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2021 DIGILAW 478 (JK)

Santokh Singh v. Karnail Singh

2021-09-14

JAVED IQBAL WANI

body2021
JUDGMENT : JAVED IQBAL WANI, J. 1. Inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. (482 Cr.P.C.) is being invoked by the petitioners through the medium of the instant petition, seeking quashment of complaint titled as "Karnail Singh Vs. Santokh Singh" (for short 'complaint') pending before the Court of learned Munsiff, Akhnoor (for brevity 'trial Court') as also for quashment of order of cognizance dated 12.05.2014 (for short 'impugned order'). 2. It is stated in the petition that on 08.10.2009, petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 solemnised marriage of their daughter, namely, Pooja Jamwal with one Suresh Singh Manhas being son of respondent herein, and that immediately after the marriage, the said daughter of the petitioners came to be tortured by her in-laws besides making demands of dowry and was turned out from the matrimonial home on 21.05.2010, where after, the said daughter started living with petitioners at her parental home. 3. It is being stated that an FIR was registered by the daughter of the petitioners against her in-laws including the respondent herein under Section 498-A RPC, challan whereof came to be presented and is pending disposal. 4. It is being further stated that a complaint under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, also came to be filed by the daughter of petitioners against her in-laws including respondent herein. 5. It is being further stated that the respondent herein in order to pressurize the petitioners and their daughter to enter into a compromise in respect of the cases filed against them by the daughter of petitioners a false and frivolous complaint came to be instituted against the petitioners by the respondent. 6. It is being further stated that the said complaint after being entertained by the trial Court, cognizance under Section 323 and 341 RPC, thereof came to be taken and process issued in terms of the impugned order dated 12.05.2014 by the trial Court. 7. 6. It is being further stated that the said complaint after being entertained by the trial Court, cognizance under Section 323 and 341 RPC, thereof came to be taken and process issued in terms of the impugned order dated 12.05.2014 by the trial Court. 7. In the grounds of challenge, the petitioners urges that complaint filed by the respondent against the petitioners is abuse of process of law maintained with an intent to cause harassment to the petitioners and that the trial Court entertained the complaint, took cognizance thereof and issued a process in a mechanical manner, and that the date of incident referred to in the complaint is 09.05.2014, within premises of Court of Munsiff, Akhnoor on which date no case of Section 498-A of the petitioners' daughter against the respondent was fixed and that the trial Court while passing the impugned order, failed to record its satisfaction that there is sufficient material to proceed against the accused person and that a bare perusal of the complaint did not reflect ingredients of the offences of Sections 323 and 341 RPC and that the complainant-respondent did not mention facts about the pendency of the Court cases against him and his other family members and that the complaint is false and baseless and that petitioner No. 1 has been implicated in the complaint as an accused who is undergoing Pre-Sea Course for G.P. Ratings from 01.01.2014 to 30.01.2014 and that complaint has been filed by the respondent against the petitioners to wreak vengeance on the petitioners on account of personal grudge. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners while making submissions reiterated the contentions raised and grounds urged in the petition. 10. Per contra, counsel for the respondent resisted and controverted the contentions raised and grounds urged by the counsel for the petitioner. 11. Before adverting to the controversy involved in the petition, it would be appropriate and advantageous to refer to Section 321, 323, 339 and 341 RPC, here under:- 321. Voluntarily causing hurt.- Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt". 323. Voluntarily causing hurt.- Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt". 323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.- Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 339. Wrongful restraint.- Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. 341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.-Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both." 12. A bare perusal of the complaint would tends to show that the only allegation levelled in the complaint against the accused persons/petitioners herein is that the complainant along with his wife and son reached at Bus Stand Akhnoor on 09.05.2014 the accused persons/petitioners constituted an unlawfully assembly surrounded them by using physical force, started abusing the complainant in presence of his wife and son, used such language by which the complainant and his family members were subjected to criminal intimidation. 13. It is no-where alleged in the complaint that the complainant sustained any injuries and got hurt in the process. The essential ingredient of the offence under Sections 321/323 thus is missing. 14. So far a offence under Section 339 is concerned, the Section requires a voluntary obstruction of a person and the obstruction such as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. A verbal prohibition or demonstrance cannot be said to be such obstruction. The perusal of the complaint tends to show that the allegation levelled against the petitioners in regard to Sections 339/341 is only that the petitioners restrained the complainant-respondent from sitting in the bus. The said allegation cannot said to fulfil the ingredients of the offence under this Section as well. 15. The perusal of the complaint tends to show that the allegation levelled against the petitioners in regard to Sections 339/341 is only that the petitioners restrained the complainant-respondent from sitting in the bus. The said allegation cannot said to fulfil the ingredients of the offence under this Section as well. 15. In the aforesaid back ground a reference to the judgment of the Apex Court passed in "Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti" reported in (2009) 10 SCC 184 would be relevant and germane herein wherein at para 9 following is noticed:- "9. In order to lodge a proper compliant, mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not be all and end of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing of that offence". 16. Further in case tiled as "Manav Misra and other Vs. State of J&K and another" reported in 2012 (4) JKJ 608 [HC], following has been provided in para 13 by this Court:- "13. The Complaint made by Mrs. Aditi, neither indicated the date/dates, month or year when she is stated to have been beaten or for that matter harassed or treated with cruelty and tortured. The role played by each one of the petitioners in causing her cruelty and harassment is also not indicated in the Complaint. Mere statement in the Complaint that all the accused had treated her with cruelty may not be sufficient enough, in law, for a Criminal Court to issue process against someone without any specific act or omission attributed to him/her either individually or collectively with others that may amount to his /her committing any act or omission punishable under law". 17. A reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in case titled as "Zandu Pharmaceutical, Works Ltd. and others Vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and another" reported in (2005) 1 SCC 122 , would be relevant and germane herein, where under the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been provided:- "11. 17. A reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in case titled as "Zandu Pharmaceutical, Works Ltd. and others Vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and another" reported in (2005) 1 SCC 122 , would be relevant and germane herein, where under the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been provided:- "11. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ((1992) SCC Supp (1) 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 18. Keeping in mind the aforesaid position of law, it can safely be said that the complaint in question had been filed by the respondent/complainant in retaliation to the cases filed by the daughter of petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and the said complaint had been maintained with the sole aim to wreak vengeance, further the allegations do not prima facie constitute the offences in question and also do not make out a case against the accused. 19. Accordingly, the petition is allowed, impugned complaint, proceedings initiated thereupon as also the impugned order are set aside.