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2021 DIGILAW 466 (JHR)

R. S. Prasad, S/o. Late G. S. Prasad v. State of Jharkhand

2021-06-25

SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2021
ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The complainant is aggrieved of the judgment dated 28.07.2016 passed in Criminal Appeal No.206 of 2013 by which the complaint case instituted by him under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been dismissed. 2. Complaint Case No. C/1 2069 of 2010 was filed on 14.07.2010 on the allegation that the cheque bearing no.227841 dated 15.06.2010 drawn on ICICI Bank, Bistupur Branch, Jamshedpur in favour of complainant was returned with the cheque return memo dated 15.06.2010 with remark “stop payment”. The complainant has stated that he gave friendly loan of Rs.50000/- to O.P. No.2, his neighbour, for construction of his old house and for the payment of the said amount O.P. No.2 issued a cheque dated 15.06.2010 drawn in his favour for Rs.50000/-. The complainant sent legal notice dated 19.06.2010 by registered-post to the accused demanding payment of the cheque amount. However, O.P. No.2 denied his liability through reply dated 07.07.2010 to the aforesaid legal notice issued by the complainant and, therefore, the complaint case was instituted on 14.07.2010. The complainant has examined himself as a witness during the trial and tendered cheque bearing no.227841, cheque return memo, demand notice, postal receipt and a copy of reply by O.P. No.2 in evidence. In his defence O.P. No.2 has examined 3 witnesses -he has examined himself as DW3. The learned trial Magistrate has found O.P. No.2 guilty under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and, accordingly, convicted and sentenced him to undergo SI for one year, with fine amount of Rs.80000/-. Before the Appellate Court, the plea raised by O.P. No.2 that the complaint itself was premature and, therefore, his conviction in Complaint Case No. C/1 2069 of 2010 is bad in law was accepted by the learned Appellate Court. 3. There is no dispute on facts that no evidence was led by the complainant to establish when the legal notice dated 19.06.2010 issued by him was served upon O.P. No.2. The learned Appellate Court has observed that no one from the postal department, nor any witness has been examined by the complainant in this regard. 4. Mr. 3. There is no dispute on facts that no evidence was led by the complainant to establish when the legal notice dated 19.06.2010 issued by him was served upon O.P. No.2. The learned Appellate Court has observed that no one from the postal department, nor any witness has been examined by the complainant in this regard. 4. Mr. Sheo Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that once O.P. No.2 denied his liability through reply dated 07.07.2010 the complainant was not required to wait for 15 days period as required under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to afford an opportunity to the accused to make payment of the cheque amount and, therefore, the complaint filed after receipt of reply dated 07.07.2010 sent by O.P. No.2 was not premature - the complaint was filed on 14.07.2010. 5. In “K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan” (1999) 7 SCC 510 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : “17.….. The conditions pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer, have been formulated and incorporated in clauses (b) to (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. The said clauses are extracted below: (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 18. On the part of the payee he has to make a demand by “giving a notice” in writing. If that was the only requirement to complete the offence on the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of such “giving”, the travails of the prosecution would have been very much lessened. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days “of the receipt” of the said notice. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days “of the receipt” of the said notice. It is, therefore, clear that “giving notice” in the context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer at the correct address.” 6. In “Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey” (2014) 10 SCC 713 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “36. A complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the court is not competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances an offence can be said to have been committed, with Section 142(b) of the NI Act, that reiterates the position of the point of time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. and which we have approved, must be satisfied for a complaint to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.” 7. If the period prescribed in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.” 7. The learned Appellate Court has taken note of the judgment in “Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah” (2008) 13 SCC 689 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “14. A complaint petition alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Act must demonstrate that the following ingredients exist i.e.: (a) a cheque was issued; (b) the same was presented; (c) but, it was dishonoured; (d) a notice in terms of the said provision was served on the person sought to be made liable; and (e) despite service of notice, neither any payment was made nor other obligations, if any, were complied with within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice.” 8. Finally, the learned Appellate Court has recorded the following findings : “10. So in the light of above decisions if there is no evidence of receipt of notice, there will be presumption of service of notice, after 30 days and as per N.I. Act, from the service of notice fifteen clear days would be given to the opposite party for payment of cheque amount. As there is no evidence of actual service of notice so 20-07-2010 would be deemed date of service of notice, and from 20-07-2010, fifteen clear days should have been given for payment of cheque amount. However, I find that the complaint case has been filed on 14-07-2010 itself, which is not beyond 15 days so complaint case itself is not cognizable and it is without valid cause of action and it is non-est. Matter can be examined from another angle also. In this case Ext.5 is reply to the notice issued by the complainant and its date was 07-07-2010 and if it is assumed that notice has been received by the opposite party on 07-07-2010, from 07-07-2010, fifteen clear dates should have been given for payment of cheque amount which could be 22-07-2010. However again as mentioned above complaint has been lodged on 14-07-10 itself. So I find that complaint itself is not maintainable. Accordingly, there is no need to discuss further merit of case. 11. However again as mentioned above complaint has been lodged on 14-07-10 itself. So I find that complaint itself is not maintainable. Accordingly, there is no need to discuss further merit of case. 11. Considering the facts of the case, material brought on record and also the provision of law, I am of the considered opinion that Ld. Trial Court has wrongly held appellant guilty U/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and convicted. Accordingly the impugned judgment dated 30-07-2013 passed in Complaint case No.2069 of 2010, is hereby set-aside. Criminal Appeal is allowed”. 9. The aforesaid consideration by the Appellate Court is in consonance with the law on the subject. In absence of any clinching evidence as to the date of service of legal notice upon O.P. No.2, the learned Appellate Court has rightly assumed that a presumption of valid service of notice can be raised only on lapse of 30 days from the date of dispatch of the legal notice and counting from such date the complaint case was instituted prematurely and was therefore liable to be dismissed. 10. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the case, I find no merit in this criminal revision petition and, accordingly, Criminal Revision No.1168 of 2016 is dismissed. 11. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Court concerned through “Fax”. Revision application dismissed.