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2021 DIGILAW 467 (GUJ)

PASCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LIMITED THROUGH DEPUT ENGINEER v. GHANSHYAMSINH AMARSINH GOHIL

2021-06-23

BIREN VAISHNAV, VIKRAM NATH

body2021
JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1 The appellant Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited (P.G.V.C.L for short) was the original respondent in the Special Civil Application No. 19061 of 2018 which was decided by the learned Single Judge by oral judgment dated 12.12.2019. Ghanshyamsinh Amarsinh Gohil, the original petitioner, had approached the learned Single Judge assailing a communication dated 17.10.2018 issued by the appellant. By the aforesaid communication, the appellant refused to entertain the request of the respondent – petitioner for a new connection for supply of electricity unless and until the outstanding dues to the tune of Rs.1,07,62,381.31 paisa of the previous owner of the land, namely, Chhatrasinh alias Satubha Sarvaiya are paid. The learned Single Judge by the judgment under challenge allowed the petition and held that the appellant electricity company could not have rejected the application filed by the petitioner for a new connection for the supply of electricity as there were no outstanding dues with regard to the land in question. 2. The facts in brief are as under: 2.1 Chhatrasinh alias Satubha Sarvaiya was the owner of land being Survey No. 16 paiki 5 paiki 1. The total land holding of his ownership was 1 hector 82 Are and 11 sq.meters. This was a part of the land of Survey No.16 admeasuring 22 acres and 38 gunthas. Initially, the land was in the name of Harijan Mala Wala. On 12.09.1975, an Entry No. 292 was recorded showing that 4 acres and 20 gunthas of that parcel of land was sold on 26.08.1975 to Makwana Dalpat Pitambar and Dhanji Pitambar. Chhatrasinh alias Satubha Sarvaiya, the previous owner from whom the original petitioner had purchased the land had bought it from Dalpat Pitambar and Dhanji Pitambar. The area was admeasuring 1 hector 82 are and 11 sq.mtrs. 2.2 On 04.03.2017, the original petitioner, Ghanshyamsinh, purchased land admeasuring 1 hector 25 are and 45 sq.mtrs from Satubha Sarvaiya (original land holding of Satubha was 1 hector 82 are and 11 sq.mtrs). The area was admeasuring 1 hector 82 are and 11 sq.mtrs. 2.2 On 04.03.2017, the original petitioner, Ghanshyamsinh, purchased land admeasuring 1 hector 25 are and 45 sq.mtrs from Satubha Sarvaiya (original land holding of Satubha was 1 hector 82 are and 11 sq.mtrs). On purchase of the land by the petitioner – respondent, he applied for N.A permission, which was rejected on 31.08.2017 on two grounds, one being that the land in question was a subject matter of Civil Suit No. 46 of 2004 filed by the appellant company in the Civil Court at Bhavnagar for outstanding electricity dues from Satubha Sarvaiya and also due to the pendency of a criminal complaint lodged by the company for theft of electricity against Satubha Sarvaiya. 2.3 When the order rejecting N.A dated 31.08.2017 was challenged before this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 11 of 2018, this Court by an oral order dated 18.01.2018, disposed of the petition and directed the petitioner to file a fresh application under Section 65 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879, which was to be considered afresh. The Collector, on such a direction being given considered the request favourably and granted N.A permission to the petitioner. The order of the Collector was passed on 08.10.2018. 2.4 The petitioner – respondent on 16.10.2018, therefore applied for a new connection for supply of electricity with the appellant company which was rejected on the ground that in accordance with the provisions of Clause 4.30 of the Electricity Code, unless the outstanding dues of the previous owner are not cleared, the petitioner – respondent shall not be entitled to a new electricity connection. This communication as aforesaid stated was set aside by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the land for which the dues were outstanding was not the same land in question and cannot be said to be the subject matter of the pending litigation. 3. Ms. Lilu K Bhaya, learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions: 3.1 That the land bearing survey no.16 of village Fulsar was initially owned by Satuabha Sarvaiya. On 22.01.2003, during the checking it was found that the owner had committed theft of electricity and therefore a bill was issued which was not paid. A Special Civil Suit No. 46 of 2004 filed for recovery of electricity dues against Satubha Sarvaiya is pending. On 22.01.2003, during the checking it was found that the owner had committed theft of electricity and therefore a bill was issued which was not paid. A Special Civil Suit No. 46 of 2004 filed for recovery of electricity dues against Satubha Sarvaiya is pending. During the pendency of the suit, Satubha transferred the land admeasuring 1 hector 25 are and 45 sq.mtrs to the respondent by way of a sale deed in the year 2017. 3.2 Clause 4.30 of the Electricity Supply Code, 2015, provides that an application for new connection, re-connection etc., will not be entertained unless any dues relating to the premises are cleared. She would submit that the private transaction between two individuals was only with a view to avoid payment of electricity dues. The Electricity Code, particularly clause 4.30, was binding on the purchaser as it was statutory in nature and the dues go with the premises irrespective of the fact that it is purchased subsequently by another party. Statutory rules cannot be given a go-by. 3.3 She would further submit that from the revenue record especially the one produced at page 52 of the affidavit-in-reply, it is undisputed that the dues were outstanding for the very piece of land which the petitioner – respondent had purchased from the previous owner who had defaulted. 3.4 In support of her submissions, Ms.Bhaya, learned counsel, relied on the following decisions: (1) 1995 (2) SCC 648 , in the case of Isha Marbles vs. Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors. She relied particularly on para 63 of the said decision. (2) 1998 (4) SCC 470 in the case of Hyderabad Vanaspathi Ltd vs. A.P. State Electricity Board and Others. She would submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the terms and conditions framed by the electricity company are statutory in nature. Even in absence of any agreement, such terms and conditions are binding to the parties. (3) L.P.A No. 691 of 2003 in the case of Krishna Industries vs. GEB & Allied matters, reported in 2003 (3) GLR 2234 . While relying on this decisions, she would submit that the condition No.2(j) of the erstwhile conditions of Supply Code were upheld. Even in absence of any agreement, such terms and conditions are binding to the parties. (3) L.P.A No. 691 of 2003 in the case of Krishna Industries vs. GEB & Allied matters, reported in 2003 (3) GLR 2234 . While relying on this decisions, she would submit that the condition No.2(j) of the erstwhile conditions of Supply Code were upheld. (4) 2006 (13) SCC 101 in the case of Dakshin Haryana Bijlee Vitran Nigam Ltd vs. Paramount Polymers (P) Ltd. She would rely on para 11 of the said decision where it was held that “wherever there are terms and conditions of supply includes such clause, then it is binding and electricity company has power to frame such terms and conditions and since the High Court has not considered that aspect, the matter was remanded.” (5) 2009 (1) SCC 210 in the case of Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd vs. D.V.S Steels. She would rely on para 12 and submit that if the statutory rules provide for such conditions, the distribution licensee can insist upon fulfilment of requirement of such rules and regulations even if rules are silent, it can stipulate such terms and conditions as it deems fit and proper to regulate transaction and dealing. So such conditions are legal. (6) Sanjay Balvantrai Desai vs. DGVCL passed in Special Civil Application No. 2582 of 2012, reported in 2013 (1) GLH (FB) 363. With regard to this decision, she would submit that the said judgment of the Full Bench has been challenged and an SLP is pending and the judgment is stayed. (7) Civil Appeal No. 1815 of 2020 in the case of Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Co. Ltd vs. M/s. Srigdhaa Beverages. She would submit that in the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held considering the earlier decisions, that the electricity dues are statutory in character under the Electricity Act and cannot be waived. 4. Mr. Mehul S Shah, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Vishal Mehta, learned advocate has appeared for the respondent – original petitioner. He has supported the decision of the learned Single Judge. He would submit that from reading the communication dated 25.07.2017, it would be evident that Survey No.16 was divided into several parts. 4. Mr. Mehul S Shah, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Vishal Mehta, learned advocate has appeared for the respondent – original petitioner. He has supported the decision of the learned Single Judge. He would submit that from reading the communication dated 25.07.2017, it would be evident that Survey No.16 was divided into several parts. The learned Single Judge on perusing the plaint in the Special Civil Suit rightly found that the land in question for which the company claimed dues was not the land which the petitioner had purchased. He would rely on the copy of the sale deed entered into between Satubha Sarvaiya and the petitioner-respondent and submit that there was an unequivocal recital in the sale deed that all previous outstanding dues whatsoever in the nature of charge, lien etc., were the responsibility and the liability of the party of the first part, i.e. the seller, Satubha Sarvaiya. 4.1 In support of his submissions, he relied on the following judgments: (1) 2006 (3) GLR 1944 in the case of Torrent Power Limited vs. Shreeji (Rakhial) Commercial Co-Operative Housing Soc. Limited. (2) 2013 (1) GLR 487 in the case of Sanjay Balvantrai Desai vs. Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Limited. (3) 2013 (1) GLR 821 in the case of Torrent Power Limited Vs. Abhisar Developers. (4) 2010 (3) GLR 2593 in the case of Abhisar Developers vs. Torrent Power Limited. (5) 2015 (1) GCD 771 in the case of Dakshin Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd Through Managing Director vs. Amardeep Association, Navsari. (6) AIR 2017 SC 3862 in the case of Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana Ltd vs. Gopal Agarwal. (7) 1995 (2) SCC 648 in the case of Isha Marbles vs. Bihar State Electricity Board. (8) AIR 2004 SC 2171 in the case of Ahmedabad Electricity Co.Ltd vs. Gujarat Inns Private Limited. (9) 2012 (8) Supreme 1 in the case of Special Officer, Commerce, North Eastern Electricity Company of Orissa (Nessco) vs. Raghunath Paper Mills Private Limited. 4.2 He particularly drew the attention of the Court to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Southern Power Distribution Co., (supra), and would submit that on reading para 6 of the decision, it is evident that when a subsequent purchaser applies for a fresh connection for supply of electricity, the same cannot be denied on the ground of non payment of arrears by the past owner. 5. 5. Having considered the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties, even if we were to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the land in question which was purchased by the petitioner – respondent was the same for which there was an outstanding amount towards electricity charges from the previous owner, there is no reason that we need to disturb and upset the final direction of the learned Single Judge in the judgment under challenge by which the communication dated 17.10.2018 issued by the appellant company was quashed and set aside. By the aforesaid communication, the appellant company refused new connection for the supply of electricity on the ground that the land that was purchased had an outstanding dues which the purchaser was bound to pay in view of Clause 4.30 of the Electricity Supply Code, 2015. 6 Facts on hand would indicate that the communication refusing a new connection unless the dues of the previous owner are cleared was misconceived for the following reasons: (A) To the memo of the petition, the application to the appellant Board asking for a connection for a supply of electricity dated 16.10.2018 is annexed. Reading the application together with the contents of the affidavit-in-reply of the appellant Board, undisputedly indicate that the application was for a new connection. (B) Notwithstanding the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Clause No. 4.30 of the Electricity Code is statutory in nature, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are in context of a subsequent purchaser who acquired such properties pursuant to auction purchase wherein unequivocally the condition was that the purchase by a subsequent purchaser was on “as is where is, whatever there is and without recourse basis”. In other words, there was a specific term in such transactions wherein the subsequent bidder / owner was fastened with the liability of charges including all statutory dues payable to the authorities concerned. (C) When the sale deed in the present transaction is seen, which has been placed on record by both the respective parties, there is a specific and a clear understanding that the dues whatever in nature preceding the transaction of sale shall be the liability of the previous owner / seller. (C) When the sale deed in the present transaction is seen, which has been placed on record by both the respective parties, there is a specific and a clear understanding that the dues whatever in nature preceding the transaction of sale shall be the liability of the previous owner / seller. It is in this context that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Southern Power Distribution (supra) particularly paras 6 and 7 thereof needs to be reproduced and which read as under: “6 We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and we are of the opinion that there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The High Court relied upon the judgment in Isha Marbles (supra) to grant relief to the First Respondent. It was held in the said judgment that an auction purchaser cannot be called upon to clear the past arrears. It was also held that a power connection to an auction purchaser cannot be withheld for the dues of the past owner. The high Court also referred to a judgment in Ahmedabad Electricity Company Limited (supra) wherein the ratio of the judgment in Isha marbles case was reiterated, particularly with reference to a fresh connection for supply of electricity. In NESCO v. Raghunath Paper Mills (P) Ltd., (2012) 13 SCC 479, the purchaser in an auction sale conducted by the official liquidator on “as is where is” and “whatever there is” basis was found not liable for payment of the electricity arrears. In the said case an advertisement was issued by the official liquidator for sale of moveable and immoveable property of M/s.Konark Paper and Industries Limited on “as is where is” and “whatever there is” basis. The auction purchaser applied for a fresh electricity connection to its unit which was denied on the ground of non payment of arrears by the past owner. After considering the judgments in Ahmedabad Electricity Company (supra) and Isha Marbles (supra), this Court held that the request of the auction purchaser for a fresh connection could not have been rejected. 7. The facts of this case are similar to that of NESCO v. Raghunath Paper Mills (P) Ltd., (2012) 13 SCC 479. The tender / sale notice mentioned that the property was being auctioned on “as is where is” basis. 7. The facts of this case are similar to that of NESCO v. Raghunath Paper Mills (P) Ltd., (2012) 13 SCC 479. The tender / sale notice mentioned that the property was being auctioned on “as is where is” basis. The First Respondent applied for a fresh connection and he is in no way connected to the past owner. He has also not undertaken to pay the past arrears of the previous owner. In view of the above, the Appeal is dismissed.” (D) Even if the decision of the Supreme Court cited by Ms.Bhaya, learned counsel, in the case of Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Co. Ltd (supra) is seen, it was a case where there was a specific condition in the auction notice that the unit was being sold on “as is where is, whatever there is and without recourse basis”. (E) Considering the previous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Isha Marbles (supra), Southern Power Distribution (supra), the Supreme Court having considered the decisions cited by Ms.Bhaya, observed in Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Co. Ltd (supra) that a distinction needed to be made between a connection of electricity supply sought to be obtained for the first time and a reconnection. It will be beneficial for us to reproduce paras 13, 14 and 15 of the aforesaid decision, which read as under: “13. We may notice a slightly contra view in Haryana State Electricity Board vs. Hanuman Rice Mills, Dhanauri & Ors., in a given scenario where the pendency of electricity dues was not mentioned in the terms and conditions of sale, and it was held in those facts that the dues could not be mulled on to the subsequent transferee. 14. We may notice that in Special Officer, Commerce, North Eastern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa (NESCO) v. Raghunath Paper Mills Private Limited & Anr., a distinction was made between a connection sought to be obtained for the first time and a reconnection. In that case, no application had been made for transfer of a service connection from the previous owner to the auction purchaser, but in fact, a fresh connection was requested. In light of the regulations therein, previous dues had to be cleared only in the case of a reconnection. Hence, the respondents were held to be free from electricity liability. In that case, no application had been made for transfer of a service connection from the previous owner to the auction purchaser, but in fact, a fresh connection was requested. In light of the regulations therein, previous dues had to be cleared only in the case of a reconnection. Hence, the respondents were held to be free from electricity liability. This Court in Souther Power Distribution Company of Telangana Limited (through its CMD) & Ors., found that the facts were similar to the NESCO case, and thus followed the same line. 15. We have gone into the aforesaid judgments as it was urged before us that there is some ambiguity on the aspect of liability of dues of the past owners who had obtained the connection. There have been some differences in facts but, in our view, there is a clear judicial thinking which emerges, which needs to be emphasized: A. That electricity dues, where they are statutory in character under the Electricity Act and as per the terms and conditions of supply, cannot be waived in view of the provisions of the Act itself more specifically section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (in pari materia with Section24 of the Electricity Act, 1910), and cannot partake the character of dues of purely contractual nature. B. Where, as in cases of E-auction notice in question, the existence of electricity dues, whether quantified or not, has been specifically mentioned as a liability of the purchaser and the sale is on “AS IS WHERE IS, WHATEVER IS AND WITHOUT RECOURSE BASIS”, there can be no doubt that the liability to pay electricity dues exists on the respondent (purchaser). C The debate over connection or reconnection would not exist in cases like the present one where both aspects are covered as per clause 8.4 of the General Terms & Conditions of Supply.” 7. What can therefore be deduced from the decision in the case of Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Co. Ltd (supra) when read conjointly with that of Southern Power Distribution Co. What can therefore be deduced from the decision in the case of Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Co. Ltd (supra) when read conjointly with that of Southern Power Distribution Co. (supra) is that in absence of a clause in a sale deed fastening the liability of the previous dues to the subsequent purchaser, and particularly when what is asked for by the subsequent purchaser is a new connection, the stand of the appellant refusing a new connection for supply of electricity relying on the pending civil suit and Clause 4.30 of the Electricity Supply Code, 2015, cannot be sustained. 8. The submission of Ms. Bhaya that the sale was an attempt to dupe the electricity company in order to avoid payment of electricity charges is also misconceived. In view of the specific clause in the sale deed making the previous owner liable for the past dues and particularly when there is still part of the land of Survey No. 16 paiki 5 namely 0056 are and 66 sq. mtrs still in the ownership of Satubha Sarvaiya, it is not that there is no remedy available for recovering the dues of the electricity company from that parcel of land. 9. The communication dated 17.10.2018 therefore was rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge. We see no reason to take a different view from the one taken by the learned Single Judge. 10. For the reasons as aforesaid, the appeal stands dismissed. In view of dismissal of the main appeal, civil application does not survive and stands disposed of, accordingly. VIKRAM NATH, BIREN VAISHNAV, JJ. FURTHER ORDER At the time of pronouncement of judgment, Ms.Lilu Bhaya, learned counsel for the appellant, made a request for staying the operation of this judgment for a period of four weeks. In view of the findings recorded by us, we do not find any good ground to accept the request of Ms.Bhaya, learned advocate, and the same is accordingly rejected.