JUDGMENT : ALOK ARADHE, J. In this intra court appeal, the appellant -Trust has assailed the validity of the order dated 11.06.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge. In order to appreciate the appellant’s challenge to the impugned order, relevant facts need mention which are stated hereinafter. 2. The lands measuring 6 acres and 31 guntas including land measuring 33 guntas of Survey No. 24 of Kothanur Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk (land in question) were notified for acquisition under section 17(1) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Act', for short) vide notification dated 23.03.1988. Thereafter, a final notification under Section 19(1) of the 1976 Act was issued on 19.10.1994. The vendors of the appellant purchased the land in question on 27.09.1995 by 5 registered sale deeds. Thereafter, an award was passed on 28.09.1995. The possession of the land is stated to have been taken on 03.02.1996. The Trust appears to have filed an application to the State Government seeking withdrawal of the land from acquisition proceeding in respect of land measuring 33 guntas. Thereupon the State Government by a notification dated 08.06.2010 issued under section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 withdrew the land measuring 33 guntas from acquisition proceedings. The Trust thereafter has purchased the land in question vide registered sale deed dated 30.08.2010. 3. The said notification was challenged by the persons to whom the land in question was allotted in respect of a residential layout formed by the Bangalore Development Authority namely J.P. Nagar 8th Stage layout, Bangalore. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 11.06.2012, after perusal of the record produced before him inter alia held that possession of the land in question was taken over by the competent authority and mere non-issuance of a notification under 16(2) of the Act is not a ground for holding that possession of the land has not been taken. It was further held that since the possession of the land in question was taken, therefore it was not open to the Government to invoke the powers under section 48(1) of the Act for withdrawal of land from acquisition, as the land has vested in the State Government. It was further held that the scheme framed in respect of land in question has not lapsed under Section 27 of the 1976 Act. It was further held that the scheme framed in respect of land in question has not lapsed under Section 27 of the 1976 Act. Learned Single Judge accordingly quashed the notification dated 08.06.2010 in respect of the land in question. In the aforesaid factual background, this appeal has been filed by the Trust. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant, while inviting the attention of this Court to Section 16 of the Act, submitted that possession of land in question has not been taken by the State Government and the Trust is in possession of land in question. It is argued that the Trust is in possession of land in question and has constructed the school. The Trust has been granted NOC by the State Government on 23.06.2010 and an order dated 07.05.2011 by the Commissioner of Public Instructions, by which permission has been granted to the Trust to run the school. It is pointed out that the Trust is running a school. It is contended that the State Government has rightly exercised powers under Section 48(1) of the 1894 Act, as the possession of land in question was not taken. It is also pointed out that prayer in the writ petition was to restore possession, therefore, it is evident that allottees from Bangalore Development Authority were not in possession of the land in question and reliefs which were claimed by petitioners in writ petitions could not be claimed in law in a writ proceeding. 5. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge grossly erred in holding that the possession of the land in question was taken on 03.02.1996. It ought to have been appreciated that Mahazar was a forged document and was prepared prior to passing of the award. It is contended that no notice was given to owner of land before taking possession of the land in question and there is no compliance with the provision of Section 16 of the Act and the finding recorded that possession of the land in question has been taken on 03.02.1996, is factually incorrect. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in 'MOHINDHR SINGH GILL AND ANOTHER Vs. CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS' (1978) 1 SCC 405 , 'GOVERNMENT (NCT OF DELHI) Vs. MANAV DHARAM TRUST AND ANOTHER' (2017) 6 SCC 751 AND 'CANON INDIA (P) LTD. Vs. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in 'MOHINDHR SINGH GILL AND ANOTHER Vs. CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS' (1978) 1 SCC 405 , 'GOVERNMENT (NCT OF DELHI) Vs. MANAV DHARAM TRUST AND ANOTHER' (2017) 6 SCC 751 AND 'CANON INDIA (P) LTD. Vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS' (2021) 125 TAXMANN.COM 188 (SC). 6. Learned counsel for the Bangalore Development Authority submitted that acquisition proceeding was withdrawn only in respect of land measuring 33 guntas and it remained intact in respect of land measuring 5.37 guntas. It is argued that appellant had locus to file an application under Section 48(1) of the Act as it had purchased the land and the same had vested in the State Government. It is contended that notification under Section 48(1) of the 1894 Act could not have been issued as possession of the land in question was taken. It is also pointed out that third party rights were created. It is urged that order passed by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference. 7. Learned Additional Government Advocate has produced the record pertaining to acquisition of the land in question for our perusal and has pointed out from the record that preliminary and final notifications were issued on 23.03.1988 and 19.10.1994 and an award was passed on 28.09.1995. It is also pointed out that possession of the land in question has been taken on 03.02.1996 and notification under Section 16(2) has been issued on 06.02.2012. It is argued that in the facts of the case, order by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference at this stage. 8. We have perused the record produced before us and have considered the submissions made on both sides. The main issue which arises for consideration is whether the State Government could have invoked the powers to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in question measuring 33 acres under Section 48(1) of the Act. It is apposite to take note of Section 16 and 48 of the Act. "16. The main issue which arises for consideration is whether the State Government could have invoked the powers to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in question measuring 33 acres under Section 48(1) of the Act. It is apposite to take note of Section 16 and 48 of the Act. "16. Power to take possession -(1) When the Deputy Commissioner has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances (2) The fact of such taking possession may be notified by Deputy Commissioner in the Official Gazette; and such notification shall be evidence of such fact." "48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed. – (1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings there under, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. (3) The provision of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section." Thus, it is evident that publication of notification in Gazette under Section 16(2) is evidence of the fact that possession of the land in question has been taken. From a bare look at Section 48(1), it is axiomatic that the State Government has power to withdraw from acquisition of land, in case possession of the same has not been taken. 9. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 'INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Vs. MANOHARLAL' (2020) 8 SCC 129 has held as follows: "127. Under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, withdrawal of the land acquisition proceedings was permissible only if the possession has not been taken under Section 16 or 17(1). Section 48(1) is extracted hereunder: “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed. MANOHARLAL' (2020) 8 SCC 129 has held as follows: "127. Under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, withdrawal of the land acquisition proceedings was permissible only if the possession has not been taken under Section 16 or 17(1). Section 48(1) is extracted hereunder: “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed. – (1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.” In case possession has been taken, there cannot be any withdrawal from the land acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894. 128. Various decisions were referred on behalf of the State of Haryana that once possession has been taken and land has not been utilised, there cannot be withdrawal from the acquisition of any land. Land cannot be restituted to the owner after the stage of possession is over. Following decisions have been pressed into service: (a). In Gulam Mustafa & Ors (supra), it was observed: “5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.” Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.” Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. (supra) when restitution of land was sought, on the basis of some Government resolutions, after possession had been taken, this observed thus: “2… Since he had sought enforcement of the said government resolution, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of constructive res judicata. He also seeks to rely upon certain orders said to have been passed by the High Court in conformity with enforcement of the government resolution. We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.” (emphasis supplied) Again, in C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors, this court stated that: “4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (for short “the Act”) in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed. 5. Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that when by operation of Section 44-B read with Section 40 of the Act, the public purpose ceased to be existing, the acquisition became bad and therefore, the GO was bad in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that after the notification in GOR 1392 dated 17-10-1962 was published, the acquisition proceeding had become final, the compensation was paid to the appellants’ father and thereafter the lands stood vested in the State. In terms of the agreement as contemplated in Chapter VII of the Act, the Company had delivered possession subject to the terms and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one of the conditions was that on cessation of the public purpose, the lands acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In terms of the agreement as contemplated in Chapter VII of the Act, the Company had delivered possession subject to the terms and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one of the conditions was that on cessation of the public purpose, the lands acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In furtherance thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS Ltd., 5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated company of the original company. Therefore, the public purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted for another public purpose. Moreover, the question stood finally settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be entertained after three decades on the ground that either original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose. 6. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) The decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh & Ors thus: “9…There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired. It is a well-settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC p. 802, para 5) “5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC p. 802, para 5) “5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no 94 (2003) 1 SCC 335 principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long after the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.”” (emphasis supplied) Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra) the Court observed that: “28. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would reveal that while taking possession, symbolic and notional possession is perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the manner in which possession is taken must of necessity depend upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad principle in mind, this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 after considering the judgment in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700 , observed that while taking possession of a large area of land (in this case 339 acres) a pragmatic and realistic approach had to be taken. This Court then examined the context under which the judgment in Narayan Bhagde case had been rendered and held as under: (Viswam case, SCC p. 262, para 9) “9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not be cooperative in taking possession of the land.” 40. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not be cooperative in taking possession of the land.” 40. In Narayan Bhagde case one of the arguments raised by the landowner was that as per the communication of the Commissioner the land was still with the landowner and possession thereof had not been taken. The Bench observed that the letter was based on a misconception as the landowner had re-entered the acquired land immediately after its possession had been taken by the Government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested of the possession, under Section 16 of the Act. This Court observed as under: (Narayan Bhagde case, SCC p. 712, para 29) “29. … This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting.” To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders granted by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no effect for two reasons, (1) that the suits/petitions were ultimately dismissed and 95 (2009) 10 SCC 501 (2) that the land once having vested in the Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the landowner would not obliterate the consequences of vesting.” This court stated, in Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors thus: “19. If Para 493 is read in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants then in all the cases the acquired land will have to be returned to the owners irrespective of the time gap between the date of acquisition and the date on which the purpose of acquisition specified in Section 4 is achieved and the Government will not be free to use the acquired land for any other public purpose. Such an interpretation would also be contrary to the language of Section 16 of the Act, in terms of which the acquired land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the law laid down by this Court that the lands acquired for a particular public purpose can be utilised for any other public purpose. 22. The approach adopted by the High Court is consistent with the law laid down by this Court in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432 and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558 . In the first of these cases, the Court considered the validity of an executive order passed by the Government for assignment of land to the erstwhile owners and observed: (M. Bhaskaran Pillai case, SCC p. 433, para 4) “4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, LA by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value.” 24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the appellants have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value.” 24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the appellants have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. In the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.” (emphasis supplied)" 10. In the instant case, from careful scrutiny of the record, it is axiomatic that possession of the land in question bearing Sy.No.24 has been taken on 03.02.1996 which can be gathered from recital in Notification dated 06.02.2012 issued under Section 16(2) of the Act. The notification under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1896, was issued on 06.02.2012 which reads as under: "xxxxx The lands mentioned below has been acquired under FINAL NOTIFICATION No.HUD/292/MNX/93 DATED 19/10/1994 which was published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 19/10/1994 in pages No.01 to 31 Part-IX No.886 ‘No.UDD/434/MNX/97 dated 12/09/1997 in Pages 04 Part III-1 the formation of "JAYAPRAKSH NARAYAN NAGAR VIII STAGE" possession of the lands of the following survey numbers have been taken on the dates shown below. The facts of same is published under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (Karnataka Extension amendment Act 17 of 1961) and under Section 36 of the BDA Act 1976 for the information of public. District: Bangalore Taluk: South Hobli: Uttarahalli Village: Kothnur SCHEDULE Sl.No. I.A.C.No. Sy.No. Extent Acquired A-G Date of taking over possession of land 1 1/93-94 3/1 0-35 22/04/1998 xxx 32 39/94-95 24 6-31 03/02/1996 xxx” Thus, the aforesaid notification is evidence of the fact that possession of the land in question has been taken. There is no cogent material on record to rebut the statutory presumption. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we concur with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that possession of the land in question was taken. 12. In view of the unambiguous language employed by the legislature in Section 48(1) of the Act and in view of the well settled legal position emerging from interpretation of Section 48(1) of the Act by the Supreme Court, it is clear as noon day, that since possession of the land in question was taken by the State Government, the power under Section 48(1) of the Act could not have been invoked. 13. 13. For yet another reason, order passed by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference. Admittedly, appellant -Trust has acquired title in respect of land in question vide registered sale deed dated 30.08.2010 i.e. much after passing of the award on 28.09.1995. The Trust, at the time it made an application to the State Government for withdrawing from acquisition of land, had no title in respect of land and therefore, it had no locus to move an application under Section 48 of the Act. Similar view has been taken in 'INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. MANOHARLAL', (2020) 8 SCC 129 . On this ground also, no interference is called for in the impugned order. 14. So far as the contention with regard to lapsing of scheme under Section 27 of the Act is concerned, the learned Single Judge in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the order has held as under: "27. This Court in R. ADIKESAVULU NAIDU‘s case (supra), has held that the scheme of J.P Nagar 8th Stage has lapsed under Section 27 of the Act. In paragraphs 141 and 142, this Court has observed as under: “141. In the result, a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the acquisition proceedings in respect of subject lands which are covered under the preliminary Notification and final Notifications, but which have not vested in the State Government within the period of five years from the date of issue of the final Notification. 142. The BDA is restrained from further implementation of the lapsed scheme if it is to be to the detriment and adverse to the interest of the land owners whose lands have, as a consequence of this order, revert to them.” 28. It is clear that the Learned Single Judge has quashed the acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject matter of those writ petitions, which have not been vested in the State Government within a period of five years from the date of issue of the final notification. The Court has not interfered with the land, which has already been vested in the State Government and layout has been formed. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Trust that the acquisition proceedings even in respect of the land in question has lapsed." 15. The Court has not interfered with the land, which has already been vested in the State Government and layout has been formed. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Trust that the acquisition proceedings even in respect of the land in question has lapsed." 15. After considering the submissions made and on perusal of record, we find no ground to differ with the view taken by the learned Single Judge on this issue. For the reasons assigned by us supra, we concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same fails and is hereby dismissed.