ORDER : Shameem Akther, J. 1. Smt. Vankudoth Jani, the petitioner, has filed the present Writ Petition on behalf of her son-Vankudoth Sai Kumar @ Sai, the detenu, challenging the detention order, dated 03.10.2020, passed by the respondent No.3-Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Commissionerate. 2. Heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the record. 3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that by relying on a single criminal case registered against the detenu in Crime No.172 of 2020 of Abdullapurmet Police Station, Rachakonda Commissionerate, the respondent No.3-Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Commissionerate, passed the detention order dated 03.10.2020. According to the respondent No.3, the detenu is a 'drug offender' and he along with his associates has been indulging in illegal and highly dangerous activities of peddling of narcotic drugs i.e., ganja in an organized manner among the innocent people in the limits of Rachakonda Commissionerate endangering the lives of youth and innocent people, causing irreparable damage to their body organs including the Central Nervous System and thereby, crippling the mental and physical health of the people addicted to drugs and acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and health as well. Hence, this Writ Petition before this Court. 4. Sri V. Raghunath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Dr.B.Karthik Navayan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court: Firstly, that the detenu is a juvenile and as on the date of his detention, he is aged about 16 years 09 months 10 days. Secondly, that relying only on single case registered against the detenu in the year 2020, the impugned detention order, dated is passed. Thirdly, the alleged case does not add up to "disturbing the public order". They are confined within the ambit and scope of the word "law and order". Since the offence alleged is under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, 'NDPS Act'), the detenu can certainly be tried and convicted under the said special law. Thus, there was no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws. Hence, the impugned detention order tantamounts to colourable exercise of power. Fourthly, the detaining authority is not justified in invoking draconian power under the preventive detention laws. The detaining authority has to be extremely careful while passing the detention order. Thus, there was no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws. Hence, the impugned detention order tantamounts to colourable exercise of power. Fourthly, the detaining authority is not justified in invoking draconian power under the preventive detention laws. The detaining authority has to be extremely careful while passing the detention order. For detention ipso facto adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty enjoyed by the people under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Lastly, the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, while passing the detention order. The detention of a minor is barred by Section 22 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short, The Juvenile Justice Act'). Admittedly, the detenu was granted conditional bail by a learned single Judge of this Court, vide order, dated 21.08.2020 passed in Criminal Petition No.3420 of 2020. After release on bail, the detenu has not involved in any crime or criminal activity and he never violated the bail conditions. Therefore, the impugned detention order deserves to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, Sri G. Mallareddy, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home, appearing for the respondents, supported the impugned detention order and submitted that in the confession statement of the detenu, he has stated that he is aged about 19 years. Even in the two bail applications filed by the detenu, he mentioned his age as 19 years. Even if it is presumed that the detenu is a juvenile, the Juvenile Justice Act allows for juveniles in conflict with law in the age group of 16 - 18 involved in heinous offences to be tried as adults. In the single case relied on by the detaining authority for preventively detaining the detenu, the detenu managed to get bail from the Court concerned. The crime allegedly committed by him was sufficient to cause a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people at large. Since the modus of committing the crime was peddling narcotic drugs among the innocent people, it has created sufficient panic in the minds of the general public. Further, respondent No.1 confirmed the impugned detention order vide G.O.Rt.No.1970, General Administration (Special (Law and Order)), Department, dated 18.12.2020. Since the modus of committing the crime was peddling narcotic drugs among the innocent people, it has created sufficient panic in the minds of the general public. Further, respondent No.1 confirmed the impugned detention order vide G.O.Rt.No.1970, General Administration (Special (Law and Order)), Department, dated 18.12.2020. Therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in passing the impugned detention order and ultimately, prayed to dismiss the Writ Petition. 6. In view of the submissions made by both the sides, the points that arise for determination in this Writ Petition are: "1. Whether the detenu is a juvenile as on the date of his detention? 2. Whether the detention order, dated 03.10.2020 passed by the respondent No.3 and the confirmation order, dated 18.12.2020, passed by the respondent No.l are liable to be set aside?" POINTS: 7. A perusal of the sworn affidavit filed by the petitioner/mother of the detenu reveals that the detenu is aged about 16 years 09 months 10 days on the date of his detention. In support of the same, the petitioner filed the photostat copies of the Study and Conduct Certificate of the detenu issued by the Zilla Parishad High School, Penpahad, and the Aadhar Card of the detenu issued by the Government of India, which reveals that the detenu was born on 24.12.2003. It indicates that on the date of detention of the detenu, the detenu is aged about 16 years and odd. There is nothing to doubt the genuineness of the said documents, since they are issued by the competent authorities. Hence, it can be concluded that the detenu is a juvenile as on the date of his detention. It is apt to refer to the decision in Ramachandran v. The Inspector of Police, 1994 CrlLJ 3722 (Madras), wherein it is held thus: "18. A Juvenile's freedom is one of a proper custody of a guardian, either a natural guardian, a de facto guardian, or a de jure guardian appointed by a Court. Detention in judicial custody or otherwise is a task discharged by the Courts and other competent detaining authorities to put a person in custody, where he is not free to act at his will and resort to unlawful activities. Detention in judicial custody or otherwise is a task discharged by the Courts and other competent detaining authorities to put a person in custody, where he is not free to act at his will and resort to unlawful activities. Since a juvenile is always in custody and that custody is deliberately chosen by the Juvenile Justice Act, it is difficult to think that his delinquency will make him a habitual offender and a goonda in that sense. It is clear discretion of the police and the Court, after complying with the requirements of law in this behalf, to choose the custody of the juvenile, except in jail, if proper care is taken and the age of the offender is ascertained and when he is found a juvenile, care is taken to see that he is not left in the custody of the parents, who are likely to expose him to the dangers of the social evils and all such other conditions are met with concern for the welfare of the child (juvenile), there will be no occasion for anybody to resort to action of preventive detention of such person. When we say that a juvenile shall not be detained under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. We do not for a moment intend to suggest that when young children are found by the law enforcement authorities to be engaged in anti-social activities, no action should be taken against them. There should be more prompt action than in the case of any adult offender, in the case of a juvenile. He should be taken to proper custody but for the purposes under the Juvenile Justice Act, the detaining authorities - Authorities shall have the freedom to create a special home for juvenile delinquents and juvenile delinquents can be detained in such homes, but for the purposes envisaged under the Juvenile Justice Act." In the instant case, it is culled out from the record that the detenu was/is a juvenile as on the date of passing the impugned detention orders. 8. Here, it is apt and appropriate to extract Sections 1(4) and 22 of the Juvenile Justice Act, which reads as follows: "1. Short title, extent, commencement and application. 8. Here, it is apt and appropriate to extract Sections 1(4) and 22 of the Juvenile Justice Act, which reads as follows: "1. Short title, extent, commencement and application. xxxx xxxx xxxx Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all matters concerning children in need of care and protection and children in conflict with law, including - apprehension, detention, prosecution, penalty or imprisonment, rehabilitation and social re-integration of children in conflict with law; procedures and decisions or orders relating to rehabilitation, adoption, re-integration, and restoration of children in need of care and protection. Section 22 - Proceeding under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure not to apply against child - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any preventive detention law for the time being in force, no proceeding shall be instituted and no order shall be passed against any child under Chapter VIII of the said Code. 9. It may not be out of place to mention that delinquency in young children is sometimes the result of neglect they suffer, when they live without any home or settled means. They also become delinquents when they fall in the company of anti social elements and notorious criminals or are made to live in the areas afflicted by immorality. Law also recognized the presence of such evils in the society, which inject criminality in the young minds. The legislative intent is clear that neither the police nor the Court or any other Authority would release a delinquent juvenile on bail, with or without surety, if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the release of the juvenile delinquent is likely to associate himself with any known criminal or expose himself to moral danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. Unlike in the case of an adult accused in a cognizable offence, in the case of a child accused, it is the safety of the child accused, which is most important, irrespective of the fact that whether or not he has made out a case for bail. Unlike in the case of an adult accused in a cognizable offence, in the case of a child accused, it is the safety of the child accused, which is most important, irrespective of the fact that whether or not he has made out a case for bail. Arrest of a juvenile delinquent is not for the purpose of putting him in prison, but for the purpose of keeping him in such custody, which shall ensure that he is not affected by the vices, which adult criminals carry with them. Such custody is recommended as a part of sentence, if the juvenile is found guilty of having committed any offence, after causing proper enquiry into the charges leveled against him. Law as regards the neglected juveniles and delinquent juveniles is clear to the extent that such a child could be left in the custody of the parent or guardian, only when the parent or such guardian is worthy of such custody or otherwise to keep the child in such custody of a home, which will provide him proper atmosphere to grow as a respectable young man. If a child, therefore, is put under detention as a drug offender, he would be exposed to every such thing, which Juvenile Justice Act says he should not be exposed to. If a juvenile is branded as a drug offender in the sense that he has habitually committed or attempted to commit or abetted the commission of offences punishable under Chapter 16 or Chapter 17 or Chapter 22 of the Indian Penal Code, there is every possibility of him making it a habit if he is not put to care of a parent or home as contemplated under the Juvenile Justice Act, so as to protect him from evils of the society. Furthermore, a juvenile can be found to be a drug offender, only when the law enforcing authorities fail to discharge their duty as enshrined under the Juvenile Justice Act. If the law enforcing agencies act as required by the law, they will not allow a juvenile to form the habit, which will make him a drug offender and give him opportunity to engage himself in any activity of drug peddling. In any case, a juvenile cannot satisfy the definition of drug offender'. If the law enforcing agencies act as required by the law, they will not allow a juvenile to form the habit, which will make him a drug offender and give him opportunity to engage himself in any activity of drug peddling. In any case, a juvenile cannot satisfy the definition of drug offender'. If the Juvenile Justice Act has to play its role, a child shall also not satisfy the other conditions of the law of preventive detention. Furthermore, there are enabling provisions under the Juvenile Justice Act to detain the delinquent juvenile in special homes for the safety and security of all. In view of the mandate given in the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, the impugned orders are unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 10. Further, as far as the merits of the instant case are concerned, in catena of cases, the Honourable Supreme Court had clearly opined that there is a vast difference between "law and order" and "public order". The offences which are committed against a particular individual fall within the ambit of "law and order". It is only when the public at large is adversely affected by the criminal activities of a person, the conduct of such a person is said to disturb the public order. Moreover, individual cases can be dealt with by the criminal justice system. Therefore, there is no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws against an individual. For the invoking of such law adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty, which is protected and promoted by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, according to the Honourable Apex Court, the detaining authority should be wary of invoking the immense power under the Preventive Detention Act. 11. In the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 , the Honourable Supreme Court has, in fact, deprecated the invoking of the preventive law in order to tackle a law and order problem. The Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under: "54. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression "public order' take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances." 12. In the case of Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 3 SCC 831 , the Honourable Supreme Court has opined as under: "The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call order publique' and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?" 13. In the present case, the detaining authority relied on a single case vide Crime No.172 of 2020 of Abdullapurmet Police Station, for preventively detaining the detenu. We shall present it in a tabular column the date of occurrence, the date of registration of FIR, the offences complained of and their nature, such as bailable/non-bailable or cognizable/non-cognizable. Sl. No. Crime No. Date of Occurrence Date of registration of FIR Offence Nature 1. 172/2020 of Abdullapurmet PS 26.06.2020 26.06.2020 Section 20 (b) (N) of NDPS Act Cognizable 14. It is appropriate to refer the decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 , wherein it was held that a single act or omission cannot be characterized as a habitual act or omission because, the idea of ‘habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omission in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them, they cannot be treated as habitual ones. 15. A perusal of the impugned detention order reveals that the detenu was arrested in connection with Crime No.172 of 2020 of Abdullapurmet Police Station on 26.06.2020 and remanded to judicial custody. Subsequently, the detenu moved first bail petition before the Court of Metropolitan Sessions Judge, L.B. Nagar, and the same was dismissed on 16.07.2020. Thereafter, the detenu moved another bail application before a learned single Judge of Court and the same was allowed by order, dated 21.08.2020 and the detenu was released vide Dis No.1496/2020, dated 26.08.2020. Subsequently, the detenu moved first bail petition before the Court of Metropolitan Sessions Judge, L.B. Nagar, and the same was dismissed on 16.07.2020. Thereafter, the detenu moved another bail application before a learned single Judge of Court and the same was allowed by order, dated 21.08.2020 and the detenu was released vide Dis No.1496/2020, dated 26.08.2020. The apprehension of the detaining authority that since the detenu was granted bail, there is imminent possibility of his committing similar offence, which is detrimental to the public order, unless he is prevented from doing so by an appropriate order of detention, is highly misplaced, as there is no criminal history to the credit of the detenu. Moreover, the detenu is a juvenile, i.e., under 18 years of age on the date of passing of the impugned detention order and the confirmation order. 16. As held in Vijay Narain Singh's case (3 supra), a single act or omission cannot be characterized as a habitual act because, the idea of >habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to commit or repeat similar offences, which is patently not present in the instant case. Grave as the offence may be, it relates to peddling of narcotic drugs. Moreover, when the detenu is under 18 years of age, no inference of disturbance of public order can be drawn. These cases can certainly be tried under the special law. Thus, this case does not fall within the ambit of the words "public Order". Instead, it falls within the scope of the words "law and order". Hence, there was no need for the detaining authority to pass the impugned detention order. 17. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the impugned detention order and the consequential confirmation order are legally unsustainable. 18. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned detention order vide No:49/PD-CELL/CCRB/RCKD/2020, dated 03.10.2020, passed by respondent No.3, and the consequential confirmation order vide G.O Rt.No.1970, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, dated 18.12.2020, passed by respondent No.1, are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely Vankudothu Sai Kumar @ Sai, S/o.Saidha, at liberty forthwith, if he is no longer required in any other criminal case. 19. The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.