JUDGMENT : 1. Challenge in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to the judgment and award dated 26.06.2019 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.5, Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) Case No.289 of 2014 whereby, the Labour Court had rejected the Reference filed by the present petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case are as under. 2.1 The petitioner-workman, as per his Statement of Claims was working since last 2 years honestly and diligently and he was paid Rs.3500/- per month by the Respondent-Corporation in Garden as also Water Branch as Helper / Labourer. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent did not provide Earned Leave Card, Presence Card as also Pay Slip. Only his presence was noted in the Muster Roll and except that, the petitioner was not provided with anything. Though he demanded every benefits as provided under the Labour Laws but it has not been provided / paid. According to the case of the petitioner, he completed 240 days in each year and he was doing the same work as permanent employees were doing. It is further stated that all of a sudden on 3.10.1999, by oral order, he was terminated from his service and while terminating him, no notice or notice pay was given, no departmental proceedings initiated and no reason assigned for terminating his services. Therefore, as asserted in the Reference, the respondent has committed breach of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as, ‘the Act’). It is his further case that after the service of the petitioner terminated, several workmen were employed by respondent without offering service to the petitioner in the case of necessity even. 2.2 As observed in the impugned judgment and award, on a complaint made by petitioner to the appropriate Government, on failure of conciliation, the Conciliation Officer-Assistant Labour Commissioner vide his communication dated 25.3.2014 informed him that in view of Section 2A of ‘the Act’, petitioner may approach the Labour Court directly for the individual industrial dispute. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner had directly approached the Labour Court by filing the aforesaid Reference. 2.3 On being served with the notice, respondent appeared and filed their written reply vide Exh.9 denying the claim made by the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner had directly approached the Labour Court by filing the aforesaid Reference. 2.3 On being served with the notice, respondent appeared and filed their written reply vide Exh.9 denying the claim made by the petitioner. It was specifically mentioned in the reply, as referred to in para-5 of the impugned judgment and award that the order of oral termination even if it is presumed to be true, since it had been challenged after 15 years in the year 2014, on the ground of delay, the Reference be rejected. Not only that, in view of insertion of Sub- Sections (2) and (3) to Section 2A of ‘the Act’ with effect from 15.9.2010, the Reference is required to be filed under it within 3 years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service, as specified in Sub-Section (1) of Section 2A of ‘the Act’. It is further pleaded in the reply that inconsistent plea is raised by the petitioner-workman. If his complaint for termination made to the appropriate Government is seen, he claimed to be working in Garden section of the Corporation as Gardener/Labourer since 2 years whereas in the Statement of Claims, he claimed that he was working in the Garden section and Water section as Helper / Labourer. It is further asserted in the reply that, no evidence is produced to show that he was working in the Garden section or even Water section. It is further pleaded that no specific date on which he started working is also mentioned by him. It is further asserted that since Reference is filed after about 15 years of inordinate delay from the date of alleged termination, any relief even if his termination appears to be or proves to be illegal, be refused when there is no dispute alive. However, since 15.9.2010 with insertion of the provision for making Reference by the individual workman directly before the Court complaining about discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination under Section 2A of ‘the Act’, a limitation of 3 years from the date of such termination is provided for. Therefore, it was requested to reject the Reference filed by the petitioner workman. 2.4 After recording the evidence of both the sides, production and proof of various documents and hearing the parties at length, the Labour Court concluded that petitioner is the workman of the Respondent-Corporation. Therefore, it was requested to reject the Reference filed by the petitioner workman. 2.4 After recording the evidence of both the sides, production and proof of various documents and hearing the parties at length, the Labour Court concluded that petitioner is the workman of the Respondent-Corporation. It is further held at para-15, page 53 that before his services were terminated, he completed 240 days in a year. It is further concluded at para-17, page 55 of the impugned judgment and award that it has been proved that service of the petitioner is terminated on 3.10.1999. However, after detailed discussion and consideration of case laws submitted by the parties, the Reference Court rejected the Reference on the ground of inordinate delay of 14 years after the termination without any explanation legal or reasonable even prayed for. 3.1 Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that it was incumbent upon the Labour Court to adjudicate upon the Industrial Dispute raised by the petitioner. It is further submitted that though all the findings are recorded in favour of the petitioner being workman of the respondent-Corporation, completion of 240 days before a year of illegal termination dated 3.10.1999, the Labour Court could not have rejected the Reference only on the ground of delay in approaching it. 3.2 It is further submitted that the Labour Laws are social welfare legislation for workmen and the rightful claim of the workmen should not be defeated on technicalities like delay in filing the Reference. 3.3 It is further submitted that there is no limitation provided for filing Reference and therefore, Reference could not have been rejected on the ground of delay. 3.4 It is further submitted that the Labour Court has ignored the evidence adduced before it in rejecting the Reference. 3.5 It is further submitted that once the Reference is made, it is mandatory statutory duty of the Labour Court to adjudicate the dispute on merits instead of rejecting the same on the ground of delay. 3.6 Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that in the present case, Reference was made to the Labour Court by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of ‘the Act’. Once Reference is made by the appropriate Government, it could not have rejected by the Labour Court on the ground of delay. 3.6 Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that in the present case, Reference was made to the Labour Court by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of ‘the Act’. Once Reference is made by the appropriate Government, it could not have rejected by the Labour Court on the ground of delay. 3.7 In support of his submission, Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner relied on a decision in the case of Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 [Equivalent (2014) (0) AIJEL-SC 55657], more particularly, para-33 thereof, in support of his argument that, once the Reference is made in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10 of ‘the Act’ by the State Government to the Labour Court for adjudication of the Industrial Dispute, it is the mandatory statutory duty of the Labour Court under Section 11A of ‘the Act’ to adjudicate the dispute on merits on the basis of evidence produced on record. 3.8 He relied on a decision rendered in Misc. Civil Application No. 1 of 2017 in Letters Patent Appeal No.906 of 2016 in the case of Danjibhai Bhanabhai Alias Bhanjibhai Maru V/s. State of Gujarat, in support of his argument that, instead of rejecting the Reference of the workman on the ground of delay, relief ultimately to be granted should have been moulded accordingly in view of the delay caused. He read and referred paras 6, 12 and 19 in support of his argument. 3.9 He next relied on a decision dated 30.12.2010 rendered by the Division Bench of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.2290 of 2010 in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation V/s. Dharmendra B. Vegad, in support of his argument that, law of limitation will not apply to the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act and relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. If there is a delay, the relief ultimately to be granted to the workman be moulded accordingly even by denying back wages but it could not have been rejected on the ground of delay. 3.10 Next he relied on a decision in the case of State of Uttarakhand and Another Vs. If there is a delay, the relief ultimately to be granted to the workman be moulded accordingly even by denying back wages but it could not have been rejected on the ground of delay. 3.10 Next he relied on a decision in the case of State of Uttarakhand and Another Vs. Raj Kumar reported in AIR 2019 SC 310 , in support of his submission that, even for raising dispute almost after 25 years of alleged termination, proper course was to award lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction to the claim of his reinstatement as was done in the said case. 3.11 A decision in the case of Brambhatt Jayesh Bhupatray Vs. State of Gujarat dated 13.3.2019 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1554 of 2018 is pressed into service more particularly paras 3 and 7 thereof to argue that, even on the ground of delay, benefit of continuity in service cannot be denied. 3.12 He has further relied on a decision in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur V/s. Phool Chand reported in (2018) 18 SCC 299, to submit that though workman in the said case was terminated after holding departmental inquiry on the ground of dereliction of duties, the Labour Court converted the punishment of removal from service to that of "stoppage/forfeit of four annual grade increments without cumulative effect" and directed the reinstatement of the deceased workman in service with award of full back wages. The said order was not interfered by the Supreme Court except back wages was substituted to 50% instead of full back wages as ordered by the Labour Court. 3.13 Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied on a decision in the case of G.M.Haryana Roadways Vs. Pawan Kumar reported in (2005) 12 SCC 459 , in support of his submission that the Reference could not have been rejected on the ground of delay in raising dispute. 3.14 He also relied on a decision in the case of Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. Vs. Ande Lingaiah reported in (2000) 10 SCC 294 , in support of his submission to argue that, the Supreme Court has permitted to file Reference under Section 2A(2) of ‘the Act’ before the Central Labour Court without going into wider question of the applicability of Section 2A(2) of ‘the Act’. Ande Lingaiah reported in (2000) 10 SCC 294 , in support of his submission to argue that, the Supreme Court has permitted to file Reference under Section 2A(2) of ‘the Act’ before the Central Labour Court without going into wider question of the applicability of Section 2A(2) of ‘the Act’. 3.15 In short, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the impugned judgment and award passed by the Labour Court is required to be interfered with and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. From the record of the case, it is clear that the appropriate Government did not make any Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’. One communication at page 14 referred by Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner reflects that he approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ahmedabad making complaint under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ on 27.1.2014. Referring to page 15, which is an application addressed to the appropriate Government, he prayed for condonation of delay. In the said communication, he referred that he is working with the Respondent-Corporation since last 4/5 years and the details about his services were narrated in the claim form as provided under Section 10(1) of ‘the Act’ addressed to the appropriate Government. As such, no such claim form is forming part of record either before the Labour Court or before this Court. What he complained for is a complaint under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ and filled in the form in respect thereof, which is at page 14 of the compilation. 5. From the impugned order, it is clear that petitioner made direct Reference under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ before the Labour Court, as advised by the Conciliation Officer, as communicated vide communication dated 25.3.2014 by the Conciliation Officer and Assistant Labour Commissioner. Therefore, on facts, Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner is unable to show that any Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’, as claimed by him, was ever sent by appropriate Government to Labour Court for adjudication. On the contrary, the order impugned speaks about Reference submitted by the petitioner under Section 2A of ‘the Act’. Therefore, the submission on facts that it is Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’, as submitted by Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner, is incorrect, which cannot be countenanced. On the contrary, the order impugned speaks about Reference submitted by the petitioner under Section 2A of ‘the Act’. Therefore, the submission on facts that it is Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’, as submitted by Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner, is incorrect, which cannot be countenanced. The said submission is very consciously made so as to come out of Limitation provided under Sub- Section (3) of Section 2A of ‘the Act’. 6. Although, no limitation is prescribed under ‘the Act’ for making a reference under Section 10(1) of ‘the Act’ yet it is for the appropriate Government to consider whether it is expedient or not to make Reference. Laws of Limitation are not applicable to the proceedings under ‘the Act’. However, the policy of Industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed in as much as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of the claims after long lapse of time, it is also necessary to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers’ financial arrangements and to avoid dislocation of an Industry. (kindly refer Prabhakar V/s. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another reported in 2015(15) SCC 1 ). Therefore, though there is no period of limitation provided for making Reference under Section 10(1) of ‘the Act’ and Law of Limitation is not applicable to the proceedings under ‘the Act’, there are decisions taking view that, very stale cases, in absence of any reasonable explanation, cannot be entertained and it could be rejected on the ground of delay. Moulding of relief and denial of back wages or part of wages on the ground of delay is altogether a different thing than to entertain very stale cases when there is no live link alive between the employee and employer. 7. In the present case, there is no evidence produced by the petitioner to show that after his termination dated 3.10.1999, he approached any one including the respondent, except his bare words, that too, after about 15 years. It appears that after his termination, he has abandoned the attempts and therefore, there is no live, real or substantial link alive to the dispute with regard to the termination. 8. It appears that after his termination, he has abandoned the attempts and therefore, there is no live, real or substantial link alive to the dispute with regard to the termination. 8. Since the inception of ‘the Act’, dismissal of individual workman was not to be termed as Industrial Dispute. It has been recognized for the first time with effect from 1.12.1965 when Legislature inserted Section 2A by Act No.35 of 1965. For the first time, from that date, discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination is deemed to be industrial dispute, notwithstanding that, no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. However, at that time, no limitation was provided for raising such individual industrial dispute under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ before the Labour Court. It is for the first time introduced by Act No.24 of 2010 with effect from 15.9.2010 whereby Section 2A was renumbered as Sub-Section (1), (2) and (3) with effect from 15.9.2010 providing for limitation of 3 years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination in service as specified in Sub-Section (1) of Section 2A of ‘the Act’. 9. When there was no provision for limitation in making Reference to the Labour Court, there are precedents by the Apex Court taking a view that though no Limitation Act is applicable to the disputes under ‘the Act’, very stale claims may not be entertained and such claim is required to be rejected on the ground of delay in absence of any link alive with disputes itself. However, so far as individual industrial dispute in the case of dismissal when there is specific limitation provided for in approaching the Court, it can never be ignored by anyone. 10. Apart from the provision under Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A to be retrospective or prospective, even present individual industrial dispute is also not referred to the Labour Court by the petitioner even within 3 years from the insertion of Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A of ‘the Act’. 11. As such, there is an amendment even to Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A of ‘the Act’ so far as its applicability to the State of Gujarat is concerned, substituting period of ‘3 years’ as mentioned in Sub- Section (3) to ‘one year’ pursuant to Laobur Laws (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 2015 vide Gujarat Act No.29 of 2015 with effect from 30.9.2015. As such, there is an amendment even to Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A of ‘the Act’ so far as its applicability to the State of Gujarat is concerned, substituting period of ‘3 years’ as mentioned in Sub- Section (3) to ‘one year’ pursuant to Laobur Laws (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 2015 vide Gujarat Act No.29 of 2015 with effect from 30.9.2015. Though nothing much turns on it as individual industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner directly before the Labour Court in the year 2014, fact remains that, within 3 years from the insertion of such limitation, no Reference is filed within the limitation provided for filing it. 12. Though, tall claim is made by the petitioner that this is a Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’ which learned advocate for the petitioner is unable to answer in how and in what manner the Reference can be said to be under Section 10 of ‘the Act’. As observed in the impugned award, no such Reference was sent by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the same. At the same time, when for the first time, petitioner approached the office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner when he filled in claim form for individual complaint on 27.1.2014, it is clear that he filled in form as provided under Section 2A of ‘the Act’. 13. Learned Labour Court Judge, has, in para-18 of the impugned judgment and award, very specifically mentioned that on a compliant made on 27.1.2014 to the office of Assistant Labour Commissioner wherein, on failure of conciliation proceedings, petitioner was, vide communication dated 25.3.2014 by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, informed to file individual industrial dispute directly before the Labour Court under Section 2A of ‘the Act’. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner has filed the present Reference directly before the Court under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ on 17.4.2014. By asserting those attempts that this is a Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’ as he approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner and conciliation proceedings were initiated, it would become Reference under Section 10(1) of ‘the Act’, cannot be said to be a Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’. By asserting those attempts that this is a Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’ as he approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner and conciliation proceedings were initiated, it would become Reference under Section 10(1) of ‘the Act’, cannot be said to be a Reference under Section 10 of ‘the Act’. Even communication addressed to the petitioner by the office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner is also clear that instead of making Reference under Section 10(1) of ‘the Act’, on failure of conciliation, he was asked to approach directly the Labour Court for his individual industrial dispute under Section 2A of ‘the Act’. If at all, the petitioner was aggrieved by such action, he could have challenged that communication at the relevant time. As such, it is not challengeable at all, as he is made aware of his right under ‘the Act’ for his individual industrial dispute. 14. Even Labour Court has referred and discussed in detail all the precedents even on the question of delay cited on behalf of the petitioner in detail and rejected the contention of the petitioner that by suitably moulding the relief Reference be allowed instead of rejecting his Reference on the ground of delay. 15. There is meaningful difference between Reference under Section 10(1) of ‘the Act’ and Reference under Section 2A of ‘the Act’. Till the insertion of the provision under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ for an individual industrial dispute, an individual was unable to directly approach the Labour Court or to the appropriate Government, it was only for collective action for collective benefit either through Union or through other affected workmen, a Reference was being sent by the appropriate Government. Therefore, individual right for an individual industrial dispute in the case of dismissal from service under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ has come to be inserted but with limitation provided therein for invoking the same. Once there is express limitation provided for, there is no discretion left with any of the authority. 16. There is no evidence produced by the petitioner to show that since the date of termination i.e. on 3.10.1999, said dispute, may be individual, is alive by production of any material either before the Labour Court or even before this Court, which shows that the petitioner has also acquiesced the dismissal or expressly abandoned the right to challenge it or accepted the decision. That is the proof of the fact that he has waived his right even to challenge his order of termination. As referred to by the Labour Court in its impugned judgment and award at internal page No.21 of the impugned award, this Court in its two of the decisions by the Division Bench held that estoppel, waiver and acquiescence is also applicable to the industrial disputes as well. In absence of any specific provision of limitation even delay and latches may also bar the remedy and therefore, when there is a specific limitation provided for filing proceedings it has to be filed within that period or not at all. 17. So far as reliance on the decision in the case of Raghubir Singh (supra) more particularly, para-33 thereof is concerned, it does not support the case of the petitioner on the ground of limitation. It has been relied on to assert that once Reference is made to the Labour Court for adjudication of the existing industrial disputes, it is the mandatory statutory duty of it to adjudicate on merits on the basis of evidence produced on record. The word ‘on merits’ mentioned in it, is sought to be interpreted to the merits alone to argue that it could not have been rejected on the ground of delay. However, I fail to see any such precedent enumerated therein by the Supreme Court. As such, Labour Court has answered each issue involved and on the contrary, held all the issues in his favour except the issue of limitation. If claim by the petitioner is required to be rejected on the basis of delay then also answering all the issues in favour of the petitioner would not prevent Labour Court from rejecting the Reference. 18. As such, Respondent-Corporation vide Exh.5 before the Labour Court gave an application to determine the issue of delay as preliminary issue but since it was to be determined on conclusion of the evidence, it was not pressed at the relevant time as endorsed on it as referred to in para-4 of the impugned decision. 19. So far as reliance placed on the decision of Danjibhai Bhanabhai Alias Bhanjibhai Maru (supra) more particularly, paras 6, 12 and 19, it is clear that in para-6, there is submission of learned advocate recorded therein. 19. So far as reliance placed on the decision of Danjibhai Bhanabhai Alias Bhanjibhai Maru (supra) more particularly, paras 6, 12 and 19, it is clear that in para-6, there is submission of learned advocate recorded therein. So far as para 12 thereof is concerned, it again records the facts of that very case and the arguments advanced therein. Whereas, para-19 is conclusion recorded by the Court while interfering in a review proceedings on the facts of its own case. As such, there is no law determined therein whether limitation would apply to an individual industrial dispute to be filed under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ or not. However, the argument as recorded therein praying to mould the relief rather than to reject the Reference on the ground of delay relying on the decision in case Shahaji Vs. Executive Engineer, PWD reported in 2007 (115) FLR 674 is a decision not determining issue in respect of limitation as provided under Section 2A of ‘the Act’. 20. Next decision relied in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation (supra) rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2290 of 2010 is concerned, again a decision in the case of Ajaib Singh Vs. the Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Porcessing Service Society Ltd. ( AIR 1999 SC 1351 ) is relied in it. It is again on issue of delay where there is no express provision for it. Whereas, in the present case, there is express provision providing limitation to prefer a Reference / claim before the Labour Court in the case of individual industrial dispute and therefore, such authority is also not applicable at all. 21. The decision in the case of State of Uttarakhand (supra) is concerned, it is not on issue of limitation. It is only relied on to argue that dispute was raised after 25 years of an alleged termination, despite that Supreme Court, instead of rejecting the Reference, awarded lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement. Again it is not a decision or precedent on the issue of limitation which arises in the present case and therefore, a reliance placed on it, is misplaced. 22. Again it is not a decision or precedent on the issue of limitation which arises in the present case and therefore, a reliance placed on it, is misplaced. 22. Decision in the case of Brambhatt Jayesh Bhupatray (supra) rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1554 of 2018 is concerned, it is on the issue of benefit of continuity of service, which cannot be denied on the ground of delay in making Reference. However, no such issue arises in the present case and therefore, said authority is also not on the point which learned advocate for the petitioner proposes to canvas before this Court. 23. The reliance in the case of G.M.Haryana Roadways (supra) is not an authority on the point of limitation provided under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ for filing direct Reference to the Labour Court for individual industrial dispute. From the facts narrated in para-5 of the aforesaid decision, it is clear that dispute was referred to the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court at Rohtak on raising demand under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ before the Labourcum- Conciliation Officer. Limited issue involved in that case before the Supreme Court was with regard to whether the grant of full back wages was justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, it is clear that said case is not an authority on the point in issue and therefore, the reliance placed by the petitioner on it, is misplaced. 24. Decision in the case of Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. (supra) is not an authority on the issue of limitation determined by the Supreme Court as provided in Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A of ‘the Act’. Since the workman therein was tossed from pillar to post from the State Labour Court to Central Labour Court and 12 years elapsed since dismissal of the workman on the ground of jurisdiction to entertain the Reference, therefore, on conclusion, without going into the wider question of applicability of Section 2-A Sub-Section (2) of the Act as amended by the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature and whether under the said amended provision a direct application would lie to the State Labour Court by an employee of a company like the workman, adjudication was entrusted to the Central Labour Court functioning at Hyderabad. Further, it is directed by the Supreme Court to dispose of the proceedings sent to the Central Labour Court, Hyderabad on merits after hearing the parties at the earliest, making it clear that it should be determined on merit without considering the question of any delay in filing the proceedings. Such direction of the Supreme Court appears to be under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, jurisdiction for which is not given to this Court and therefore, even relying on the said decision, it cannot be held that Reference was within the period of limitation or it should be extended. Hence, the aforesaid decision is also of no help to the petitioner. 25. At any rate, I see no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment and award and therefore, the Labour Court has rightly rejected the Reference filed at the instance of petitioner under Section 2A of ‘the Act’ beyond period of limitation irrespective of retrospective or prospective operation of it. Therefore, this petition fails and it is hereby summarily rejected.