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2021 DIGILAW 55 (GUJ)

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad v. Navgujarat Education Trust

2021-01-21

A.S.SUPEHIA, N.V.ANJARIA

body2021
ORDER : 1. All the captioned six appeals preferred by the Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad are directed against judgment and orders passed by the Small Causes Court in respective Municipal Valuation Appeal filed by the same respondent herein. Since all the appeals have common thread of facts and the same issues of law involved, they were heard together to be treated simultaneously by this order. 1.1 Heard learned senior advocate Mr. Maulin Raval for Raval and Trivedi Associates with learned advocate Mr. Chintan Gandhi for the appellant Corporation and learned advocate Mr. Kunjal Pandya for the respondent in all the appeals. 2. The first captioned First Appeal No. 3994 of 2019 is directed against judgment and order dated 30.1.2018 of the Small Causes Court No. 5, Ahmedabad in Municipal Valuation Appeal No. 30 of 2017 wherein the bill for property tax in relation to Appeal year 2008-2009 was under challenge. In all other First Appeals, similar orders of even date passed by the Small Causes Court in respect of Appeal Year 2009-2010, 2006-2007, 2010-2011, 2011-2012 and 2007-2008, are subject matter of challenge. 3. All these Municipal Valuation Appeals culminating into the judgment and orders impugned in the different First Appeals as above, were preferred by the respondent Navgujarat Education Trust through its Managing Trustee in respect of the assessment fixed by the appellant Corporation in respect of the premises situated at Ahmedabad ward Usmanpura Gam bearing tenement No. 0520/09/0393/0001/F contending that the respondent was a public charitable trust registered on 9.10.1964, engaged in educational activities without any object of profit making, therefore liable to exemption from the taxes. 3.1 In the first captioned appeal, it was submitted that its premises was wrongly assessed to tax. It claimed that bill showing area of 3438 square meters was required to be issued as was issued in the earlier years. It was claimed that it being charitable trust not engaged in profit making or business activities, was entitled to exemption from general tax and education cess. It prayed before the Small Causes court to make assessment of the premises on the basis of measurement of 3438 sq. mtrs. and location factor F/1 previous Class-B. 3.2 The Corporation contested the respective Municipal Appeals by filling reply at Exh.9 denying the case of the trust. It prayed before the Small Causes court to make assessment of the premises on the basis of measurement of 3438 sq. mtrs. and location factor F/1 previous Class-B. 3.2 The Corporation contested the respective Municipal Appeals by filling reply at Exh.9 denying the case of the trust. It was contended that the appeals were not maintainable as were preferred against the bill and no cause of action had arisen. It was further contended that the principles of assessment applicable prior to 2001 would not apply as new formula had replaced the old. It was the contention that assessment of the premises of the trust was properly made under section 454 of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, and the rules made thereunder. 3.3 The Small Cause Court allowed all the Valuation Appeals setting at naught the assessment and directed to issue bill for the relevant Appeal Year giving exemption to the appellant trust from education cess and general tax. It further required the Corporation to recover the tax as per area of 3438 sq. mtrs. and as per the location factor F/1, previous Class-B. The Corporation was required to refund the excess amount of tax if any paid by the assessee trust. 3.4 In other words, the Small Causes Court in all the Valuation Appeals set aside the assessment of tax done by the Corporation and directed to give exemption from tax liability. In setting aside the assessment, the Small Causes Court supplied the following reasons common to all orders: “.....but respondent has not produced any documentary evidence to show that in the new B.P.M.C. Act there is no exemption to the education trust from general tax and education cess. As against this, the appellant has produced the certificated copy of the judgment at mark 4/16 in M.V.A. No. 762 of 2002 dated 12.1.2006 for the year 2001-02 of this court in which direction is given to the respondent to give exemption to the appellant in general tax and education cess under Section 132 of the B.P.M.C. Act. As against this, the appellant has produced the certificated copy of the judgment at mark 4/16 in M.V.A. No. 762 of 2002 dated 12.1.2006 for the year 2001-02 of this court in which direction is given to the respondent to give exemption to the appellant in general tax and education cess under Section 132 of the B.P.M.C. Act. The appellant has also produced another judgment vide mark 4/19 in which also in the M.V.A. No. 73 of 2006 dated 5.6.2011 and the same direction of exemption is given for the year 2002-2003, mark 4/20 is the similar judgment is also in M.V.A. No. 74 of 2006 for the year 2003-2004, mark 4/12 in which also the M.V.A. No. 75 of 2006 for the year 2004-2005, mark 4/22 is the similar judgment in M.V.A. No. 76 of 2006 for the year 2005-2006, the learned advocate for the appellant has further argued that the appellant has also filed application before the A.M.C. for getting exemption from education cess and general tax but respondent has not accepted the request of the appellant.....” 4. In assailing the impugned judgment and orders of the Small Causes Court in each Municipal Valuation Appeal, on behalf of the appellant Corporation the contentions were raised that: (i) The decisions in Municipal Appeal Nos. 73, 74, 75, 76 of 2006 relied on by the respondent trust before the Small Causes Court were challenged in First Appeal No. 1228 of 2012 before this court and that those appeals have been pending, which fact is not disclosed. (ii) The Trust challenged the property tax bill therefore the appeals were not maintainable and that no cause of action had arisen. (iii) The respondent Trust has been charging maximum fees from the students and cannot be said to be engaged in charitable activities and that it was earning profits to be not eligible to any exemption from the tax. (iv) the Corporation issued property tax bill in respect of area admeasuring 4942.82 sq. mtrs. however, the respondent trust erroneously claimed area of the premises to be 3438 sq. mtrs. It was contended that there was additional construction. (v) New formula of taxation was introduced by the Corporation based on factors in the year 2001 in which there is no provision for exemption from taxes under section 132 of the Act. (vi) There was specific factor applied to such property. mtrs. It was contended that there was additional construction. (v) New formula of taxation was introduced by the Corporation based on factors in the year 2001 in which there is no provision for exemption from taxes under section 132 of the Act. (vi) There was specific factor applied to such property. (vii) The bill for property taxes could not have been quashed for any purpose in view of the decision of this court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs. Rasiklal S. Maradia, 2012 (1) GLR 767 . 4.1 On the other hand, learned advocate for the respondent trust seriously defended the orders passed by the Small Causes Court allowing Valuation Appeals and holding the trust entitled to exemption from taxes. It was reiterated that the respondent was charitable trust and in view of the earlier assessment consistently done, as per the orders produced, the assessment was to be undertaken in similar way to exempt the respondent. 5. Having considered the facts and delineated rival submissions as above, as regards the contention about the introduction of new formula and whether in respect of the premises in question the formula would apply or not, is not the question of evidence. The Small Causes Court has erred and misdirected itself to observe that documentary evidence was not produced by the Corporation in respect of introduction of new formula. The formula when introduced and whether will apply to the case on hand or not, is something to be appreciated and ascertained from the state book and the rules. The applicability of new formula for particular financial year would be a question of fact to be considered and decided after looking at the provisions of the law and the rules. 5.1 Having stated to the above extent, we refrain from dealing with any of the arguments of the parties, further desist from entering into or opine about the merits of the case of either side, as we immediately notice from the nature of the impugned order that the Small Causes Court has for all practical purposes quashed the tax bills issued to the respondent Trust. The assessment of taxes undertaken by appellant Corporation is set aside and the Corporation is directed to grant exemption to the respondent. 5.2 In view of the well settled law emanating from the judgments referred to herein, such course was not open for the Small Causes Court. The assessment of taxes undertaken by appellant Corporation is set aside and the Corporation is directed to grant exemption to the respondent. 5.2 In view of the well settled law emanating from the judgments referred to herein, such course was not open for the Small Causes Court. In the landmark decision on the subject in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad vs. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. 1994 (2) GLR 1498 , the Division Bench ruled after examining the scheme of the Act that the assessment must be completed before close of the relevant official year and that once the official period is over, it is not open to the Commissioner to assess and levy the property tax for that year and in that view. It was observed that if the court dealing with the challenge to the assessment quashes the assessment, the Commissioner would not be able to re-assess and levy the property tax. 5.2.1 The following was stated: “The provisions of Rule 20 clearly show that the power of the Commissioner to make changes in the entry can be exercised only during the official year itself. Once this official year is over, the Commissioner will have no jurisdiction to make any alteration. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad, 1993 (2) GLH 897 , it was held by a Division Bench of this Court, after examining the scheme of the Act, that the assessment must be completed before the close of the relevant official year and once the official year has expired, the Commissioner cannot assess and levy property tax and, therefore, the Court also cannot issue direction to the Commissioner to do something which was not permissible under the Act. The quashing of the assessment would mean that the Commissioner would not be in a position to reassess and levy property taxes and the taxes for those official years would be totally lost to the Corporation. This being the position, the appellate court cannot and should not set aside the assessment and remand the case for de novo assessment by the Commissioner. This being the position, the appellate court cannot and should not set aside the assessment and remand the case for de novo assessment by the Commissioner. Any remand would, obviously, serve no useful purpose.” (Para 65) 5.2.2 On behalf of the assessee respondents, it was a contention canvassed that if the assessment is nullity for want of compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Act or Rule, the Small Causes Court would have no option but to quash the assessment in toto. This contention was negatived by the court stating: “The principle underlying the judgment in Anant Mill's case clearly answers the aforesaid question in favour of the Corporation. In that case, it had been contended that the Chief Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the grounds affecting legality of the assessment. It was also submitted in that case, on behalf of the assessee, that if the Chief Judge came to the conclusion that the method of assessment was illogical or irrelevant and the assessment, therefore, invalid, then it would not be competent for the Chief Judge to determine the rateable value afresh by applying the appropriate method in a correct manner. Elaborating further, it was submitted that all that the Chief Judge would be able to do would be to declare the assessment invalid and leave it to the Commissioner to make a fresh assessment according to the correct method and this would, again, result in the Corporation losing the tax altogether. Similar is the contention raised before us, namely, that the assessment is bad as proper procedure is not followed.....” (Para 67) 5.2.3 Thereafter, the observations in Anant Mill's case (supra) at Page 922, were relied on: “.....This contention is also, in our opinion, without substance. It ignores the scheme of the provisions in regard to appeals contained in the Act. We have already pointed out that an appeal may be preferred against the rateable value and in this appeal the assessee would challenge the determination of the rateable value made by the Commissioner. He may challenge it on any ground available to him and such ground may well relate to the method of valuation adopted for the purpose of determining the rateable value. He may challenge it on any ground available to him and such ground may well relate to the method of valuation adopted for the purpose of determining the rateable value. It is apparent from the provision in Section 409 Sub-Section (1) and particularly the words “before evidence as to value has been adduced” that the appeal against rateable value is in the nature of an original proceeding where evidence as to value may be led by both parties. The Chief Judge may on the application of a party to the appeal appoint a competent person to make the valuation and such person may be called as a witness and if he is so-called, he may be cross-examined by the other side. The evidence as to value which may be adduced before the Chief Judge in the appeal may be based on any method which is regarded by the party or his witness as appropriate. It cannot be restricted to the method of valuation adopted by the Commissioner. So also when a competent person is directed to make a valuation, he may value it according to the method which he regards as proper there is no requirement in the statute that his, valuation must be based on the method adopted by the Commissioner. The entire question as to retable value would be open before the Chief Judge and as contemplated under Section 411 Clause (a), it would be for the Chief Judge to fix the ratable value and the decision of the Chief Judge fixing the ratable value would be final, subject to appeal to the High Court and the Commissioner would be bound to give effect to such decision as provided in Section 413. The whole scheme of the provisions clearly contemplates that in the appeal against the ratable value, the Chief Judge would have to fix the ratable value after considering the evidence as to value which may be adduced before him and it is implicit in this process that he would also have to decide which method of valuation should be adopted. The whole scheme of the provisions clearly contemplates that in the appeal against the ratable value, the Chief Judge would have to fix the ratable value after considering the evidence as to value which may be adduced before him and it is implicit in this process that he would also have to decide which method of valuation should be adopted. If, therefore, the Chief Judge takes the view that the contractor's test method is inappropriate or inapplicable, he can decide which other method should be adopted and fix the rateable value by applying such method on the basis of the evidence before him.” 5.2.4 It was finally observed and held in Oriental Insurance case (supra): “We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations in Anant Mill's case. Following the said ratio, it would mean that even if the assessment is held to be not in accordance with law, whether because of the wrong method followed with regard to determining the rateable value or because of any irregularity or illegality in procedure or because of violaton of the principles of natural justice or because notice under Rule 15(2) had not been issued, then the Small Cause Court would itself have the jurisdiction to examine evidence and determine the correct rateable value. It would be wholly inappropriate for the Small Cause Court to merely quash the assessment, which would have the effect that for the official years in question, the entire tax would be lost to the Corporation. In effect, the ratio decidendi of the decision in Anant Mills' case is that the Small Cause Court exercises the same power and will have the same jurisdiction, which is exercised by the Commissioner for the purposes of determining what should be the correct reteable value.” (Para 67) 5.2.5 The court summarised the legal position in Para 82 to hold that if the mandatory notice under the Rule is not given, the assessment will be set aside, but the Small Causes Court should itself decide after recording necessary evidence as to what should be rateable value. It was also held that an appeal cannot be filed against the bill for the purpose of challenging the rateable value if complaint against the proposed fixation of rateable value had not been filed though opportunity had been granted. It was also held that an appeal cannot be filed against the bill for the purpose of challenging the rateable value if complaint against the proposed fixation of rateable value had not been filed though opportunity had been granted. 5.3 This position of law was also re-iterated in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs. Mukeshkumar Babulal Shah, (2000) 1 GLR 871 , holding thus: “It is, therefor, clear that the orders, as had been passed by the Small Causes Court, which are subject matter of challenge in these Appeals, cannot be said to have been passed in accordance with law. Even if the Small Causes Court had come to the conclusion that the Gross Rateable Value had been wrongly fixed and the assessment was not correct, it was the duty of the Small Causes Court itself to consider the material and evidence available on record and find as to what should be the correct Ratebale Value for the purpose of the payment of the due amount of tax to the Municipality. The Small Causes Court cannot create a situation, wherein the assessment is reduced to Zero and the assessee is let scoot free from paying any tax to the Municipal Corporation in respect of the year for which the assessment is found to be illegal by the Small Causes Court, as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad vs. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra). The Small Causes Court was under an obligation to take up such an exercise for determination of the rateable value in accordance with law on the basis of the material and evidence available before it since the powers are co-extensive with the Assessing Authority under the Act.” (Para 13) 5.4 The principle was again re-iterated yet in another decision in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs. Rasiklal S. Maradia (supra), in which Oriental and Fire General Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) and Mukeshkumar Babulal (supra) both were referred to and relied on. The judgment and order of the Small Causes Court impugned in Rasiklal S. Maradia (supra) were on similar nature, with respect to which it was observed that learned Small Causes Judge had created a situation resulting into zero tax assessment without examining the fixation of rateable value of the premises after having exercised the powers as if that of Commissioner. 6. 6. Thus, if the Small Causes Court while dealing with the Municipal Valuation Appeal arrives at a conclusion that assessment was erroneous, but in the final order quashes the entire assessment, such course is held to be illegal, for, it would divest the Assessing Authority namely the Municipal Commissioner to assess the tax for the relevant official year, the very assessment having been set at naught by the court. 6.1 In view of the above settled position of law, the impugned judgment and orders of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, impugned in each of the appeals suffer from manifest infirmity in law inasmuch as the Small Causes Court has set at naught the entire assessment absolving the respondent trust from paying the tax. The Small Causes Court while dealing with the Municipal Valuation Appeal exercises powers of the Commissioner himself and it was therefore incumbent upon the court to undertake exercise of assessment of the tax. It could not have set aside the entire assessment. 7. On the aforesaid consideration alone, the cases in each of the Municipal Valuation appeals decided by the Small Causes Court No. 5, Ahmedabad impugned in the respective First Appeal, are required to be remanded to the Small Causes Court to undertake exercise in accordance with law and render decision afresh. In order that the Small Causes Court is enabled to decide afresh in accordance with law, all the impugned judgment and orders dated 30.1.2018 passed in respective Municipal Valuation Appeals, which are subject matter of challenge in the first appeal concerned, are hereby set aside. The Small Causes Court shall take up the appeals for consideration afresh so as to decide the same within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the present order. 8. It is made clear that this court has passed the above order of remitting back the matters to the Small Causes Court only on the aforesaid consideration. The court has not expressed any opinion on the contentions of the parties and on other counts as may be permissible for them in law to be canvassed in respect of the assessment. All the contentions of both the parties are kept open to be considered by the Small Causes Court while deciding the Valuation Appeals afresh. 9. All these appeals are partly allowed and stands disposed of in terms of the above order and above directions. All the contentions of both the parties are kept open to be considered by the Small Causes Court while deciding the Valuation Appeals afresh. 9. All these appeals are partly allowed and stands disposed of in terms of the above order and above directions. Order in Civil Applications 10. In view of the orders passed in the respective main First Appeals, no orders are required to be passed in the Civil Applications. Accordingly, they stand disposed of.