JUDGMENT : T.S. Sivagnanam, J. Prayer: Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 31.01.2020 in Contempt Petition No.2079 of 2019. 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 31.01.2020, in Contempt Petition No.2079 of 2019, which was filed alleging that the learned Single Bench, on a misconception of the entire facts and misconstruing the order made in W.P.No.3929 of 2014, dismissed the contempt petition. 2. This appeal has been filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Registry, on scrutinising the papers, returned the same calling upon the appellant to state as to how the appeal is maintainable against the order dated 31.01.2020, in Cont.P.No.2079 of 2019 primarily on the ground that no punishment has been imposed on the respondents. What appears to have weighed in the mind of the Registry is with regard to the scope of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1971 Act”) and in the understanding of the Registry, an appeal is maintainable under Section 19 of the 1971 Act, only if there is an order of punishment passed by the learned Single Bench and in the absence of an order of punishment, the intra-court appeal is not maintainable. 3. We have elaborately heard Mr.N.L.Rajah, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.S.Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.A.P.Srinivas, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents. 4. A brief prelude of the factual position would be necessary, before we examine the correctness of the stand taken by the Registry as regards the maintainability of this appeal. The appellant filed the writ petition in W.P.No.3929 of 2014 to quash the order passed by the first respondent dated 15.01.2014, under Section 279(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the I.T.Act”) rejecting the petition filed by the appellant to compound the offence framed against him under Section 276C and Section 277 of the I.T.Act for the assessment year 2002-03. 5. It was alleged by the respondent-Department that when the appellant filed his return of income for the assessment year 2002-03, he has concealed an amount of Rs.2,26,38,372/- deposited in a foreign bank account and therefore, to be prosecuted for offence punishable under Section 276C of the I.T.Act. The appellant filed a petition under Section 279(1) of the I.T.Act for compounding the offence. The appellant filed a petition under Section 279(1) of the I.T.Act for compounding the offence. The first respondent, after referring to the facts of the case and after hearing the Authorized Representative of the appellant, took note of the circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) dated 16.05.2008, wherein guidelines have been laid down by the CBDT with regard to compounding of offence under the Direct Tax Laws. The first respondent, in his order dated 15.01.2014, while rejecting the compounding petition, observed that the appellant cannot claim, as a matter of right, that the offence should be compounded; Clause (g) of para 4.4 of the CBDT circular dated 16.05.2008, states that the first respondent may consider any other relevant ground for not accepting the compounding petition. Further, it was observed that the appellant had effected cross-border transactions and if not for the information received from a foreign Government, the Revenue would have been put to great loss. It was further observed that though the appellant may claim certain infirmity in the nature of the evidence on which the Department relies, the fact is that the signature of the appellant tallies with the signature in the document and this evidence establishes major fraud, insofar as funds have gone out of the country and if not for the information obtained, the monies would have remained untaxed. Further, the appellant in keeping funds abroad, that too, in countries where banking secrecy law shield the investment, is also to be regarded as anti-national activity. Further, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) has upheld the orders passed by the Revenue, vide order dated 25.02.2013 and the matter is also under investigation by the Enforcement Directorate. The appellant cannot take advantage of the fact that the nature of the documents is not foolproof and accordingly, there is a case for compounding; the appellant has not produced the documents, nor the copies of the accounts to disprove the stand taken by the Department. Thus, considering the nature of the offence and the quantum of income involved, the first respondent held that it is not a fit case for compounding the offence committed and the appellant’s case will fall under para 3, 4.4(b), 4.4(c) and 4.4(g) of the circular dated 16.05.2008 and therefore, the petition deserves to be rejected. 6. Thus, considering the nature of the offence and the quantum of income involved, the first respondent held that it is not a fit case for compounding the offence committed and the appellant’s case will fall under para 3, 4.4(b), 4.4(c) and 4.4(g) of the circular dated 16.05.2008 and therefore, the petition deserves to be rejected. 6. The learned Writ Court, after taking note of the submissions on either side, observed that the objection of the respondent-Department is that the order passed by the Tribunal, reducing the quantum of penalty, has been challenged by the Department before this Court by filing a tax case appeal and this cannot be a reason to deny the benefit of Section 279(1-A) of the I.T.Act to the appellant. The reliance placed on the observations made by the Court in Crl.O.P.No.9065 of 2011, dated 28.02.2019 in a petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the criminal complaint, the Court held that the observation made in paragraph 19 of the said order dated 28.02.2019, is per incuriam and the observation made therein is not the proper appraisal and cannot be relied on. In this regard, the Court referred to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Dass vs. ITO [ (1999) 5 SCC 241 ]. Ultimately, the writ petition was disposed of by order dated 28.08.2019, and the operative portion of the order reads as follows:- “10. In the light of the above observations, the impugned order passed by the first respondent herein under Section 279(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 15.01.2014 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Committee prescribed under the CBDT Guideline No.7.1(c) dated 16.05.2008. The petitioner is granted liberty to place a copy of this order along with afresh compounding petition under Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, before the Committee, within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On receipt of the aforesaid application along with a copy of this order, the Committee shall consider the same, in the light of the observations made in this order and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within a period of 60 days there from. The Writ Petition stands allowed accordingly.”” 7. On receipt of the aforesaid application along with a copy of this order, the Committee shall consider the same, in the light of the observations made in this order and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within a period of 60 days there from. The Writ Petition stands allowed accordingly.”” 7. In terms of the above, the order passed by the first respondent rejecting the compounding petition dated 15.01.2014, was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Committee prescribed under the CBDT guidelines more particularly, in paragraph 7.1(c) dated 16.05.2008; the appellant was granted liberty to place a copy of the order passed in the writ petition along with a fresh compounding petition under Section 279 of the I.T.Act before the Committee within a time frame and the Committee shall consider the same in the light of the observations made in the order and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within a period of 60 days there from. The writ petition stood allowed, accordingly. 8. The Revenue had not challenged the order passed in the writ petition by filing an appeal, allowing the order to attain finality. The appellant complied with the directions issued by the learned Writ Court and submitted a fresh compounding petition dated 10.09.2019. This was rejected by the first respondent, vide order dated 06.11.2019, for the following reasons:- “2. ............ (a) the assessee has cross border transactions, but for the information received from a foreign Government, the Revenue would have been put to loss. (b) the evidence gathered in the instant case establishes major frauds in so far as funds have gone out of the country and if not for the information obtained, the monies would have remained untaxed. (c) the assessee has neither produced the documents nor the account copy to disprove the contentions of the department. The attitude of the assessee was of total non-cooperation in the entire proceedings before the Assessing Officer on this issue.”” An annexure to the above order contains the reasons as to why the application was rejected, which forms part and parcel of the order dated 06.11.2019 and requires to be read along with the said order. 9. The attitude of the assessee was of total non-cooperation in the entire proceedings before the Assessing Officer on this issue.”” An annexure to the above order contains the reasons as to why the application was rejected, which forms part and parcel of the order dated 06.11.2019 and requires to be read along with the said order. 9. The appellant did not challenge the said order dated 06.11.2019, by filing a writ petition as was done by him in the earlier round, but chose to file Cont.P.No.2079 of 2019 stating that the first respondent wilfully neglected the directions issued by the learned Writ Court in its order dated 28.02.2019, and the order amounts to interference with the administration of justice and the respondents are liable to be punished for contempt. The contempt petition was heard by the Court and by order dated 31.01.2020, the Court found that there is no merit in the contempt petition. The following observation has been made by the Court in support of its conclusion:- “29. Though the learned Single Judge has given categorical findings that there was no impediment on the part of the Department to compound offence under Section 279(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, yet, in the operative portion of the order, the learned Single Judge has directed the respondent to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The relevant portion of Section 279(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 reads as under:- “Section 279. Prosecution to be at the instance of Chief Commissioner or Commissioner:- 1 ………………………………………… (1A) A person shall not be proceeded against for an offence under section 276C or section 277 in relation to the assessment for an assessment year in respect of which the penalty imposed or imposable on him under clause (iii) of sub- section (1) of section 271 has been reduced or waived by an order under section 273A.] 2 ………………………………………… 3 …………………………………………” 30. In the light of the said direction, the petitioner filed a fresh compounding application on 09.09.2019 before the respondents, which was disposed by the respondents vide impugned order dated 06.11.2019. 31. In my view, though the learned Single Judge has clarified the portion yet he has directed the respondents to pass order keeping in mind the observations made in the order. There is no positive direction in the said order. 31. In my view, though the learned Single Judge has clarified the portion yet he has directed the respondents to pass order keeping in mind the observations made in the order. There is no positive direction in the said order. In case, the learned Single Judge had taken a view that application for compounding the offences was to be allowed, the learned Single Judge would have quashed the order dated 15.01.2014 and allowed the Writ Petition as prayed. The learned Single Judge has merely made passing comment in para 8.6, which is reproduced below:- “8.6. The only objection to such a proposition from the Department is that the order passed by the Tribunal, reducing the penalty, has been challenged in Tax Case Appeal before this Court. It is not the case of the Department that this Court had stayed the order of the Commissioner of Appeals, as well as the Tribunal in the Tax Case Appeals. Just because the order reducing the penalty has been put under challenge in the Tax Case Appeals, it cannot be said that the order reducing the penalty itself has been kept under abeyance. In this background, it can only be said that the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of Section 279 (1A) of the Act and the mere challenge to the order reducing the penalty may not suffice to deny such a benefit. In view of these subsequent developments, there cannot now be any impediment on the part of the Department to compound the offences under Sections 276C and 277 of the Act.” 32. Therefore, I do not find any merits in the present Contempt Petition.”” 10. The appellant is aggrieved by the aforementioned finding rendered by the Court holding that there is no merit in the present contempt petition. The endeavour of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is to convince this Court that the intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable and in this regard, placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) vs. S.C.Sekar & Ors. [ (2009) 2 SCC 784 ]. [ (2009) 2 SCC 784 ]. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to paragraph 43 of the judgment wherein, the Court quoted with approval the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ashis Chakraborty vs. Hindusthan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress [ (1992) 1 CHN 160 (Cal)]. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that if the scope of the appeal under Section 19 of the 1971 Act is restricted only to punishment imposed under Section 12 of the 1971 Act and nothing beyond, then a person, who is ex facie found guilty of contempt under Section 14 of the 1971 Act and is detained in custody pending the hearing on the charge of contempt and is refused bail, would have no right of appeal against such refusal of bail pending the decision on the charge of contempt, which will amount to deprive the alleged contemnor on the right of appeal in such circumstances. Paragraphs 44 to 46 of the judgment have also been referred to, to buttress the submission that the intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable. 11. Opposing the prayer sought for by the appellant, the learned Senior Standing Counsel submitted that the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble three Judge decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of J.S.Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar & Ors. [ (1996) 6 SCC 291 ] is a clear answer to the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and the appeal filed is not maintainable, as the learned Contempt Court found that there was no wilful violation of the order and there is no merit in the contempt petition and if at all, the appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 06.11.2019, passed by the first respondent, it may at best, be a fresh cause of action for the appellant to avail other remedies. 12. Further, the learned counsel placed reliance on the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar & Ors. vs. Depinder Singh Dhesi & Ors. [ (2019) 8 SCC 280 ] wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the observations in paragraph 6 of the judgment in J.S.Parihar and while dismissing the contempt petitions, imposed a cost of Rs.5,000/- on each of the petitioners. vs. Depinder Singh Dhesi & Ors. [ (2019) 8 SCC 280 ] wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the observations in paragraph 6 of the judgment in J.S.Parihar and while dismissing the contempt petitions, imposed a cost of Rs.5,000/- on each of the petitioners. The learned Senior Standing Counsel also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K.Mittal & Anr. [ (2000) 3 SCC 171 ] and the judgment of the Hon’ble First Bench of this Court in K.Phanindra Reddy, I.A.S. vs. C.Lawrence & Anr. [Contempt Appeal No.3 of 2017 dated 17.04.2017]. 13. The law on the subject is no longer res integra. Admittedly, the learned Contempt Court found that there is no merit in the contempt petition and in order to maintain an appeal under Section 19 of the 1971 Act, the party on whom a punishment has been imposed alone could have approached the Court. In the instant case, the appellant was the petitioner in the contempt petition and he sought for punishing the respondents for wilful disobedience of the order in the writ petition. The learned Contempt Court found that there is no violation, rather the portions of the order passed in the writ petitions, which were heavily relied on by the appellant, were held to be observations made by the learned Writ Court. In such circumstances, we need to examine as to the role of the appellant in a contempt proceedings. This aspect has been vividly brought out in the decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) and the following paragraphs would be relevant:- “17. The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is summary but the consequences are serious. That is why the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings in contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in spite of a case of contempt having been made out are both discretionary with the Court. Contempt generally and criminal contempt certainly is a matter between the Court and the alleged Contemnor. No one can compel or demand as of right initiation of proceedings for contempt. Certain principles have emerged. A jurisdiction in contempt shall be exercised only on a clear case having been made out. Mere technical contempt may not be taken note of. Contempt generally and criminal contempt certainly is a matter between the Court and the alleged Contemnor. No one can compel or demand as of right initiation of proceedings for contempt. Certain principles have emerged. A jurisdiction in contempt shall be exercised only on a clear case having been made out. Mere technical contempt may not be taken note of. It is not personal glorification of a Judge in his office but an anxiety to maintain the efficacy of justice administration system effectively which dictates the conscience of a Judge to move or not to move in contempt jurisdiction. Often an apology is accepted and the felony condoned if the Judge feels convinced of the genuineness of the apology and the prestige of the Court having been restored. Source of initiation of contempt proceedings may be suo motu, on a Reference being made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on Reference made by a Subordinate Court in case of criminal contempt. A private party or a litigant may also invite the attention of the Court to such facts as may persuade the Court in initiating proceedings for contempt. However, such person filing an application or petition before the Court does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or relator. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the Court. It is thereafter for the Court to act on such information or not to act though the private party or litigant moving the Court may at the discretion of the Court continue to render its assistance during the course of proceedings. That is why it has been held that an informant does not have a right of filing an appeal under Section 19 of the Act against an order refusing to initiate the contempt proceedings or disposing the application or petition filed for initiating such proceedings. He cannot be called an aggrieved party.”” 14. In terms of the above decision, the informant, who is the appellant before us, does not have a right of filing an appeal under Section 19 of the 1971 Act or against an order refusing to initiate contempt proceedings or disposing of the application or petition filed for initiating such proceedings and he cannot be called an aggrieved party. In terms of the above decision, the informant, who is the appellant before us, does not have a right of filing an appeal under Section 19 of the 1971 Act or against an order refusing to initiate contempt proceedings or disposing of the application or petition filed for initiating such proceedings and he cannot be called an aggrieved party. Therefore, the appellant could not have maintained an appeal under Section 19 of the 1971 Act. If such is the situation, can the appellant invoke Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and seek for maintaining this intra-court appeal. The answer to the question should be answered in the negative and against the appellant. To put it plainly, the appellant is seeking to indirectly achieve what he could not achieve in terms of the provisions of the 1971 Act. The facts in the decision in Ashis Chakraborty, which was referred to in Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) is couched on an entirely different factual background and would not be applicable to the case of the appellant. That apart, if the appellant’s role is only that of an informant and upon information given, the Court is convinced that no proceedings for contempt is required to be initiated, then the appellant cannot be heard to say that he should be permitted to maintain an intra-court appeal against the finding of the Contempt Court especially when, his role terminates the moment the information is placed before the Court. 15. Thus, for the above reasons, we are satisfied on the facts and circumstances of this case that the intra-court appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable and consequently, the objection raised by the Registry is sustained and the writ appeal is dismissed as not maintainable in the SR stage itself. No costs.