JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal, filed by the Administrator Auqaf Islamia Wakaf, is directed against the order dated 09.01.2019 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jammu in File No.11/Misc, whereby the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 came to be dismissed holding that the arbitrator has given sufficient and cogent reasons for disallowing the claims raised by the appellant herein and allowing only one claim on account of mobilization advance. Thus, all the objections raised by the appellant herein came to be rejected. 2. The facts-in-short, as gathered from the appeal file, are that Notice Inviting Tender bearing No.1184-98/AQ dated 21.07.1998 was issued by the Administrator Auqaf, Jammu inviting sealed tenders from the eligible contractors for the construction of Haj House Complex at Rail Head Complex, Jammu. Tender of M/s. R.S. Construction Engineers, respondent No.1 herein, came to be found lowest, thus approval for allotment of contract was granted to it by the appellant herein for an amount of Rs.3,77,58,698/- vide Govt. Order No.Rev/Haj and Auqaf-6/85 dated 18.01.1999. Thereafter contract came to be allotted to respondent No.1 vide Letter No.1897-98/AQ dated 3.3.1999. An agreement to this effect was executed on 08.05.1999 between Administrator Auqaf, Jammu and contractor-respondent No.1 herein. As per the contract agreement, the work was required to be commenced on 10.03.1999 and completed on 10.09.2001. Since several disputes arose between the parties to the agreement, respondent No.1 approached this Court for appointment of an independent arbitrator and with the consent of both the parties; one Sh. S.K. Gupta came to be appointed as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes which had arisen between the parties to the agreement. It is pertinent to mention that during the pendency of arbitration application for appointment of an independent arbitrator, the appellant herein terminated the contract on 18.10.2007. 3. Be that at it may, both the parties participated in the arbitration proceedings, filed their claims and counter claims and also led evidence. The sole arbitrator after completion of arbitration proceedings passed the award dated 31.01.2010. 4. Against the said award, the Administrator Auqaf Islamia Wakaf-appellant herein filed a petition under Section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 for setting aside of the award dated 31.01.2010. The sole arbitrator after completion of arbitration proceedings passed the award dated 31.01.2010. 4. Against the said award, the Administrator Auqaf Islamia Wakaf-appellant herein filed a petition under Section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 for setting aside of the award dated 31.01.2010. It was pleaded before the learned Additional District Judge that since the basic agreement was void as the same was against the provisions of law contained in the Waqafs Act, as such the arbitration provided by such agreement is also void. It was also pleaded that the agreement-in-question as well as the subject matter of dispute was also not capable of settlement by arbitration as the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was barred under the provisions of Waqafs Act. It was also contended by the appellant herein that Claim Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10 & 12 allowed by the arbitrator in favour of respondent No.1 herein were not only against the express terms and conditions of the contract, but also unjustified, based on no evidence, imaginary and without any jurisdiction. 5. Learned Additional District Judge, Jammu after discussing in detail the preliminary objections as well as the objections raised by the appellant herein with regard to Claim Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10 & 12, rejected the same vide order dated 09.01.2019. Hence, the present appeal. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their respective contentions, gone through the appeal file as well as the award dated 31.01.2010 passed by the learned arbitrator and the order dated 09.01.2019 of Additional District Judge, Jammu. 7. The appellant herein while challenging the award dated 31.01.2010 passed by the sole arbitrator had raised six preliminary objections before the learned Additional District Judge, Jammu. The six preliminary objections raised were: i. The contract for construction of Haj House Complex at Rail Head, Jammu between the appellant and respondent No.1 was against the provisions of law contained in Waqafs Act. ii. Whether the disputes raised in the arbitration fall within the scope of arbitration clause or not. iii. The composition of arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. iv. The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the provisions of the Waqafs Act. iii. The composition of arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. iv. The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the provisions of the Waqafs Act. v. Passing of the award in favour of respondent No.1 herein was influenced by corruption. vi. The award is against the public policy of the State. 8. A perusal of the order dated 09.01.2019 reveals that the learned Additional District Judge, Jammu has one by one rightly discussed in detail these preliminary issues, as such I do not find any reason to interfere with the same nor I find any infirmity with that part of the order impugned. Otherwise too, while arguing the appeal, learned counsel for appellant had not pressed these preliminary issues. 9. Though the appellant has objected to allowing of claim Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10 & 12, but, more particularly, the appellant has laid much stress in allowing claim Nos.3 & 10 by the learned arbitrator. 10. It is pleaded that although no escalation was permitted by the terms of the agreement, yet the learned arbitrator allowed claim No.1 to the tune of Rs.18,68,263/- in favour of respondent No.1 herein, which is beyond the scope of arbitration. The appellant has also objected to allowing of claims No.2 & 3 on account of extra work carried out in earth filling, earth brought from outside; loss suffered due to shuttering remained hanging, labour, T&P, machinery remained idle for 18 months for want of Government stores. The appellant has also objected to allowing of claim Nos.4 & 6 on account of interest allowed by the arbitrator and payment of earnest money in favour of respondent No.1. 11. As regards claim No.1, though it is pleaded that the work allotted was to be completed within the period of contract, yet there is nothing in the terms of agreement to show that if the work continues beyond the period of contract, escalation shall not be allowed. Therefore, in the absence of any stipulation in the agreement prohibiting payment of escalation, respondent No.1 is entitled to escalation cost as per RBI norms. 12. Therefore, in the absence of any stipulation in the agreement prohibiting payment of escalation, respondent No.1 is entitled to escalation cost as per RBI norms. 12. As regards allowing of claims No.2 & 3 on account of extra work carried out in earth filling, earth brought from outside; loss suffered due to shuttering remained hanging, labour, T&P, machinery remained idle for 18 months for want of Government stores, a perusal of the award reveals that the learned arbitrator before allowing the claims, himself visited the site, perused the drawing and MB No.6943/C1. Further, as per the agreement, materials like steel and cement were to be provided by the appellant to the contractor, which, as per record, reveals that the appellant failed to provide the same in time. The file reveals that respondent No.1 vide letter EXH C5, C6, C7, C8, C72, C73 and ANN-1 made a number of requests to make arrangements for issuance of steel, cement and funds for making running payments and for casting of RCC slab of 3rd floor of Block “A”, however, no response was given by the appellant herein, as a result of which shuttering etc. remained hanging in position for 18 months vis-à-vis idleness of labour, staff, machinery, T&P engaged for execution of the project work. It has also been claimed by respondent No.1 that the same has been recorded in the works diary/works register maintained by the Engineer-incharge and duly signed by both the parties in token of its correctness and acceptance. Therefore, the objection raised by the appellant herein with regard to claim Nos.2 & 3 is devoid of any force and is, accordingly, rejected. 13. Now I come to claim Nos.4, 6, 7 & 8, i.e., loss suffered on account of interest accrued on financial limit of bank, private financial units, traders etc.; release of FDR amounting to Rs.4.40 lacs deposited against earnest money as per terms and conditions of the contract agreement; payment/refund of interest of Rs.1.50 lacs accrued on earnest deposit as well as damages for the loss of profit which the claimant was expected to earn from the balance contract work. 14. The record reveals that as per the terms of agreement, respondent No.1/claimant started the execution of work on 10.03.1999 with an assurance that adequate funds would be provided for completion of the project on 10.09.2001. 14. The record reveals that as per the terms of agreement, respondent No.1/claimant started the execution of work on 10.03.1999 with an assurance that adequate funds would be provided for completion of the project on 10.09.2001. However, the file reveals that CC 1st bill was submitted by respondent No.1 on 27.09.1999 but paid in April 2001 for Rs.27,28,000/-, whereas CC 2nd bill was submitted on 29.11.1999 but paid in June 2001 for Rs.27,65,000/-; thus there was a huge delay of nineteen months in making the payments of these two running bills. Appellant in its reply before the learned Arbitrator had stated that if the financial status of contractor/respondent No.1 was of such a low level then why he submitted his tender; meaning thereby the appellant herein had itself admitted that it was not making the payments in time, rather there was huge delay in making the payments to the contractor/respondent No.1. Further, instead of giving an effective reply against claim Nos.4 & 6 before the learned Arbitrator, the appellant herein chose to submit evasive and vague response. It has also been claimed by the contractor/respondent No.1 that since the appellant herein failed to provide cement and steel as per the terms of agreement, the contractor/respondent No.1 had to arrange the same from his own resources by making advance payment to suppliers worth Rs.18.00 lacs. The file reveals that the contractor had produced a bank statement before the learned Arbitrator in respect of a bank loan obtained from Canara Bank, Jammu, wherein he had paid interest of Rs.4 lacs against the bank limit of Rs.18.00 lacs used by him. It has also been claimed by respondent No.1 that site for Block “C” was not provided at all nor drawings and design were ready with the appellant herein for Blocks “B” and “C”. Further, I am in agreement with the learned Arbitrator that the termination of the contract by the appellant herein on its own was not legally justified and that the contract could not have been unilaterally rescinded. I am also in agreement that due to the lapses and breach of contract on the part of department/appellant herein that the contractor/respondent No.1 herein had not been able to complete the contract work within the period of contract and, therefore, the appellant herein cannot justify to retain the accrued interest on the earnest deposit. I am also in agreement that due to the lapses and breach of contract on the part of department/appellant herein that the contractor/respondent No.1 herein had not been able to complete the contract work within the period of contract and, therefore, the appellant herein cannot justify to retain the accrued interest on the earnest deposit. Further, under these circumstances the contractor/respondent No.1 is also entitled to the damages for the loss of profit which he was expected to earn from the balance contract work. Contractor/respondent No.1 has also claimed that previously he completed two prestigious projects within record time relating to India Population Project (World Bank Aided Project) and construction of five storied Police Headquarters Building at Panama Chowk, Jammu. Considering all these aspects into account, I find that the learned Arbitrator has rightly decided Claim Nos.4, 6, 7 & 8 in favour of respondent No.1, as such the objection raised by the appellant herein in respect of these four claims is hereby rejected. 15. Appellant has also contended that Claim Nos.3 and 10 allowed by the learned Arbitrator are in fact the same claim made under two different heads. 16. I have gone through the award passed by the learned Arbitrator as well as the order dated 09.01.2019 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jammu in a petition filed by the appellant herein under Section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 and I am in full agreement with the learned Additional District Judge, Jammu that claim No.3 allowed by the learned Arbitrator pertained to the losses suffered by the contractor due to shuttering material remaining idle for 18 months, labour, T&P, machinery remaining idle for 18 months for want of Government stores and lack of funds and the same was for the scheduled period of completion of contract as per the terms of agreement; whereas claim No.10 allowed by the learned Arbitrator was for the damages suffered due to prolongation of contract beyond the stipulated date of completion of project on account of default of appellant herein. Both the claims are under different heads, as such no question arises to overlap the same, that too when the learned Arbitrator has decided the same in accordance with law. Therefore, the objection raised by the appellant in respect of Claim No.10 is also rejected. 17. Both the claims are under different heads, as such no question arises to overlap the same, that too when the learned Arbitrator has decided the same in accordance with law. Therefore, the objection raised by the appellant in respect of Claim No.10 is also rejected. 17. As regards allowing interest under Claim No.12 by the learned Arbitrator, I am of the view that the learned Arbitrator in his discretion can award pendentelite and future interest from the date of award till realization of the awarded amount because the terms of the contract did not prohibit the same. As such this objection as regards Claim No.12 is also rejected. 18. Further, the appellant has failed to show that the award of the learned arbitrator suffered from perversity or there was an error of law or that the arbitrator had otherwise mis-conducted himself. Appellant was neither able to point out any error apparent on the face of record nor was otherwise able to make out a case for interference with the award by the Arbitrator with respect to these issues. Learned Arbitrator has rightly appreciated the documents on record; terms and conditions of the contract in a perspective manner and provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The technical points raised by the parties had been considered by the Arbitrator and in absence of any patent illegality being pointed out there was no scope for interference. There was no material on record to hold that by granting the claim as made, the award as passed was against the public policy of India. Each claim as made was individually examined and the findings recorded by the Arbitrator were confirmed. 19. The present appeal having been filed under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, the scope for interference therein would have to be kept in mind. In this regard a useful reference can be made to the following observations of the Apex Court in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the decision of MMTC Ltd. vs. Vedanta Ltd. ( 2019 ) 4 SCC 163: “11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided Under Section 34(2)(b)(ii), i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided Under Section 34(2)(b)(ii), i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the "fundamental policy of Indian law" would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury reasonableness. Furthermore, "patent illegality" itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract. It is only if one of these conditions is met that the Court may interfere with an arbitral award in terms of Section 34(2)(b) (ii), but such interference does not entail a review of the merits of the dispute, and is limited to situations where the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or perverse, or when the conscience of the Court is shocked, or when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. An arbitral award may not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a possible view based on facts. (See Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 ). Also see ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 ; Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445 ; and McDermott International v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 ). It is relevant to note that after the 2015 amendments to Section 34, the above position stands somewhat modified. Also see ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 ; Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445 ; and McDermott International v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 ). It is relevant to note that after the 2015 amendments to Section 34, the above position stands somewhat modified. Pursuant to the insertion of Explanation 1 to Section 34(2), the scope of contravention of Indian public policy has been modified to the extent that it now means fraud or corruption in the making of the award, violation of Section 75 or Section 81 of the Act, contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, and conflict with the most basic notions of justice or morality. Additionally, Sub-section (2A) has been inserted in Section 34, which provides that in case of domestic arbitrations, violation of Indian public policy also includes patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso to the same states that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciation of evidence. 12. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by the Court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.” 20. In NTPC vs. M/s Deconar Services Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.6483/2014 decided on 04.03.2021, a three judge bench of the Supreme Court has, in line with the settled principle of minimum interference in arbitral awards, inter alia reiterated that in order to succeed in a challenge against an arbitral award, the party challenging the award must show that the arbitrator’s award suffered from perversity; or an error of law; or that the arbitrator had otherwise mis-conducted himself. The Court highlighted that merely showing that there is another reasonable interpretation or possible view on the basis of the material on record is insufficient to allow interference by the Court. 21. Viewed thus, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed along with CM.