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2021 DIGILAW 536 (MP)

State of M. P. v. Ajay

2021-07-06

DEEPAK KUMAR AGARWAL, SHEEL NAGU

body2021
ORDER Agarwal J. -- 1. The present application under section 378(3) CrPC has been preferred by State for leave to appeal against judgment of acquittal dated 5.11.2020, passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, District Bhind in ST No.11/2018, whereby respondents have been acquitted of offences under section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sections 498A, 304B or 302/34 or 306 of IPC. 2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that deceased Arti Devi was married to accused Ajay Sharma (respondent No.1 herein) in 2015. On 10.10.2017 at about 12:05 am, cousin brother of deceased Santosh Sharma informed police station Endori, District Bhind that Arti Devi died by hanging herself at about 05:00 in the morning. On the basis of this information, Merg u/S. 174 of CrPC was recorded and matter was enquired. During Merg enquiry, father of deceased Vinod Sharma, Harish Sharma, Siyaram Sharma, Girraj and Krishna Swaroop Sharma were present. In their statements they narrated that deceased Arti Devi died by hanging herself, but did not allege anything against the accused persons. Autopsy of the body of deceased was conducted and doctor opined that deceased died by hanging herself. Statements of witnesses were recorded. Afterwards, Crime against accused Ajay Sharma, Damodar, Krishna Swaroop alias Kallu Prasad and Smt. Aruna (respondents herein) was registered for offence u/S. 304-B/34 of IPC and under section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Viscera was sent for medical examination. As per viscera report, there was no poisonous substance in the viscera of the deceased. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed and charges were framed. 3. Prosecution witnesses Santosh Sharma (PW1), Pyarelal Sharma (PW2), Harish Sharma (PW3) in their statements before the trial Court stated that accused Ajay Sharma and his family members used to harass and torture the deceased with regard to demand of dowry of motorcycle, but father of deceased Vinod Sharma (PW5) has not supported their version, which he ought to have supported, if as alleged by these witnesses the story was correct. This witness, in his statement, denied that accused persons demanded dowry and accused Ajay Sharma used to come to the house after consuming liquor and commit Marpeet with the deceased and demand motorcycle. This witness also denied that mother-in-law of deceased Smt. Aruna, father-in-law of deceased Kallu Prasad, father-in-law (Chachiya Sasur) of deceased Damodar used to support accused Ajay Sharma to treat the deceased with cruelty. This witness also denied that mother-in-law of deceased Smt. Aruna, father-in-law of deceased Kallu Prasad, father-in-law (Chachiya Sasur) of deceased Damodar used to support accused Ajay Sharma to treat the deceased with cruelty. Further, this witness specifically denied that due to demand of dowry, his daughter was subjected to cruelty. Apart from the above, the prosecution has utterly failed to produce evidence of real sisters of deceased Smt. Sangeeta and Smt. Rubi and aunt of deceased namely Smt. Billa, who were important witnesses. No explanation in this regard was given by the prosecution. 4. The scope of interference against the acquittal of criminal charges is extremely limited as explained by the apex Court in the case of Hakeem Khan and Ors. v. State of M.P. reported in (2017) 5 SCC 719 , relevant portion of which is reproduced below for convenience and ready reference :- 12. For all these reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court clearly fell in grave error in setting aside the acquittal in the present case. We have to remind ourselves that the law on reversal of acquittals is well settled and is stated in many judgments, but one of them needs to be quoted here. In Murugesan v. State [ (2012) 10 SCC 383 ] this Court went into the meaning of different expressions- “erroneous”, “wrong” and “possible”, and has stated the law as follows:- 33. The expressions “erroneous”, “wrong” and “possible” are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms: “erroneous.- wrong; incorrect. Wrong.- (1) not correct or true, mistaken. (2)unjust, dishonest, or immoral. Possible.- (1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved. (2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable. 34. It will be necessary for us to emphasise that a possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a Court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior Court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher Court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate Court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a Court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. But such a conclusion of the higher Court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate Court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a Court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact whether it is agreed upon or not by the higher Court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial Court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial Court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial Court.” 5. Looking to the prosecution evidence available on record, this Court does not find it a fit case for grant of leave to appeal. The trial Court has rightly acquitted accused (respondents herein) under section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sections 498A, 304B or 302/34 or 306 of IPC. 6. Accordingly, this application for leave to appeal against judgment of acquittal dated 5.11.2020 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, District Bhind in ST No.11/2018 is hereby dismissed.