JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The sole appellant has been convicted and sentenced to RI for life with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. A First Information Report was lodged on 31.10.2008 against Krishna Ghasi for the offences under sections 341,325 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Jairam Ghasi who is the informant of this case gave his fardbeyan at about 17:30 hrs. on 31.10.2008 at Primary Health Centre, Mahuadanr alleging murderous assault by Krishna Ghasi on his brother Ugen Ghasi. The injured remained under treatment for 12 days but could not survive and died on 12.11.2008 and accordingly the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was added in the Report. On completion of the investigation in Mahuadanr PS Case No. 44 of 2008 a charge-sheet was laid against Krishna Ghasi under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing death of Ugen Ghasi. 3. During trial the prosecution has examined eight witnesses out of which PW1-Munnu Ghasi, PW2-Sukhdeo Kawar and PW7-Jairam Ghasi who is the informant claimed in the Court that they had seen Krishna Ghasi assaulting Ugen Ghasi on his head with a tangi. PW8-Ram Pravesh Sharma is the police witness who brought the material object in the Court and PW5-Bijendra Kumar Singh is the investigating officer of the case. 4. In Sessions Trial No.75 of 2009, the learned Trial Judge has held as under: “10. On conjoint reading of statements of these three witnesses coupled with evidence of doctor PW6 and Material Ext.1 which was produced before this court by PW8. I find no force in the argument advanced by the learned lawyer for defence. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey Vrs State of Delhi, reported in 2002 (4) SCC 76 in similar facts before it. I find no force in the argument advanced by the learned lawyer for defence. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey Vrs State of Delhi, reported in 2002 (4) SCC 76 in similar facts before it. "has negated the contention and held that it cannot be an unnatural conduct, if the witness could not participate to save life of the victim, being unarmed and normally could not have risked his life at the hands of the accused which was imminent.” Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court in the case of Praduman Manjhi V State of Jharkhand, reported in 2011 (3) JLIR page 267, has also in similar facts before them has held that “eye witnesses including family members did not try to save the deceased though present at the time of occurrence where accused armed with deadly weapon, it is natural that nobody would like to come forward to save deceased and take risk of his life-it cannot he held that since eye witness or other persons did not intervene in the melee, evidence should be discarded and that they were not present at the spot.” 11. I further find that the prosecution has examined PW3 Jitu Kanwar and PW 4 Parsu Ghasi who have claimed to have reached the place of occurrence, after the assault was over but both witnesses have specifically narrated that the accused was inside his house and was threatening everybody with dire consequences. Nothing has come out in the cross-examination to disbelieve both these witnesses. PW5 Bijendra Kumar Singh, who has conducted investigation in this case, has supported the prosecution case. 12. In the light of the discussions made above, I find and hold that the prosecution has proved the charge against the accused beyond all shadow of reasonable doubts and accordingly I hold him guilty for murder of the deceased Ugen Ghasi and convict him for committing murder of Ugen Ghasi.” 5. In a highly unsatisfactory judgment which runs into just four pages the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, at Latehar convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. In a highly unsatisfactory judgment which runs into just four pages the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, at Latehar convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Trial Judge has written the judgment in a most casual manner and he has failed to marshall the materials on record and for that reason alone the impugned judgment can be set-aside with a remand order, but considering that about 13 years have passed and the appellant has remained in custody for 10 years we would examine the appeal on merits and not remand the matter for a fresh judgment by the trial Court. 6. In “Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Punjab” (1995) 1 SCC 760 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “10. …… The trial court appears to have been blissfully ignorant of the requirements of Section 354(1)(b) CrPC. Since, the first appeal lay to this Court, the trial court should have reproduced and discussed at least the essential parts of the evidence of the witnesses besides recording the submissions made at the bar to enable the appellate court to know the basis on which the ‘decision’ is based. A ‘decision’ does not merely mean the ‘conclusion’ — it embraces within its fold the reasons which form the basis for arriving at the ‘conclusions’. The judgment of the trial court contains only the ‘conclusions’ and nothing more. The judgment of the trial court cannot, therefore, be sustained. The case needs to be remanded to the trial court for its fresh disposal by writing a fresh judgment in accordance with law.” 7. The legality of the conviction of the appellant for murder has been challenged primarily on two grounds; (i) death of Ugen Ghasi 12 days after the assault and (ii) doubt on veracity of testimony of the eyewitnesses. 8. PW1 has stated in the Court that his statement was not taken by the Investigating Officer during the investigation but this appears to be factually incorrect. In the opening paragraph of his examination-in-chief the Investigating Officer has stated that he recorded the statement of Munnu Ghasi. PW1 has deposed in the Court that when Krishna Ghasi assaulted his uncle he was about 20 paces behind him. He has further stated that several villagers assembled there and he carried Ugen Ghasi to the hospital. In the opening paragraph of his examination-in-chief the Investigating Officer has stated that he recorded the statement of Munnu Ghasi. PW1 has deposed in the Court that when Krishna Ghasi assaulted his uncle he was about 20 paces behind him. He has further stated that several villagers assembled there and he carried Ugen Ghasi to the hospital. PW2 has also deposed in the Court that in the afternoon on the day of the occurrence he was walking behind Ugen Ghasi and saw that when Ugen Ghagi reached near the house of Krishna Ghasi he started indiscriminate attack on him with a tangi. In the cross-examination he has stated that his house was at a distance of about 100 paces from the place of occurrence. PW7 is none else but brother of Ugen Ghasi. He has deposed in the Court that at the time of assault upon his brother he was present there. He brought his brother to Primary Health Centre, Mahuadanr where his statement was recorded by the police. In the cross-examination he has stated that he is residing at a distance of about half a mile (aadha kos) from the place of occurrence and on the day of the occurrence he was accompanying his brother for raising donation on the occasion of Deepawali. 9. PW1 and PW3 are intimately related to the deceased. Merely because witnesses are close relatives is not enough to reject their testimony if it is otherwise credible. Their evidence needs to be scrutinized with the standard of care and caution as indicated in “Raju v. State of T.N.” (2012) 12 SCC 701 . We find that these witnesses have tendered reliable and trustworthy evidence. 10. In “Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan” (2012) 10 SCC 433 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “34. The testimony of an eyewitness, if found truthful, cannot be discarded merely because the eyewitness was a relative of the deceased. Where the witness is wholly unreliable, the court may discard the statement of such witness, but where the witness is wholly reliable or neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable (if his statement is fully corroborated and supported by other ocular and documentary evidence), the court may base its judgment on the statement of such witness. Of course, in the latter category of witnesses, the court has to be more cautious and see if the statement of the witness is corroborated. Of course, in the latter category of witnesses, the court has to be more cautious and see if the statement of the witness is corroborated. Reference in this regard can be made to Sunil Kumar, Brathi v. State of Punjab and Alagupandi v. State of T.N.” 11. The conduct of PW1, PW2 and PW7, who have claimed in the Court that they were present at the time of the occurrence but apparently did not make any attempt to save Ugen Ghasi, has come in for serious criticism by the defence. 12. The conduct of a witness is examined in the context of facts and circumstances of the case. In “Rana Partap v. State of Haryana” (1983) 3 SCC 327 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that there is no set rule of natural reaction and to discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way. 13. It is case of the prosecution that the attack on Ugen Ghasi was sudden. It has come on record that when Ugen Ghasi came near the house of the appellant he suddenly attacked him with a tangi. PW1 has stated that he was about 20 paces behind Ugen Ghasi and PW7 has simply stated that on the day of the occurrence he was with his brother. The witnesses therefore did not have sufficient time to intervene and save him. Furthermore, in the cross-examination the eyewitnesses have stated that the appellant and Ugen Ghasi were not on inimical terms. PW1 has stated that there was no quarrel between them before the appellant attacked Ugen Ghasi on 31.10.2008. PW2 has also affirmed that the appellant and Ugen Ghasi had no quarrel in the past and PW7 has stated that there was no land dispute with the appellant. Ugen Ghasi is uncle of the appellant and the prosecution has failed to put forth a motive for the crime. No doubt in a case which is based on eyewitness account motive may not assume significance but absence of motive would certainly be a factor to decide the nature of offence. 14. In “Nachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab” (1975) 3 SCC 266 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “10. No doubt in a case which is based on eyewitness account motive may not assume significance but absence of motive would certainly be a factor to decide the nature of offence. 14. In “Nachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab” (1975) 3 SCC 266 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “10. ….the failure of the prosecution to establish the motive for the crime does not mean that the entire prosecution case has to be thrown over-board. It only casts a duty on the Court to scrutinise the other evidence, particularly of the eyewitnesses, with greater care.…” 15. PW6, Dr. Reema K. Khalko who conducted autopsy on the dead body of Ugen Ghasi on 12.11.2008 has found the following injuries: “(1) Abrasion with scab: ½ cm x ½ cm, 1cm x ½ cm and ½ cm x ½ cm. These abrasions were on front of left leg middle part. (2) Stitched wounds: (i) 16 cm long with 18 stitches on left parietal region of head, underneath there is a bony gap of size 9 cm x 8 cm in left parieto occipital bone. (ii) 10 cm long with 11 stitches on left thigh lateral side middle part. (iii) 5 cm long with two stitches front of left arm upper part. (3) Internal injuries: Laceration of left parietal lob of brain posterior part with presence of blood and blood-clot in left hemisphere of brain.” 16. A glance at the postmortem report indicates that there were three stitched wounds; one was over parietal region of the head of Ugen Ghasi. There was bony gap of the size of “9 cm x 8 cm” underneath the first wound over the left parieto-occipital bone. The other two injuries were over left thigh and left arm of the deceased. The prosecution has not produced injury report of Ugen Ghasi prepared at Primary Health Centre, Mahuadanr which would have indicated the extent of head injuries. Though one can gather some indication from the description of injury No.(i) recorded in the postmortem report but in absence of opinion by the doctor who first examined Ugen Ghasi it is not possible to hold that the appellant intended to cause death of Ugen Ghasi by inflicting a tangi blow on his head. The other two injuries are definitely not life-threatening. The other two injuries are definitely not life-threatening. Had the appellant intended to cause death of his uncle he could have attempted repeated tangi blow on his head or any other vital part of the body. 17. Mrs. Priya Shreshtha, the learned Spl.PP would submit that since the attack on Ugen Ghasi was sudden it must be inferred that it was a premeditated act. The learned Spl.PP has referred to the evidence of PW4 who has stated that the brain mater was bulging out of the skull to impress upon us that the appellant has rightly been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 18. At first look this argument appears to be attractive but when examined in the context of the prosecution evidence we find that the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable. In “Mahesh Balmiki alias Munna v. State of M.P.” (2000) 1 SCC 319 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that in some cases a single blow may entail conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, in some cases under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and in some other cases under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and therefore the question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. 19. The appellant has attacked Ugen Ghasi with a tangi was proved but the prosecution has failed to prove that the attack was with an intention to kill him. A blow on head by tangi would certainly be very dangerous and life-threatening but in absence of other attending facts necessary to constitute murder it is not possible to hold that the appellant had knowledge that his act was so imminently dangerous that in all probability it would cause death. The testimony of PW1, PW2 and PW7 is quite cryptic and equally cryptic is appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial Judge, who had the benefit of looking into the case records. 20. In “Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab” [Cr. The testimony of PW1, PW2 and PW7 is quite cryptic and equally cryptic is appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial Judge, who had the benefit of looking into the case records. 20. In “Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab” [Cr. Appeal No. 2094 of 2008, dated 09.01.2019] a three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by a two Judges Bench that the accused who assaulted the deceased with a spade was liable to be convicted under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. We would certainly keep in mind that in a criminal case a judgment has no precedential value nonetheless the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court certainly provide valuable guidance in a case of similar nature. 21. Having considered the aforesaid aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that the appellant is liable to be convicted and sentenced to RI for ten years under section 304 Part-1 of the Indian Penal Code. 22. Ordered accordingly. 23. The judgment of conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code dated 05.09.2011 and the order of sentence of RI for life and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-for the said offence dated 16.09.2011 against the appellant, namely, Krishna Ghasi passed by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Latehar in Sessions Trial No.75 of 2009 are set-aside. 24. The appellant, namely, Krishna Ghasi is convicted and sentenced to RI for 10 years under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. 25. Mrs. Priya Shreshtha, the learned Spl.PP states that the appellant is in custody for more than sixteen years, with remission. 26. Accordingly, the appellant, namely, Krishna Ghasi shall be set free forthwith, if not wanted in connection to any other case. 27. In the result, Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 02 of 2012 is partly allowed, in the above terms. 28. Let lower Court records be transmitted to the Court concerned, forthwith. 29. Let a copy of the Judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned through FAX.