ORDER : The present petitioner was accused in C.C.No.4210/2008, in the Court of the learned XV Addl.Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru City, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the “trial Court”). By its judgment dated 27.11.2009, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as Rs. N.I.Act’) and was sentenced accordingly. 2. The summary of the case of the complainant in the trial Court is that the petitioner (accused) being an individual, approached the respondent (complainant) to sell the property bearing House List No.1, V.P.Khata No.317C, situated at Cholanayakanahlli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore, New Corporation No.99, Chamundinagar Main Road, R.T.Nagar Post, Bangalore-32, measuring East to West 30 feet and North to South 40 feet, totally 1200 sq.ft. due to his unforeseen financial circumstances and inability to make proper repayment to the concerned bank where the accused had availed the loan. The complainant/respondent, having an affinity to the said property since she was holding the said property for a period of more than one year which had been earlier purchased by her for a sale consideration of Rs. 41,00,000/-from one Mr.Touseef Ali and later conveyed by her in favour of the accused, agreed to purchase the said property and hence entered into an agreement with the accused for purchase of the said property on 15.09.2007, for a sum of Rs. 60,00,000/-and paid a sum of Rs. 55,00,000/-to the accused as an advance amount on the condition that the accused would get the property registered in favour of the complainant within fifteen days from the date of the said sale agreement dated 15.09.2007. It is further stated in the private complaint that the accused again approached the complainant to terminate the agreement for sale dated 15.09.2007 and to take back the advance amount. Due to the intervention of the well wishers and friends, the matter was amicably settled and the complainant agreed to terminate the agreement for sale dated 15.09.2007 and in terms of settlement entered into between the parties as per Ex.P-8 dated 5.10.2007, the accused had paid a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/-by two installments i.e., Rs. 13,50,000/-on 4.10.2007 and Rs. 1,50,000/-on 5.10.2007 respectively. For the remaining advance amount of Rs. 40,00,000/-, the accused has issued two cheques viz., Ex.P-2 bearing No.979781, dated 15.11.2007, for Rs. 15,00,000/-by two installments i.e., Rs. 13,50,000/-on 4.10.2007 and Rs. 1,50,000/-on 5.10.2007 respectively. For the remaining advance amount of Rs. 40,00,000/-, the accused has issued two cheques viz., Ex.P-2 bearing No.979781, dated 15.11.2007, for Rs. 20,00,000/-and another cheque at Ex.P-3, bearing No.979782, dated 20.11.2007, for Rs. 20,00,000/-, drawn on Amanth Co-operative Bank, Shivajinagar Branch, Bengaluru, to discharge the aforesaid liabilities and assured that the cheques will be honoured when presented for encashment. As per the assurance of the accused, the complainant presented both the cheques on 20.11.2007 through her bank, but, the said two cheques at Exs.P-2 and P-3 were returned by the complainant’s bank for the reason “funds insufficient” as per the Banker’s endorsements at Exs.P-6 and P-7, dated 22.11.2007 respectively. Immediately thereafter, the complainant issued a legal notice on 26.11.2007, the copy of which is marked at Ex.P-9 demanding the payment of the cheque amounts of Rs. 40,00,000/-within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice, which was served on the accused on 4.12.2007 as per the postal acknowledgement at Ex.P-11. In spite of service of legal notice, the accused has not made any repayment and instead, he has given an evasive reply notice dated 5.12.2007 as per Ex.P-13 by denying the very transaction between the parties. It is further alleged by the complainant that the accused had deliberately issued the cheques with the sole intention of cheating and defrauding the complainant and has deliberately allowed the cheques to be dishonoured and thus committed an offence punishable under Sections 138 and 142 of N.I.Act. The complainant having complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 138 of N.I.Act, had filed the private complaint as per Ex.P-1. 3. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, charges were framed against the accused for the alleged offences. 4. The complainant in order to prove her case, got examined her husband Sri Radhakrishnan as her General Power of Attorney Holder as PW-1 and got marked seventeen documents from Exs.P-1 to P-17. No witnesses were examined from the accused side, however, in the cross-examination of PW-1, the documents at Exs.D-1 and D-2 came to be marked on behalf of the accused. 5. After hearing both side, the trial Court by its impugned judgment dated 27.11.2009, convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I.Act and sentenced him accordingly. 6. No witnesses were examined from the accused side, however, in the cross-examination of PW-1, the documents at Exs.D-1 and D-2 came to be marked on behalf of the accused. 5. After hearing both side, the trial Court by its impugned judgment dated 27.11.2009, convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I.Act and sentenced him accordingly. 6. Challenging the said order, the accused has preferred an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.960/2009, before the Court of Fast Track Court-XIII, Bengaluru City, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as Rs. Sessions Judge's Court), which by its judgment dated 07.10.2011, dismissed the appeal by confirming the judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court. It is against these judgments of conviction, the accused has preferred this appeal. 7. The respondent is being represented by her learned counsel. 8. Records from the trial Court and Sessions Judge’s Court pertaining to the matter were called for and the same are placed before the Court. 9. Heard the arguments from both side. Perused the materials placed before this Court. 10. The only point that arises for my consideration is,- “Whether the impugned judgments suffer from perversity, illegality, impropriety warranting any interference at the hands of this Court”. 11. The present petition is a revision petition. It is the settled principle of law that scope of revisional jurisdiction is very limited. The Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction, cannot enter into detailed discussions on merits or de-merits of the case. The Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence afresh as if sitting in appeal, unless evidence found perverse and manifestly unreasonable calling for interference in the interest of justice. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, reported in [ (2019) 4 SCC 197 ], was pleased to observe that interference with concurrent findings of fact of trial Court and first appellate court by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not warranted, unless findings are vitiated by perversity, error of law or jurisdictional error. 12. In the light of the above settled principle of law, now it has to be seen whether the impugned judgments passed by the trial Court and the Sessions Judge’s Court are perverse and unreasonable warranting interference by this Court. 12. In the light of the above settled principle of law, now it has to be seen whether the impugned judgments passed by the trial Court and the Sessions Judge’s Court are perverse and unreasonable warranting interference by this Court. A perusal of the impugned judgments and the evidence led in the matter, as well from the submission of learned counsel from both side leads to take the following facts as admitted facts. They are : (i) The complainant and the accused were known and acquainted with each other even prior to the alleged date of transaction, which is 15.09.2007. (ii) It is the accused who is the drawer of the cheques at Exs.P-2 and P-3 each for a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/-and dated 15.11.2007 and 20.11.2007 respectively. (iii) The complainant is the payee in both the cheques. (iv) Both the cheques when presented for realisation by the complainant through her Banker, came to be dishonoured and returned with the Banker’s shara as “funds insufficient” as evidenced in Banker’s cheques return memo at Exs.P-6 and P-7. (v) After the dishonour of the cheques, the complainant got issued legal notice to the accused calling upon him to pay the cheque amount, which is at Ex.P-9. (vi) After receipt of the legal notice, the accused did not meet the demand made in the legal notice, on the other hand, sent his reply dated 5.12.2007 as per Ex.P-13. The above admitted facts since establishes that the accused was the drawer of the cheques at Exs.P-2 and P-3, which came to be dishonoured when presented for realisation and despite the notice of demand received by him, he did not pay the cheque amount to the complainant, a presumption about the existence of legally enforceable debt forms in favour of the complainant, however, the said presumption being rebuttable, it has to be seen whether the accused (petitioner herein) has rebutted the said presumption. 13. As held by our Hon’ble Apex Court in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, reported in [ (2019) 5 SCC 418 ], if accused could able to raise a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution could fail. It was further observed in the same case that the onus would be on accused to raise probable defence. The standard of proof of rebutting presumption was that of preponderance of probabilities. It was further observed in the same case that the onus would be on accused to raise probable defence. The standard of proof of rebutting presumption was that of preponderance of probabilities. To rebut the presumption, it was open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused could also rely on materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. It was not necessary for the accused to come to the witness box in support of his defence, since Section 139 of N.I.Act imposes an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. In the instant case, admittedly the accused has not entered the witness box nor examined any of the witnesses from his side, however, in the cross-examination of PW-1, he got marked two documents at Exs.D-1 and D-2. In this background, it has to be seen whether there is successful rebuttal of presumption formed in favour of the complainant under Section 139 of N.I.Act. 14. According to PW-1 – the General Power of Attorney Holder of the complainant, agreeing to purchase the subject matter property, which was an immovable property measuring 30’ x 40’, situated at Cholanayakanahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, for a consideration of Rs. 60,00,000/-, from the accused, had entered into an agreement with him on 15.09.2007 and paid a sum of Rs. 55,00,000/-to the accused as an advance amount, however, later on the accused pleaded his inability to sell that property to the complainant and requested her to accept back all the advance amount paid by her. In that regard, at the intervention of the well-wishers, the complainant agreed to the same. In that regard, the accused paid her a sum of Rs. 13,50,000/-and another sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-on 4.10.2007 and 5.10.2007 respectively and also executed an agreement in that regard on 5.10.2007. The said agreement was produced and marked at Ex.P-8 by the complainant. It is also the evidence of PW-1 that it is towards the repayment of the balance amount of Rs. 40,00,000/-, as mentioned and agreed in the said agreement dated 5.10.2007, two cheques of Rs. 20,00,000/-each, which is in question, were issued by the accused to the complainant. The said agreement was produced and marked at Ex.P-8 by the complainant. It is also the evidence of PW-1 that it is towards the repayment of the balance amount of Rs. 40,00,000/-, as mentioned and agreed in the said agreement dated 5.10.2007, two cheques of Rs. 20,00,000/-each, which is in question, were issued by the accused to the complainant. In the cross-examination of PW-1, though several questions were put to the witness, the same resulted in eliciting some more details about the complainant and the accused entering into an agreement at Ex.P-8 on 5.10.2007, rather, raising any suspicion about the existence of any such agreement. It is considering these aspects, since both the trial Court, as well the Sessions Judge’s Court have held that the complainant and accused had entered into an agreement as per Ex.P-8, I do not find any error or perversity in the said finding. However, learned counsel for the petitioner in his argument submitted that the date of purchase of the stamp paper is prior to the date of transaction. Further, the signature in Ex.P-8 are put by leaving some space after the printed contents of the agreement, as such, the said agreement is suspicious. Merely because the stamp paper is said to have been purchased prior to the date of a particular transaction, by that itself, it cannot be concluded that the transaction is suspicious. Had that been the contention of the accused, then, he should have definitely put necessary questions in that regard to PW-1 in his cross-examination and could have elicited the reasons for such an early purchase or possession of the stamp paper prior to the date of transaction. Furthermore, no such contention was taken by the accused in the trial Court or in the Sessions Judge’s Court. As such, the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable. Similarly, a perusal of Ex.P-8 go to show that no extra space beyond the reasonable or required space is left in every page of the agreement at Ex.P-8. As such, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the space between the contents of the agreement and executant’s signature is more, as such, it creates suspicion in the execution of Ex.P-8, is also not acceptable. 15. Though PW-1 in his evidence has stated that towards payment of the advance amount of Rs. As such, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the space between the contents of the agreement and executant’s signature is more, as such, it creates suspicion in the execution of Ex.P-8, is also not acceptable. 15. Though PW-1 in his evidence has stated that towards payment of the advance amount of Rs. 55 lakhs paid by the complainant to the accused, the accused refunded a sum of Rs. 13,50,000/-on 4.10.2007 and another sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-on 5.10.2007, the same has not been specifically denied or disputed by the accused in the cross-examination of PW-1. On the other hand, the accused himself confronted a document to PW-1 in his cross-examination, the contents of first page of the document was admitted by the complainant (PW-1) and the same was marked as Ex.D-1. The said document go to show that the General Power of Attorney Holder of the complainant-Sri K.Radhakrishnan, who is the husband of the complainant, has given an acknowledgement in writing dated 4.10.2007. However, PW-1 did not accept the contents of second page of Ex.D-1 in its entirety. The said content of Ex.D-1 in its second page reads as below : “ Apart from Rs. 13,50,000/-again paid Rs. 1,50,000/-one lakh and fifty thousand paid on 05/10/07 Total Amount Rs. 15,00,000/-Total paid to Radha Krishnan from Nasrulla Khan and No Amount is due to me”. The signature of PW-1 in the first page of Ex.D-1 was marked as Ex.D-1(a) and in the second page of Ex.D-1 as Ex.D-1(b). It is heavily relying upon the said contents at second page of Ex.D-1, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the said recital clearly mentions as “...... no amount is due to me”, as such, the husband of the complainant has admitted that there is no due, therefore, the question of issuing two cheques for Rs. 20 lakhs each does not arise. 16. The said argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable for the reason that, though the accused initially disputed the very agreement at Ex.P-8, but, his own suggestion and confronting Ex.D-1 would go to show that he has paid a sum of Rs. 13,50,000/-and another sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-, totalling to Rs. 15,00,000/-, which is also the recital in Ex.P-8. The accused has not shown any reason as to why he should make the total payment of Rs. 13,50,000/-and another sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-, totalling to Rs. 15,00,000/-, which is also the recital in Ex.P-8. The accused has not shown any reason as to why he should make the total payment of Rs. 15,00,000/-in two parts to the complainant had there not been any agreement as per Ex.P-8. The very same agreement at Ex.P-8 further to to show that remaining balance of Rs. 40,00,000/-was paid through two cheques which are at Exs.P-2 and P-3 in the case. Therefore, the agreement at Ex.P-8 and issuance of cheques at Exs.P-2 and P-3 stands established. However, though the very same recital of two payments of Rs. 13,50,000/-and Rs. 1,50,000/-is reiterated at second page of Ex.D-1, but, PW-1 has not admitted the second page of Ex.D-1 in its entirety, for the reason that, the last six words in it mentions “...... no amount is due to me”. It is the contention of the complainant that the said portion was subsequently inserted by the accused without the knowledge, notice or consent of the complainant. The accused has not elicited any answer from PW-1 in his cross-examination to overcome such a stand of the complainant nor he himself led any evidence to overcome the suspicion regarding the insertion of the alleged terms “...... no amount is due to me”. Furthermore, a bare looking at the said portion of the words with the remaining handwriting in the second page of Ex.D-1, makes it amply clear that even from the common man’s view, the handwriting are totally different and it appears to have been inserted subsequently. Both the trial Court and the Sessions Judge’s Court after carefully analysing this aspect in its proper perspective have uniformly held that the writing “...... no amount is due to me” at second page of Ex.D-1 is in different handwriting and from which it is clear that the accused has manipulated the second page of Ex.D-1. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that “...... no amount is due to me” raises a doubt in the case of the complainant, is not acceptable. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has in his next point of argument submitted that the very same subject property was mortgaged by the accused in favour of one Sri Safoora Bi under a Mortgage Agreement at Ex.D-2, which is dated 15.10.2007. no amount is due to me” raises a doubt in the case of the complainant, is not acceptable. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has in his next point of argument submitted that the very same subject property was mortgaged by the accused in favour of one Sri Safoora Bi under a Mortgage Agreement at Ex.D-2, which is dated 15.10.2007. PW-1 is the attesting witness for the said document and had Ex.P-8 been there, the said PW-1 would not have signed Ex.D-2 as a witness. The said argument is also not acceptable for the reason that : (a) As per the deposition sheet of PW-1, the said document is not at all marked as exhibit. On the other hand, it shows marking of the said document, which is the Photostat version and also not clearly visible, was objected from the complainant’s side during the trial. However, subject to objection, the signature of the witness was marked at Ex.D-2. Therefore, the very alleged document which is shown to be a Mortgage Agreement was not at all marked, except the signature. (b) A perusal of the said document go to show that the signature marked as Ex.D-2 also is not of PW-1 because PW-1’s name and the alleged signature is at Sl.No.1 in the witness column. (c) It is not the case of the accused that PW-1 has signed the said document as a witness representing the complainant. Even if it is taken that he has signed the said document as a witness, still, the same is in his individual capacity, but, not as representative of the complainant. (d) There is nothing on record to show that the said witness was aware of the contents of the document which was not marked as exhibit and which was objected to for marking. (e) The schedule of the property in Ex.P-8 mentions the Municipal Corporation number as No.99, whereas, the property number mentioned in Ex.D-2 is No.99/1. (f) Assuming for a moment that PW-1 knowing the contents of the document has signed it as a witness, still, admittedly the said Mortgage Agreement was ten days subsequent to the document at Ex.P-8, which means, after the complainant and accused agreed to cancel their previous Agreement of Sale dated 15.09.2007, the alleged vendor i.e., accused proceeded to mortgage the property to third party. For these reasons, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that because of Ex.D-2, the alleged transaction between the complainant and the accused under Ex.P-8 cannot be believed, is not acceptable. 18. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner also addresses an argument that the complainant had no financial capacity to give such a huge amount in cash as advance, which also creates a doubt in the case of the complainant. In his support, he relied upon an observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basalingappa’s case (supra). Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent in his argument submitted that the complainant had the cash with her which she has received as a sale consideration for an immovable property. In Basalingappa’s case (supra), which is after appreciating the evidence led before the Court to indicate that, apart from loan of Rs. 6 lakhs given to the accused, within two years, an amount of Rs. 18 lakhs had been given out by the complainant and his financial capacity being questioned, the Hon’ble Apex Court proceeded to hold that it was incumbent on the part of the complainant to have explained his financial capacity. In the instant case, though from the accused side some details were elicited regarding avocation and the financial transaction, but, no where it was specifically suggested to the witness that the complainant had no financial capacity to lend such a huge amount to the accused. PW-1 in his cross-examination has stated that the complainant does transactions. He has stated that the complainant could able to pay Rs. 55,00,000/-to the accused from out of the sale of the building made by the complainant for a sum of Rs. 56,25,000/-. He has also stated that the said transaction of Rs. 56,25,000/-were witnessed by himself i.e., PW-1 and Ramadas and by one Sri Chand Pasha. The said evidence was not further denied or disputed from the accused side. As such, the accused except eliciting some more details regarding the financial capacity, could not able to create any doubt in the financial capacity of the complainant and he did not even question the financial capacity of the complainant specifically. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the complainant had no financial capacity to lend money, is not acceptable. 19. The defence of the accused was that he had lost the cheques, which were duly signed and kept blank by him. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the complainant had no financial capacity to lend money, is not acceptable. 19. The defence of the accused was that he had lost the cheques, which were duly signed and kept blank by him. According to him, he had kept three blank signed cheques in his house and the same has come in the hands of the complainant. Except such a bald defence, nothing has been placed by the accused to show that he had kept such cheques in his house and the same were misused by the complainant. Admittedly, he has not lodged any police complaint in that regard nor even sent any notice demanding the return of the cheques. He has also not stated as to how could the cheques said to have been kept in his house, reached the hands of the complainant. It is not his case that the complainant had visited his house at any point of time and at that time, she had stolen those cheques without his knowledge or notice. Therefore, both the trial Court and the Sessions Judge’s Court have rightly disbelieved the defence taken up by the accused. 20. Barring the above, no other grounds worth to be considered are raised by the petitioner in the matter. Since all the contentions taken up by the petitioner in this case, which are discussed above, clearly shows that both the trial Court and the Sessions Judge’s Court have after due appreciation of the materials, including the evidence placed before them in their proper perspective, have come to a uniform finding that the complainant has proved the guilt of the accused, I do not find any illegality or perversity in it warranting interference by this Court. Further, it is after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court has ordered the sentence, which has been further confirmed by the Sessions Judge’s Court, in which also, I do not find any reason to interfere. 21. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following order: ORDER The Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed as devoid of merits. Registry to transmit a copy of this order to both the trial Court as also the Sessions Judge’s Court along with their respective records forthwith.