JUDGMENT Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Supplementary Affidavit produced by learned Counsel for the petitioner in Court, is taken on record. 3. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship firm belonging to one Mr. Nitish Rawat. He is a permanent resident of Uttarakhand State as per averment made in paragraph no. 8 of the writ petition. According to the petitioner, he has wide experience of providing catering services in educational institutions/training institutes. 4. Respondent no. 2 issued a e-tender notice on 22.02.2021 inviting bids for award of contract for supplying food to students in 27 residential schools run by the Directorate within Uttarakhand State. Petitioner is challenging condition nos. 36, 37, 39 & 43 of the tender notice, in this writ petition. These conditions inter alia provided, as follows:- "36. A bidder should have experience of providing catering service, in minimum five Government Residential Educational Institutions/Training Institutes within Uttarakhand State, during financial year 2018-19. 37. Bidder should have experience of providing catering services to minimum 500 students in five institutions in State of Uttarakhand, during financial year 2019-20. 39. Bidder should have five year old registration with Employees Provident Fund Organisation in State of Uttarakhand. 43. The bidder firm should belong to State of Uttarakhand and the proprietor/ partner/ director of the bidder firm should also belong to State of Uttarakhand." 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submits that petitioner is a proprietorship firm owned by Mr. Nitish Rawat, who is a permanent resident of District Nainital. Thus, condition contained in clause no. 43 of the tender notice does not prejudice the petitioner; therefore, this Court refrains from examining validity of condition contained in clause no.43 of the tender notice. 6. It is settled position in law that while inviting bids, employer can impose conditions regarding financial capacity, experience etc. to ensure that only serious bidders having sufficient experience and resources submit their bids. It is equally settled in law that the terms of an invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny and Courts cannot whittle down the terms of the tender as they are in the realm of contract unless they are wholly arbitrary, discriminatory or actuated by malice. 7. In the counter affidavit, respondents have stated that condition contained in clause no. 7. In the counter affidavit, respondents have stated that condition contained in clause no. 36 & 37 were necessitated in view of the peculiar geographical conditions of Uttarakhand State and also in view of the pandemic caused by Covid-19, as the purpose was to ensure that cooked food is provided to the students in residential schools run by the department even during complete lockdown. It has been further stated that these residential schools are scattered in remote inaccessible areas of State of Uttarakhand and only a firm having experience of providing catering services in these inaccessible places could have provided cooked food to the students studying in these residential schools during adverse times. Regarding condition contained in clause no. 39, it has been stated that this was necessary to protect the interest of the employees engaged by the successful bidder for running the kitchen, upon award of contract. 8. Learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that due to peculiar conditions prevailing in State of Uttarakhand, a firm which is not familiar with the geographical, market and weather conditions of the State may find it difficult, at times, to provide cooked food to the inmates of residential schools run by Directorate of Tribal Welfare. He further submitted that it is the responsibility of the State to provide quality cooked food to these inmates round the year, irrespective of the weather conditions. He further submitted that the pandemic caused by Covid-19 has aggravated the situation and the conditions contained in clause nos. 36 & 37 were added to ensure that quality cooked food is made available to inmates of educational institutes even during most adverse conditions. Thus, according to him, a firm which has no experience of providing cooked food in residential schools in Uttarakhand would face difficulty in procuring food items and other materials needed for running a kitchen, during difficult times and State Government cannot take chance in such a matter where life and well-being of poor students studying in these residential schools, is involved. He further submitted that one can easily visualize the situation when due to non-availability of necessary material consequent to natural disaster or lockdown, kitchen is not run for one or two days. He further submitted that one can easily visualize the situation when due to non-availability of necessary material consequent to natural disaster or lockdown, kitchen is not run for one or two days. He further submitted that a local firm due to its resources/connections would be in a better position to deal with such difficult situations, therefore, this insistence on past experience within State of Uttarakhand was made in the tender notice. Regarding condition contained in clause no. 39 of the tender notice, he submits that this condition was added to protect the interest of the employees hired by a contractor and to ensure that employees’ dues are paid in time and possibility of contractor fleeing away without paying dues of the employees, when faced with adverse conditions, is ruled out. 9. Viewed from the perspective of the employer, the conditions contained in clause nos. 36, 37 & 39 cannot be said to be so unreasonable as to warrant interference by this Court while exercising power of judicial review. There is no allegation of malafide made in the writ petition. Moreover these conditions are applicable to all bidders, therefore they cannot be termed as discriminatory. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Directorate of Education & others Vs. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. & others reported in (2004) 4 SCC 19 has held as under: "12. It has clearly been held in these decisions that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm of contract. That the Government must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender. It must have reasonable play in its joints as a necessary concomitant for an administrative body in an administrative sphere. The courts would interfere with the administrative policy decision only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by the particular circumstances. The courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the Government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. The courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide." 11. Hon’ble Suprme Court in the case of Reliance Telecom ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 269 has held as under: "44. The courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide." 11. Hon’ble Suprme Court in the case of Reliance Telecom ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 269 has held as under: "44. In Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, the Court, after referring to Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Tejas Constructions & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Council, Sendhwa, expressed the view that (at SCC p. 229, para 23) the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play and actions are amenable to judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose and if the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities. It further observed that fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and the courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by courts is very limited unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers and greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities in the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract. The Court also laid emphasis on public interest and the prudence in applying the principle of restraint where the action is fair and reasonable and does not smack of mala fides. It was also emphasised that the courts cannot interfere with the terms of the tender prescribed by the Government simply because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. 12. In the case of Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., reported in (2016) 16 SCC 818 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "12. In Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Port of Bombay it was held that the constitutional courts are concerned with the decision-making process. 12. In the case of Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., reported in (2016) 16 SCC 818 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "12. In Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Port of Bombay it was held that the constitutional courts are concerned with the decision-making process. Tata Cellular v. Union of India went a step further and held that a decision if challenged (the decision having been arrived at through a valid process), the constitutional courts can interfere if the decision is perverse. However, the constitutional courts are expected to exercise restraint in interfering with the administrative decision and ought not to substitute its view for that of the administrative authority. This was confirmed in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa as mentioned in Central Coalfields. 13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decision-making process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision." 13. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court does not find any scope for interference with the conditions mentioned in the tender notice. 14. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. 15. There will be no order as to costs.