JUDGMENT : With the consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and/or video quality. 2. The instant intra-Court appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 31.07.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 1719 of 2012 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and has quashed the letter dated 10.09.2002 whereby the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment under National Coal Wage Agreement has been rejected. 3. The brief facts of the case which need to be enumerated herein, read as under :- The mother of the petitioner, namely, Late Ketki Bedia, who was an Ex-General Mazdoor working under the appellant CCL, has died on 08.04.1997 in harness. The writ petitioner made application within stipulated time before the Personnel Officer but as the application was not submitted in due format, the same was again demanded by the appellant CCL and in pursuance thereto, the application was filled up in due format but the claim of the writ petitioner was rejected vide communication dated 10.09.2002. The aforesaid order has been questioned by the writ petitioner by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1719 of 2012 and the learned Single Judge, after taking consideration the order passed by another Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3078 of 2013, has quashed the order of rejection of the claim of appointment on compassionate ground with a direction upon the appellant management to consider the case of the writ petitioner afresh which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant CCL, has submitted that the death has occurred on 08.04.1997 and the application was rejected on 10.09.2002 but the writ petitioner has approached to this Court in the year 2012 and as such, there is considerable delay on the part of the writ petitioner in approaching this Court i.e., the writ petitioner has approached this Court after lapse of about 10 years from the date of rejection and about 15 years from the date of death of the bread earner and due to lapse of considerable period of time, the purpose for which the appointment on compassionate ground to be offered in favour of the dependant of the deceased employee for providing immediate succour to the bereaved family, has been frustrated and as such, the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration this aspect of the matter while quashing the order of rejection. He has further submitted that the learned Single Judge has not gone into the factual aspect involved in W.P.(S) No.3078 of 2013 since according to him, the factual aspect involved therein is quite different to that of the present one as because in W.P.(S) No. 3078 of 2013 the death has occurred in the year 2010 while the claim has been rejected on 03.01.2013 and as such, there is no delay on the part of the litigant in the said case in approaching the court of law but the fact herein is quite different and hence the applicability of the order passed by another Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 3078 of 2013 should not have been applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 5. Per contra, Mr. 5. Per contra, Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, has submitted that it is incorrect to say that there is delay on the part of the writ petitioner, rather, according to him, although the death has occurred on 08.04.1997 and the claim of the writ petitioner has been rejected on 10.09.2002 but the said order has been communicated only in the year 2008 and thereafter the writ petition has been filed in the year 2012 hence when the appellant CCL has committed laches in deciding the application of the writ petitioner which was decided by them after lapse of about 11 years, now they cannot be allowed to take the plea of delay and laches said to have been committed on the part of the writ petitioner and, therefore, the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration this issue, has quashed the order rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner which cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. So far as the applicability of the order passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3078 of 2013 is concerned, there also the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the delay of one and half years. However, rejection order was quashed. According to the writ petitioner, the delay in making application for appointment on compassionate ground in the case in hand is also more or less the same and as such, what has been said by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the factual aspect involved in W.P.(S) No.3078 of 2013 is quite different to present one is absolutely incorrect. Hence, it has been submitted that the learned Single Judge, while quashing the impugned order of rejection of the claim of the writ petitioner, has not committed any error. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 7. This Court, before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, deems it fit and proper to refer some admitted factual aspects which read as under :- Admittedly, the mother of the writ petitioner had died in harness on 08.04.1997. The application has been filed after expiry of the period of limitation as prevalent during the relevant time. The claim of the writ petitioner has been rejected vide order dated 10.09.2002. The application has been filed after expiry of the period of limitation as prevalent during the relevant time. The claim of the writ petitioner has been rejected vide order dated 10.09.2002. The writ petitioner has approached to this Court in the year 2012. The issue has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that there are delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner in approaching to the court of law after lapse of 15 years from the date of death which frustrated the very intent and spirit of appointment to be offered on compassionate ground under the National Coal Wage Agreement applicable during the relevant time. The aforesaid argument has been refuted by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner that the application for consideration of claim of appointment on compassionate ground has been communicated to the writ petitioner only in the year 2008 and, thereafter, in the year 2012, writ petition was filed. 8. The issue which fell for consideration was that when the death had occurred on 08.04.1997, even accepting what has been said by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the order of rejection of the claim of appointment on compassionate ground was passed on 10.09.2002 and was communicated sometime in the year 2008 but, when the very spirit and intent of appointment on compassionate ground under the National Coal Wage Agreement is to provide immediate succour to the dependant of the bereaved family even accepting that no communication has been made but taking into consideration the urgency in the matter and in order to get appointment on compassionate ground if the appellant CCL has not taken any decision or not communicated any decision to that effect, it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner to approach the court of law for seeking a direction as even in spite of lapse of considerable period no decision has been taken but no such effort has been made. The writ petitioner has even failed to demonstrate to this Court by annexing any of the document that he was diligently pursuing the matter for appointment on compassionate ground. The writ petitioner has even failed to demonstrate to this Court by annexing any of the document that he was diligently pursuing the matter for appointment on compassionate ground. In view thereof, according to our considered view the writ petitioner himself was not diligent about his right otherwise he would have approached to the court of law immediately after a reasonable period but he has approached to this Court after lapse of about 15 years from the date of death of his mother. 9. It requires to refer herein that so far as the writ petition is concerned, it is true that there would be no application of Limitation Act or no limitation is provided but certainly there is issue of delay and laches which is to be considered by the High Court while issuing the writ as has been held in New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh & Ors. [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ] in particular paragraph 17, which is quoted as hereunder : 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India). In State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. And Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, in para-7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held which reads as hereunder - “7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” 10. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has the duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. It is, thus, evident that the principle of delay and laches is to be taken into consideration by the writ court while issuing a writ but herein admittedly this Court has been approached after lapse of 15 years from the date of death and as such, the case of the writ petitioner is hopelessly barred by delay and laches. It is, thus, evident that the principle of delay and laches is to be taken into consideration by the writ court while issuing a writ but herein admittedly this Court has been approached after lapse of 15 years from the date of death and as such, the case of the writ petitioner is hopelessly barred by delay and laches. The explanation furnished by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the order rejecting his claim has been communicated in the year 2008 and, therefore, the writ petition has been filed after lapse of four years, that explanation is also not acceptable to us for two reasons, firstly, even accepting that the order rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner has been communicated in the year 2008 the question is what the writ petitioner was doing from the date of making application till the order said to have been communicated to him and secondly, even accepting the version of the writ petitioner that in the year 2008 the order rejecting his claim has been communicated to him even thereafter, after lapse of four years the writ petition has been filed and, therefore, according to our considered view, it is a case where the explanation furnished by the writ petitioner cannot be accepted. 11. So far as the issue raised about applicability of the order passed in W.P.(S) No.3078 of 2013 is concerned, we have gone across the order passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No.3078 of 2013 (passed by another Single Judge) which has been appended as Annexure-2 to the memo of appeal, wherefrom it is evident that the bread earner in that case died on 15.11.2010 and the claim was rejected on 03.01.2013 and immediately thereafter writ petition was filed in the year 2013 but the fact in the present case is otherwise because in this case the death had occurred on 08.04.1997 but the writ petition was filed in the year 2012 with a plea that the order of rejection of appointment on compassionate ground was communicated in the year 2008 and as per the discussion made hereinabove, the case of the writ petitioner is not falling under the factual aspect involved in that case and, therefore, the applicability of the judgment by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be proper and justified. 12. 12. This Court has also considered the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.897 of 2021, disposed of on 09.04.2021 wherein it has been held, after taking into consideration the nature of appointment on compassionate ground under the National Coal Wage Agreement and taking into consideration the fact that from the date of death substantial period has gone and as such, the very object of the compassionate appointment which is for providing immediate succour to the family of the deceased employee, the concerned respondent has been held not entitled for compassionate appointment. The relevant paragraph (Para 9) is being quoted as hereunder :- “9. We are in agreement with the High Court that the reasons given by the employer for denying compassionate appointment to the Respondent’s son are not justified. There is no bar in the National Coal Wage Agreement for appointment of the son of an employee who has suffered civil death. In addition, merely because the respondent is working, her son cannot be denied compassionate appointment as per the relevant clauses of the National Coal Wage Agreement. However, the Respondent’s husband is missing since 2002. Two sons of the Respondent who are the dependents of her husband as per the records, are also shown as dependents of the Respondent. It cannot be said that there was any financial crisis created immediately after Respondent’s husband went missing in view of the employment of the Respondent. Though the reasons given by the employer to deny the relief sought by the Respondent are not sustainable, we are convinced that the Respondent’s son cannot be given compassionate appointment at this point of time. The application for compassionate appointment of the son was filed by the Respondent in the year 2013 which is more than 10 years after the Respondent’s husband had gone missing. As the object of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the passage of a long period of time since his father has gone missing.” 13. As the object of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the passage of a long period of time since his father has gone missing.” 13. This Court, after taking into consideration the facts in entirety, is of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed error in quashing the order rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner for compassionate appointment without taking into consideration the principle of delay and laches committed on the part of the writ petitioner as also without assessing the applicability of factual aspects involved in W.P.(S) No.3078 of 2013, the order passed therein has been held to be applicable. 14. Accordingly, the instant appeal deserves to be allowed and is allowed. 15. In consequence, the writ petition stands dismissed and the order dated 10.09.2002 passed by the appellant CCL is affirmed.