Gollo Kaya, S/o Shri Gollo Himang v. State of A. P. , Represented by Public Prosecutor
2021-09-13
ROBIN PHUKAN
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. This petition, under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., is preferred jointly by the petitioners, namely, (1) Shri Gollo Kaya, (2) Shri Gollo Kacho, who are the accused herein this case and (3) Shri Techi Jordu, who is the complainant of this case for quashing Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 69/2018 under Sections 394/34 of the IPC. 2. The factual background leading to filing of this criminal petition is adumbrated hereinbelow:- “On 17.04.2018, at about 12.30 PM, 3 unknown boys came in one Eon Car (white colour) bearing registration No. AR-01H-1041, entered into the shop of Shri Techi Jordu situated at Nyorch Village, near Yupia District HQ and physically assaulted him and demanded a sum of 10,000/- and after a heated argument, they have taken away a sum of Rs.4,000/- from his shop. On receipt of the Ejahar from Shri Techi Jordu, on 18.04.2018, the Officer-in-Charge of Naharlagun Police Station registered Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 69/2018 under Section 394/34 IPC and endorsed to S.I.-Shri T. Mai for investigation. The I.O. then visited the place of occurrence and examined the witnesses and arrested the accused and forwarded them to the learned Court below and on completion of the investigation, the I.O. of the case laid the Charge-Sheet before the learned Court below against the petitioners No.(1) Shri Gollo Kaya and (2) Shri Gollo Kacho to stand trial under Section 394/34 of the IPC. In the meanwhile, the accused and the complainant, at the instance of their family members entered into a settlement deed and resolve their dispute and decided to withdraw the case on the basis of the said settlement deed. Thereafter, he approached this Court for quashing the FIR and the Charge-Sheet as the offence under Section 394 of the IPC is not compoundable.” 3. We have heard Mr. T. Poto, the learned counsel for the petitioners and also heard Mr. U. Bori, the ld. Addl. P.P. for the state of Arunachal Pradesh. 4. Mr. T. Poto, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that no incident, as described in the FIR, has ever taken place and in fact the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 came to the shop of the petitioner No. 3 for collecting donation for holding meeting in the village and then some arguments took place between them and a sum of Rs.4,000/-is donated by the petitioner No.3 to the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2. Mr.
1 & 2 came to the shop of the petitioner No. 3 for collecting donation for holding meeting in the village and then some arguments took place between them and a sum of Rs.4,000/-is donated by the petitioner No.3 to the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2. Mr. Poto, further submitted that at the instance of their family members, the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 and petitioner No. 3 entered into a settlement deed and they have compromised the matter amicably outside the Court and decided not to pursue the matter and since the offence under Section 394 of the IPC is not compoundable offence, they approached this Court by filing this criminal petition. 5. Mr. Poto, the learned counsel for the petitioners has referred following case laws, in his support:- (i) Madan Mohan Abbot-vs.-State of Punjab; (2008) 4 SCC 582 ; (ii) Nikhil Merchant-vs-CBI & Anr; (2008) 9 SCC 677 ; (iii) Shiji alias Pappu & Ors-vs-Radhika and Anr; (2011) 10 SCC 705 . 6. Mr. Poto, further submitted that the offence herein this case is personal in nature and not against the society and on the basis of ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases, the proceeding of Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 69/2018 under Section 394/34 of the IPC can be quashed. Therefore, it is contended to allow the petition. 7. On the other hand, Mr. U. Bori, the learned Addl. PP for the State of Arunachal Pradesh has submitted that the occurrence took place on the highway and the punishment prescribed in the offence is more than 10 years and in view of the settled position of law, a proceeding of this nature can be quashed. Therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 8. Having heard the submission of learned advocates of both sides, we have carefully gone through the record. It appears that during investigation, the I.O. has examined only 2 (two) prosecution witnesses and out of the 2 (two) witnesses, petitioner No. 3 is the complainant and one is the shop keeper. 9. It also appears from the Case Diary that the petitioner No. 3 is not the victim, though, he lodged the complaint one Aman Ali was the person who actually paid the sum to the petitioners No.1 and 2. He has been running a small grocery shop located at Nyorch, Yupia registered in the name of M/s Hamid Enterprise.
9. It also appears from the Case Diary that the petitioner No. 3 is not the victim, though, he lodged the complaint one Aman Ali was the person who actually paid the sum to the petitioners No.1 and 2. He has been running a small grocery shop located at Nyorch, Yupia registered in the name of M/s Hamid Enterprise. On the relevant date at about 12.30 PM, 3 unknown boys, who introduced themselves as member of ANSU, entered into his shop and demanded a sum of Rs.10,000/-and when he refused to pay the same they threatened him and later on he paid sum of Rs.4,000/-to them. It also appears that the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2, have accused asked Aman Ali to pay some amount to meet the expenditures in the ongoing meeting arising out of the disputes between the Chakma/Hajong and the Nyishies of Hollongi area and neither there was assault nor there was any threat given to the shop owner Mr. Aman Ali. 10. It appears that the alleged dispute is personal in nature. While dealing with quashing of proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Abbot-vs- State of Punjab (Supra) held that:- “We need to emphasize that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law”. 11. In Nikhil Merchant-vs Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr.
This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law”. 11. In Nikhil Merchant-vs Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr. (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise”. 12. Again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiji Alias Pappu and Ors-vs.-Radhika and Anr (Supra) has held that:- “It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can, in our opinion, be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C”. 13. Here, in this case, as we have already stated only 2 (two) witnesses were examined, out of which, one is the complainant and the other is the shop keeper.
The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C”. 13. Here, in this case, as we have already stated only 2 (two) witnesses were examined, out of which, one is the complainant and the other is the shop keeper. They have settled the disputes amicably on the intervention of their family members and entered into an agreement which is enclosed here in this case as Annexure -P2. The other witness namely Aman Ali, who allegedly paid the sum of Rs.4000/- has not signed the agreement. But he authorised the complainant/petitioner No.3 to sign and swear Affidavit and vakalatnama and to file withdrawal application before appropriate court. The said authorisation letter is annexed as Annexure-P/3. Further it appears that the Investigating Officer has submitted charge sheet against the accused persons under section 392 IPC, though the case was registered earlier under section 394 IPC as the complainant/victim confirmed that no assault committed by the accused persons and the medical officer also confirmed the same. 14. The alleged offence took place in a shop situated at Nyroch village, not on the Highway as submitted by the ld. Addl. P.P. Though it is submitted that the offence is punishable with imprisonment for 10 years yet, a cursory reading of the material available i.e. the FIR, the Charge Sheet and statement of the witnesses and other documents placed on record it cannot be said with certainty that the ingredients of the offence under section 392 IPC is fulfilled. At best ingredients of the offence of extortion, punishable under section 384 IPC, seem to be made out. We are not oblivious that this court, while dealing with the petition under section 482 Cr.P.C, cannot assume the role of appellate court to appreciate the evidence. But, we considered the facts and circumstances of the case only to determine whether it is fit case in which the inherent power can be invoked or not. 15. Further it appears that even if the trial is allowed to complete, then also there will hardly be any chance of conviction as it cannot be expected that the petitioner No. 3, who is the informant of this case and witness Aman Ali will depose against the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2, in view of the settlement agreement, they have entered into. The chance of conviction is bleak.
1 & 2, in view of the settlement agreement, they have entered into. The chance of conviction is bleak. It may be noted here that in the case of Shiji Alias Papu(supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has allowed petition for quashing the offence under section 394 IPC also. 16. It is now well settled that the proceeding can be quashed invoking section 482 Cr.P.C. on twin condition of (i) securing the end of justice and (ii) to prevent abusing the process of the court. Reference in this context may be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan: 2019 SCC On Line SC 320. 17. Thus, considering the principle of law, so laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases and further considering the materials placed on record as well as the circumstances under which the offence was committed and further considering the submission of learned Advocates of both sides, this Court is of the considered view, ends of justice, would be meted out, if this petition is allowed. Further proceeding with the case to our considered opinion will be an abuse of the process of the court. Accordingly, this petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. stands allowed. The FIR of Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 69/2018, registered under Section 394/34 of the IPC and the Charge-Sheet/Final report 110/2018 dated 14.6.2018, stands quashed. The Case Diary be returned, forthwith.