JUDGMENT : CONC Nos. 103/2018, 89/2018 & 99/2018. 1. These condonation delay applications have been filed by the applicants seeking condoning the delay of 441 days in CONC No. 103/2018, 363 days in CONC No. 89/2018, and 426 days in CONC No. 99/2018 days in filing the appeals against the common judgment and decree dated 4th July 2017 passed by the learned Principal District Judge Baramulla in three references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 2. The case in brief is that land measuring 4 kanal, 2 marlas and 6 sirsai was requisitioned by PW(R&B) Department for widening of Narbal-Tangmarg Road and accordingly a notification was issued by the Collector concerned vide notification dated 30th August 2005 in terms of Section 4 (1) of J&K Land Acquisition Act for inviting objections, if any, from the affected land owners as well as villagers. No objections were filed by the affected land owners and consequently PNC was held with land owners on 7lh October 2006. During negotiation, the rates as stated in the application were approved for land depending upon nature of the land. However, some of the land owners did not agree to the rates offered by PNC and filed a writ petition seeking acquisition in terms of Land Acquisition Act. Subsequently, the Collector issued notification dated 31st December 2009 whereby notice under Section 6 and 7 has been issued. Thereafter, notice under Section 9 and 9A were also issued vide notice dated 9th October 2009. 3. In response to the said notice, the interested persons including the petitioners participated in the proceedings and objections were filed by the owners. Subsequently, the Collector has passed an award on 24th March 2011 whereby the petitioners were held entitled for compensation amounting to Rs. 7,07,051/-. Thereafter, an application under Section 18 was made before the Collector, Land Acquisition NTR seeking an amount of Rs. 20,55,912/- as compensation for the structures, on the basis of estimate prepared by some private surveyor. The Collector, Land Acquisition accordingly made reference under Section 18 to the Principal District Judge Baramulla on 13th October 2011. After leading evidence and considering the objections filed by the parties, the Principal District Judge, Baramulla, by a common judgment dated 4th July 2017 decided three references under Section 18, which is questioned by the applicants-appellants herein. The Collector, Land Acquisition accordingly made reference under Section 18 to the Principal District Judge Baramulla on 13th October 2011. After leading evidence and considering the objections filed by the parties, the Principal District Judge, Baramulla, by a common judgment dated 4th July 2017 decided three references under Section 18, which is questioned by the applicants-appellants herein. The appeal is beyond limitation prescribed, therefore, the applications for condonation of delay have been filed. 4. It is pertinent to mention here that Rule 3-A of Order XLI CPC, comprising of sub-rules (1), (2) and (3), was inserted to secure determination of question as to the limitation at the stage of admission of appeal. Sub-rule (3) has been inserted so that the Court shall not make an order of stay till Application for condonation of delay is decided. In this regard I am fortified by judgments rendered in the cases of S.M. Iqbal v. Firdous Ahmad Shah, SLJ 1995 299; and S.M.Chopra v. Hilda & anr, 2016 (2) CPR(NC) 345. It has been held that an appeal filed beyond limitation period must not only be accompanied by an application setting forth the facts on which appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within limitation period, but even no stay should be granted by the Appellate Court unless application for condonation of delay is allowed. Therefore, Rule 3-A envisages that when an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefore, it shall be accompanied by an application setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court, that he had sufficient-cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. It may be noted here that Order XLI Rule 3-A of the Code deals specifically with application for condonation of delay which no doubt can be allowed in the event sufficient cause is set forth but this exercise has to be done on the point of limitation as per the provisions of the Limitation Act. 5. It may be noted here that Order XLI Rule 3-A of the Code deals specifically with application for condonation of delay which no doubt can be allowed in the event sufficient cause is set forth but this exercise has to be done on the point of limitation as per the provisions of the Limitation Act. 5. Before adjudicating all the three condonation of delay applications, it is appropriate to state that the issue regarding Section 5 of the Limitation Act has already been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Per Union Bhagvathy Devaswam vs. Bhargavi Amma, 2008 (8) SCC 321 , wherein in para 13 (iii) the Apex Court enunciated, besides others, the following principle qua an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:- “The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.” 6. A reference to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276 , titled as P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerela would also be appropriate and advantageous, wherein at paragraph 6 following is noticed. “Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.” 7. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that: “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.” 8. The Supreme Court in Office of The Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., AIR 2012 SC 1506 , has held that: “12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 9. In the above case, the Supreme Court has said that though in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, yet the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions and the claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted given that the modern technologies being used and available and that law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. The Supreme Court has further gone to say that it is right time to inform all government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for delay and there was genuine effort, there is no need to accept usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. In reiteration of earlier decisions, the Supreme Court in Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 , has held that: "Merely because the Respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in absence of ‘sufficient cause’ delay shall not be condoned.” 10. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Supreme Court made an observation as follows: “15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present-day scenario. They are: (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No(s).19846/2020 titled as Union of India Vs. Central Tibetan Schools Admin & Ors., decided on 04.02.2021, while dismissing it on account of delay, has observed and held: “We have repeatedly being counselling through our orders various Government departments, State Governments and other public authorities that they must learn to file appeals in time and set their house in order so far as the legal department is concerned, more so as technology assists them. This appears to be falling on deaf ears despite costs having been imposed in number of matters with the direction to recover it from the officers responsible for the delay as we are of the view that these officers must be made accountable. It has not had any salutary effect and that the present matter should have been brought up, really takes the cake! The aforesaid itself shows the casual manner in which the petitioner has approached this Court without any cogent or plausible ground for condonation of delay. In fact, other than the lethargy and incompetence of the petitioner, there is nothing which has been put on record. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the Statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bheru Lai [SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP [C] Diary No. 22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021]…………….”. 12. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bheru Lai [SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP [C] Diary No. 22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021]…………….”. 12. From the above, it is, amongst others, apparent that there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so, as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. If grounds made in application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose other-side to unnecessarily face such a litigation. The scope of facts is to be carefully scrutinized. Looking from all angles, application on hand does not offer or give ‘sufficient cause’ to condone delay in filing the Appeal. 13. The main ground taken by applicants-appellants for seeking condonation of delay in all the above three condonation of delay applications is that the time was taken in fulfilling the formalities by as the appeal could not have been filed without obtaining sanction. The file has to pass through different departments/offices and it was because of procedural delay that the appeals could not be filed on time. 14. The Reference Court directed parties to lead their evidence. Plaintiff/respondent produced and examined witnesses in support of their stand. The Reference Court, as is also axiomatic from bare perusal of judgment 4th July 2017, has comprehensively and verbosely discoursed and decided all Issues ad seriatim, after taking into account all facets of the matter. Judgment and decree passed by the Tribunal, when analyzed in the context of grounds made in the accompanying Appeal, does not call for any interference. 15. The judgment, which is sought to be challenged in accompanying Appeal, was passed way back on 4th July 2017 and applicants/ appellants have approached this Court almost after one year. Judgment and decree passed by the Tribunal, when analyzed in the context of grounds made in the accompanying Appeal, does not call for any interference. 15. The judgment, which is sought to be challenged in accompanying Appeal, was passed way back on 4th July 2017 and applicants/ appellants have approached this Court almost after one year. Application, on the face of it, does not show any ground, muchless material or cogent, to condone delay of363 days in CONC No.89/2018. In such circumstances, application is liable to be dismissed. 16. To substantiate the submission, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court cited as 2015 (3) SCC 569 , and AIR 1996 SC 2173 and two judgments of this Court cited as JKJ 2009 (3) HC 810 and another which has been passed in CM No.3002/2019 titled State of JK & Ors. vs. Ghulam Mohammad Banday. In this case CM No. 3002/2009 titled State of JK & Ors. vs. Ghulam Mohammad Banday, the applicant has explained in detail by giving the date of sanction vide communication dated 4th January 2019 for filing appeal and has also explained the detailed reasons of delay of 173 days in filing the appeal. 17. The applicants-appellants admittedly received a copy of the judgment and decree passed by the Principal District Judge, Baramulla, on the same date when the judgment was announced on 4th July 2017. On going through the averments made in these COD applications, it has been emerged that these applications have been drafted in a very vague manner and no plausible explanation warranting condonation of delay has been made. 18. The applicants-appellants, in the applications seeking condonation of delay, have neither given any detail about obtaining of sanction from the concerned department for filing appeal nor has mentioned the dates before which authority the file was pending, whereas, the appeal even otherwise has to be filed by the Collector himself, therefore, there is no requirement for moving the file for opinion before various authorities. It is also stated in these condonation of delay applications that the Law Officer who has to draft the appeal also required to go through the record which was not available with the appellants. It is also stated in these condonation of delay applications that the Law Officer who has to draft the appeal also required to go through the record which was not available with the appellants. It is astonished to see that whether the appeal has to be drafted by the law officer of the department or by learned Additional Advocate General or Deputy Advocate General, whereas in the applications, it is admitted that the sanction was granted to file appeal and Deputy Advocate General was requested to draft and file the appeal. However, no date of sanction has been mentioned in the applications, which has otherwise been drafted in a very casual manner. Non-explaining of details vis-a-vis delay that too on the part of the Government which has no problem qua the manpower, is at abundance. The plea, therefore, is not sustainable. 19. Objections filed by respondents vehemently resist applications and it is contended that the delay is very huge in all the three condonation of delay applications. 20. The COD applications in hand apparently are filed with an impression that in seeking condonation of delay, the expression 'sufficient cause' would receive a liberal construction in favour of the applicants. It is however, manifest and without any doubt that the explanation offered by the applicants in the applications in hand cannot by any sense of imagination be said to be sufficient, plausible, and cogent. The explanation per se is cryptic and casual. 21. Viewed in the context what has been observed, considered and analysed hereinabove, the applications in hand are found to be without any merit and are, accordingly, dismissed; as a consequence whereof the accompanying appeals shall also stand dismissed. Original record along with copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Court below. CR Nos. 02/2019, 03/2019, 04/2019 22. In all these civil revision petitions filed by the petitioners against the order dated 25th January 2019, the Court vide order dated 18th December 2018 has held as under: “This execution petition has come up today for further proceedings. Perusal of record reveals that decree holders have furnished details of account numbers of judgment No. 2 in Treasury Tangmarg. Treasury Officer Tangmarg is directed to attach all these numbers to the extent of decretal amount of Rs. 1,25,85,445/- and submit compliance report by or before the next date. Office is directed to issue warrant of attachment accordingly. Perusal of record reveals that decree holders have furnished details of account numbers of judgment No. 2 in Treasury Tangmarg. Treasury Officer Tangmarg is directed to attach all these numbers to the extent of decretal amount of Rs. 1,25,85,445/- and submit compliance report by or before the next date. Office is directed to issue warrant of attachment accordingly. Put up on 12.02/2019.” 23. This court vide order dated 25th January 2019, stayed the operation of the execution proceedings subject to depositing 75% of the balance award amount along-with the statutory interest as applicable in terms of Section 35 of the J&K Land Acquisition Act before the Registry of this Court on the part of the petitioner within a period of four weeks. 24. As per the report of the Registry, an amount of Rs.2,36,53/-, Rs.1,07,258/- and Rs.5,65,801/- in CR Nos.2/2019, 03/2019 and 04/2019 stand deposited before the Registry of this Court. 25. Since the COD applications along-with appeal against the common judgment and award dated 4th July 2017 has been dismissed by this Court, as such, the present civil revision petitions are also disposed of accordingly. 26. Registrar Judicial of this Court is directed to remit back the amount so deposited by the petitioners to the Executing Court i.e., Principal District Judge, Baramulla. 27. All these civil revisions are disposed of.