ORDER 1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode. 2. It transpires that a statutory bilateral agreement dated 30th of May, 2017 stood executed between the Management of BILT Graphic Paper Products Limited Unit, Sewa and the Workmen represented by different Unions before the Conciliation Officer-cum- Deputy Labour Commissioner, Jeypore in the conciliation proceeding under Section 12(3) read with Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 3. The present Petitioner-Union claiming itself to be the true representative of the Workmen and filed W.P.(C) No.20176 of 2017 challenging the aforesaid bilateral agreement dated 30th of May, 2017. This Court vide order dated 21st of November, 2017 disposed of the aforesaid Writ Petition with a direction to the Commissioner to take appropriate steps within a period of six weeks on the application dated 21st of June, 2017 filed by the Petitioner-Union raising the similar grievance as raised in this Writ Petition. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Union submits that the contemnor sat over the matter and is not taking steps to comply the order dated 21st of November, 2017 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.20176 of 2017. Hence, this contempt petition . 5. Conciliation proceedings were postulated to put an end to the ongoing disputes between the parties. Upon perusal of the Memorandum of Settlement between the Management of BILT Graphic Paper Products Limited Unit: Sewa and Workmen represented by different Unions dated 30th May, 2017, it is revealed that a bilateral settlement has been secured by the Parties. 6. It is well settled that a settlement of such nature is binding on both the employer and the workmen under section-18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, making the workmen unions bound by the settlement. Once a settlement is arrived at under the said provision, none of the parties can go back on their stance. The hypothesis for the same is to vindicate the inviolability of the settlement reached via the length of the conciliation proceedings and the persuasive skills of the conciliation officer. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court has succinctly emphasised the sanctity of Section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in Barauni Refinery Shramik Parishad and Ors v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors:, MANU/SC/0784/1990. 9. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court has succinctly emphasised the sanctity of Section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in Barauni Refinery Shramik Parishad and Ors v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors:, MANU/SC/0784/1990. 9. ' .It may be seen on a plain reading of Sub- sections (1) and (3) of Section 18 that settlements are divided into two categories, namely, (1) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings. A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category has extended application since it is binding on all parties to the industrial dispute, to all others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all others who joined the establishment thereafter.Therefore, a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement.There is an underlying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the union signing the settlement but also on others. That is why a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is put on par with an award made by an adjudicatory authority'. 8. In addition, the Hon'ble Apex court has also held that the settlement is binding not only on the signatories but also on the members of the union that had objected to it. This binding principle emanates from the intrinsic assumption of fairness and reasonableness with respect to the settlement reached with the efforts of the conciliation officer. 8. In addition, the Hon'ble Apex court has also held that the settlement is binding not only on the signatories but also on the members of the union that had objected to it. This binding principle emanates from the intrinsic assumption of fairness and reasonableness with respect to the settlement reached with the efforts of the conciliation officer. In the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd v. State of Rajasthan and Ors, MANU/SC/0755/1999, it held that: '25.settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which has objected to the same. Recognised union having majority of members is expected to protect the legitimate interest of labour and enter into a settlement in the best interest of labour. This is with the object to uphold the sanctity of settlement reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an Individual employee or minority union from scuttling the settlement. When a settlement is arrived at during the conciliation proceedings it is binding on the members of the Workers' Union as laid down by Section 18(3)(d) of the Act. It would ipso facto bind all the existing workmen who are all parties to the industrial dispute and who may not be members of unions that are signatories to such settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act. Act is based on the principle of collective bargaining for resolving industrial disputes and for maintaining industrial peace.'. 9. The concept of Industrial Dispute resolution manifests industrial peace and cooperation. Accordingly, all settlements attained between contesting parties are to be positioned with a firm foot. Going back on the same issue and pursuing to alter once reached settlements cannot be countenanced. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has deprecated such stance in P. Virudhachalam and Ors v. Management of Lotus Mills and Ors, MANU/SC/0890/1998 and held that it will also bind the non-signatory objectioners to the settlement to keep intact the spirit of Industrial Dispute resolution. The Court iterated that ; '10..It is impossible to accept the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that settlements between the parties are different from agreements between the parties. It is trite to observe that all settlements must be based on written agreements and such written agreements get embedded in settlements. The Court iterated that ; '10..It is impossible to accept the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that settlements between the parties are different from agreements between the parties. It is trite to observe that all settlements must be based on written agreements and such written agreements get embedded in settlements. But all agreements may not necessarily be settlements till the aforesaid procedure giving them status of such settlements gets followed. In other words, under the scheme of the Act, all settlements are necessarily to be treated as binding agreements between the parties but all agreements may not be settlements so as to have binding effect as provided Under Section 18(1) or (3) if the necessary procedure for giving them such status is not followed in given cases. On the aforesaid scheme of the Act, therefore, it must be held that the settlement arrived at during conciliation proceedings on 5.5.1980 between Respondent No. 1-Management on the one hand and the four out of 5 unions of workmen on the other, had a binding effect Under Section 18(3) of the Act not only on the members of the signatory unions but also on the remaining workmen who were represented by the fifth union which, though having taken part in conciliation proceedings, refused to sign the settlement. It is axiomatic that if such settlement arrived at during the conciliation proceedings is binding to even future workmen as laid down by Section 18(3)(d), it would ipso facto bind all the existing workmen who are all parties to the industrial dispute and who may not be members of unions that are signatories to such settlement Under Section 12(3) of the Act'. 10. Moreover, every time an objection to a settlement is raised and countenanced, it falls into the vicious cycle of disagreements, undermining the industrial democracy envisioned by the principle of binding settlements. Legitimatizing challenges to an already settled contest serves no purpose but would be a retrograde step. 11. The said agreement has been entered into by the Parties and they have agreed to the terms and conditions as enumerated in the said settlement. Hence at this juncture, they cannot turn around and seek quashment of the said settlement, nor can it be termed as an arbitrary settlement. 12. 11. The said agreement has been entered into by the Parties and they have agreed to the terms and conditions as enumerated in the said settlement. Hence at this juncture, they cannot turn around and seek quashment of the said settlement, nor can it be termed as an arbitrary settlement. 12. In view of the above, we do not find any reason to interfere with the bilateral settlement arrived at between the parties and undermine the sanctity of the agreement. Hence, no contempt proceedings can be initiated against the contemnor since he cannot decide an issue which has already received seal of approval by the parties. 13. Accordingly, this CONTC is disposed of.