JUDGMENT : VINEET KOTHARI, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order dated 29.09.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge allowing Special Civil Application No.96 of 1996 filed by the State of Gujarat against the Respondent Landholder. 2. The facts of the case in brief as noted by the learned Single Judge are quoted below for ready reference : “2. A few facts germane for the purpose of deciding the present petition are that the respondent No.1 had filled in the form No.1 declaring his holdings under Section 6(1) of the said Act on 09.03.1984. The competent authority after considering the relevant material, passed the order dated 20.12.1984 holding inter alia that the respondent No.1 held the excess vacant lands as per the schedule annexed to the said order. The said order came to be challenged by the respondent No.1 after about ten years by filing the appeal being No. 54 of 1994 before the Tribunal, who without assigning any cogent reason entertained the grossly time barred Appeal and set aside the order dated 20.12.1984 passed by the competent authority, vide the impugned order dated 27.01.1995, and remanded the case to the competent authority. It appears that in the meanwhile, the petitioner – State had drawn the final statement on 31.12.1984 under Section 9 of the Act, issued the notification under Section 10 (1) on 25.04.1985, the notification under Section 10 (3) on 18.07.1985, and the notice under Section 10(5) on 07.01.1986, and had ultimately taken over the possession of the surplus lands in question on 25.03.1986. 3. It further appears that earlier the present petition was disposed of as per the order dated 11.08.1999, after the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Repeal Act') had come into force. The respondent No.1 having filed the Misc. Civil Application being No. 1628 of 1999 seeking review of the said order, the said application was dismissed by the Court vide the order dated 10.09.1999. The respondent No. 1 thereafter preferred two Letters Patent Appeals being No. 1281 of 1999 and 1282 of 1999, against the said orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the petition as well as in the Misc. Civil Application. The respondent No. 1 thereafter preferred two Letters Patent Appeals being No. 1281 of 1999 and 1282 of 1999, against the said orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the petition as well as in the Misc. Civil Application. The said appeals came to be allowed by the Division Bench vide the order dated 27.01.2000, whereby the Division Bench directed the Single Bench to decide the petition afresh. 4. The petition was thereafter again heard and decided by the learned Single Judge as per the order dated 14-15.02.2007, whereby the petition came to be allowed and the order dated 27.01.1995 passed by the Tribunal came to be quashed and set aside. The aggrieved respondent No.1 again preferred Letters Patent Appeal being No. 1633 of 2007 before the Division Bench, who vide the order dated 22.01.2014 allowed the said Letters Patent Appeal, and again remanded the matter back to the learned Single Judge for deciding the same afresh on merits. Accordingly, the petition was heard by this Court afresh.” 3. The reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for allowing of the Writ Petition filed by the State against the order of learned Revenue Tribunal dated 27.01.1995 are also quoted below for ready reference: “7. As regards the issue of delay, it is pertinent to note that as per Section 33 of the said Act, the person aggrieved by the order impugned by the competent authority, was required to file appeal within 30 days of the date on which the order was communicated to him, however, if the appellate authority was satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time, the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of 30 days. In the instant case, as transpiring from the impugned order itself, the respondent No. 1 had neither made any application seeking condonation of delay nor had stated in the memo of Appeal as to how he was prevented for 10 years from filing the appeal within the prescribed time limit. The Tribunal without assigning any reason, condoned the said delay in absolutely casual manner and entertained the Appeal ignoring the said statutory provisions contained in Section 33 of the said Act. The affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent No.1 in the present petition is also absolutely silent about the cause of such a gross delay. The Tribunal without assigning any reason, condoned the said delay in absolutely casual manner and entertained the Appeal ignoring the said statutory provisions contained in Section 33 of the said Act. The affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent No.1 in the present petition is also absolutely silent about the cause of such a gross delay. It is well settled proposition of law that delay has to be satisfactorily explained, otherwise the Appeal itself would not be maintainable in the eye of law. In this regard, a very pertinent observations have been made by this Court in the case of K.N. Patel versus State of Gujarat reported in 2009 (3) GLH 372 . Para 12 thereof reads as under : - “………” 8. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. Through Deputy Engineer Versus Khemchand Nathabhai Gadhavi reported in 2011 (2) GLH 90 , and in the case of Dudhiben Muljibhai Patel & Anr. versus State of Gujarat and Others reported in 2016 (2) GLR 1786 . The Court, therefore, finds much substance in the submissions made by the learned AGP that the appeal being grossly time barred, and the delay having not been explained much less satisfactorily, the Appeal itself was not maintainable. 9. So far as merits of the case are concerned, it appears that the Tribunal while passing the impugned order has completely ignored the events which took place in ten years after the competent authority passed the order. As transpiring from the record, after passing of the order by the competent authority in 1984, the State Government after following the due process of law had taken over possession on 25.03.1986. The notifications and the notices issued under Section 10 of the said Act had remained unchallenged all throughout at the instance of respondent No.1. The receipt of the notifications and notices under Section 10 were also never disputed by the respondent No.1. The only contention raised by the respondent No. 1 before the Tribunal was that the land in question was not covered in the residential zone. The receipt of the notifications and notices under Section 10 were also never disputed by the respondent No.1. The only contention raised by the respondent No. 1 before the Tribunal was that the land in question was not covered in the residential zone. However, as rightly pointed out by the learned AGP, the land in question was covered under the residential zone as per the certificate issued by the VUDA, apart from the undisputed fact that the respondent No. 1 himself in the application filed under Section 21 of the said Act, had stated that the said land in question bearing R.S. No. 205 was covered under the residential zone as per the master plan. Even if it is believed that there was no master plan prepared on the date of enforcement of the said Act, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. and Others versus N. Audikesava Reddy and Others reported in AIR 2002 SC 5 , the master plan prepared subsequent to the enforcement of the said Act, is required to be taken into consideration to determine whether a particular land is vacant land or not. 10. The submission of Mr. M.C. Bhatt for the respondent No. 1 that the order of competent authority having been set aside by the Tribunal, and thereafter the Repeal Act having come into force, all the proceedings would stand abated, and the respondent No. 1 would be entitled to get back the possession, also cannot be accepted. As per Section 4 of the Repeal Act, all the proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of the Repeal Act before any Court, Tribunal or other authority shall stand abated, except in the situations provided in the proviso to the said provision. Hence, even if the proceedings are held to be pending before the competent authority after the remand made by the Tribunal, such proceedings had stood abated. So far as vesting and possession of land in question is concerned, it is pertinent to note that as per the saving clause contained in Section 3 of the Repeal Act, such repeal of Principal Act would not affect for vesting of the vacant land under Section 10(3), possession of which has been taken over by the State Government. So far as vesting and possession of land in question is concerned, it is pertinent to note that as per the saving clause contained in Section 3 of the Repeal Act, such repeal of Principal Act would not affect for vesting of the vacant land under Section 10(3), possession of which has been taken over by the State Government. In the instant case, admittedly the possession was taken over by the State authorities after following the procedure under Section 10(5) of the said Act and the said proceedings having not been challenged at any point of time, such taking over possession had acquired legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In this regard, a very pertinent observations made by the Apex Court in the case of State of Assam versus Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Others (supra) be reproduced as under : - “…..” 11. In the aforesaid premises, the land in question having duly vested in State Government, and the proceedings having already stood abated on the enforcement of the Repeal Act, no further action is required to be undertaken by the respondent authorities. The Tribunal also having entertained the grossly time barred appeal of the respondent No. 1, and even otherwise, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal being perverse and illegal, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside, and is accordingly set aside.” 4. In the present Letters Patent Appeal, the learned counsel for the Appellant Mr.Vikram Thakor has vehemently submitted before us and sought to impress upon the Court that the learned Tribunal was justified in directing the remand of the case to the Competent Authority who had passed the ex parte order against the Landholder on 20.12.1984 determining the excess land under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the “ULC Act”) merely on the ground that the land in question was residential whereas in fact it was an agricultural land not subject to the provisions of the ULC Act. He submitted that the delay of 10 years condoned by the Tribunal should be deemed to have been condoned in fair exercise of its power and discretion and therefore, the proceedings under the provisions of the ULC Act which took place in between period from 1984 to 1986 including passing of the order by the Competent Authority vide notification issued under Section 10(1) of the Act on 25.04.1985, notification issued under Section 10(3) of the Act on 18.07.1985, notice for possession under Section 10(5) of the Act on 07.01.1986 and possession of surplus land taken on 25.03.1986 should be deemed as set aside by the learned Tribunal and the matter should be allowed to be re-adjudicated by the Competent Authority. 5. He further drew our attention towards the additional Affidavit filed by the Power Attorney Holder of the landholder one Mr.Vinodchandra Kantilal Patel in which he has produced the site photograph dated 03.10.2016 (page 75 of the paper book) in which a standing crop is shown to be standing as on that date 03.10.2016. 6. He further submitted that while the matter was pending before the learned Single Judge, a Civil Application (for Direction) No. 1 of 2017 was filed by the Appellant in the present Letters Patent Appeal No.1338 of 2016 arising out of Special Civil Application No.96 of 1996 in which on the basis of the averments made in the said Application, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court passed an order dated 28.03.2019 directing the Respondent State Authorities to produce the Panchnama dated 22.07.2016 drawn by the Local Revenue Officer at Vadodara which has not even so far been produced and therefore, an adverse inference should be drawn against the State Authorities for such non-compliance with the direction of this Court in the order dated 28.03.2019. 7. 7. Per contra, Mr.Krutik Parikh learned Additional Government Pleader has submitted that all the proceedings which have taken place under the provisions of the ULC Act as noted by the learned Single Judge in Para-2 of the order were undertaken in due process of the provisions of the ULC Act which was repealed on 30.03.1999 and these orders and Notifications particularly the Notification under Section 10(3) of the Act dated 18.07.1985 vesting the land in question in the State free from all encumbrances, cannot be set at naught by simple remand of the case by the learned Tribunal vide order dated 27.01.1995 which had grossly erred in condoning the delay of 10 years in filing of the said Appeal by the Appellant under Section 33 of the Act even without an Application for seeking such condonation of delay, much less cogent reasons assigned for seeking the condonation of said delay of 10 years. He therefore, urged that the learned Single Judge was right in allowing the Writ Petition filed by the State and no interference in the same is called for. 8. As far as the direction of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the order dated 28.03.2019 in Civil Application No.1 of 2017 is concerned, learned Additional Government Pleader urged that no such fact of interim order passed by the learned Single Judge about the Panchnama dated 22.07.2016 was brought to the notice of learned Single Judge when the impugned final order dated 29.09.2016 allowing the Writ Petition filed by the State was passed by the learned Single Judge and secondly he submitted that there was no occasion for drawing any Panchnama by the Revenue Authorities on 22.07.2016 as the possession of the land in question had already been taken over by the State Authorities under the provisions of ULC Act on 25.03.1986 under Section 10(6) of the Act in pursuance of the notice under Section 10(5) of the Act dated 07.01.1986 and merely because some alleged crop was sown on the government land in question by the Appellant or somebody else it cannot prove the valid and legal possession of the land in question continuing with the Appellant and therefore, there is no merit in the present Letters Patent Appeal filed by the Appellant Landholder through Power of Attorney and the same deserves to be dismissed. 9. 9. He also relied upon certain recent judgments of this Court which are enumerated hereinbelow: (i) In the case of Heirs of Dec. Jethabhai Ishwarbhai versus State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in 2021 LawSuit (Guj.) 164 passed on 22.01.2021 in Letters Patent Appeal No.405 of 2017 (Pages-17). (ii) In the case of Dalwadi Mujlibhai Mathurbhai Since Decd. Through heirs versus State of Gujarat Through Secretary reported in 2021 LawSuit (Guj.) 438 passed on 11.02.2021 in Letters Patent Appeal No.555 of 2011 (Pages-12). (iii) In the case of Chandralal Mulchand Ambavani versus State of Gujarat reported in 2021 LawSuit (Guj.) 709 passed on 22.02.2021 in Letters Patent Appeal No.1411 of 2016 (Pages-24). (iv) In the case of Prabhatbhai Shivabhai Solanki Through Lrs. versus State of Gujarat reported in 2021 LawSuit (Guj.) 987 passed on 23.02.2021 in Letters Patent Appeal No.1281 of 2016 (Pages-46). (v) In the case of Ravijibhai Chhotabhai Patel versus Competent Officer & DY Collector reported in 2021 LawSuit (Guj.) 984 passed on 25.03.2021 in Letters Patent Appeal No.941 of 2016 (Pages-43). (vi) In the case of Ganesh Industrial Estate versus Additional Deputy Collector reported in 2021 SCC Online (Guj.) 749 passed on 20.04.2021 in Letters Patent Appeal No.263 of 2013 (Pages-55). (vii) In the case of Dineshkumar Jagubhai Patel versus State of Gujarat passed on 05.03.2021 in Letters Patent Appeal No.332 of 2017 (Pages-55). 10. Having heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties, we are of the clear opinion that we cannot agree with the submissions made by the learned Counsel Mr.Vikram Thakor for the Appellant as we find that it is too late in the day after 22 years of repeal of the ULC Act itself to put the clock back. We do not even find convincing reasons for doing so. The procedure prescribed in the Act was duly followed by the Authorities in the contemporary period of 1984 to 1986 as narrated above and without any valid and strong challenge to the same, by a simple remand direction of the learned Tribunal in the order dated 27.01.1995, we cannot hold that all these proceedings stood washed away or set aside. 11. 11. We fully affirm and concur with the views expressed by the learned Single Judge that the remand direction passed by the learned Tribunal while entertaining the appeal on merits after 10 years of the impugned order passed by the Competent Authority without any Application seeking condonation of delay on cogent reasons, no such discretion could have been exercised by the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, clearly fell in grave error in doing so without realizing the effect of such remand direction merely because the Appellant Landholder came before it with the case that the land in question was not residential but agricultural or that there was some evidence like site photos to establish that the Appellant continued to be in possession of the surplus land in question. Such averments taken at their face value without considering the controverting evidence on the state record which were the documents of the contemporary period establishing the procedure adopted by the Authorities of the Revenue Department as prescribed under the provisions of the ULC Act, resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice against the State and unnecessarily it sought to open a fresh inquiry into the matter. 12. The learned Single Judge, therefore, was right, in our opinion, in setting aside the said order of the learned Tribunal, which could not be said to be a fair exercise of discretion to condone the delay and remand the case back to the Competent Authority. We do not find any such case properly made out by the Appellant. The very fact that the Competent Authority had to pass an ex parte order after giving several opportunities of hearing to the Appellant Landholders indicates that the Landholder was not serious about the proceedings under the ULC Act in respect of the land in question and merely because after 10 years, he chose to file an Appeal under Section 33 of the Act, the learned Tribunal could not have entertained the said Appeal No.54 of 1994 against the order passed by the Competent Authority on 20.12.1984 and allow by remand direction on 27.01.1995. 13. Regarding the other claim made by learned Counsel for the Appellant with the help of site photographs indicating the standing crop of the Appellant, we are not inclined to accept any such kind of flimsy evidence which has no legs to stand upon. 13. Regarding the other claim made by learned Counsel for the Appellant with the help of site photographs indicating the standing crop of the Appellant, we are not inclined to accept any such kind of flimsy evidence which has no legs to stand upon. Firstly, this point was not placed before the learned Single Judge because of which no opinion is expressed by the learned Single Judge on the said aspect of the matter and therefore, we should not entertain such a plea in the present Letters Patent Appeal after a long gap of time and secondly, the said evidence whatever worth it is or rather lack of it, flies in the face of the evidence of contemporary period by which it is established that the due procedure was adopted by the State Authorities under the provisions of the ULC Act in which the Competent Authority has passed the order declaring surplus land, vested the same in the State free from all encumbrance under Section 10(3) Notification, gave notice for taking possession to the Landholders under Section 10(5) of the Act and finally took the possession of the surplus land under Section 10(6) of the Act. All these documents stand firm to show that the landholder stood divested effectively of his surplus land under the provisions of the ULC Act, 1976. 14. The scheme of the Act in the light of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decisions in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh versus Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 and in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma reported in 2015 (5) SCC 321 has been discussed by the Division Bench of this Court in few of the recent judgments rendered by this Court to which one of us (Dr.Vineet Kothari, J.) was a party and without extracting from the said judgments profusely, a reference to the same for the benefit of the parties is considered enough and appropriate and the same are already referred above. 15. 15. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the present Letters Patent Appeal filed by the Landholder who is now represented by Puspaben Wd/o of Natwarlal Mahijibhai Patel (wife), Bhupendrakumar Natwarlal Patel (son), Nileshkumar Natwarlal Patel (son) and Manojkumar Natwarlal Patel (son) and under a separate order passed today allowing the Civil Application No.1 of 2021 for bringing legal heirs of Deceased Appellant Natwarlal Mahijibhai Patel who is said to have died on 15.04.2021 is represented by Legal Heirs. Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.