JUDGEMENT : 1. This revision petition has been filed against the Order dated 22nd February 2021, passed by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu (for short “Trial Court”) dismissing the bail application, bearing File No.1171/BA titled Mohd. Aslam Batana v. Narcotics Bureau Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, and for setting aside the same, with a further prayer to grant bail in favour of petitioner. 2. The case set up by petitioner in the instant petition is that petitioner was allegedly arrested on 22nd November 2020 from Nagrota Toll Post when he was coming from Srinagar to Jammu along with his family in his own vehicle. He was whisked away to police station Nagrota in the first instance and thereafter to the office of Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and implicated by respondent in some false and frivolous case, bearing Crime no.02/2019 dated 24th March 2019 for commission of offences punishable under Sections 8 & 20 NDPS Act, 1985, whereas petitioner is neither involved in any such offence nor is he connected with alleged offenders. An application for grant of bail is stated to have been filed by petitioner on 28th November 2020 before the Trial Court, which has been rejected vide order dated 22nd February 2021. 3. Objections have been filed by respondents, in which they submit that secret information was received from reliable sources on 24th March 2019 at 1500 hours that two persons, namely, Bashir Ahmad Khan and Showkat Ahmad Dar, were carrying huge quantity of narcotic drugs, i.e., Charas, in a car Toyota Corolla bearing Registration No.DL7CG-1566, from Kashmir Valley and reaching Jammu via Ban Toll Plaza, Nagrota, Jammu. After statutory and procedural compliance, the NCB team reached in front of Ban Toll Plaza Nagrota, Jammu, at about 1830 hours, and started watching vehicles coming from Srinagar side towards Jammu for arrival of abovementioned vehicle. At about 2015 hours, the NCB noticed the above car and immediately indicated the said car to stop. On asking the person seated on driver seat, disclosed his identity as Showkat Ahmad Dar and other person sitting in the front seat of the said car disclosed his name as Bashir Ahmad Khan. On search of car, a false cavity behind the back seat of the said car was found and on opening the said cavity through screw, 35 packets were recovered. On search of car, a false cavity behind the back seat of the said car was found and on opening the said cavity through screw, 35 packets were recovered. Out of 35 packets, 16 packets were wrapped with white colour cello tape having marking 22.22 and 19 packets were wrapped with brown colour cello tape (04 packets having marketing APPLE & 15 packets having marking 777). On further inquiry from accused, Bashir Ahmad Khan and Showkat Ahmad Dar, they disclosed that all 35 packets were containing Charas and on testing with Narcotics Drugs, detection kit by NCB officers, it was confirmed to be Charas, NCB officer further weighed all contraband with weighing machine and its total weight came to 36 kgs including packing material. It is stated that based on evidence and voluntary and confessional statement given on 25th March 2019, by Bashir Ahmad Khan and Showkat Ahmad Dar, in which they, inter alia, admitted their guilt of being found in conscious possession and recovery of Charas, a narcotics drugs contravening Section 8 of NDPS Act 1985 and the accused were, accordingly, arrested at 0950 hours and 1215 hours on 25th March 2019 under Section 8, 20, 60 NDPS Act. The chemical analysis report from Chemical Examiner Grade II of Central Revenues Control Laboratory, New Delhi, vide their test report was received, which was confirmed for positive result of Charas in the drawn samples. During investigation, accused, Bashir Ahmad Khan, accepted that seized drug was given by petitioner, Mohd Aslam Batana, whereupon I.O. issued summons to petitioner, but he tried to escape and did not cooperate in the investigation of the case. It is also contended analysis of customer Application Form (CAF) of petitioner, it has come to notice that the mobile number used was in the name of Nasreena Begum F/H Fazal Rehman R/o Sogam, Kupwara, Devar Inderbug Neqa Dever Margey, Kupwara and in this context, I.O. summoned her but she did not appear before I.O., and that on 21st November 2020, petitioner, Mohd Aslam Batana, finally appeared in the office of NCB, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, and based on the evidence and statement recorded from him, he was arrested on 21st/22nd November 2020, in which he, inter alia, admitted his guilt for supply of Charas to accused, Bashir Ahmad Khan. Hence petitioner was placed under arrest on 22nd November 2020. Hence petitioner was placed under arrest on 22nd November 2020. Respondents also maintain that petitioner revealed that mobile no.7051979387, which is used by him for Charas supply and was continuously in touch with Bashir Ahmad and Showkat Ahmad Dar, is in the name of Nasreena Begum, who is his sister-in-law and petitioner identified the CAF and signature on the CAF of Nasreena Begum. It is also stated that during analysis of CDR and CAF of the mobile numbers, supplier of drugs and carrier of drugs are known to each other and had been in touch regularly through phone, and that the case is under trial before the Trial Court and if petitioner is enlarged on bail, there is every possibility of evidence being tampered. 4. Heard and considered. 5. According to learned counsel for petitioner, the Trial Court has rejected the bail application and denied bail to petitioner on totally untenable premises. He states that petitioner is sought to be implicated merely on the basis of confessional statements of the accused and there is no other evidence to substantiate the allegations against petitioner. He also states that petitioner is sought to be implicated in the case merely on the basis of confessional statements of accused and there is no other evidence to substantiate allegations against petitioner. He has placed reliance on Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu 2020 SCC Online SC 882, to contend that statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is hit by provisions of Section 25 and 27 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used as evidence against co-accused. He also states that NCB filing complaint in all the cases, which are dealt with by the said agency and the procedure to be followed for trial is the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure for complaints in Warrant Cases and has no power to file supplementary Challan as provided under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and thus once complaint in the case Crime No.2/2019 has already been filed and the same is pending before the Trial Court, the NCB cannot use the same case to file supplementary complaint in case of the petitioner once he has not been listed as accused in the earlier complaint and, therefore, the proceedings against petitioner are totally beyond the provisions of the Code and petitioner is entitled to bail. Learned counsel has also argued that the Trial Court has erred in applying the judgment of Union of India vs. Shiv Shankar Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 as the acceptability of the statement under Section 67 NDPS Act as voluntary or involuntary was not the issue at all before Trial Court, but it was only the issue of admissibility of the statement under Section 67 NDPS Act, which was argued that it has been declared to be inadmissible in evidence and the inadmissibility will operate from the day first and has not to wait for trial, but the Trial Court has totally misinterpreted the judgments referred to the in the case and has tried to justify rejection of the bail plea of petitioner on imagination and conjectures. It is contended that satisfaction as required under Section 37 of NDPC Act means a satisfaction from the facts of the case whether or not the accused prima facie seems to be involved in the commission of crime and this satisfaction has also not been drawn correctly by the Trial Court. He also avers that call details without transcript of conversation are not evidence which could take position of proof of involvement of accused in commission of crime and nobody including petitioner can be convicted of such a heinous offence under Section 8/20 NDPS, merely on the basis of call details and therefore, satisfaction drawn by Trial Court is totally wrong. 6. In the case in hand, petitioner has raised the point in respect of statements made purportedly under Section 67 of NDPS Act. Interplay of Section 67 vis-à-vis Section 53 and 53-A of NDPS Act and their mutual effect has been elaborately considered by the Supreme Court in Tofan Singh (supra) and crystallized the controversy while answering the reference. The Supreme Court considered the word enquiry finding place in Section 67 of NDPS Act and held that information gathered at antecedent stage prior to commencement of investigation and, therefore, question of its being admissible in trial as confessional statement against accused does not arise. Thus, the same cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused for this foundational reason. Thus, the same cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused for this foundational reason. It is further held that even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that a statement obtained under Section 67 of NDPS Act amounts to a confessional statement, permitting the same to be admissible against the accused would violate the Fundamental Right of such accused and Section 67 of NDPS Act would have to be read down accordingly. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the enquiry under Section 67 is a stage prior to investigation as referred in Section 53 of NDPS Act or the said enquiry is distinct from the enquiry under Section 53-A of NDPS Act which is during the course of investigation of offences. Therefore, law so far as Section 67 vis-à-vis Section 53 and 53-A of NDPS Act is concerned, stands settled. 7. At the same time, NDPS Act contains some provisions in the form of Section 35, 54 and 66 relating to presumptions and burden of proof on accused. The meaning of “presumptions” has been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Izhar Ahmad Khan Vs. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052 : “18...........The term "'presumption" in its largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to be an inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative of the truth or falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted. Thus, according to Best, when the rules of evidence provide for the raising of a rebuttable or irrebuttable presumption, they are merely attempting to assist the judicial mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts presumed or inferred.” 8. It was held in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar, (2000) 8 SCC 382 : “33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.” 9. It is now well settled that presumption is rule of evidence which has evolved and is essentially invoked to plug certain gaps or remove lacuna in the evidence as observed by the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate vs. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 133: “21. In judging whether a general or a particular or special onus has been discharged, the Court will not only consider the direct effect of the oral and documentary evidence led but also what-may be indirectly inferred because certain facts have been proved or not proved though easily capable of proof if they existed at all which raise either a presumption of law or of fact. Section 114of the Evidence Act covers a wide range of presumptions of fact which can be used by Courts in the course of administration of justice to remove lacunae in the chain of direct evidence before it. It is, therefore, said that the function of a presumption often is to "fill a gap" in evidence.” There are numerous statutes in our country, including POCSO Act, which have incorporated this principle of reverse burden in varying degrees. To mention a few, Sections 35, 54 and 66 of NDPS Act, Sections 7,11,20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 21 of the Prevention of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (now repealed), Section 43-E of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 Sections 118, 119, 137, 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 304-B of IPC, Sections 79 to 90A, 111-A, 113-A, 113-B, 114, 114-A of the Evidence Act etc. provide for presumption of guilt against the accused. provide for presumption of guilt against the accused. Sections 35 and 54 of NDPS Act raise presumptions with regard to culpable mental state on the part of the accused and these provisions carry reverse burden of proof on the accused. Since NDPS Act carries stringent provisions as well as punishments and at the same time it is promulgated for wider National and Social Interest, therefore, an ambivalent approach has been adopted by the Apex Court while interpreting the said provisions in the case of Noor Aga Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 . Relevant paragraphs deserve reiteration for clarity purpose: “40. The provision for reverse burden is not only provided for under the special acts like the present one but also under the general statutes like the Indian Penal Code. The Indian Evidence Act provides for such a burden on an accused in certain matters, as, for example, under Section 113A and 113B thereof. Even otherwise, this Court, having regard to the factual scenario involved in cases, e.g., where husband is said to have killed his wife when both were in the same room, burden is shifted to the accused. Enforcement of law, on the one hand and protection of citizen from operation of injustice in the hands of the law enforcement machinery, on the other, is, thus, required to be balanced. The constitutionality of a penal provision placing burden of proof on an accused, thus, must be tested on the anvil of the State's responsibility to protect innocent citizens. The court must assess the importance of the right being limited to our society and this must be weighed against the purpose of the limitation. The purpose of the limitation is the reason for the law or conduct which limits the right. While, however, saying so, we are not unmindful of serious criticism made by the academies in this behalf. 56. The purpose of the limitation is the reason for the law or conduct which limits the right. While, however, saying so, we are not unmindful of serious criticism made by the academies in this behalf. 56. The provisions of the Act and the punishment prescribed therein being indisputably stringent flowing from elements such as a heightened standard for bail, absence of any provision for remissions, specific provisions for grant of minimum sentence, enabling provisions granting power to the Court to impose fine of more than maximum punishment of Rs.2,00,000/- as also the presumption of guilt emerging from possession of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances, the extent of burden to prove the foundational facts on the prosecution, i.e., `proof beyond all reasonable doubt' would be more onerous. A heightened scrutiny test would be necessary to be invoked. It is so because whereas, on the one hand, the court must strive towards giving effect to the parliamentary object and intent in the light of the international conventions, but, on the other, it is also necessary to uphold the individual human rights and dignity as provided for under the UN Declaration of Human Rights by insisting upon scrupulous compliance of the provisions of the Act for the purpose of upholding the democratic values. It is necessary for giving effect to the concept of `wider civilization'. The courts must always remind itself that it is a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that more serious the offence, the stricter is the degree of proof. A higher degree of assurance, thus, would be necessary to convict an accused.” 10. In the case of State of Punjab Vs. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 , the Supreme Court has cautioned in following words: “28. .........It must be borne in mind that severer the punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously followed.” 11. The presumption vis-à-vis NDPS Act has been explained by the Supreme Court in Noor Aga Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 41, in the following words: “58. .........It must be borne in mind that severer the punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously followed.” 11. The presumption vis-à-vis NDPS Act has been explained by the Supreme Court in Noor Aga Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 41, in the following words: “58. Sections 35 and 54 of the Act, no doubt, raise presumptions with regard to the culpable mental state on the part of the accused as also place burden of proof in this behalf on the accused; but a bare perusal the said provision would clearly show that presumption would operate in the trial of the accused only in the event the circumstances contained therein are fully satisfied. An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, the legal burden would shift. Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence is not as high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the guilt of accused on the prosecution is "beyond all reasonable doubt" but it is `preponderance of probability' on the accused. If the prosecution fails to prove the foundational facts so as to attract the rigours of Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus which is possession of contraband by the accused cannot be said to have been established.” 12. Same principle was reiterated in Mohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab, (2018), 17 SCC 627 while interpreting the provisions of Section 35 and 54 of NDPS Act and in the recent judgment of Gangadhar alias Gangaram Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) 9 SCC 202 . 13. In the present case, NCB maintains that accused, Bashir Ahmad Khan and Showkat Ahmad Dar, stated that seized drug was given by present petitioner, Mohd Aslam Batana, whereupon I.O. issued summons to petitioner, but he tried to escape and did not cooperate in the investigation of the case. However, ultimately, he was arrested on 22nd November 2020 and since then he is in incarceration. 14. Petitioner, prima facie, is facing prosecution on the basis of statement of co-accused, purportedly under Section 67 of NDPS Act along with seizure of Charas from accused Bashir Ahmad Khan and Showkat Ahmad Dar. 15. However, ultimately, he was arrested on 22nd November 2020 and since then he is in incarceration. 14. Petitioner, prima facie, is facing prosecution on the basis of statement of co-accused, purportedly under Section 67 of NDPS Act along with seizure of Charas from accused Bashir Ahmad Khan and Showkat Ahmad Dar. 15. Petitioner who is saddled with presumptions as per Section 35, 54 and 66 of NDPS Act would have to discharge such presumptions in the trial as per the provisions of the statute and mandate of the Supreme Court in this regard. From the Charas, seized, and ownership thereof would be seen in juxtaposition to statements of petitioner and other accused/witnesses and contraband/material recovered, then it all would also have material bearing. Therefore, petitioner does not bring home the analogy advanced for getting bail on the basis of Section 67 of NDPS Act only because it is not a case based upon statement under Section 67 of NDPS Act only. Some more layers are present into it. Nevertheless, petitioner still made out a case for grant of bail because of reasons assigned in succeeding paragraphs. 16. Petitioner in the present case is aged 42 years and from the facts it appears that he is first time alleged offender without any previous criminal record and has a family in District Poonch, therefore, chance of absconding is remote. 17. Besides that, complaint under Sections 36-A of NDPS Act has already been filed by the respondent in which many witnesses are official witnesses (Government employees), therefore, cumulatively chance of tampering with witnesses/evidence is remote. 18. Petitioner has already suffered more than 11 months of incarceration which amounts to pretrial detention. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, this Court intends to allow the petition. Accordingly, the Order dated 22nd February 2021, passed by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu dismissing the bail application, bearing File No.1171/BA titled Mohd. Aslam Batana v. Narcotics Bureau Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, is set-aside and as a consequence of which, it is directed that petitioner shall be released on bail on his furnishing personal bond of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) along with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. 19. Aslam Batana v. Narcotics Bureau Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, is set-aside and as a consequence of which, it is directed that petitioner shall be released on bail on his furnishing personal bond of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) along with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. 19. This order will remain operative subject to compliance of the following conditions by the petitioner: (1) The petitioner will comply with all the terms and conditions of the bond executed by him; (2) The petitioner will cooperate in the investigation/trial, as the case may be; (3) The petitioner will not indulge himself in extending inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Police Officer, as the case may be; (4) The petitioner shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused; (5) The petitioner will not seek unnecessary adjournments during the trial; (6) The petitioner will not leave the jurisdiction of this Court without previous permission of the Trial Court/Investigating Officer, as the case may be; and (7) Petitioner would not commit same nature of offence during trial and would not indulge in any criminal activity in future. (8) Petitioner shall not tamper with the evidence or witnesses in any manner and shall not be a source of embarrassment and harassment to any witnesses in any manner. 20. Ordered accordingly. 21. Revision petition stands allowed and disposed of in above terms.