentioned therein and that before participating in the bid the bidders were first require to satisfy themselves by physically verifying the determined quantity of mineral and the approach road to the site. These clauses are reproduced for ready reference: 19- bZ&fuykeh lekIr gksus ds i'pkr 03 dk;Z fnol ds vUnj lQy cksyhnkrk dks vius ewy vfHkys[k dk lR;kiu ml tuin ds ftykf/kdkjh tgkW {ks= fLFkr gS] ds }kjk vFkok funs'kd] HkwrRo ,oa [kfudeZ] funs'kky; ds }kjk djkuk gksxkA funs'kd }kjk ewy vfHkys[k ds lR;kiu dh fLFkfr esa vfHkys[k&lRkiu dh vk[;k bZ&esy ds ek/;e ls lEcfU/kr ftykf/kdkjh dks izsf"kr dh tk;sxhA vfHkys[k&lRkiu ds i'pkr gh ftykf/kdkjh }kjk ysVj vkWQ bUVsaV tkjh fd;k tk;sxkA lR;kiu esa ;fn dksbZ vfHkys[k vFkok izek.k&i= dwVjfpr] vlR; vFkok xyr ik;k tkrk gS rks ysVj vkWQ bUVsaV tkjh ugha fd;k tkosxk rFkk c;kus dh /kujkf'k ¼vusZLV euh½ tCr dj yh tk;sxhA 22- 'krsZa%& ¼1½ bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa [kuu LFky ds fy, igqWp ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ&fufonk lg bZ&fuykeh esa Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk nkok Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA 2. The petitioner after visiting the area participated in the bid by getting himself registered with all formalities with MSTC and after transfer of earnest money and application fee Rs.15,000/-, and the earnest money Rs.1,57,50,000/- through RTGS applied online on MSTC Portal for grant of mining lease for the area in question, viz Gata No.3/1/1, Khand-1, Area 21 hectares of Village Barsanamanpur, Tehsil Narayani, District Banda. The bid of the petitioner @ Rs.207/ cubic meter being highest, was accepted. And as per Condition No.17 of the Government Order dated 14/08/2017 which was Condition No.19 of the Advertisement the petitioner was under an obligation to get the original documents verified within three days from the date of completing of e-tender. The petitioner however did not comply the said condition which led the respondent to issue Letter No.2698/Khanij-30, Banda dated 22/10/2018. However, as the petitioner did not comply the same, the District Magistrate vide order dated 24/1/2019 forfeited the earnest money. 3. In the interregnum i.e. between the period of acceptance of bid and the passing of order dated 24/1/2019, the petitioner visited this Court vide Writ-C No. 36068/2018 for the following directions: "i. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 2 to accept the request of the petitioner with regard to the withdrawal of site for mining operation on plot no. 3/1/1 (Part-I) situated at Barsana Manpur, Tehsil Naraini, District Banda; ii. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 2 to refund the earnest money deposited by the petitioner in pursuance of the advertisement dated 13.09.2018 along with the interest @ 9% per annum; iii. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 2 to decide the representation dated 25.10.2018 of the petitioner (Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition); iv. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 2 to issue a survey panel to examine the exact quantity of mineral available on the site." 4. With the contention that since there was no minerals as advertised, the respondents be directed to look into the grievance before issuing the letter of intent. The petitioner was however nonsuited by order dated 30/10/2018 whereon the petition was dismissed in the following terms: “4. With the contention that since there was no minerals as advertised, the respondents be directed to look into the grievance before issuing the letter of intent. The petitioner was however nonsuited by order dated 30/10/2018 whereon the petition was dismissed in the following terms: “4. We have considered the submissions raised and find that Clause 22 (1) of the Advertisement dated 13.09.2018 reads as under: 22- 'krsZa%& ¼1½ bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa [kuu LFky ds fy, igqWp ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ&fufonk lg bZ&fuykeh esa Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk nkok Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA^^ 5. In view of the aforesaid clause, the aforesaid relief cannot be granted as the petitioner had made the offer with open eyes.” 5. The order being not assailed by the petitioner has attained finality. 6. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal against the order dated 24/1/2019 passed by the District Magistrate before the Commissioner, Division Chitrakoot Dham, wherein on 26/04/2019 by an interim order Commissioner directed for spot inspection whereas certain report was furnished on 28/05/2019 stating that approximately in 18 hect. area mixed minerals were found deposited in crevices at the base of river Ken. The report led the Commissioner pass an order on 20/12/2019 whereby he set aside the order dated 24/01/2019 and remanded the matter with a direction to the Collector to take action as per the report. 7. Evidently, the Commissioner did not dwell on the aspect of non compliance of the stipulation contained in Condition No.17 of the Government Order dated 14/08/2017, nor of the fact that the claim of the petitioner for waiver was negatived in Writ -C No.36068/2018. 8. Be that as it may. Revision under Rule 78 of the Rules, 1963 was preferred by the Collector against the order dated 20.12.2019 before the State Government with an application for condonation of delay on 19/06/2020. The petitioner besides raising an objection against condonation of delay also filed the counter affidavit on merit. However, as evident therefrom there was no whisper as to non compliance of Condition No.17 nor was there denial of dismissal of Writ-C No.36068/2018. However it was stated that the issue raised in the Writ Petition had no relation with the order dated 24/1/2019 passed in Appeal. 9. However, as evident therefrom there was no whisper as to non compliance of Condition No.17 nor was there denial of dismissal of Writ-C No.36068/2018. However it was stated that the issue raised in the Writ Petition had no relation with the order dated 24/1/2019 passed in Appeal. 9. The Revisional Authority vide order dated 28/9/2020 while condoning the delay set aside the order passed by Commissioner and upheld the order of Collector on the findings: ^^fuxjkuhdrkZ dk dFku gS fd] 'kklukns'k la[;k&1875@86&2017&57 ¼lk0½@2017 Vh0lh0&1 fnukad 14-08-2017 esa fn;s x;s funsZ'kkuqlkj 'krZ la0&20 ¼1½ esa mfYyf[kr fd ^*bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,d [kuu LFky ds fy, igaqp ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr~ bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk nkok Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk,xkA^* foKfIr la[;k &60@[kfut&30] ckank fnukad 13-09-2018 ds 'krZ la[;k &22 ¼1½ esa mfYyf[kr gS fd ^*bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa [kuu LFky ds fy, igqap ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj foMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk nkok Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA^* ek0 mPp U;k;ky; bykgkckn esa izLrkod }kjk izLrqr fjV ;kfpdk la[;k&36068@2018 Jh jkejktk VªsMlZ cuke m0iz0 jkT; o vU; ;ksftr fd;k x;k Fkk] tks fnukad 30-10- 2018 dks fujLr dj nh x;h] mDr vk/kkj ij Hkh ek0 U;k;ky; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA m0iz0 mi[kfut ¼ifjgkj½ ¼rSrkfyloka la'kks/ku½ fu;ekoyh&1963 ds fu;e 23 ¼4½ ds izkfo/kkuksa ds rgr 'kklukns'k la[;k&1875@86&2017&57 ¼lk0½@2017 Vh0lh0&1 fnukad 14-08-2017 ds fcUnq la[;k&06 ds vUrxZr bZ&fufonk@bZ&uhykeh@bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh ds fy, fu/kkZfjr fnukad ds iwoZ U;wure cksyh ;k izLrko ds fu/kkZj.k ds fy, [kfut dh xq.koRrk vkSj ek=k dk ewY;kadu ftykf/kdkjh] ckank }kjk xfBr lfefr ftlesa vij ftykf/kdkjh ¼fo0@jk0½ ckank] lEcfU/kr miftykf/kdkjh rFkk ftys esa rSukr [kku vf/kdkjh] ckank Fks }kjk mi[kfut dh [kuu ;ksX; ek=k ,oa ml {ks= ij vusZLV euh dk fu/kkZj.k fd;k x;k FkkA voj U;k;ky; }kjk vius vkns'k fnukad 26-04-2019 }kjk xfBr lfefr vij ftykf/kdkjh ¼fo0@jk0½ ds uhps ds vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk mi[kfut dk ewY;kadu fd;k x;k gS] ftlls Hkh ek0 U;k;ky; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My ckank }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA izLrkod dks cksyh lekIr gksus ds mijkUr i;kZIr le; ekSf[kd :i ls@fyf[kr :i ls vfHkys[kksa dks izLrqr djus gsrq fn;k x;k ijUrq mlds }kjk dkQh le; O;rhr gksus ds mijkUr Hkh vfHkys[k izLrqr ugha fd;s x;s] ftldks voj U;k;ky; }kjk laKku esa ugha fy;k x;kA vr% ek0 U;k;ky; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA izfroknh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dks foLrkjiwoZd lquk x;k rFkk i=koyh ij miyC/k vfHkys[kksa dk v/;;u djus ls Li"V gS fd fuxjkuhdrkZ }kjk izLrqr iqujh{k.k dksfoM&19 o jkT; ljdkj ls izkIr vuqefr ds dkj.k le;kUrxZr gS rFkk 'kklukns'k la[;k&1875@86&2017&57 ¼lk0½@2017 Vh0lh0&1 fnukad 14-08-2017 esa fn;s x;s funsZ'kkuqlkj 'krZ la0&20 ¼1½ esa mfYyf[kr fd ^*bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls iwoZ {ks= esa vakdfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa [kuu LFky ds fy, igqap ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysa^* ds vuqlkj izfroknh dks foKfIr esa izfrHkkx djus ls iwoZ ckyw&[kuu {ks= dks fujh{k.k dj vk'oLr gks ysuk pkfg, FkkA ek0 mPp U;k;ky; bykgkckn esa izfroknh }kjk izLrqr fjV ;kfpdk la[;k&36068@2018 Jh jkejktk VªsMlZ cuke m0iz0 jkT; o vU; ;ksftr fd;k x;k Fkk] tks fnukad 30-10-2018 dks fujLr dj nh x;h] mDr vk/kkj ij Hkh ek0 U;k;ky; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA izLrkod dks cksyh lekIr gksus ds mijkUr i;kZIr le; ekSf[kd :i ls@fyf[kr :i ls vfHkys[kksa dks izLrqr djus gsrq fn;k x;k ijUrq mlds }kjk dkQh le; O;rhr gksus ds mijkUr Hkh vfHkys[k izLrqr ugha fd;s x;sA ekuuh; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA vr% fuxjkuhdrkZ }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 24-01-2019 esa fdlh gLr{ksi dh vko';drk ugha gSA^^ 10. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this petition. It is contended that the Revision under Rule 78 of the Rules, 1963 was highly belated and it was beyond the Revisional Authority to have entertained the same after the expiry of Ninety Days and that the benefit of the order dated 23.3.2020 passed by Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 was not available as the same was applicable only to the Courts and Tribunals. 11. Contradicting these contentions, it is urged on behalf of the respondent that by virtue of order dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s) 3/2020 In Re: Cognizance For Extension of Limitation the Supreme Court to obviate the difficulty faced in filling due to COVID-19 Virus directed that a period of Limitation prescribed under the general law on special law whether condonable or not stood extended w.e.f. 15th March, 2020 till further order. It is urged that in the instant Case the Revision was to be filed on or before 19.3.2020 could be filed on 19.6.2020 and as the limitation stood extended w.e.f. 15.3.2020, the Revisional Authority was within his right in condoning the delay. 12. In SLP (C ) No(s) 3/2020 it was held on 23.3.2020: “This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State). To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this Court, it is herby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings. We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities. We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities. This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction. Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts. Returnable in four weeks.” 13. The said SLP has now been finally disposed of on 8/3/2021 in the following terms. “1. Due to the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, this Court took suo motu cognizance of the situation arising from difficulties that might be faced by the litigants across the country in filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central or State). By an order dated 27.03.2020 this Court extended the period of limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether compoundable or not with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders. The order dated 15.03.2020 was extended from time to time. Though, we have not seen the end of the pandemic, there is considerable improvement. The lockdown has been lifted and the country is returning to normalcy. Almost all the Courts and Tribunals are functioning either physically or by virtual mode. We are of the opinion that the order dated 15.03.2020 has served its purpose and in view of the changing scenario relating to the pandemic, the extension of limitation should come to an end. 2. We have considered the suggestions of the learned Attorney General for India regarding the future course of action. We deem it appropriate to issue the following directions: 1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021. 2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. 3. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. 3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. 4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for containment zones, to state. “Regulated movement will be allowed for medical emergencies, provision of essential goods and services, and other necessary functions, such as, time bound applications, including for legal purposes, and educational and jobrelated requirements.” 3. The Suo Motu Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.” 14. Though a contention is raised on behalf of the petitioner that the order passed by Supreme Court in the SLP applied only to the Courts and Tribunals and not to the Authorities like the Revisional Authority under Rule 78 of the Rules, 1963 who are quasi-judicial in nature. The contentions are taken note of and rejected at the outset. In Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1960 SC 606 it is held: “6. This Court had occasion to consider the nature of the two kinds of acts, namely, judicial which includes quasijudicial and administrative, a number of times. In Province of Bombay v. Kushaldas S. Advani 1950 SCR 621 : ( AIR 1950 SC 222 ), it adopted the celebrated definition of a quasi-judicial body given by Atkin L. J. in R. v. Electricity Commissioners 1924-1KB 171 which is as follows:- "Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs. " This definition insists on three requisites each of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be a quasijudicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. After analysing the various cases, Das J. (as he then was) laid down the following principles as deducible therefrom in Kushaldas S. Advani's case (supra) at p.725 of SCR: (at p. 260 of AIR): "(i) That, if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by any party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine' the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. 7. It is on these principles which are now well-settled that we have to see whether the Central Government when acting under R. 54 is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity or otherwise. It is not necessary for present purposes to decide -whether State Government when it grants a lease is acting merely administratively. We shall assume that the order of the State Government granting a lease under the Rules is an administrative order. We have, however, to see what the position is after the State Government has granted a lease to one of the applicants before it and has refused the lease to others. 8. Mr. Pathak contends that even in such a situation there is no right in favour of the person to whom the lease has been granted by the State Government till the Central Government has passed an order on a review application if any. 8. Mr. Pathak contends that even in such a situation there is no right in favour of the person to whom the lease has been granted by the State Government till the Central Government has passed an order on a review application if any. Rule 55, however, makes it clear that the order of the State Government is final subject to any order on review by the Central Government under R. 54. Now when a lease is granted by the State Government, it is quite possible that there may be no application for review by those whose applications have been refused. In such a case the order of the State Government would be final. It would not therefore be in our opinion right to say that no right of any kind is created in favour of a person to whom the lease is granted by the State Government. The matter would be different if the order of the State Government were not to be effective until confirmation by the Central Government; for in that case no right would arise until the confirmation was received from the Central Government. But R. 54 does not provide for confirmation by the Central Government. It gives power to the Central Government to act only when there is an application for review before it under R. 54. That is why we have not accepted Mr. Pathak's argument that in substance the State Government's order becomes effective only after it is confirmed; R. 54 does not support this. We have not found any provision in the Rules or in the Act which gives any power to the Central Government to review suo motu the order of the State Government granting a lease. That some kind of right is created on the passing of an order granting a lease is clear from the facts of this case also. The order granting the lease was made in December 1952. In April 1953 the appellant was put in possession of the areas granted to him and actually worked them thereafter. At any rate, when the statutory rule grants a right to any party aggrieved to make a review application to the Central Government it certainly follows that the person in whose favour the order is made has also a right to represent his case before the authority to whom the review application is made. At any rate, when the statutory rule grants a right to any party aggrieved to make a review application to the Central Government it certainly follows that the person in whose favour the order is made has also a right to represent his case before the authority to whom the review application is made. It is in the circumstances apparent that as soon as R. 52 gives a right to an aggrieved party to apply for review a lis is created between him and the party in whose favour the grant has been made. Unless therefore there is anything in the statute to the contrary it will be the duty of the authority to act judicially and its decision would be a quasi-judicial act.” 15. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669 it is held: “(30) The orders which the Central Government passes, certainly fall within the words "determination" and "order". The proceeding before the Central Government also falls within the wide words "any cause or matter". The only question is whether the Central Government, when it hears and decides an appeal, can be said to be acting as a Court or tribunal. That the Central Government is not a Court was assumed at the hearing. But to ascertain what falls within the expression "Court or tribunal", one has to begin with "Courts". The word "Court" is not defined in the Companies Act, 1956. It is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code. The definition in the Indian Evidence Act is not exhaustive, and is for the purposes of that Act. In the Now English Dictionary (Vol. II, pp. 1090, 1091), the meaning given is: "an assembly of judges or other persons legally appointed and acting as a tribunal to hear and determine any cause, civil, ecclesiastical, military or naval." All tribunals are not Courts, though all Courts are tribunals. The word "Courts" is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. Judicial power, according to Griffith, C. J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. Judicial power, according to Griffith, C. J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. Proprietary Ltd. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 (357) means:- "the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action." (31) When rights are infringed or invaded, the aggrieved party can go and commence a querela before the ordinary Civil Courts. These Courts which are instrumentalities of Government, are invested with the judicial power of the State, and their authority is derived from the Constitution or some Act of legislature constituting them. Their number is ordinarily fixed and they are ordinarily permanent, and can try any suit or cause within their jurisdiction. Their numbers may be increased or decreased, but they are almost always permanent and go under the compendious name of "Courts of Civil Judicature". There can thus be no doubt that the Central Government does not come within this class. (32) With the growth of civilisation and the problems of modern life, a large number of administrative tribunals have come into existence. These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of 'Courts' in Art. 136, 227 or 228 or in Arts. 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of Civil Judicature but not tribunals other than such Courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions in Arts. 136 and 227. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of 'Courts' in Art. 136, 227 or 228 or in Arts. 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of Civil Judicature but not tribunals other than such Courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions in Arts. 136 and 227. By "Courts" is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by "tribunals", those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that Courts have "an air of detachment". But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. Many tribunals, in recent years, have acquitted themselves so well and with such detachment as to make this test insufficient. Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Company of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) A.C. 275 (296) observed: "The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court, which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power.... In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. (33)……... (34)……… (35)……… (36) Now, in its functions Government often reaches decisions, but all decisions of Government cannot be regarded as those of a tribunal. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. (33)……... (34)……… (35)……… (36) Now, in its functions Government often reaches decisions, but all decisions of Government cannot be regarded as those of a tribunal. Resolutions of Government may affect rights of parties, and yet, they may not be in the exercise of judicial power. Resolutions of Government may be amenable to writs under Arts. 32 and 226 in appropriate cases, but may not be subject to a direct appeal under Art. 136 as the decisions of a tribunal. The position, however, changes when Government embarks upon curial functions, and proceeds to exercise judicial power and decide disputes. In those circumstances, it is legitimate to regard the officer who deals with the matter and even Government itself as a tribunal. The officer who decides, may even be anonymous; but the decision is one of a tribunal, whether expressed in his name or in the name of' the Central Government. The word "tribunal" is a word of wide import, and the words "Court" and "tribunal" embrace within them the exercise of judicial power in all its forms. The decision of Government thus falls within the powers of this Court under Art. 136. (Emphasis supplied)” 16. In view whereof the contention that the Revisional Authority which is a quasi-judicial Authority cannot be brought within the ambit of Tribunal is negatived. It is held that the respondents were entitled for the benefit under order passed in SLP and it was within the competence of the Revisional Authority to condone the delay and entertain the Revision on merit. The first contention therefore fails. 17. It is next contended that the Appellate Authority i.e. Commissioner, Banda, Division Chitrakoot Dham since remitted the matter, a revision under Rule 78 of 1963 Rule was not tenable. Rule 78 of the Rules, 1963 mandates: “78. The State Government may, either suo moto at any time or on an application made within ninety days from the date of communication of the order, call for the examine the record relating to any order passed or proceeding taken by the District Officer, committee, Director or the Divisional Commissioner under these rules and pass such orders as it may think fit.” 18. Thus Revision lies even against an order remitting the matter. Thus Revision lies even against an order remitting the matter. The second contention accordingly fails. 19. The next contention that the Revisional Order suffers from the vice of perversity. It is observed that the Appellate Authority glossed over the vital facts, viz that in Writ-C No.36068/2018 the claim of petitioner for waiver was negatived on the anvil of Clause 19 and 22 (1) of the Advertisement and secondly, the petitioner who was under an obligation to deposit the credentials within 3 days from date of closing the bid proceeding; having failed to comply the same, it was not within the right of the petitioner to have questioned the tendering of the sand mine. In view whereof, in our considered opinion, the Revisional Authority was well justified in interfering with the Appellate Order and restore the order passed by District Magistrate. 20. Considering this we do not perceive any merit in the petition. 21. Consequently, petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.