JUDGMENT NITIN W.SAMBRE,J. - This Petition is by a third party/stranger to a execution proceeding questioning the order dated 14/09/2020 passed by the learned District Judge-1, Niphad in Review Application No.08 of 2020 in Regular Civil Appeal No.125 of 2017. 2. By the said impugned order, objection to the execution of decree for possession came to be rejected. 3. The facts necessary for deciding the present Petition are as under:- 4. Respondent/decree holder initiated Special Civil Suit No.330 of 1987 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nashik, alleging that vide Sale Deed Dated 27/6/1978 one Eknath Jaju sold and transferred the suit property to the decree holder. 5. Based on the said title, prayer for declaration of ownership, possession and recovery of storage charges of Rs 45,270/- was claimed. The said suit came to be dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Niphad, District Nashik on 29/4/1999. The Respondent/decree holder preferred Civil Appeal No.15 of 2001 before the Additional District Judge, Niphad. The said appeal also came to be dismissed on 28/4/2006. However, it is held that decree holders are entitled for the amount of Rs 50,000/- with interest @ 6% from 29/6/1978 till its realization. The second appeal was dismissed on 20/2/2007 preferred by the Respondent. Aforesaid judgments were subject matter of challenge in Appeal being Civil Appeal No.1784 of 2009 which was arising out of SLP (C) No. 12154 of 2007. The Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment delivered on 23/3/2009 decreed the entire suit claim. The suit claim reads thus :- "(a) That it be declared that the Defendant has no right, title or interest of any nature whatsoever in respect of the property, viz. being the plot of land admeasuring one acre four gunthas or thereabouts, that is 5,324 sq. yards (44 gunthas x 121 sq. yds) equivalent to 4451.53 sq. meters, along with 6 (six) corrugated iron-sheet godowns, one house and one well thereon, known as Kandechichawli situated at Gram Panchayat at Nos. 753 to 761 in the village Saykheda, Sub- District Niphad, District Nashik or say part thereof, or to store or keep any goods, articles or things therein or to use, enter upon or remain upon the said property or any part thereof, and that the Defendant is in wrongful use and occupation of the said property. 753 to 761 in the village Saykheda, Sub- District Niphad, District Nashik or say part thereof, or to store or keep any goods, articles or things therein or to use, enter upon or remain upon the said property or any part thereof, and that the Defendant is in wrongful use and occupation of the said property. (b) That the Defendant be ordered to remove himself, his servants, agents and all his goods, articles and things from the said property. (c ) That the Defendant by himself, his servants and agents or otherwise howsoever be restrained by a perpetual order and injunction of this honourable Court from in any manner storing or keeping any goods, articles or things or using, occupying or entering upon or remaining in use and occupation of the said property or any part thereof. (d) That the Defendant be ordered and decreed to pay to the Plaintiffs the sum of Rs 45,270/- being the arrears of storage charges and/or compensation for the period of three years prior to the institution of the suit at the rate of Rs 1,257.50 per month with interest on Rs 45,270/- at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the Defendant remove himself, his servants and agents and his goods, articles and things from the said property. (e) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the court receiver or some other fit and proper be appointed Receiver of the said property, with all powers under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (f) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the Defendant by himself, his servants and agents or otherwise howsoever, be restrained by an order and Injunction of this Hon'ble Court, from in any manner, storing or keeping any goods, articles or things or using or entering upon or remaining in use or occupation of the said property or any part thereof. (g) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the Defendant, his servants and agents or otherwise howsoever, be restrained by an order and Injunction of this Hon'ble Court from in any manner dealing with or disposing of, or alienating or encumbering or creating any right, title or interest in favour of any one in respect of the said property or any part thereof." 6. Based on the aforesaid decree, Special Darkhast No.2 of 2015 came to be initiated in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Niphad in which, Petitioner invoked the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97, sub-rule (2) vide application/objection-Exhibit-66, alleging that the portion of the suit property vide Sale Deed dated 19/7/2000 was sold by Defendant Ramakant Jaju in favour of Sundari Pille who, in turn, sold the same to the Petitioner on 13/10/2006. Petitioner claimed that Petitioner is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the aforesaid proceedings, as such he should not be dispossessed in execution of the decree. 7. The said objection-Exhibit-66 was rejected by a detail reasoned order on 21/7/2017 passed by the Executing Court. 8. The Petitioner preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.125 of 2017. The said appeal came to be partly allowed by setting aside the aforesaid order passed below Exhibit-66, thereby remanding the matter back to the Executing Court. Respondent herein preferred Review Application No. 08 of 2020, seeking review of the aforesaid order of remand on 24/2/2020. Vide order impugned dated 14/9/2020, Review Application came to be allowed and the order of remand dated 14/1/2020 referred to above, came to be set aside and the appeal was dismissed, thereby confirming the order passed below Exhibit-66 in Special Darkhast No.2 of 2015. 9. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Anturkar while questioning the legality of the order impugned would urge that the same is not sustainable, as the order dated 14/1/2020 in Regular Civil Appeal No.125 o 2017 was passed by the learned District Judge 2. According to him, order on the Review Application, thereby allowing Review was passed by District Judge - 1, which court was not manned by very same judge who has passed the earlier order dated 14/1/2020. In that view of the matter, though the judge who passed the earlier order dated 14/1/2020 was available, the order passed by District Judge - 1 in Review Application No.1 of 2020 which is impugned herein is without any jurisdiction. So as to substantiate his contention, he would invite attention of this court to the provisions of Section 114, Order 47, Rules 1, 2 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Malthesh Gudda Pooja vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 15 SCC 330 . In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Malthesh Gudda Pooja vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 15 SCC 330 . 10. His further contention is, once by Bombay Amendment, provisions of Rule 102 of Order 21 of C.P.C. are deleted, objection preferred by the Petitioner under Order 21 Rule 97 sub-rule (2) ought to have been decided on its own merit by a detailed inquiry. It is also claimed by him that review has been sought on altogether different grounds than the one canvassed earlier and that being so, reviewing court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The learned Senior Counsel would urge that court below has failed to consider very applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to him, in review jurisdiction, it is not open to re-appreciate the evidence and that being so, court should have held that no case for review is made out. Drawing support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 , his contentions are, review court ought not to have entertained review thereby allowing the same. He has also placed reliance on the latest judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 896. 11. Further contentions of Mr. Anturkar are, in absence of rules framed under Section 127 of the Civil Procedure Code governing the proceedings for review before the Civil Court, the order impugned is not sustainable. As such, submissions are, the order impugned is liable to be set aside. 12. While countering the aforesaid submissions, party in person who is a decree holder and who has opposed the claim would urge that he is litigating for his right since 1987 i.e. for almost more than 35 years. According to him, Petitioner is a stranger to the decree, who has purchased the property during pendency of suit and that being so, he cannot claim better rights than the rights of the judgment debtor. The party in person would try to enlighten this Court on the previous knowledge of the Petitioner in purchasing the property during pendency of present proceedings before the court. The party in person would try to enlighten this Court on the previous knowledge of the Petitioner in purchasing the property during pendency of present proceedings before the court. According to him, pursuant to the order of learned Principal District Judge, Review Application was placed before the learned District Judge-1 and that being so, order impugned is sustainable. As such, he sought dismissal of the Petition. 13. At the outset, the first issue, in my opinion, which warrants consideration is: whether order impugned could be termed as one without jurisdiction, as the order in original, thereby remanding the matter back to Executing Court was passed by District Judge-2, whereas District Judge-1 has reviewed that order. While passing the order impugned, the learned Judge was sensitive to the fact that the order of which review was sought before him was passed by District Judge-2 manned by some different judicial officer. Thereafter, Respondent/original decree holder made some grievance before the Principal District Judge and Principal District Judge vide administrative order dated 28/3/2020 was pleased to withdraw the review proceedings from the file of District Judge-2, Niphad and assigned the same to learned Court presided over by District Judge-1 in exercise of powers under Section 24 of the C.P.C. Said provision with equal vigor is applicable to even execution proceeding. As such, aforesaid circumstances prompted learned Principal District Judge to assign the matter to learned District Judge-1 who has proceeded to exercise jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. 14. In the aforesaid backdrop, contention of the learned Senior Counsel that review application should have been heard by District Judge-2 who was very much available, cannot be accepted. Under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code which is equally applicable to the execution proceedings, Principal District Judge is empowered to transfer the proceedings from one judge to another judge, provided cause to that effect is made out. The fact that transfer of proceedings from District Judge-1 was never questioned before hearing of Review Application, cannot permit the Petitioner to raise technical objection that in the scheme of Order 47 Rules 1, 2 and 5 matter should have been heard by District Judge-2 and not by District Judge-1. The fact that transfer of proceedings from District Judge-1 was never questioned before hearing of Review Application, cannot permit the Petitioner to raise technical objection that in the scheme of Order 47 Rules 1, 2 and 5 matter should have been heard by District Judge-2 and not by District Judge-1. As far as judgment in the matter of Malthesh Gudda Pooja cited supra which is relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner is concerned, same will not be of any assistance in the backdrop of order of transfer of review proceedings by the Principal District Judge. It appears that the order passed under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code transferring the matter from the file of District Judge-2 to District Judge-1 can be termed as an exception to the provisions of Order 47 Rule 5 to mean that even if same judge was available whose order was sought to be reviewed, circumstances prevailed before the Principal District Judge to transfer the review Application to District Judge-1. As such, said contentions are liable to be rejected. 15. In the light of aforesaid observations and having regard to the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, it is apparent that only grievance made is, the judge who has passed the order of which review is sought, though was available, matter was placed before other judge. Both these judges have similar jurisdiction which fact is not in dispute. In the aforesaid backdrop, claim of the Petitioner that the learned District Judge-1 has committed an illegality in entertaining the Revision Application is devoid of any merits. If the contention of the Petitioner that District Judge-2 has jurisdiction, District Judge-1 who is manning similar Court with similar powers, of- course has jurisdiction to decide the claim put-forth. As such, no illegality could be noticed on the aforesaid issue. 16. As far as next contention of the learned Senior Counsel that reviewing court has re-appreciated the evidence and allowed Review Application is concerned, it can be observed from the order impugned that by express provisions court has every authority in law to review the judgment, provided an error apparent on the face of record is noticed. 16. As far as next contention of the learned Senior Counsel that reviewing court has re-appreciated the evidence and allowed Review Application is concerned, it can be observed from the order impugned that by express provisions court has every authority in law to review the judgment, provided an error apparent on the face of record is noticed. The order of which review was sought was based on observation that Executing Court, while dealing with the objection of the Petitioner pursuant to provisions of Order 21 Rule 97/98 has held that an adjudication is required to be conducted, before removal of the obstruction by recording findings to that effect. Reviewing court noted that the Apex Court in the matter of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust and Another reported in (1998) 3 SCC 723 has observed that that detail inquiry as contemplated while deciding the suit is not required while dealing with the objection of the obstructionist. Though vide Bombay Amendment, provisions of Rule 102 of Order 21 are deleted, it is required to be noted that under Order 21 Rule 97, inquiry contemplated an inquiry which need not be a detailed inquiry or collection of evidence. Paras 11, 12, 14 of the aforesaid judgments speak thus:- "11. When a decree-holder complains of resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution court to adjudicate upon it. But while making adjudication, the court is obliged to determine only such question as may be arising between the parties to a proceeding on such complaint and that such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of the complaint." "12. The words "all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97" would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resistor raised it. The questions which executing court is obliged to determine under rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g. if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree- holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resistor or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree-holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code, execution court can decide whether the question raised by a resistor or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section." "14. It is clear that executing court can decide whether the resistor or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refused to vacate the property. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor. Of course the Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination. If the Court deems it necessary." 17. This Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.8175 of 2018, which was decided on 1/10/2018. Respondents vide Review Petition (St) No.29552 of 2018 sought re-call of the order which was allowed by this Court on 1/11/2018. This Court has observed that the present Petitioner has purchased the suit property from Sundari Ganpati Pillai by registered Sale Deed dated 13/10/2006 which was admittedly executed in favour of the Petitioner during the pendency of the litigation. It is then observed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment dated 14/3/2008 passed in Appeal (Civil) No.1998 of 2018 in the matter of Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram and Ors has held that the Petitioner who is a transferee cannot obstruct decree holder and benefits under Order 21 Rule 98 are not available. As such, it was held that the Petitioner was not entitled for benefit under Order 21 Rule 98 of the Civil Procedure Code. 18. In spite of above, the Petitioner has pursued the proceedings before the Executing Court with identical submissions. As such, it was held that the Petitioner was not entitled for benefit under Order 21 Rule 98 of the Civil Procedure Code. 18. In spite of above, the Petitioner has pursued the proceedings before the Executing Court with identical submissions. Respondent/decree holder has also participated in the proceedings and the Executing Court recorded detailed finding after elaborate inquiry on the rights of the present Petitioner to obstruct decree, particularly when he is a purchaser of property during pendency of the proceedings. 19. As far as scheme of Order 21 Rule 97 is concerned, in the judgment in the matter of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd., Apex Court has already held that if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. The Supreme Court then proceeded to hold that the Executing Court can decide whether resistor or the obstructor like Petitioner is a person bound by the decree and can refuse to vacate the property, based on his rights to be looked into within the purview of Order 21 Rule 97 sub-rule (2). In the aforesaid backdrop of the observations of the Apex Court, if we peruse the observations of the Executing Court, the Executing Court in detail has considered the contentions of the Petitioner, of creation of right in his favour by virtue of Sale Deed of 2006. As such, it can be noticed that inquiry as was contemplated under Order 21 Rule 97 sub-rule (2) was duly taken recourse to and looked into by the Executing Court so also re-appreciated by the appellate Court in the order under challenge. The Executing Court not only has determined the question of legal right of the Petitioner to obstruct decree but has legally arrived at conclusion that the Petitioner cannot be held to be entitled to obstruct decree under the provisions of law. 20. In that view of the matter, since the lower appellate court i.e. District Judge-1 whose order is impugned herein has noticed error apparent on the face of record and as such proceeded to pass an order reviewing the order of learned District Judge-2, thereby dismissing the objection raised by the Petitioner. 20. In that view of the matter, since the lower appellate court i.e. District Judge-1 whose order is impugned herein has noticed error apparent on the face of record and as such proceeded to pass an order reviewing the order of learned District Judge-2, thereby dismissing the objection raised by the Petitioner. The Apex Court in the matter of Kamlesh Verma cited supra in para 17 to 19 has laid down that it is not open for reviewing Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach to a different conclusion even if it is possible. As far as case in hand is concerned, what is noticed is, parties have relied on documentary evidence. The issue as to whether under Order 21 Rule 97/98, 101 a detail inquiry like that in a suit is required to be conducted is answered. As such, it cannot be inferred that reviewing court has exercised power of appellate court thereby re-appreciating the evidence. In that view of the matter, summary principles laid down in aforesaid judgment to be considered in the matter of review are worth referring to, which read thus: "20.1 When the review will be maintainable" (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [ AIR 1954 SC 526 ] to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. [ (2013) 8 SCC 337 ]" 21. In the case in hand reviewing court has noted that there is mistake apparent on the face of record and as such, order in review jurisdiction was passed. The Reviewing Court was conscious of the fact that it has no power to re-appreciate the evidence and has proceeded to deal with rival contentions. 22. In the case in hand reviewing court has noted that there is mistake apparent on the face of record and as such, order in review jurisdiction was passed. The Reviewing Court was conscious of the fact that it has no power to re-appreciate the evidence and has proceeded to deal with rival contentions. 22. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that no lis pendens was registered and that being so, protection under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available to the Respondents is also liable to be rejected, as it can be inferred from the evidence brought on record hat the Petitioner was having knowledge of pendency of the dispute. Not only that, this Court has already observed that the Petitioner cannot be termed as purchaser without notice as he has not taken appropriate caution before getting part of the suit property transferred in his favour, as the proceedings were pending in relation to the suit property before the competent authority. Mr. Anturkar has relied on provisions of the Bombay Act No. XIV of 1939 and Bombay Act No.LVII of 1959 so as to make out a point based on the provisions of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act in favour of the Petitioner. It is to be noted that this Court had an occasion to consider the said provisions in the matter of Pramod Moreshwar Tattu vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Baramati and others reported in 2018 (6) Mh.L.J. 18. It is already observed by the Executing Court that in 7 x 12 extract of the suit property there is mention about pendency of the suit proceedings i.e. pendency of Regular Civil Suit No. 62 of 1995. Once there is mention about pendency of the suit, it cannot be inferred that the Petitioner is a purchaser of the suit property without notice. In the aforesaid backdrop, contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that in the absence of registration of lis pendens, benefit that of the purchaser of the suit property without notice should be extended, cannot be accepted and is accordingly liable to be rejected. 23. The status of the predecessor-in-title i.e. Mr. Jaju was that of licensee at an agreed license fees. 23. The status of the predecessor-in-title i.e. Mr. Jaju was that of licensee at an agreed license fees. The said document of 29/6/1978 since is a registered document, based on same the Supreme Court recorded a finding of presumption that transaction between Respondents/decree holders and original judgment debtors was a genuine one. The objection of the Petitioner to the execution of decree in question that he has perfected his title having succeeded to the same through Sundari Pille who has purchased the property from Ramakant Jaju. It appears that the said Sundari Pille i.e. predecessor- in-title of the Petitioner preferred Writ Petition (St) No.96454 of 2020 before this Court wherein injunction in the objection proceedings was rejected by the court below. This court has already dismissed the said Writ Petition preferred by Sundari Pille. As such, Petitioner cannot claim better title than Sundari Pille or from Jaju who is a judgment debtor. 24. It can be inferred from the record that Petitioner has purchased the suit property during pendency of proceedings before the court below. The Petitioner has nowhere demonstrated that before purchasing the property he or his vendor at any time had called objections of the persons interested, thereby issuing public notice. Apart from above, entry in revenue record about pendency of proceedings, absence of title verification cannot give benefit to the Petitioner as that of purchaser for value without notice. The Executing Court and the lower appellate court was sensitive to the aforesaid issue and noticed that the Respondent/decree holder is agitating his claim for last 35 years. 25. In the aforesaid backdrop, in my opinion, no case for interference is made out, as both the the courts below have dealt in detail the contentions raised by the Petitioner. The judgment under review, so also the one passed below Exhibit-66 which is questioned in the present Petition in categorical terms deal with all the contentions raised. The Petitioner who is a third party being transferee during penency of civil suit cannot claim better rights than the defendants/judgment debtors. 26. In that view of the matter no case for interference is made out. Petition fails and same stands dismissed.