ORDER : By an order dated 15th December, 2020, after noticing the conflict of views expressed by two learned Single Judges of this Court, the learned Single Judge referred following question to a larger Bench: "Whether a criminal petition or an appeal is maintainable against an order of a Special Court or the exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail?" This question has been framed in the context of subsection (2) of Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, "the SC and ST Act"). We are reframing the questions for consideration as under: (i) Whether an appeal is maintainable under subsection (2) of Section 14A of the SC an ST Act against an order granting or refusing to grant bail? (ii) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 438 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C") is taken away by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 14A of the SC and ST Act? 2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/accused and the learned SPP appearing for the State on the aforesaid issue. SUBMISSIONS 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/accused submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act specifically overrides sub-section (3) of Section 378 of Cr.P.C. Sub-section (3) of Section 378 deals with only an appeal against the acquittal. His submission is that therefore, an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant bail will not be an appealable order. He also invited our attention to Section 18 of the SC and ST Act which provides that the provisions of Section 438 of the pre-arrest will not apply to any case involving arrest of any person on the allegation of a crime being committed under the SC and ST Act. He invited our attention to paragraph 10 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan –v-Union of India and others, AIR 2020 SC 1036 . He invited our attention to paragraph 10 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan –v-Union of India and others, AIR 2020 SC 1036 . His submission is that though Section 20 of the SC and ST Act provides for overriding the provisions of any other law for the time being in force which are inconsistent with the provisions of the SC and ST Act, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of Section 438 and 439 of Cr.P.C which confer the concurrent jurisdiction on the Sessions Court and the High Court and the provisions of the SC and ST Act. His submission is that the provisions of Section 438 and 439 of Cr.P.C which confer a power on the High Court to consider the applications for pre-arrest bail or regular bail as the case may be, operate in a different field in the sense that it is not an appeal against the order of the Sessions Court denying the prayer for pre-arrest or bail. The learned counsel would submit that if this Court comes to the conclusion that an appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 14A will lie against the order of the Special Court refusing or granting bail, still the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 438 and 439 of the Cr.P.C. remains intact. Lastly, he submits that in case the appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A is held to be maintainable, this Court will have to decide the issue whether such an appeal will lie before a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench. 4. The learned SPP appearing for the State submitted the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (for short "the POTA Act") is para materia with the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act. The learned SPP relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh and others, (2003) 8 SCC 50 and submitted that as held by the Apex Court, in view of the availability of a remedy of appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act, the power of this Court either under Section 438 or 439 of Cr.P.C cannot be exercised. He also relied upon another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and others vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922 and submitted that even the said decision supports the proposition which he is canvassing. The learned SPP also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Mohd. Hussain Alias Saleem, (2014) 1 SCC 258 . 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/accused sought to make a distinction between Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act and Section 34 of the POTA Act. His submission is that the remedy under Section 438 and 439 of Cr.P.C available before this Court remains intact. 6. We have carefully considered the submissions. It is necessary to make a reference to Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act which reads thus: "14A. Appeals—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every appeal preferred under subsection (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal." (underline supplied) 7. Sub-section (1) of Section 14-A of SC and ST Act has an overriding effect on the provisions of Cr.P.C. However, sub-section (1) of Section 14-A excludes the interlocutory orders from its purview. Sub-section (1) of Section 14-A of SC and ST Act has an overriding effect on the provisions of Cr.P.C. However, sub-section (1) of Section 14-A excludes the interlocutory orders from its purview. Therefore, going by sub-section (1) of Section 14-A, an appeal will not lie against an order granting or refusing to grant bail. However, sub-section (2) of Section 14A of Cr.P.C provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of Special Court and exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. Thus, sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act carves out an exception to the rule under sub-section (1) of Section 14A which lays down that no appeal will lie against an interlocutory order. 8. The emphasis of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/accused was on the fact that Section 378 of Cr.P.C is applicable to criminal appeals and sub-section (3) of Section 378 provides that an appeal as such filed under subsection (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 378 can be entertained only with the leave of the High Court. It is true that sub-section (3) of Section 378 of Cr.P.C has nothing to do with the power to grant bail. The law is well settled. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the law in such a manner that no provision of the law becomes redundant. A possible interpretation can be that an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant bail can be preferred without seeking a leave of the High Court as required by Section 378 of Cr.P.C. 9. The Apex Court has interpreted more or less identical provisions of POTA in the case of STATE OF GUJARAT vs SALIMBHAI ABDULGAFFAR SHAIKH (supra). In paragraph 7 of the said decision, the Apex Court has quoted Section 34 of POTA. For the sake of convenience, we are reproducing paragraph 7 of the said decision which reads thus. "7. In order to examine the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to take note of Section 34 of POTA which reads as under: 34. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court. (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. (5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days." (underlines supplied) 10. As far as the provision regarding appeal is concerned, there is no difference between sub-section (1) of Section 34 of POTA and sub-section (1) of Section 14-A of SC and ST Act. The only one difference which can be noted is that sub-section (1) of Section 34 specifically provides that an appeal will lie both on facts and law. However, as in the case of sub-section (1) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act, subsection (1) of Section 34 of POTA Act provides that there will be no appeal against an interlocutory order. There is no difference between the language used in sub-section (4) of Section 34 of POTA Act and sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act. Both the Sections start with a non obstante clause and provide for an appeal against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. 11. The Apex Court interpreted the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 34 of POTA. In paragraph 8 of the aforesaid decision in the case of SALIMBHAI ABDULGAFFAR SHAIKH (supra), the Apex Court noted that normally, an order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order and an appeal would not lie against such an order. 11. The Apex Court interpreted the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 34 of POTA. In paragraph 8 of the aforesaid decision in the case of SALIMBHAI ABDULGAFFAR SHAIKH (supra), the Apex Court noted that normally, an order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order and an appeal would not lie against such an order. The Apex Court further observed that in view of sub-section (4) of Section 34, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order granting or refusing to grant bail. The Apex Court also noted that Section 439 of Cr.P.C confers concurrent powers on the Court of Sessions and the High Court to grant bail. In paragraph 12, the Apex Court noted the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the provisions of POTA do not take away the power of the High Court to grant bail by exercising the power under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. Another argument was that sub-section (5) of Section 49 of POTA provides that nothing in Section 438 of Cr.P.C shall apply in relation to pre-arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under the said Act. It must be observed here that the said provision of sub-section (5) of Section 49 of POTA is pari materia with Section 18 of the SC and ST Act. 12. In paragraph 14 of the said decision, the Apex Court held thus: "14. That apart, if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted, it would mean that a person whose bail under POTA has been rejected by the Special Court will have two remedies and he can avail any one of them at his sweet will. He may move a bail application before the High Court under Section 439 CrPC in the original or concurrent jurisdiction which may be heard by a Single Judge or may prefer an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 34 of POTA which would be heard by a Bench of two Judges. To interpret a statutory provision in such a manner that a court can exercise both appellate and original jurisdiction in respect of the same matter will lead to an incongruous situation. The contention is therefore fallacious." (underline supplied) 13. To interpret a statutory provision in such a manner that a court can exercise both appellate and original jurisdiction in respect of the same matter will lead to an incongruous situation. The contention is therefore fallacious." (underline supplied) 13. Hence, the Apex Court in clear terms held that as sub-section (4) of Section 34 of POTA provides for an appeal to the High Court against an order granting or refusing to grant bail, the High Court cannot exercise the power under Section 439 of Cr.P.C in exercise of original or concurrent jurisdiction. As can be seen from sub-section (2) of Section 34 of POTA, an appeal under sub-section (4) thereof lies before a Division Bench. Therefore, the interpretation put by the Apex Court to sub-section (4) of Section 34 of POTA Act will govern subsection (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act. 14. As far as an appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A is concerned, the same will be governed by Section 5 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 which reads thus: "5. First Appeals. -Save as otherwise provided in this Act. - (i) all First Appeal against a decree or order passed in a suit or other proceedings, the value of subject matter which exceeds fifteen lakh rupees shall be heard by a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court and other First Appeals shall be heard by a Single Judge of the High Court. (ii) All Criminal Appeals against Judgments in which sentence of death or imprisonment for life is passed and against Judgments or acquittal in cases in which offences are punishable with death or imprisonment for life shall be heard by a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court and other Criminal Appeals shall be heard by a Single Judge of the High Court." (underline supplied) Thus, clause (ii) of Section 5 lays down which category of criminal appeals will be heard by a Division Bench. It provides that all other appeals shall be heard by a Single Judge of this Court. Only the criminal appeals against the judgments in which sentence of death or imprisonment for life is passed and against the judgments of acquittal in cases in which offences are punishable with death or imprisonment for life shall be heard by a Division Bench of this Court. Only the criminal appeals against the judgments in which sentence of death or imprisonment for life is passed and against the judgments of acquittal in cases in which offences are punishable with death or imprisonment for life shall be heard by a Division Bench of this Court. All other appeals are required to be heard by a Single Judge. Therefore, an appeal provided under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act will lie before a Single Judge. If the argument that notwithstanding the remedy of an appeal available under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act, the High Court can exercise original or concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of Cr.P.C is accepted, then a Single Judge of this Court will be exercising an appellate jurisdiction against an order granting or refusing to grant bail by a Special Court and an original or concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of Cr.P.C to grant bail. As can be seen from Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act, a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court is always a Court of sessions. Therefore, as held by the Apex Court, the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 14-A cannot be interpreted in such a manner that the High Court will exercise original or concurrent jurisdiction as well as Appellate Jurisdiction in respect of the same matter which will lead to an incongruous situation. 15. We need to state here that the position of law is that normally, a High Court will not entertain an application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C unless the applicant first approaches the Sessions Court. Therefore, when a person is arrested with the allegation of commission of an offence punishable under the SC and ST Act, he will have to approach the Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the SC and ST Act for grant of bail. 16. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH vs MOHD. HUSSAIN ALIAS SALEEM (supra) considered similar provisions regarding an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant bail under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (for short 'the NIA Act'). The Apex Court has followed the view taken in the case of STATE OF GUJARAT vs SALIMBHAI ABDULGAFFAR SHAIKH (supra). HUSSAIN ALIAS SALEEM (supra) considered similar provisions regarding an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant bail under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (for short 'the NIA Act'). The Apex Court has followed the view taken in the case of STATE OF GUJARAT vs SALIMBHAI ABDULGAFFAR SHAIKH (supra). The Apex Court interpreted sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the NIA Act on the same lines. 17. In the case of USMANBHAI DAWOODBHAI MEMON AND OTHERS vs STATE OF GUJARAT (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short 'the TADA Act'). 18. Some controversy is raised about the jurisdiction of the Special Court to grant pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C in the context of the provisions of Section 18 of the SC and ST Act which reads thus: "18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act. -Nothing in Section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act." 19. The argument is that as Section 438 of Cr.P.C is not applicable to persons against whom the allegation is of commission of offences punishable under the SC and ST Act, there is no question of any appeal being filed against an order granting or refusing to grant pre-arrest or anticipatory bail. It is also contended on the other hand that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of PRATHVI RAJ CHAUHAN vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (supra), the High Court can entertain an application for grant of pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. 20. In the case of PRATHVI RAJ CHAUHAN vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (supra), the Apex Court dealt with a validity challenge to Section 18 as well as Section 18-A of the SC and ST Act. The issue before the Apex Court was whether the provisions of Section 438 of Cr.P.C are applicable to the cases under the SC and ST Act. The question was examined in the context of the bar created by Section 18 as well as by sub-section (2) of Section 18-A of the SC and ST Act. Section 18-A reads thus: "18A. The issue before the Apex Court was whether the provisions of Section 438 of Cr.P.C are applicable to the cases under the SC and ST Act. The question was examined in the context of the bar created by Section 18 as well as by sub-section (2) of Section 18-A of the SC and ST Act. Section 18-A reads thus: "18A. (1) For the purpose of this Act, - (a) preliminary enquiry shall not be required for registration of a First Information Report against any person; or (b) the investigating officer shall not require approval for the arrest, if necessary, of any person, against whom an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act has been made and no procedure other than that provided under this Act or the Code shall apply. (2) The provisions of section 438 of the Code shall not apply to a case under this Act, notwithstanding any judgment or order or direction of any Court." (underline supplied) 21. In the case of PRATHVI RAJ CHAUHAN vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (supra), the Apex Court considered its earlier decisions in the light of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 10, the Apex Court held thus: "10. Concerning the applicability of provisions of section 438 Cr.PC, it shall not apply to the cases under Act of 1989. However, if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1989, the bar created by section 18 and 18A (i) shall not apply. We have clarified this aspect while deciding the review petitions." (underline supplied) 22. Hence, in paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Apex Court has held that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 18 and sub-section (2) of Section 18-A, a recourse can be taken to Section 438 of Cr.P.C if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the SC and ST Act. 23. Hence, in paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Apex Court has held that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 18 and sub-section (2) of Section 18-A, a recourse can be taken to Section 438 of Cr.P.C if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the SC and ST Act. 23. In view of the said dictum of the Apex Court, in a case where the complaint alleges commission of an offence punishable under the SC and ST Act, the Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court can exercise the jurisdiction under Section 438 of Cr.P.C provided the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for the applicability of the provisions of the SC and ST Act. Therefore, if a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court passes an order of granting or refusing to grant pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C, an appeal will be available to the High Court under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act. However, while dealing with the appeal, the High Court can consider the question of grant of pre-arrest bail only if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for the applicability of the provisions of the SC and ST Act as held by the Apex Court in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan (supra). 24. There are other decisions placed on record which will deal with the provisions regarding an appeal under subsection (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act. There is a decision of the learned Single Judge of Gujrat High Court placed on record in the case of ANILABEN vs STATE OF GUJARAT in Criminal Misc. Application No.6219/2018 decided on 28th March 2018. We need not detain ourselves with the said decision as now there is a clear pronouncement of law by the Apex Court on the issue of scope of appeal as well as the power to grant pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of CR.P.C. 25. Application No.6219/2018 decided on 28th March 2018. We need not detain ourselves with the said decision as now there is a clear pronouncement of law by the Apex Court on the issue of scope of appeal as well as the power to grant pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of CR.P.C. 25. To conclude, we hold as under: (i) An appeal is maintainable under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court established under Section 14 of the said Act granting or refusing to grant bail; (ii) As held by the Apex Court in the case of PRATHVI RAJ CHAUHAN vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (supra), in a given case, the powers under Section 438 of Cr.P.C can be exercised, if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the SC and ST Act. Therefore, only to that extent, against an order granting or refusing to grant pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C by a Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, a remedy of appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act is available; (iii) In view of availability of the remedy of appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act, it will not be open for the High Court to exercise the original or concurrent jurisdiction under Sections 438 and 439 of Cr.P.C; (iv) We hold that in view of clause (ii) of Section 5 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 a Single Judge has the jurisdiction to entertain and decide an appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 14-A of the SC and ST Act; (v) The question formulated by the learned Single Judge in his order dated 15th December 2020 and the questions formulated by us in paragraph 1 above are answered on the above terms.