JUDGMENT Satyen Vaidya, J. - By way of instant appeal, the appellant has assailed the judgment and decree dated 22nd February, 2011 passed by learned District Judge, Mandi in HMA petition No. 12 of 2008, whereby the petition filed by the appellant under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short 'the Act') for dissolution of marriage has been dismissed. 2. Facts necessary for adjudication of this appeal are as under: - 3. On 06.05.2008, appellant filed the above noted petition with the averments that the parties were Hindu and were married on 27.09.1984 at Village Panoh Tehsil Bangana, District Una, H.P. Out of wedlock, two sons and one daughter were born. 3. As per appellant, the respondent from the very beginning of married life had the habit of creating scene on petty matters. The appellant tolerated, but behaviour of respondent become bad to worse. After birth of youngest child, respondent forced the appellant to live separately from his parents and on his refusal, she along-with her minor girl child aged about 11 months went to her parental house in the year 1990. The matter was got compromised with the intervention of family members of the appellant. Respondent never provided moral education to children, whereas appellant discharged all the responsibilities of being father. 4. In 2002, appellant took respondent to District Mandi at his place of posting, where she got job of Drawing Teacher in Government school. After getting the Government job, respondent become more adamant. Her behaviour became more cruel towards the appellant. She started insulting the appellant in front of his family members and even used abusive language. She never left any opportunity of insulting the appellant. He suffered mental agony and had to spend sleepless nights. He became laughing stock in the society. 5. Appellant and respondent though shared the same house in District Mandi but were separate in mess since 2005 and were not continuing marital relations with each other. Appellant was forced to take food outside as she would not cook food for him. Respondent willfully refused to perform marital obligations towards the appellant. 6. On 25.12.2007, at the time of death of the father of appellant, respondent created scene. She forced the appellant to get the land transferred in her name which appellant had purchased in the name of his mother. Respondent willfully refused to perform marital obligations towards the appellant. 6. On 25.12.2007, at the time of death of the father of appellant, respondent created scene. She forced the appellant to get the land transferred in her name which appellant had purchased in the name of his mother. Respondent threatened the appellant of dire consequences in case he failed to transfer such land in her favour. She inflicted bite injury to the appellant on his wrist, which caused deep bleeding wound. Respondent caught hold of petitioner by collar and pushed him down. 7. Respondent contested and denied the allegations, raised in the petition by the appellant, by filing written reply. She raised the objection as to maintainability of petition and estoppel etc. It was submitted by the respondent that appellant was separated by his parents in 1997. He remained posted at Kaza from 2002 to 2007. 8. As per respondent, she was appointed as Drawing Teacher in District Mandi in September, 2002 and was posted at Surari under complex of Kotli School. Appellant also got himself transferred to District Mandi in July, 2003 and joined the company of respondent. 9. Respondent specifically contended that the behaviour of appellant towards her changed drastically when he was transferred to Kaza. He started scolding the respondent on every petty matter. Appellant, in fact, wanted to marry another lady and, therefore, wanted to get rid of respondent. It was further submitted that the respondent was residing with appellant and both were maintaining marital relations as husband and wife. The parties had jointly constructed the house at village Jhiri in District Mandi and the respondent had also made substantial financial contribution besides providing guarantee for the house loan. 10. The respondent further stated that she had found some objectionable SMS in the mobile phone of appellant and when confronted, he got annoyed and made false police reports against the respondent. 11. In his rejoinder, appellant controverted the contents of reply filed by the respondent with reiteration of the contents of the petition. 12. Learned trial Court framed following issues from the pleadings of the parties:- 1. Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner as alleged? OPP 3. Relief. 13. Appellant examined himself as PW-5 by submission of his affidavit in examination-in-chief as PW-5/A. He also tendered photocopies of documents Ext.P-1 to P-24. Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner as alleged? OPP 3. Relief. 13. Appellant examined himself as PW-5 by submission of his affidavit in examination-in-chief as PW-5/A. He also tendered photocopies of documents Ext.P-1 to P-24. In crossexamination he admitted that in 1992-93, the family of his elder brother had separated, but feigned ignorance about the factum of litigation of his brother and his wife in matrimonial court. He also admitted that during his posting at Kaza, respondent remained at his native village. He denied that he had cordial relations with respondent at the time of her joining the job in District Mandi. It was also admitted by the appellant that in 2003, he was posted in Panarsa in District Mandi. He denied that respondent contributed towards the construction of house at village Jhiri and that respondent had issued cheque in the sum of Rs.50,000/-. It was, however, admitted that the respondent was guarantor for repayment of loan taken by the appellant for construction of house at Jhiri. It was also admitted that the respondent had lodged an FIR under Sections 323, 325, 451 and 506 IPC at police station, Aut, District Mandi against the appellant, besides this, she had also made a complaint against the appellant before the Superintendent of Police, Mandi. Though he denied that the children used to visit their mother only but further qualified that they visited him as well as their mother. He denied that he had relations with lady named Sonam Norjee at Kaza. He denied that on 29.10.2004, he signed an agreement with the said lady at Kullu. He further denied that he paid Rs.85,000/- to Sonam Norjam, besides purchasing an insurance policy in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- in the name of her child. He denied that he maltreated the respondent. 14. Pw-1 Head Constable Bhim Singh from police station, Aut produced daily diary report No. 12 dated 26.04.2008 and proved its copy as Ext.PW-1/A. Similarly, he proved copy of DDR No. 9 dated 11.06.2008 as Ext.PW-1/B. In cross-examination, he admitted that no FIR was registered on the basis of either of the daily diary reports Ext.PW-1/A and Ext.PW-1/B. 15. Pw-3 and PW-4 S/Sh. Jagdish Ram and Kishan Singh also appeared as witnesses for the appellant and echoed the version of appellant. Pw-3 and PW-4 S/Sh. Jagdish Ram and Kishan Singh also appeared as witnesses for the appellant and echoed the version of appellant. PW-2 Ram Dayal claimed himself to be a neighbour of appellant and PW-3 is the real brother of appellant. In cross-examination, PW-2 has categorically admitted that till 2004, he was residing at Kanpur along-with his family. When confronted with certain dates and events, he could not answer satisfactorily. He fairly admitted that dispute with respect to transfer of land did not occur in his presence and appellant had not received injury in his presence. PW-3 being brother of appellant tried to corroborate his version. He stated that before 2002, no report was lodged against the respondent. Report of the incident of 25.12.2007 was also not made. He denied that he was party to maltreatment of respondent. He, however, admitted that a compromise was effected and further volunteered that compromise was made in Police Station. PW-4 Sh. Kishan Singh also echoed the version of appellant in his examination-in-chief. He maintained in cross-examination that he visited the house of appellant only once or twice and feigned ignorance about material facts put to him in cross-examination. 16. On the other hand, respondent examined herself as RW-2 and reiterated her case as set-up in the defence by way of submission of affidavit in examination-in-chief. She specifically stated that the appellant used to receive phone calls and messages on his mobile from some lady and whenever he was confronted, he used to fight with the respondent. She, however, maintained that the appellant used to threaten her of divorce. Respondent in her examination-in-chief categorically stated that the appellant had relations with another lady and when this fact came to her knowledge, the appellant entered into an agreement with said lady at Kullu, in which appellant and that lady had also made mention of their daughter. In crossexamination, nothing material could be elicited on behalf of the appellant. 17. Rw-1 Sh. Subhash Chand appeared on behalf of respondent. He stated that he was a document writer at Kullu and had brought his register. This witness proved a copy of extract from his register dated 29.10.2004 Ext.RW-1/A, which was an agreement got written by one Devinder Nath. As per version of this witness, other party to the agreement was Sonam Norjam. Subhash Chand appeared on behalf of respondent. He stated that he was a document writer at Kullu and had brought his register. This witness proved a copy of extract from his register dated 29.10.2004 Ext.RW-1/A, which was an agreement got written by one Devinder Nath. As per version of this witness, other party to the agreement was Sonam Norjam. In cross-examination, RW-1 clarified that the appellant present in the Court was the same person who got the agreement scribed from him. He maintained that he obtained signatures of the parties on the register. He further maintained that he personally knew appellant as he was posted as Junior Engineer in HP PWD at Kullu. RW-3 is Sh. Abhinandan Rattan, who is son of the parties. He stated in his examination-in-chief that he came to know that his father had illicit relations with some lady and this was a cause of dispute between his parents. RW-4 is Smt. Pini Devi, but her statement is not of much relevance. RW-5 is Sonam Norjee, who specifically stated that appellant had married her by suppressing the factum of his marital status. She stated that the appellant lived with her for about 1 years and they had one daughter from this relationship. When she came to know about the already existing marriage of the appellant, she was asked to divorce the appellant. The divorce was effected and Ext RW-1/A was executed at Kullu, in which she as well as appellant had appended their signatures. She specifically stated that the appellant gave her Rs.85,000/- in lieu of divorce and also purchased an insurance policy in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- in the name of their daughter. In cross-examination again nothing material could be elicited on behalf of the appellant. 18. Learned District Judge, Una after holding the trial, proceeded to dismiss the petition filed by the appellant. 19. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 20. The petition for dissolution of marriage was filed by the appellant on 06.05.2008 whereas their marriage had been solemnized on 27.09.1984. The allegations, which according to appellant constitute cruelty, were alleged to be initially of the period before 1990 and secondly, after 2002. Meaning thereby that as per appellant also, the relations between the parties remained cordial between 1990 to 2002. The allegations, which according to appellant constitute cruelty, were alleged to be initially of the period before 1990 and secondly, after 2002. Meaning thereby that as per appellant also, the relations between the parties remained cordial between 1990 to 2002. Though there is no convincing evidence on record to prove the allegations of appellant with respect to commission of acts constituting cruelty prior to 1990, yet as per his own saying, appellant had condoned such alleged acts of cruelty and thereafter the parties lived peacefully till 2002. 21. Coming to the allegations of cruelty after 2002, raised in the petition, the same are also very vague and general in nature. The Hindu Marriage and Divorce (Himachal Pradesh) Rules, 1982 framed by Himachal Pradesh High Court specifically requires the allegations of cruelty to be specified in the petition with sufficient particularity with time and place of the act alleged and other facts relied upon. The contents of the petition are completely non-compliant to above referred rules. 22. Appellant has tried to get his version corroborated through the statements of PW-2 Ram Dayal and PW-3 Jagdish Ram. As far as the statement of PW-2 is concerned, that does not inspire confidence, in view of specific admission on his part that till 2004, he resided at Kanpur. He has not given specific instances as to when and where was he present to witness the alleged mis-behaviour of respondent towards the appellant. In fact, in cross-examination he has denied happening of any such incident in his presence, which makes his testimony hearsay. Moreover, the parties after 2002, resided in District Mandi. The statement of PW-3, who is real brother of appellant, as such, his statement has to be seen with circumspection as he definitely had interest in the success of the case of the appellant. Much reliance cannot be placed on the testimony of this witness especially when the appellant himself had not been able to plead and prove the allegations of cruelty against the respondent in accordance with law. The documents tendered by the appellant in his statement Ext.P-1 to P-24 are merely photocopies, which have not been proved in accordance with law. In any case, the making of unilateral complaints by the appellant against the respondent repeatedly will not prove his case as no action was taken on such complaints. The documents tendered by the appellant in his statement Ext.P-1 to P-24 are merely photocopies, which have not been proved in accordance with law. In any case, the making of unilateral complaints by the appellant against the respondent repeatedly will not prove his case as no action was taken on such complaints. Most of these complaints were made by the appellant after filing of the petition, which can be a ploy of the appellant to create evidence in his favour. The fact that respondent was guarantor for repayment of loan taken by appellant for construction of house, also makes the version of appellant doubtful. Had the relations between the parties been as bad as projected by appellant, respondent would not have prudently provided guarantee for the loan taken by appellant or seen from another angle appellant would not have asked respondent to stand guarantee for his loan. 23. It is well settled that onus to prove the allegations of cruelty is on the person who alleges it. In Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "23. But before doing so, it is necessary to clear the ground of certain misconceptions, especially as they would appear to have influenced the judgment of the High Court. First, as to the nature of burden of Proof which rests on a petitioner in a matrimonial petition under the Act. Doubtless, the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his or her case for, ordinarily, the burden lies on the party which affirms a fact, not on the party which denies it., This principle accords with commonsense as it is so much earlier to prove a positive than a negative. The petitioner must therefore prove that the respondent has treated him with cruelty within the meaning of section 10 (1) (b) of the Act. But does the law require, as the High Court has held, that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt ? In other words, though the burden lies on the petitioner to establish the charge of cruelty, what is the standard of proof to be applied in order to judge whether the burden has been discharged? 24. The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be estabilshed if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. 24. The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be estabilshed if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act,section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man,so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where. the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a promissory note "the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue"(1) ; or as said by Lord Denning, "the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear" (2). But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a promote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged." 24. From the material, as discussed above, it can be said with certainty that appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proof placed upon him. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged." 24. From the material, as discussed above, it can be said with certainty that appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proof placed upon him. No doubt, the standard of proof required in the petition for dissolution of marriage under Hindu Marriage Act is that of preponderance of probabilities, but that does not mean the party alleging acts of cruelty can succeed without satisfying the Court as to existence of alleged facts in accordance with law. 25. Judging the case of the appellant on the touch stone of aforesaid legal principles, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the appellant has failed to prove that respondent treated him with such cruelty which made it impossible for him to live with respondent without being in constant fear of danger to his health and life. 26. Learned District Judge, Una while passing the impugned judgment has arrived at the conclusions after detailed and thorough consideration of the evidence coupled with all attending and material facts and circumstances of the case. The judgment passed by learned District Judge, Una does not suffer from illegality. 27. There is another factor which dis-entitles the appellant from claiming divorce from the respondent on the ground of cruelty. Section 23 (1) (a) of Hindu Marriage Act reads as under: - "23. (1) In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that (a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner [except in cases where the relief is sought by him on the ground specified in sub-clause (a), subclause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of section 5] is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and in such case and not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief accordingly." 28. In the present case, there is sufficient material which dis-entitles the appellant from obtaining the decree of divorce as prayed by him. Respondent raised a specific plea against the appellant that he had maintained illicit relations with another lady. This fact stands duly proved on record. RW-5 Sonam Norjam on oath verified this fact by stating that the appellant had married her by suppressing the fact his earlier marriage. Respondent raised a specific plea against the appellant that he had maintained illicit relations with another lady. This fact stands duly proved on record. RW-5 Sonam Norjam on oath verified this fact by stating that the appellant had married her by suppressing the fact his earlier marriage. She specifically maintained that they had a daughter from this relationship. According to this witness, a document was executed between her and the appellant as an evidence of divorce inter-se them. She further stated that the appellant had given her Rs.85,000/- in lieu of divorce and had also purchased a policy of insurance in the name of their daughter. PW-1 has proved document Ext.RW-1/A, which is the agreement executed between the appellant and the respondent evidencing the factum of divorce. He specifically identified the appellant to be the person having signed the said document in his presence. This witness thereby clarified the fact that name of the executant in Ext.RW-1/A in fact was wrongly recorded whereas person at whose instance the said document was scribed was the appellant himself. 29. In the light of the above noted proved fact, the appellant is definitely guilty of conduct which was immoral vis-avis his married life. The allegations of respondent that it was on account of his illicit relations with another lady that appellant had started ill-treating her and also wanted her to give him divorce, cannot be brushed aside. This fact has been corroborated by none else but the son of the parties, who has stated that the relations between his parents were disturbed after his father indulged in extra marital relationship. 30. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued with vehemence that the marriage between the parties has broken irretrievably and hence the same deserves to be dissolved by a decree of divorce. Reliance has been placed on the judgments reported in 2007 (4) SCC 511 , 2017(2) Civil Court Cases, 223, 2018(2) Civil Court Cases 649 and 2018(1) Civil Court Cases 328. With due reverence to the ratio laid down in all the above cases, the appellant cannot derive any benefit therefrom for the reason that no such ground is envisaged under the Act and this Court lacks jurisdiction to pass a decree of divorce on any such grounds which does not find mention in the Act. With due reverence to the ratio laid down in all the above cases, the appellant cannot derive any benefit therefrom for the reason that no such ground is envisaged under the Act and this Court lacks jurisdiction to pass a decree of divorce on any such grounds which does not find mention in the Act. The appellant otherwise cannot be allowed to raise this argument on account of the fact that he has been proved to be guilty of commission of matrimonial wrong towards respondent. 31. As far as the issue of desertion, framed by learned District Judge, Una, is concerned, it appears to be totally misconceived. There were no pleadings on record to warrant framing of Issue No.2. 32. In view of the discussion made above, the appeal being devoid of any merits is dismissed with no orders as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand dismissed.