JUDGMENT S.K. Panigrahi, J. - The present appeal has been directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.09.2018 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal in C.T. (Ss) Case No.18 of 2017, whereby the appellant assails his conviction for commission of offences punishable under Sections 304 Part-II of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'the I.P.C.' for brevity) and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he has been sentenced to further undergo R.I. for a period of three months under Section 304 Part-II of the I.P.C. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the substratum of the matter presented before this Court remain that the deceased was a resident of village Analabeda, P.S. Rasol, Dist- Dhenkanal. On 4th October 2016, the deceased was assaulted by Nirakara Sahu (hereinafter referred to as 'the Appellant' for brevity), with a bamboo lathi near the shop of Ami Sahoo (P.W.2) at around 8.00 P.M. in the evening. The deceased sustained injuries on the head and other parts of the body and subsequently, succumbed to such injuries due to shock and haemorrhage. The incident was reported to be witnessed by two individual witnesses, namely, Sudhakar Biswal (P.W.1) & Ami Sahoo (P.W.2) and later P.W.2 was declared hostile during the course of investigation. The sole eye-witness, P.W.1 happens to be the maternal uncle of the deceased and, therefore, is an interested witness. The FIR was filed by Damayanti Biswal (P.W.3) who is the sister-in-law of the deceased and is not an occurrence witness. 3. The O.I.C., Rasol Police Station, Rasol (P.W.15) after receiving the F.I.R., registered the same as Rasol P.S. Case No. 93 of 2016. The O.I.C. then proceeded to the spot and examined witnesses.Tthe deceased was transferred to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Hindol for treatment. The O.I.C. collected four broken pieces of lathi (M.Os.I to IV), apparels worn by the accused (M.Os. XI and XII) at the concerned spot. The O.I.C proceeded to the village and took the appellant into custody. 4. During the course of investigation, the condition of the deceased worsened and he was shifted to S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack where he succumbed to the injuries. The body of the deceased was sent for post mortem examination. XI and XII) at the concerned spot. The O.I.C proceeded to the village and took the appellant into custody. 4. During the course of investigation, the condition of the deceased worsened and he was shifted to S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack where he succumbed to the injuries. The body of the deceased was sent for post mortem examination. The biological samples of the appellant and that of the deceased were collected and sent to State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar for chemical examination and opinion. Documents relating to Mangalabag Police Station, concerning the death of the deceased were collected, seized and the accused was arrested. After conclusion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed by the Investigating Officer (P.W.16). 5. The prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses to bring home the charges. P.W.1 is the maternal uncle of the deceased who also happens to be the only eye-witness to the occurrence. P.W.2 is the shop keeper at the spot where the incident unfolded. P.W.3 is the sister-in-law of the deceased who lodged the FIR at the Hindol Police Station, Hindol. P.W.4 and P.W.5 were declared hostile along with P.W.2 during the course of investigation. P.W.6 is the wife of the deceased. P.W.7 is the father-in-law of P.W.6 and is an occurrence witness who saw the deceased lying in a pool of blood and consequently, lost his consciousness at the sight of body of the deceased. P.W.8 is a witness to seizure of weapon of offence and tooth frame of the deceased. P.W.9 is the sister-in-law of the deceased. P.W.10 and P.W.13 are the witnesses to the statement of the appellant before the O.I.C. of Hindol Police Station, Hindol. P.W.11 and P.W.12 are Constable and A.S.I. of Mangalabag Police Station respectively. P.W.14 is the Medical Officer who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. P.W.15 is the O.I.C. of Hindol Police Station, Hindol who registered the FIR. P.W.16 is the final Investigating Officer who submitted the charge sheet after conclusion of investigation. 6. Shri Ramani Kanta Pattanaik, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that out of the two eye witnesses, P.W.2, the shopkeeper near whose shop the incident was reported to have taken place, has turned hostile as the depositions made by him suffered from glaring inconsistencies. The materials on record also suggest that P.W.2 resiled from the statements made before the Investigating Officer. The materials on record also suggest that P.W.2 resiled from the statements made before the Investigating Officer. Accordingly, P.W.2 and his depositions relating to the present case cannot be relied upon. 7. The plea of the appellant is that the depositions made by P.W.1 suffers from glaring infirmities as the presence of P.W.1 at the time of occurrence was neither admitted by P.W.2 nor by P.W.4 and P.W.5. Moreover, the learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that P.W.1, in his examination-in-chief, had stated that incident took place at around 7.30 A.M. in the morning whereas the occurrence took place in the evening time and not in the morning time. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State has submitted that the report of the Medical Officer (P.W.14) reveals that the deceased suffered homicidal death due to the seized weapons (M.Os.I-IV). Further, he relied upon the evidence of P.W.1 who is one of the eye witnesses and iterated that the evidence adduced by the eye witnesses did not suffer from any infirmity, despite cross- examination. Hence, he submitted that the prosecution has sufficiently proved the motive of the accused in committing such a heinous crime. Having made the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the State submits that the prosecution has been successful in establishing the fact that the appellant is the author of the crime beyond reasonable doubt and that the present appeal ought to be dismissed being devoid of merit. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties. It can be summarised that the learned court below, in order to bring home the culpability of the appellant, has relied upon the following circumstances namely (i) statement of eye-witness (ii) Corroboration of witnesses' depositions. While doing so the trial court has proceeded to hold that these circumstances establish a complete chain of circumstances which prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed the murder of the deceased. 10. Upon perusal of the evidence produced before the learned trial court, with regard to the first circumstance i.e. the statement of the eye-witness stated hereinabove, the evidence of P.W. 1 has been relied upon. The evidence of an eyewitness, if credible, constitutes, needless to say, the best possible evidence. 10. Upon perusal of the evidence produced before the learned trial court, with regard to the first circumstance i.e. the statement of the eye-witness stated hereinabove, the evidence of P.W. 1 has been relied upon. The evidence of an eyewitness, if credible, constitutes, needless to say, the best possible evidence. There is wealth of judicial authority for the proposition that conviction may rest on the sole testimony of an eyewitness, sans any other evidence, provided, always, the evidence of the eyewitness is absolutely credible. In a recent case of Dalip Kumar v State of Delhi[1], Delhi High Court iterated that: '14. As the value of evidence increases, however, so does the rigour and strictness of the scrutiny to which the evidence is required to be subjected. While, therefore, upholding the principle that conviction can rest on the sole testimony of an eye-witness, without any supportive evidence whatsoever, the Supreme Court has, been at pains to also hold that, in all such cases, the credibility of the evidence of the eye-witness is required to be conclusively established. For this, the court is required to assess, among other things, the evidence of the eye-witness, as tendered during investigation, when compared with his evidence during trial, and to examine whether the evidence, tendered during trial, is cogent and coherent, and free from any disabling inconsistencies, as well as the extent to which the evidence of the eye-witness is consistent with the evidence of other witnesses, tendered during trial. While embarking on this exercise, needless to say, the court is required to be mindful of the distinction between minor, and major, inconsistencies, and may only take cognizance of those inconsistencies which dent the case of the prosecution. At the same time, inconsistencies, even if minor, may, if they are sufficiently large in number, substantially weaken the credibility of the testimony of the witness concerned. 15. In the ultimate eventuate, these are all factors of which the criminal court is bound, by oath, to be duly sensitised. At all times, the court is required to be alive to the fact that the facts, cumulatively seen, and the evidence, holistically assessed, may exonerate the accused, or may cast doubt on his guilt, and to the legal position that, in either case, the accused is entitled to acquittal.' [1] CRL.A.45/2002 &Crl. M.A.10587/2019. At all times, the court is required to be alive to the fact that the facts, cumulatively seen, and the evidence, holistically assessed, may exonerate the accused, or may cast doubt on his guilt, and to the legal position that, in either case, the accused is entitled to acquittal.' [1] CRL.A.45/2002 &Crl. M.A.10587/2019. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amar Singh vs State (NCT of Delhi)[2], iterated similar thoughts: '16. ..There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony Courts will insist on corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity but quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. xx xx xx xx 32. The conviction of the appellants rests on the oral testimony of PW-1 who was produced as eye witness of the murder of the deceased. Both the Learned Sessions Judge, as well as High Court have placed reliance on the evidence of PW-1 and ordinarily this Court could be reluctant to disturb the concurrent view but since there are inherent improbabilities in the prosecution story and the conduct of eye witness is inconsistent with ordinary course of human nature we do not think it would be safe to convict the appellants upon the in corroborated testimony of the sole eye witness. Similar view has been taken by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Selvaraj v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1976) 4 SCC 343 . Wherein on an appreciation of evidence the prosecution story was found highly improbable and inconsistent of ordinary course of human nature concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the two Courts below was set aside.' [2] Criminal Appeal No. 335 of 2015 and Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 2015. 11. In the present case, there are several inconsistencies and omissions in the statements given by P.W. 1 to the Investigating Officer and the statements deposed before the Sessions Court. 11. In the present case, there are several inconsistencies and omissions in the statements given by P.W. 1 to the Investigating Officer and the statements deposed before the Sessions Court. Further, the trial court has believed that the evidence of P.W.1 receives support from the evidence of P.W.s 2, 4 and 5, but on a close scrutiny, it is seen that the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 4 and 5 are inconsistent with depositions of P.W.1 and does not corroborate with each other. P.Ws. 2, 4 and 5 have made depositions that P.W.1, who is believed to be the sole eye witness; wasn't at all present at the spot on the date and time of occurrence. On the other hand, P.W.1 had stated that the deceased, appellant, P.Ws. 2, 4 and 5 and himself were present on the spot when the incident unfolded. Further, the credibility of the depositions made by P.W.1 suffers from additional infirmities as he was recorded quoting a different time of occurrence i.e., 7:30 AM whereas the concerned incident took place around 7-8 P.M. in the evening. If the evidence of those witnesses is read together, it cannot be relied on the deposition that P.W.1 who had seen the assault on the deceased or the assaulters. 12. In the present case, P.W.1 is the maternal uncle of the deceased and claimed to have seen the assault on deceased by the appellant. But curiously, he did not take any pro-active steps in the matter to either report to the police or inform any of the family members. Such conduct of the eyewitness is contrary to human nature. The witness here knew the deceased, allegedly saw the fatal assault on the victim and yet kept quiet about the incident. If P.W.1 had the occasion to actually witness the assault, his reaction and conduct does not match up to an ordinary reaction of a person who knew the deceased and his family. His testimony, therefore, deserves to be discarded. 13. In the instant case, considering that the court cannot rely on the statement of the two eye-witnesses and, therefore, prosecution case solely rests on the circumstantial evidence. His testimony, therefore, deserves to be discarded. 13. In the instant case, considering that the court cannot rely on the statement of the two eye-witnesses and, therefore, prosecution case solely rests on the circumstantial evidence. It is now well settled that with a view to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form such a chain of events as would permit no conclusion other than the guilt of the accused. The circumstances cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also well settled that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot be a substitute for a proof and the courts shall take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the basis of the circumstantial evidence. Further, if it is found that the appreciation of evidence in a case, which is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by serious errors and on that account miscarriage of justice is often occasioned. In such a circumstance, the Court will certainly interfere even with the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court, as held in the case of Bharat vs. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 106 . 14. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down indicative parameters to keep in mind while dealing with cases where the prosecution version is based solely on the circumstantial evidence. It has held that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against the accused can be said to be fully established. Namely, (a) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It has held that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against the accused can be said to be fully established. Namely, (a) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned `must' or `should' and not `may be' established; (b) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (c) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (d) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (e) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held these five golden principles as the 'panscheel' of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence. Although the learned court below has relied upon the aforesaid judgment. However, while dealing with the evidence on record as discussed hereinabove, the court below has ignored and misapplied the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193 has dealt with a case where suspicion has been allowed to take the place of reason and has held in no uncertain terms that: '21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In the present case the courts below have overlooked these settled principles and allowed suspicion to take the place of proof besides relying upon some inadmissible evidence.' 16. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In the present case the courts below have overlooked these settled principles and allowed suspicion to take the place of proof besides relying upon some inadmissible evidence.' 16. In the oft quoted and relied upon landmark decision of Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 1091 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with circumstantial evidence said that the rules especially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. It held that in such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. It warned of the dangers of such a practice by recalling the warning addressed by Baron Alderson, to the jury in Reg v. Hodge, (1838) 2 Lew. 227, where he submitted that:- "The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to from parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete." 17. In Hanumant Singh's case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: 'In cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused..' 18. In the case of Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 172 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: '26. In the case of Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 172 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: '26. It is now well-settled that with a view to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form such a chain of events as would permit no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused. The circumstances cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also well-settled that suspicion, however, grave may be, cannot be a substitute for a proof and the courts shall take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the basis of the circumstantial evidence.' 19. The Investigating Officer has grossly failed to corroborate the prosecution story. Only seizing the weapon, used in the crime and other articles at the instance of the accused, does not indicate that the accused is the brain behind the crime. The entire circumstantial evidence fails to show beyond reasonable doubt regarding the involvement of the accused. 20. For evidence introduced and to be made admissible in courts, requires a degree which should exclude falsity and help to expose the correct facts in a trial. Witnesses disputably stand at the pinnacle of the justice delivery sequence. The testimony should be such that clarifies the situation while maintaining a favourable attitude towards the side for whom the statement is being given. When the witnesses are not able to depose correctly or turn 'hostile' in the court of law, it shakes public confidence in the criminal justice delivery system. Accentuating this view, Bentham said: 'witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice'. However, it seems the 'eyes and ears' have defied the prosecution. In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as the prosecution witnesses Nos. 2, 4 and 5 have turned hostile. Accentuating this view, Bentham said: 'witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice'. However, it seems the 'eyes and ears' have defied the prosecution. In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as the prosecution witnesses Nos. 2, 4 and 5 have turned hostile. Their alleged statements made to the police under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure were not confronted to them and marked as exhibits and further the Investigating Officer has not spoken in his evidence anything about the alleged statements of the above hostile witnesses recorded Under Section 161 as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in three Judge Bench in the case of V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588 : '15. Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure bars use of statement of witnesses recorded by the police except for the limited purpose of contradiction of such witnesses as indicated there. The statement made by a witness before the police Under Section 161(1) Code of Criminal Procedure can be used only for the purpose of contradicting such witness on what he has stated at the trial as laid down in the proviso to Section 161(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. The statements Under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure recorded during the investigation are not substantive pieces of evidence but can be used primarily for the limited purpose: (i) of contradicting such witness by an accused Under Section 145 of Evidence Act; (ii) the contradiction of such witness also by the prosecution but with the leave of the Court and (iii) the re- examination of the witness if necessary. 16. Court cannot suo moto make use of statements to police not proved and ask question with reference to them which are inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in the court. The words in Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure "if duly proved" clearly show that the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be admitted in evidence straightway nor can be looked into but they must be duly proved for the purpose of contradiction by eliciting admission from the witness during cross-examination and also during the cross- examination of the investigating officer. Statement before the investigating officer can be used for contradiction but only after strict compliance with Section 145 of Evidence Act that is by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.' 21. Nonetheless, even at the advent of hostility, the court expects the prosecution to endeavour in corroborating the 'hostile' testimonies as a last-ditch effort into buttressing its side of the story. However, the 'defeatism' of the prosecution is uninspiring as no such effort seems to have been made. Consequentially, the testimonies of the witnesses in this case are inadmissible in its entirety. The prosecutor has not been able to prove that the M.Os. I-IV (pieces of bamboo lathi) were used by the appellant for committing the crime as the same were not sent for forensic analysis to place any satisfactory evidence. Moreover, the Investigating Officer didn't attempt to join the broken pieces of lathi on apprehension of loss of forensic clue which further shrouds the possibility of M.Os. I-IV belonging to the same bamboo lathi which were used to assault the deceased. The M.Os I-IV, seized offers little evidentiary value as they were neither sent for forensic analysis nor was it physically inspected carefully to link the same with the present case beyond all reasonable doubt. 22. The infirmities in the conduct of recording confession would next bear scrutiny. The major flaw in the exercise here was the presence of the police during the exercise. When recording of confession is held in police presence, the resultant communications fall within the ban of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 23. With the above backdrops and discussions, this Court comes to an irresistible conclusion that the prosecution has not been successful in bringing home the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that the learned trial court below has grossly failed to deal with the evidence in proper perspective. In the instant case, there are no independent eye witnesses and the sole eye witness is a relative of the deceased. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence suffers from glaring infirmities and lack weightage both quantitatively and qualitatively to prove the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 24. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, especially due to lack of proper corroboration of witnesses and the weak chain of circumstantial evidence, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence impugned herein are liable to be set aside. 25. 24. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, especially due to lack of proper corroboration of witnesses and the weak chain of circumstantial evidence, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence impugned herein are liable to be set aside. 25. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.09.2018 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal in C.T. (Ss) Case No.18 of 2017 are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the said charge in the said case. If the appellant, namely, Nakhia @ Sushila @ Susil @ Laxmidhar Sahu @ Laxmidhar Sahoo is in custody, he be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is required in any other case. 26. Accordingly, the CRLA is disposed of being allowed. 27. L.C.R. be returned back forthwith.