JUDGMENT : ALOK ARADHE, J. In this appeal preferred under Section 4 of Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 the appellants (hereinafter referred to as the 'Authority' for short) have assailed the validity of the order dated 14.12.2012 by which learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition preferred by respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Company' for short) and proceeding for acquisition of the land initiated for benefit of the authority has been quashed. In order to appreciate the authority's challenge to the impugned order, few facts need mention, which are stated hereinafter. FACTS: 2. Land bearing Sy.No.9/2 situate in Lottegollahalli Village, Bangalore North Taluk measuring 3 acres and 17 guntas was recorded in the revenue records in the names of Uttanallappa, S.Narimaiah, Muniswamappa, M.Narasimhappa and Hanumaiah (hereinafter referred to as 'the owners of the land' for short). The Authority issued a preliminary Notification under Section 17(1) and 17(3) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1976 Act' for short) for acquisition of 1316.04 and 1/2 guntas of land including the land bearing Sy.No.9/2 for formation of Rajmahal Vilas II Stage Layout. The State Government thereafter published final Notification under Section 19 of the 1976 Act. It is pertinent to note that out of 3 acres and 17 guntas of land, which was notified, 0.29 guntas of land was acquired by the Railways for formation of Mysore-Salem Railway line, an extent of 0.34 guntas were utilized by the authority for formation of Ring Road and 0.32 guntas of land was a built up area. Land measuring 1 acre and 2 guntas of Sy.No.9/2 is the subject matter of this appeal. 3. The owners of the land made applications on 20.12.1981 seeking compensation. Thereafter, they filed an a writ petition viz., W.P.No.16065-69/1987 before this court in which challenge was made to the proceedings initiated for acquisition of the land. During the pendency of the writ petition, the owners of the land on 18.06.1988 submitted a representation to the authority for deleting the land from acquisition proceedings. The Authority vide resolution dated 28.06.1988 resolved to recommend to the State Government to de-notify the land measuring 1 acre and 2 guntas. The Authority forwarded the recommendation to the State Government for appropriate action. The Authority vide resolution dated 28.06.1988 resolved to recommend to the State Government to de-notify the land measuring 1 acre and 2 guntas. The Authority forwarded the recommendation to the State Government for appropriate action. The owners of the land on 22.09.1988 filed a memo seeking to withdraw the writ petition and the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 22.09.1988. The State Government by a communication dated 26.12.1988 requested the Authority to send the status report of the case. The Authority by a communication dated 03.05.1989 informed the government about the withdrawal of the writ petition. 4. The Deputy Commissioner of the Authority by an endorsement dated 11.03.1991 issued to one M.Ramaiah informed him that in view of resolution No.1084 dated 28.06.1988, no acquisition proceedings are pending in respect of land in question. The State Government by a communication dated 16.02.1993 informed the Authority that file relating to de-Notification of the land in question is closed and directed the Authority to send a fresh proposal if it so chooses. Thereafter, by five sale deeds executed on 22.05.1985 and three sale deeds executed on 30.06.1998, the owners of the land sold the land to the company. The Authority vide resolution No.325/97 passed on 31.12.1997 resolved to rescind the earlier resolution No.874 dated 28.06.1988. Thereafter, a permission was granted by the authority to the company on 22.05.1996 to accord permission to construct culvert / bridge on an adjoining land, subject to terms and conditions mentioned in the aforesaid communication. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 09.03.1998 in pursuance of which, according to the authority, the possession of the land in question was taken on 07.04.1998 and 10.02.2000. Thereafter, vide communication dated 30.08.2001 authority informed the company that earlier resolution dated 28.06.1988 has been withdrawn on 31.12.1997 and therefore, lands belong to Authority. However, on 04.8.2001, the Assistant Executive Engineer temporarily withdrew the permission on the allegation that instructions contained in earlier permission had not been complied with company. 5. The company filed a writ petition viz., W.P.No.41352/2001 in which challenge was made to the proceeding for acquisition of the land as well as the resolution dated 31.12.1997 passed by the Authority. The company submitted a representation on 22.11.2011 to the authority for withdrawal of the resolution No.395/27 dated 31.12.1997. The Authority vide communication dated 29.08.2003 rejected the request made by the Authority. The company submitted a representation on 22.11.2011 to the authority for withdrawal of the resolution No.395/27 dated 31.12.1997. The Authority vide communication dated 29.08.2003 rejected the request made by the Authority. The learned Single Judge by an order dated 25.01.2007 dismissed the writ petition mainly on the ground that Company being a subsequent purchaser has no locus to maintain the petition and Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) has no application to a proceeding initiated under 1976 Act. The order passed by the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the division bench vide order dated 16.08.2008. Thereupon the company approached the Supreme Court by filing SLP No.711/2011 which was allowed by the Supreme Court and the matter was remitted to the learned Single Judge for consideration of all the issues except the issue pertaining to the effect of Section 11-A of the Act in respect of the proceeding initiated under 1976 Act. The learned Single Judge by an order dated 24.12.2012 allowed the writ petition and quashed the proceedings initiated for acquisition of the land in question. In the aforesaid factual background, this appeal has been filed. SUBMISSIONS: 6. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that under Section 48(1) of the Act, the competent authority viz., the State Government alone can withdraw the land acquisition proceedings and the resolution No.1084 dated 28.06.1988 is passed by the authority is only a recommendation and not an order under Section 48(1) of the Act. It is also pointed out that there is no order de-notifying the land and resolution dated 28.06.1988 does not create any vested right in the owners of the land much less the company, which is a subsequent purchaser. It is therefore, contended that principles of natural justice do not apply insofar as it pertains to second resolution No.325/1997 dated 31.12.1997. It is contended that in the light of Section 36(3) of the 1976 Act, the land will initially vest in the State Government and thereafter, shall vest in the authority upon transfer of land from the Deputy Commissioner. It is also contended that both the resolutions were passed by the Authority prior to vesting of the land. It is contended that in the light of Section 36(3) of the 1976 Act, the land will initially vest in the State Government and thereafter, shall vest in the authority upon transfer of land from the Deputy Commissioner. It is also contended that both the resolutions were passed by the Authority prior to vesting of the land. It is also urged that learned Single Judge erred in recording a finding that possession of the land has not been taken over in the absence of any pleading either in the original writ petition or amended writ petition and the same is contrary to record. 7. It is also pointed out that land in question is an urban land and there is neither any standing crop nor any structure situate thereon. The possession of the land has been taken by drawing a mahazar in the presence of the witness. It is also urged that learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that permission granted to construct a culvert is admittedly in respect of Storm Water Drain abutting the land and not the land in question. It is also urged that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that since, the second resolution is arbitrary and illegal, the earlier resolution revives is perverse. Even otherwise, first resolution is only a recommendation not creating any vested right in owners of the land and the State Government had not acted on the resolution by issuing a Notification under Section 48(1) of the Act. Therefore, it is urged that quashing of second resolution cannot result in revival of an unauthorized Notification. It is also urged that no mandamus can be issued to implement the first resolution in view of the fact that award has been passed and the possession of the land in question has been taken. It is also contended that resolution No.1084 dated 28.06.1988 did not held any promise to the owners of the land and they have altered their position therefore, principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation have no application to the facts of the case. 8. It is also argued that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. It is further submitted that resolution cannot be treated as an order and the learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that the writ petition was filed after a lapse of four years after passing of resolution dated 31.12.1997. 8. It is also argued that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. It is further submitted that resolution cannot be treated as an order and the learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that the writ petition was filed after a lapse of four years after passing of resolution dated 31.12.1997. It is further submitted that there is no delay in completing the proceeding of acquisition of the land and the Authority has substantially implemented the scheme viz., RMV Extension II Stage Layout and the same was upheld by division bench of this court. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on decisions in 'LARSEN AND TOUBRO LTD VS. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS', (1998) 4 SCC 387 , 'VED GUPTA VS. M/S APSARA THEATRES, JAMMU AND ANOTHER', (1983) 4 SCC 323 , 'B.VENKATASWAMY REDDY VS. STATE', ILR 1989 KAR 75, 'UNION OF INDIA VS. KARTHICK CHANDRA', (2010) 2 SCC 422 , 'P.K.KALBURQI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA', (2005) 12 SCC 489 , 'PRAHLAD SINGH AND OTHERS VS. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS', (2011) 5 SCC 386 , 'DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS LTD. VS. UNIONO F INDIA', (1988) 1 SCC 86 , 'MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. VEER KUMAR JAIN', (2010) 5 SCC 791 , 'SULOCHANA CHANDRAKANT GALANDE VS. PUNE MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT & OTHERS', (2010) 8 SCC 467 , 'B.UMESH VS. BDA', ILR 1991 KAR 824, 'SARGUJA TRANSPORT SERVICE VS. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MP GWALIOR & OTHERS',R (1987) 1 SCC 5 , 'LARSEN AND TOUBRO LTD. VS. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS', (1998) 4 SCC 387 , 'BANDA DEVELOPMENT AUTHOIRTY VS. MOTILAL AGARWAL', (2011) 5 SCC 394 , 'BDA VS. DR.HANUMANTHAPPA', ILR 1997 KAR 642. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for Company submitted that resolution dated 31.12.1997 passed by the Bangalore Development Authority withdrawing its earlier resolution dated 28.06.1988 which exempted the lands in question from the purview of land acquisition has been passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that neither any opportunity of hearing was given to the owners of the land nor the company before passing the resolution dated 31.12.1997. It is further submitted that neither any opportunity of hearing was given to the owners of the land nor the company before passing the resolution dated 31.12.1997. It is also submitted that provisions of Section 19(3),(4),(5) & (6) are special provisions, by which authority is competent to alter the scheme by deletion of a portion of land from the areas already notified and such deletion would be effective and complete and would go outside the scheme itself. It is also contended that such alteration would not require the procedure to be complied with prescribed under Section 48(1) of the Act. Since, Section 19(3) to 19(6) are special provisions and are part of the code which is self contained. It is further contended that submission of the authority that it did not pass the resolution dated 28.06.1988 is misconceived as the lands have vested in the State Government and therefore, the authority could not have released the land from acquisition. It is also contended that de-notification of the Act is a ministerial act and that beyond issuance of Notification under Section 19 of the 1976 Act all other action for acquisition of the land are required to strictly taken in accordance with provisions of the Act. It is argued that provisions of Section 9, 11, 12,and 16 of the Act have to be strictly construed as the same is an ex-proprietory legislation. 10. It is pointed out that no material has been placed on record by the authority that provisions of Section 9, 11, & 12 have been complied with and taking of symbolic or notional possession is not sufficient and actual physical possession must be taken. It is further argued that since, possession of the land in question has not been taken therefore, the land has not vested in the State Government under Section 16(2) of the Act and therefore, the question of vesting of the land under Section 36(3) of the Act in the Authority under 1976 Act does not arise. It is further argued that since, possession of the land in question has not been taken therefore, the land has not vested in the State Government under Section 16(2) of the Act and therefore, the question of vesting of the land under Section 36(3) of the Act in the Authority under 1976 Act does not arise. It is also argued that in the absence of any material on record, it is not open for the Authority to contend that there has been an application of mind on behalf of the State Government while communicating the closure of the proposal and action of the Authority in passing the subsequent resolution dated 31.12.1997 amounts to an act of fraud, which would vitiate all subsequent actions of the Authority. It is contended that the Authority has over reached this court and has breached the sanctity of judicial proceeding and the resolution dated 31.12.1997 is vitiated as no reasons have been assigned. 11. It is also contended that the Company's legitimate expectation has been belied and the award passed in the land acquisition proceeding is non est and the same also required to be held so as it has been passed after unreasonable delay. It is also argued that scheme framed under Section 27 of the Act by the authority has lapsed and company being the subsequent purchaser has the locus to challenge the land acquisition proceedings in order of remand dated 15.09.2011. In support of his submission, learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on decisions in 'JAMAL UDDIN AHMAD VS. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN', (2003) 4 SCC 257 , 'SRINIWAS RAMNATH KHATOD VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA', (2002) 1 SCC 689 , 'KHADIM HUSSAIN VS. STATE OF U.P.', (1976) 1 SCC 843 , 'BONDU RAMASWAMY VS. BANAGLORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY', (2010) 7 SCC 129 , 'CHAIRMAN, INDORE VIKAS VS. PURE INDUSTRIAL COCK AND CHEM. LTD.', (2007) 8 SCC 705 , BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY VS. PALITANA SUGAR MILL (P.) LTD.', (2003) 2 SCC 111 , 'K.T.PLANTATION PRIVATE LIMITED VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA', (2011) 9 SCC 1 , 'PERIYA ANGAMMAL VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU', (1982) 2 MLJ 98 , 103, 'MOHAMADSARIF HAKIMJI CHIPPA VS. STATE OF GUJARAT', AIR 1967 GUJ 269 , 270, 'VELAGAPUDI KANAKA DURGA VS. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KRISHNA DISTRICT CHILAKAPUDI, AIR 1971 AP 310 , 312-13, 'LAXMANRAO KRISTRAO VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, AIR 1950 BOM 334 , 'BALWANT NARAYAN BHAGDE VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU', (1982) 2 MLJ 98 , 103, 'MOHAMADSARIF HAKIMJI CHIPPA VS. STATE OF GUJARAT', AIR 1967 GUJ 269 , 270, 'VELAGAPUDI KANAKA DURGA VS. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KRISHNA DISTRICT CHILAKAPUDI, AIR 1971 AP 310 , 312-13, 'LAXMANRAO KRISTRAO VS. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, AIR 1950 BOM 334 , 'BALWANT NARAYAN BHAGDE VS. M.D.BHAGWAT', (1976) 1 SCC 700 , 'PRAHLAD SINGH VS. UNION OF INDIA', (2011) 5 SCC 386 , 'OM PRAKASH VS. STATE OF U.P.', (1998) 6 SCC 1 , 'SITA RAM BHANDAR SOCIETY VS. GOVT. (NCT OF DELHI)', (2009) 10 SCC 501 , 'MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMET AUTHORITY VS. VEER KUMAR JAIN', (2010) 5 SCC 791 , 798, 'FERRO ALLOYS CORPN. VS. UOI', (1999) 4 SCC 149 , 'JAI NARAIN PARASRAMPURIA VS. PUSHPA DEVI SARAF', (2006) 7 SCC 756 , 'B.L.MANDAWAT VS. UNION OF INDIA, 1993 SUPP (4) SCC 10, 'BALRAM SINGH VS. BHIKAM CHAND JAIN', (1985) 4 SCC 246 ', SAROJ ANAND VS. PRAHLAD RAI ANAND', (2009) 15 SCC 505 , 'BSNL VS. SUBASH CHANDRA KANCHAN', (2006) 8 SCC 279, 'KRISHNASWAMI VS. UNION OF INDIA', (1992) 4 SCC 605 , 'RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR VS. COLLECTOR', (2012) 4 SCC 407 , 'UNION OF INDIA VS. HINDUSTAN DEVELOPMENT CORPN.,', (1993) 3 SCC 499 , 'UNION OF INDIA VS. GODFREY PHILIPS INDIA LTD.', (1985) 4 SCC 369 , 'STATE OF PUNJAB VS. NESTLE INDIA LTD.', (2004) 6 SCC 465 , 'HARISH CHANDRA RAJ SINGH VS. DY. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER', (1962) 1 SCR 676 , 'BHAGWAN DAS VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, 'RAMCHAND VS. UNION OF INDIA', (1994) 1 SCC 44 , OFFSHORE HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED VS. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY', (2011) 3 SCC 139 , 'GUNWANT KAUR VS. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, BHATINDA', (1969) 3 SCC 769 AND 'JET PLY WOOD (P) LTD AND ANOTHER VS. MADHUKAR NOWLAKHA AND OTHERS', (2006) 3 SCC 699 . 12. Learned Additional Government Advocate has adopted the submissions made by learned Senior counsel for the authority and submitted that no Notification under Section 48(1) of the Act was issued. It is also urged that instructions can be issued in respect of a matter not covered under statutory rules. Reliance has been placed on decision of the Supreme Court in 'UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER VS. ASHOK KUMAR AGGARWAL, (2013) 16 SCC 147 and SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA VS. PREBON YAMANE (INDIA) LMITED, (2015) 16 SCC 89 , OPTO CIRCUIT INIDA LTD. VS. Reliance has been placed on decision of the Supreme Court in 'UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER VS. ASHOK KUMAR AGGARWAL, (2013) 16 SCC 147 and SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA VS. PREBON YAMANE (INDIA) LMITED, (2015) 16 SCC 89 , OPTO CIRCUIT INIDA LTD. VS. AXIS BANK AND OTHERS, 2021 SCC ONLINE SC 55. 13. Learned Senior counsel for the Authority has produced the record pertaining to acquisition of the land for our perusal. By way of rejoinder reply, learned Senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that the State Government had closed the file and therefore, the authority was left with no option but to pass the second resolution, which is just and proper. It is also argued that no right accrues from the first resolution and in the garb of challenging the second resolution, which was passed in the year 1997, in the writ petition the company had challenged the acquisition proceedings, which were initiated in the year 1978 and it ought to have been appreciated by the learned Single Judge that challenge to land acquisition proceedings was highly belated. It was also argued that in the light of order of remand passed by the Supreme Court, the locus of the company cannot be gone into but the question of laches on the part of the company can certainly be examined while deciding the controversy on merits. It is contended, in the alternative that, in any case, the learned Single Judge ought to have confined the relief to the quashment of second resolution only. It is also pointed out that the possession from the owners of the land was taken on 07.04.1998 and was handed over to the Authority on 21.04.1998. Our attention has also been invited to the representations submitted by the owners of the land in the year 1981, in which they had demanded compensation on account of acquisition of the land. LEGAL PRINCIPLES: 14. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note of well settled legal principles. It is trite law that in the absence of any legal right, this court would not issue a writ of mandamus. [See: 'KHATOON VS. STATE OF U.P., (2018) 14 SCC 346 ]. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note of well settled legal principles. It is trite law that in the absence of any legal right, this court would not issue a writ of mandamus. [See: 'KHATOON VS. STATE OF U.P., (2018) 14 SCC 346 ]. It is equally well settled law that preparation of panchanama is a well accepted mode of taking possession in respect of an open land [See: M.VENKATESH VS. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1]. We may refer to Wade's Administrative Law, 9th Edition, Page 500, wherein while dealing with principles of natural justice, which reads as under: The classic situation in which the principles of natural justice apply is where some legal right, liberty or interest is affected, for instance where a building is demolished or an office-holder is dismissed or a trader's licence is revoked. But good administration demands their observance in other situations also, where the citizen may legitimately expect to be treated fairly. 15. It is equally well settled legal proposition that in the absence of any legal right, the principles of natural justice do not apply. In other words, a person cannot claim a right of hearing in the absence of a legal right. [See: 'STATE OF H.P. VS. KAILASH CHAND MAHAJAN', (1992) Supp 2 SCC 351, STATE OF TAMIL NADU VS. SESHACHALAM, AIR 2008 SC 647 ]. With regard to principles of promissory estoppel, the Supreme Court in 'VASANTH KUMAR RADHA KISHAN VORA VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY', (1991) 1 SCC 761 and 'BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS. VS. R.HANUMAIAH AND ORS.', AIR 2008 SC 3631 has held that it must be established that a representation was actually made by a competent authority and if a promise is not made by an authority competent to make such a promise, would be an ultra vires act and would not bind the authority. STATUTORY PROVISIONS: 16. In the light of aforesaid well settled legal principles, we may advert to the statutory provisions. Section 16 and Section 48(1) of the Act, Section 36(3) of 1976 Act, which read as under: 16. Power to take possession- (1) When the Deputy Commissioner has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (2) The fact of such taking possession may be notified by the dc. Power to take possession- (1) When the Deputy Commissioner has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (2) The fact of such taking possession may be notified by the dc. In the official gazette, and such Notification shall be evidence of such fact. 48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed. — (1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. 36. Provisions applicable to the acquisition of land otherwise than by agreement.- (3) After the land vests in the Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon payment of the cost of the acquisition, and upon the Authority agreeing to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of the acquisition, transfer the land to the Authority, and the land shall thereupon vest in the Authority. REASONS: 17. Section 16 of the Act makes it evident that land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances when the possession of the land in question has been taken and when such a Notification is published by the Deputy Commissioner in the official gazette, such Notification shall be evidence of the factum of taking possession. From perusal of Section 48(1) of the Act, it is axiomatic that the State Government is the competent authority to withdraw from the acquisition of any land, the possession of which has not been taken. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to refer to draft note of the Authority and resolution dated 28.06.1988, which read as under: DRAFT NOTE FOR THE AUTHORITY Shri.Uthanallappa and four others have requested for the de-Notification of the land measuring about 1 acre in Sy.No.9/2 of Lottegollahalli Village. They have stated that this land consists of coconut, guova, jasmine and kakada plants and all types of nursery and requested to de-notify the Sy.No.9/2 of Lottegollahalli village as per G.O.No.HUD 478 MNX 76, dtd. 1.1.87. Sy.No.9/2 of Lottegollahalli Village measures 3A-07Gts. Out of which 0-29 gts. Has already been acquired for Bangalore-Salem Railway. The portion to the West of the Railway line is 1A-26 gts., in extent and several houses have come up in this portion. 1.1.87. Sy.No.9/2 of Lottegollahalli Village measures 3A-07Gts. Out of which 0-29 gts. Has already been acquired for Bangalore-Salem Railway. The portion to the West of the Railway line is 1A-26 gts., in extent and several houses have come up in this portion. The ring road passes through this western portion. The portion to the East of Railway line measures 1A-02 gts. The applicants are requesting this portion for de-Notification The Additional Land Acquisition Officer, who has inspected the land, has reported that there are Jasmine plants, Kakada Plants and about 50 coconut trees and that there is no nursery as such, in this piece of land. This land is adjacent to SFHS HIG scheme and all surrounding lands are already acquired and handed over to BDA. Shri.R.Krishnappa, Member, BDA, ha requested to place this subject before the Authority. The Deputy Commissioner (Land Acquisition) has opined that as the land is not being used for raising nursery and propagation as claimed by the claimants, the Govt. Order dated 1-1-87 regarding exemption of land used for nurseries, does not attract this case. The land has not been acquired due to court stay in W.P.No.16065 to 16069/87. The subject is placed before the Authority for taking decision on the following: (a) to consider the request of Shri.Uthanallappa and four others regarding de-Notification of land in Lottegollahalli Village in the light of G.O.No.HUD 478 MNX 86 dated 1-1-1987. SD/- SD/- SD/- A.L.A.O. D.C. E.M. BDA, B'LORE BDA B'LORE BDA, B'LORE SD/- SD/- SD/- F.M. COMMR. CHAIRMAN BDA, B'LORE BDA B'LORE BDA, B'LORE B.D.A.Meeting dated 28-6-1988 Subject No.1084 The note placed before the Authority by the Deputy Commissioner (LA) was perused. After a detailed discussion, it was resolved to denotify an extent of 1A-02gts. Of land in Sy.No.9/2 of Lottegollahalli Village in favour of Sri.Uthanallappa and four others in view of G.O.No.HUD 478 MNX 86 dt.1-1-1987. SD/- CHAIRMAN BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY BANGALORE. 18. As stated supra, the competent authority to withdraw from the acquisition of any land, of which possession has not been taken is the Government. Admittedly, in the instant case, no Notification under Section 48(1) of the Act has been issued by the State Government. The owners of the land themselves had made a request to the State Government for withdrawing from the acquisition of the land. Admittedly, in the instant case, no Notification under Section 48(1) of the Act has been issued by the State Government. The owners of the land themselves had made a request to the State Government for withdrawing from the acquisition of the land. However, the State Government did not accede to the aforesaid prayer and on 26.02.1993 in response to the resolution passed by the Authority and directed that the matter be treated as closed at the Government level and the Authority was directed to send a fresh proposal. The relevant extract of communication dated 16.02.1993 read as under: I am directed to invite your attention to the reference cited above and state that as no final report on this subject is received from you since long, this matter has been treated as closed at Government level. You may send proposals afresh with all details if necessary. Thereafter, the Authority sent a fresh proposal on 31.12.1997, by which it was resolved to rescind its earlier resolution dated 28.06.1988. The resolution dated 28.06.1988 does not create any legally enforceable right in favour of the company. 19. In order to attract the principles of promissory estoppel as well as legitimate expectation, a representation if any to be made by the competent authority. In the instant case, no representation has been made by the competent authority, therefore, the question of application of either principles of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation dose not arise. Similarly, in the absence of any legal right, accrued to the owner of the land or the company while passing the first resolution, the principles of natural justice would have no application to the factual matrix of the case. The finding recorded in paragraph 17 of the learned Single Judge, that admittedly the possession of the land has not been taken is factually incorrect, as the Authority in para 3 of statement of objections has categorically taken a stand that possession had been taken on 07.04.1998 and 10.02.2000. 20. At this stage, we may refer to relevant extract of Section 19 of the 1976 Act, which read as under: 19. 20. At this stage, we may refer to relevant extract of Section 19 of the 1976 Act, which read as under: 19. Upon sanction, declaration to be published giving particulars of land to be acquired.- (1) Upon sanction of the scheme, the Government shall publish in the official Gazette a declaration stating the fact of such sanction and that the land proposed to be acquired by the Authority for the purposes of the scheme is required for a public purpose. (2) The declaration shall state the limits within which the and proposed to be acquired is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and the place where a plan of the land may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and the Authority shall, upon the publication of the said declaration, proceed to execute the scheme. (4) If at any time it appears to the Authority that an improvement can be made in any part of the scheme, the Authority may alter the scheme for the said purpose and shall subject to the provisions of sub-sections. (5) and (6),forthwith proceed to execute the scheme as altered.(5) If the estimated cost of executing the scheme as altered exceeds, bya greater sum than five per cent the estimated cost of executing the scheme as sanctioned, the Authority shall not, without the previous sanction of the Government, proceed to execute the scheme as altered. (6) If the scheme as altered involves the acquisition otherwise than by agreement, of any land other than that specified in the schedule referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 18, the provisions of sections 17and 18 and of subsection (1) of this section shall apply to the part of the scheme so altered in the same manner as if such altered part were the scheme. 21. In the absence of any statutory provision, which empowers the authority to modify the scheme on its own, it cannot be held that provisions of Sub-Section (5) and (6) are attracted. It is also pertinent to note that in the entire petition, the company has not questioned the validity of the panchanama. 21. In the absence of any statutory provision, which empowers the authority to modify the scheme on its own, it cannot be held that provisions of Sub-Section (5) and (6) are attracted. It is also pertinent to note that in the entire petition, the company has not questioned the validity of the panchanama. It is also noteworthy that permission to construct the culvert has been granted in respect of an adjoining land and not in respect of the land in question, which is the subject matter of this appeal. In any case, even assuming that second resolution for any other reason is held to be invalid, no mandamus can be issued in the absence of any legal right and corresponding legal duty to comply with the first resolution. Similarly, since, no legal right have accrued to the owner of the land and to the company while passing the first resolution dated 28.06.1988, therefore, the question of application of principles of natural justice while passing the second resolution dated 31.12.1997 does not arise. It is well settled in law that in order to claim the relief, the aggrieved person has to plead and prove the legal right founded on such relief. [See: 'KHATOON VS. STATE OF U.P., (2018) 18 SCC 346]. It is also pertinent to note that the company in the writ petition has no where has challenged the validity of the award. 22. The issuance of Notification under Section 48(1) of the Act to withdraw from acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken may or may not be a ministerial act, yet admittedly, in the facts of the instant case, no Notification under Section 48(1) of the Act has been issued, therefore, it is not necessary for us to record a finding in this regard. We have carefully gone through the writ petition. No averment with regard to non compliance of Section 9, 11, 12, & 16 in the writ petition, has neither been made nor any finding has been recorded by the learned Single Judge on the aforesaid issue, therefore, we refrain from examining the aforesaid issue at the instance of the respondent who was the petitioner before the learned Single Judge, in this intra court appeal. The authority has subsequently passed a resolution rescinding the previous resolution, therefore, the action of passing of the second resolution cannot be termed as a fraud / over reach on the part of the authority. It is also relevant to note that neither any averment has been made in the writ petition that the scheme has lapsed under Section 27 of the 1976 Act, nor the aforesaid issue has been dealt with the learned Single Judge, therefore, it is not necessary for us to examine whether or not the scheme has lapsed. 23. The reliance placed by learned Additional Government Advocate on the decision of the Supreme Court in 'UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER VS. ASHOK KUMAR AGGARWAL, (2013) 16 SCC 147 is totally misconceived as the aforesaid case is an authority for the proposition that executive instructions have binding force provided the same has been issued to fill up the gap between statutory provision and are not inconsistent with statutory provisions. The aforesaid principle has no application in the fact situation of the case. In view of preceding analysis, the order dated 14.12.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed and the writ petition preferred by the company is dismissed. In the result, the appeal is allowed.