ORDER Nagu J., 1. Present intra-Court appeal, filed u/S.2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uccha Nayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, assails the final order dated 19.7.2019 passed in Writ Petition No.8343/2016 by the learned Single Judge while exercising writ jurisdiction u/Art.226 of the Constitution dismissing the petition in question by which challenge was made to Annexure P-1 and P-2 dated 16.9.2016 & 5.11.2012 informing petitioner/appellant that he is disqualified to be appointed as Assistant Seed Certification Officer owing to third child having been born to appellant/petitioner after 26.1.2001. The other letter under challenge was a show-cause notice as to why FIR be not lodged against the petitioner/appellant for taking shifting stands on affidavit in regard to the date of birth of the third child. 2. Learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition in question on the ground that petitioner/appellant was disqualified u/R.6 (6) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services [General Conditions of Services] Rules 1961 (for brevity “1961 Rules”) and has misled the employer by giving two different dates of birth of third child. As such it is held by the learned Single Judge that the petitioner/appellant is ineligible for government service. 3. Though the controversy lies in a narrow compass but enumeration of the skeletal facts attending the case is necessary: 9.1.2001 : First child Ku. Pragati born to the petitioner/appellant. 8.7.2003 : Second child Ku. Rakshita born to the petitioner/appellant. 20.3.2008 : Third child Master Krishna Baghel born to petitioner/appellant as per the first affidavit sworn in by petitioner/appellant vide A-3 along with IA.1406/2020 in WA. 30.6.2009 : Last date for submission of application forms invited by advertisement issued by VYAPAM for filling up 112 posts of Assistant Seed Certification Officer. 20.11.2009 : Allegedly corrected date of birth of third child Master Krishna Baghel as per second affidavit sworn in by the petitioner/appellant. 4. For the sake of clarity, the relevant statutory provision contained in rule 6 (6) of 1961 Rules is reproduced below : “(6) No candidate shall be eligible for appointment to a service or post who has more than two living children on of whom is born on or after the 26th day of January, 2001. 4. For the sake of clarity, the relevant statutory provision contained in rule 6 (6) of 1961 Rules is reproduced below : “(6) No candidate shall be eligible for appointment to a service or post who has more than two living children on of whom is born on or after the 26th day of January, 2001. Provided that no candidate shall be disqualified for appointment to a service or post, who has already one living child and next delivery takes place on or after the 26th day of January 2001, in which two or more than two children are born.” 5. The contention of learned counsel for petitioner/appellant is that the eligibility of a candidate is judged as on the last date of submission of application forms published in the advertisement, which was 30.6.2009 in the present case and since third child [Master Krishna Baghel] was born on 20.11.2009 [as per the second affidavit containing the changed date of birth] petitioner/appellant did not incur any disqualification under rule 6 (6) of 1961 Rules on the relevant date i.e. 30.6.2009 when the third child was not born. 6. It is not disputed at the bar by the rival parties that the said element of disqualification as alleged by the employer of petitioner/appellant having third child was discovered before the appointment order could be issued. 7. A close scrutiny of the text of rule 6 (6) reveals that the disqualification of a third child born after 26.1.2001 contemplated therein is in relation to eligibility for appointment to a service or post under the Government of Madhya Pradesh. This disqualification qua a candidate is for appointment. Thus, the candidate who may not be disqualified under this provision at the time of submission of his application form or at any stage during the process of recruitment, but incurred disqualification on account of third child born before the appointment order, would suffer disqualification under the said provision. This is the plain and simple meaning which can be derived from textual & contextual interpretation of the said provision. 8. This is the plain and simple meaning which can be derived from textual & contextual interpretation of the said provision. 8. In the instant case, even if we ignore the dispute as regards correct date of birth of third child [20.3.2008 or 20.11.2009] and for the sake of argument accept the contention of petitioner/appellant that the third child was born on 20.11.2009, then too petitioner/appellant has suffered disqualification u/R.6 (6) of 1961 Rules with effect from 20.11.2009 and has rendered himself ineligible for appointment to the post of Assistant Seed Certification Officer. 9. The concept of last date for submissions of application forms has no relevance for the purpose of disqualification u/R.6 (6) of 1961 Rules. The reason is not far to see. The point of incurring of disqualification u/R.6 (6) of 1961 Rules is the appointment and not the last date of submission of application pursuant to advertisement. 10. It could have been a different matter if petitioner/appellant had been appointed by issuance of the appointment order prior to the birth of third child. In that situation petitioner/appellant would have been dealt with differently as per the applicable rules. 11. In view of above discussion and testing the factual matrix attending the instant case on the anvil of rule 6 (6) of 1961 Rules, there is no manner of doubt that since third child was born before the appointment order to the post in question could be issued, the petitioner/appellant has rendered himself disqualified for the said appointment. 12. Consequently, this Court does not see any reason to take a different view than the one taken by the learned Single Judge, though for an additional reason as enumerated above. 13. Consequently, present writ appeal stands dismissed.