ORDER : 1. This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. praying this Court to set aside the order of taking cognizance and issue of process dated 14.02.2012 passed by the Civil Judge and JMFC, at Nelamangala, Bengaluru Rural District in C.C. No. 323/2012 for the offences punishable under Sections 41(2) and 43 of Water (Prevention and Control Pollution) Act, 1974 (‘the Act’ for short) and quash the entire proceedings insofar as the petitioners are concerned and pass such other relief/s as this Court deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the respondent had initiated the proceedings against the petitioners herein by filing a complaint invoking Sections 25 and 26 of the Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, 1974, making the allegation that the offences are punishable under Sections 41 and 44 of the Act against the petitioners herein and also accused No. 3 for violation of Section 25(1) of the said Act and also the offences punishable under Sections 41 to 44 of the Act against accused Nos. 1 to 3 for violation of Section 33A of the Act regarding non compliance of the directions of the complainant- Board. 3. Learned Magistrate, after considering the averments made in the complaint and also the documents, vide order dated 14.02.2012 passed an order of taking cognizance and comes to the conclusion that sworn statement of the complainant is dispensed with under Section 200(a) of Cr.P.C. and thereafter, considering the material available on record took cognizance of the offence against the petitioners herein and other accused. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the petitioner, particularly, second petitioner is not responsible for any violation of the provisions of the Act since there is no any specific averment in the complaint that he was in charge of the affairs of the Company and the petitioner No. 2 was only the Director of the Company. The complaint dated 07.02.2012 is filed after seven years of the incident and according to the complaint averments, the allegation made is pertinent to the year 2006. Thus, it clearly discloses, that with mala-fide intention, the complaint is filed. 5. The complaint dated 07.02.2012 is filed after seven years of the incident and according to the complaint averments, the allegation made is pertinent to the year 2006. Thus, it clearly discloses, that with mala-fide intention, the complaint is filed. 5. In support of the contention, learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and Another, 2005 AIR SCW 4070, wherein it is held that the Director of the Company is not deemed to be vicariously liable merely because by virtue of office he holds unless the specific averments are made in the complaint that he was in charge of the affairs of the Company. Learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court Para Nos. 19 and 20 of the judgment, wherein the Apex Court also discussed with regard to Section 141 of the Act. 6. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur High Court in the case of M/s. Daawat Foods Limited vs. M.P. Pollution Control Board decided on 05.02.2018 and brought to the notice of this Court Para No. 8, wherein the High Court held that Section 47 is largely pari materia with Section 141 of the Act, 1881. Learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court Para No. 19, wherein the High Court has discussed the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Limited vs. Neeta Bhalla and Another and observed with regard to provisions of the Water Act as Section 47, providing for vicarious liability of the Directors and their prosecution for offences committed by Companies is in pari matria with Section 141 of the Act, 1881, in which Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held that there must be a specific averment that the Director was a person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company. 7. Learned counsel referring to these two judgments would vehemently contend that there is no specific averment in the complaint that the Director was in charge of the affairs of the Company and hence, there cannot be any prosecution against the petitioners herein. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would vehemently contend that there is a notification of the year 2003, and in terms of the notification the prior permission is not taken. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would vehemently contend that there is a notification of the year 2003, and in terms of the notification the prior permission is not taken. Learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court para No. 4 of the complaint, wherein a specific averment is made with regard to the second petitioner herein and also the third accused who are the occupier of the first accused Industry. As such, accused Nos. 2 and 3 being the occupier of the first accused Industry are liable for the alleged act of the first accused Industry. When they are the occupier of the Industry and in the realm of affairs of the Company, they are liable to be prosecuted. 9. In support of the said contention, learned counsel relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Modi Disttillery and Others decided on 06.08.1987, wherein the Apex Court discussed with regard to the involvement of the person in the Company affairs and held that whether Chairman, Vice Chairman, Managing Director and Members of the Board of Directors of Company owning industrial unit could be proceeded against under Section 47 of the Act in absence of prosecution of the Company owning the said industrial unit. The combined reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 47 clarifies that Chairman, Vice Chairman, Managing Director and members of Board of Directors of Company owning industrial unit could be prosecuted as having been in charge of and responsible to Company, for business of industrial unit, the Company owned by it and could be deemed guilty of offence with which charged. Having willfully failed to furnish the requisite information to the Appellate-Board, not open to Chairman, Vice Chairman, Managing Director and other members of Board of Directors to seek Court’s assistance to derive advantage from lapse committed by their own industrial unit. If there is technical flaw in complaint attributable to failure of industrial unit to furnish requisite information called for by the Appellate-Board, the legal infirmity could be cured by remitting to Chief Judicial Magistrate with direction to call upon appellant to make formal amendments to averments contained in the complaint, so as to make controlling Company of industrial unit figure as concerned accused in complaint. The documents reveal, the Company had no proper arrangements for treating of highly polluted trade effluents discharged by it and although appellant repeatedly required Company to obtain its consent, Company deliberately avoided compliance of Sections 25(1) and 26, which is offence punishable under Section 44 read with Section 47 of the Act. 10. Learned counsel referring this judgment would vehemently contend that the judgment of the Apex Court would come to the aid of the complainant/respondent to initiate the proceedings against the petitioners herein for violation of the provisions of the Act and hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. 11. In reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, learned counsel for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the judgment referred supra by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 and the principles laid down therein is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Learned counsel for the petitioners also brought to the notice of this Court Para No. 4 of the judgment, wherein it is held that where an offence under this Act has been committed by a Company every person what at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the Company for the conduct, of the business of the Company, as well as the Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. In the case on hand, the Company is also arraigned as an accused. However, no averment is made in the complaint against the petitioner No. 2 herein that he was in charge of the affairs of the Company. Hence, it is a fit case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 12. Having heard the respective counsel and also on perusal of the complaint, this Court has to consider the averment made in the complaint. On perusal of the complaint, in Para No. 4, the specific allegations are made against the Company as well as the Directors of the Company. The specific allegations are also made in the complaint that third respondent is a General Manager and the second petitioner herein is the Managing Director of M/s Golden Seam Textiles Private Limited and also arraigned the Executive Engineer as accused No. 4. The specific allegations are also made in the complaint that third respondent is a General Manager and the second petitioner herein is the Managing Director of M/s Golden Seam Textiles Private Limited and also arraigned the Executive Engineer as accused No. 4. In Para No. 4 of the complaint, a specific allegation is made that the accused is a Company within the provisions under Section 47 of the Act, which is engaged in process of establishing and manufacturing of garment materials and stitching unit, with that purpose the first accused Company has established its unit of manufacturing of garment materials under the name and style of M/s Golden Seam Textiles Private Limited. It is also the specific allegation in the complaint that accused Nos. 2 and 3 are the occupier of the first accused Industry and as such, accused Nos. 2 and 3 being the occupier of the first accused Industry and therefore, they are liable for the alleged act of the offences committed by the first accused Industry. Thus, the first accused Industry has established its unit for garments stitching and manufacturing of garment materials in the name and style of M/s. Golden Seam Textiles Private Limited. 13. Having perused the averments made in the complaint, a specific allegation is made in the complaint that petitioner No. 2 i.e. the petitioner herein, who represented the Company was also an occupier of the first accused Company along with accused No. 3. The specific averments are also made that the petitioners are liable for the alleged act of offence committed by accused No. 1 Industry. It is not in dispute that petitioner No. 2 herein is the Director of the Company and when the specific allegations are made in the complaint though contend that he was not in the realm of the affairs of the Company, the petitioner herein has not denied the same and also not stated, who else are in the affairs of the Company if he is not the in charge of the affairs of the Company. No doubt, the Apex Court in the judgment referred supra held that Director of the Company is not deemed to be vicariously liable merely because he hold the office, but the principles laid down in the said judgment is not applicable to the case on hand since in para No. 4 of the complaint, the specific allegations are made that the petitioner No. 2 herein is also the occupier of the Company. 14. The judgment of the Jabalpur High Court placed before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioners also not comes to their aid. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that petitioner No. 2 was not in charge of the affairs of the Company. When the specific allegations are made that petitioner No. 2 is the occupier of the Company, the Company is also arraigned as a party to the proceedings, the very contention that Section 141 of the Act comes to the aid of the petitioners, cannot be accepted. 15. The Apex Court in U.P. Pollution Control Board’s case has made a specific observation that the persons who are looking after the affairs of the Company could be deemed to be guilty of offence with which charged and having willfully failed to furnish the requisite information to Appellate-Board, not open to Chairman, Vice Chairman, Managing Director and other members of the Board of Directors to seek Court’s assistance to derive advantage from the lapse committed by their own Industrial unit. If there is technical flaw in complaint attributable to failure of Industrial unit to furnish requisite information called for by the Appellate-Board, the legal infirmity could be cured by remitting to Chief Judicial Magistrate with direction to call upon appellant to make formal amendments to averments contained in the complaint, so as to make controlling Company of the industrial unit figure as concerned accused in complaint. The Apex Court even gone to the extent of observing that in case of any lapse in making the pleading also, the same can be amended and so also the complaint can be amended by necessary amendments. The Apex Court even gone to the extent of observing that in case of any lapse in making the pleading also, the same can be amended and so also the complaint can be amended by necessary amendments. In the said judgment, it is also held that if they willfully failed to furnish the requisite information to the Appellate-Board, it is not open to the Director or Managing Director as the case may be to take shelter of non-mentioning of the averment and the technical flaw in the complaint attributable to the failure of industrial unit to furnish the requisite information can be cured. When such being the facts and circumstances of the case, the very contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that he is not responsible for the affairs of the Company cannot be accepted in the absence of the specific averments in the complaint. 16. No doubt, in the complaint, specific allegations are made that inspection was conducted in the year 2006 and the subsequent averment also discloses that mahazar was drawn in the year 2008 and later in the year 2012, the complaint is filed but the same will not take away the case of respondent No. 2, since it constitutes the defence. Insofar as the delay is concerned, it is mixed question of law and facts, which has to be ascertained only during the course of the trial. 17. In view of the discussion made above, I pass the following: ORDER: The petition is rejected.