JUDGMENT : N. ANIL KUMAR, J. 1. The present second appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and decree in A.S. No. 164/2018 dated 25.9.2020 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Irinjalakuda, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first appellate court’] which affirmed the judgment and decree of the Principal Munsiff's Court, Irnjalakuda (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial court’] in O.S. No. 1817/2015 dated 8.8.2018 dismissing the suit for cancellation of Ext.B1 sale-deed No. 2899/2013 of the Sub Registrar's Office, Nellayi and for consequential permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondent/ defendant from trespassing into or committing waste in the plaint schedule property. 2. The subject matter of the present appeal pertains to the plaint schedule property by virtue of Ext.A1 (Ext.B1) sale-deed No. 2899/2013 of the S.R.O. Nellayi admeasuring appropriately 40 cents of property and a building therein comprised in Sy. Nos. 1491/18 and 1469/1 situated in Nenmanikkara Village in Mukundapuram Taluk. The parties will be referred to in the rank assigned to them in the suit for the purpose of convenience and clarity. 3. The facts emerging from the records of the case are as follows:- The plaintiff and his brother Sreedharan obtained the plaint schedule property by virtue of Ext.B2 sale-deed No. 3116/1955 of S.R.O. Nellayi. Subsequently, Sreedharan transferred his title and interest in the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff by executing Ext.B3 settlement deed No. 2411/2010 of the very same Sub Registrar's Office. Hence, the plaintiff is the absolute owner in possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule property. On 18.6.2013, the defendant and his friend one Kuttappan approached the plaintiff and his wife claiming that his son Saroj Kumar had some financial liabilities with two persons namely, Sudheesh S/o Kuttappan and Mahesh S/o Raghavan, while working together in Gulf country. The aforesaid Raghavan is arraigned as the defendant in this case. Towards the financial liability of the plaintiff's son, they demanded to execute a registered deed in their favour as security for payment of a debt. Believing their representation, the plaintiff and his wife executed a document on 19.6.2013 in favour of the defendant. In fact, the document was executed as a mortgage deed to discharge the liability due to the defendant. The plaintiff and his wife were made to believe that the mortgage would be released in the event of repayment of the debt of their son. In fact, the document was executed as a mortgage deed to discharge the liability due to the defendant. The plaintiff and his wife were made to believe that the mortgage would be released in the event of repayment of the debt of their son. In April 2015, the wife of the plaintiff received a legal notice, which was advised by Kuttappan. On receipt of the legal notice, the plaintiff made enquiry at the Sub Registrar's office, Nellayi. On enquiry, it was disclosed that he executed a sale-deed on 19.6.2013 in favour of the defendant in lieu of a mortgage deed. The above deed was executed as a result of fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff neither received any amount nor did he hand over the possession of the plaint schedule property in favour of the defendant. The sale consideration of Rupees six lakh alleged to have been received by the plaintiff is false. In fact, during the relevant period, the plaint schedule property would fetch an amount of Rs. 3.5 lakh per cent as market value. Since the existence of Ext.A1 sale-deed casts a cloud on the title of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property, the sale-deed is liable to be cancelled. 4. On service of summons, the defendant appeared and contested the suit. In short, the stand taken by the respondent/defendant was that the defendant obtained title and possession over the plaint schedule property after due execution of Ext.A1 sale-deed and hence the defendant is the true owner of the plaint schedule property. After the execution of Ext.A1 sale-deed, the property was mutated in favour of the defendant. On the very same date of execution of Ext.A1 sale-deed, the plaintiff handed over the prior title deeds of plaint schedule property to the defendant. At present, the plaintiff has rented out the plaint schedule property to run the branch office of the CPI (M) at Pazhayi Kalasamithy. 5. Necessary issues for determination were framed by the trial court. The parties let in evidence in support of their respective claims. PWs. 1 to 3 were examined on plaintiff's side and marked documents as Exts.A1 to A13. DW-1 to 3 were examined and marked as Exts.B1 to B11 on defendant's side. Exts.X1 and X2 were also marked. PW-3 the Advocate Commissioner prepared Exts.C1, C1(a) and C2. The parties let in evidence in support of their respective claims. PWs. 1 to 3 were examined on plaintiff's side and marked documents as Exts.A1 to A13. DW-1 to 3 were examined and marked as Exts.B1 to B11 on defendant's side. Exts.X1 and X2 were also marked. PW-3 the Advocate Commissioner prepared Exts.C1, C1(a) and C2. On appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently held that Ext.A1 sale-deed is valid and the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged fraud and misrepresentation. Thereupon, the plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of filing this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri. K.S. Bharathan and the learned Senior counsel for the respondent Sri. S.V. Balakrishna Iyer. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the two courts below erred in construing Ext.A1 (Ext.B1) as a sale-deed. According to the learned counsel, in the nature of contention advanced by the appellant, both the courts below went wrong in finding that the consideration in terms of market value in Ext.A1 is abysmally low, which is one of the indica of the fact that the plaintiff has never intended to sell the plaint schedule property to the defendant. It was submitted that the trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the suit of the appellant on unsustainable grounds, particularly Exts.A10 to A12 as well as the evidence of PW2 would prove to the hilt that the possession of the plaint schedule property with the building thereon, is with the appellant/plaintiff. It was submitted that both the courts below have illegally refused to consider the fact whether there was transfer of consideration or intention to transfer the property as mentioned in Ext.A1. 8. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the respondent would contend that the appellant executed Ext.A1 document on 19.6.2013 for valuable consideration and pursuant to Ext.A1 sale-deed, the plaint schedule property was mutated in favour of the respondent. According to the learned Senior counsel, the oral evidence of DW-2 the Village Officer would show that the plaint schedule property was mutated in favour of the respondent on 18.10.2013. According to the learned Senior counsel, the oral evidence of DW-2 the Village Officer would show that the plaint schedule property was mutated in favour of the respondent on 18.10.2013. Exts.X1 and X2 official records would prove that the plaint schedule property was mutated and consequently Ext.B4 to B8 Land Tax Receipts were issued in favour of the respondent. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the defence set up by the appellant is that of a loan transaction between the parties. He submits that no document in support of the defence has been produced by the appellant. The learned Senior Counsel submits that such a defence is not tenable and is barred under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in the face of Ext.B1 registered sale-deed admittedly executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. 9. In this case, the execution of the sale-deed on 19.6.2013 by virtue of Ext.B1 is not in dispute. The said document was presented before the Sub Registrar and registered on the same day. The plaintiff appeared before the Sub Registrar and had executed Ext.B1. According to the plaintiff, he agreed to execute a mortgage deed in favour of the defendant to discharge the debt due to his son. He would contend that he did not want to execute a sale-deed for a meagre amount of Rs. 6 lakh. He maintained that the value of the property as on the date of execution of the deed was on the higher side and the value fixed in Ext.A1 is abysmally low. 10. Ext.B1 sale-deed shows that the defendant is entitled to hold, possess and enjoy the scheduled properties from the date of sale. According to the plaintiff, the possession of the property was not delivered to the defendant either on the date of sale or thereafter. It has come out in evidence that the plaintiff has rented out the plaint schedule building to run the office of the CPI (M) Branch. 11. Sale is defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. In a sale, there is an absolute transfer of all rights of the property sold and no rights are left in the transferor. 11. Sale is defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. In a sale, there is an absolute transfer of all rights of the property sold and no rights are left in the transferor. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, can be made by a registered instrument. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. If the intention of the parties was that the title should pass on the execution of sale-deed, the title would pass to the purchaser even if physical possession was not handed over. The seller cannot avoid the same. Normally, ownership and title to the property will immediately pass to the purchaser on registration of the sale-deed with effect from the date of execution of the sale-deed. However, the circumstances would indicate that possession was retained by the plaintiff and the building was rented out to a tenant even after the execution of the sale-deed. 12. It is true that the plaintiff had obtained title to the plaint schedule property by virtue of Exts.B2 and B3 sale-deed. DW-2 and DW-3 were examined to prove Ext.B1 sale-deed. DW-3 the document writer, who prepared Ext.B1 sale-deed, testified that Ext.B1 was prepared under the instruction of both the plaintiff and the defendant. He further deposed that before the preparation of the document, prior title deeds, tax receipt, identity cards etc. have been verified by him. He also stated that Ext.B1 was read over to the parties and they understood the contents therein. DW-3 also supported the version of DW-2. 13. It is an admitted fact that one Haridas was in possession of the plaint schedule property as a tenant at the time of execution of Ext.B1 sale-deed. Ext.C1 commission report would show that Haridas was the tenant of the building at the time of local inspection whereas Ext.C2 would show that the building is presently occupied by another tenant. 14. When the recitals in Ext.B1 are sufficient to prove the intention of the parties, no oral evidence can be looked into for ascertaining the intention of the parties. 14. When the recitals in Ext.B1 are sufficient to prove the intention of the parties, no oral evidence can be looked into for ascertaining the intention of the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant is unable to substantiate the fact that the recitals are insufficient or ambiguous warranting this Court to examine the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties for ascertaining the intention subject to the limitations placed by Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,1972 (for short ‘the Evidence Act’). The mere contention that it was executed as a mortgage deed is not sufficient to establish the plea of fraud and coercion alleged by the plaintiff. Going by Order 6 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified, in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading. Thus a party relying on fraud, undue influence misrepresentation etc. has to give particulars in plaint alleging such fraud, undue influence etc. To set aside a sale-deed, as vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation, a high degree of evidence is required. No specific plea as contemplated under Order 6 Rule 4 has been set up as a defence in the suit. 15. The terms on which the suit property was conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant having been set out in Ext.B1 itself. In view of the bar contained in Section 91 of the Evidence Act, it is not open to the plaintiff to claim that the conveyance was made as security. The terms of Ext.B1 completely rule out the so-called understanding between the parties that the plaint schedule property was to remain as a security for payment of a debt and was to be re-conveyed to the plaintiff upon payment of Rupees six lakh with interest. Section 92 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of the grant or other disposition of the property have been proved according to Section 91, no evidence of any oral agreement, or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to such instrument, for the purpose of contradicting, varying or adding to or subtracting from its terms. Section 92 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of the grant or other disposition of the property have been proved according to Section 91, no evidence of any oral agreement, or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to such instrument, for the purpose of contradicting, varying or adding to or subtracting from its terms. By setting up the defence as security for payment of debt, the plaintiff seeks to contradict and vary the terms of Ext.B1 sale-deed. In Bishundeo Narain Rai (Dead) by LRs. and Others vs. Anmol Devi and Others, (1998) 7 SCC 498 , the Supreme Court analysed the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in respect of sale of immovable property. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 11 as follows:- “11. Apropos the question noted above, a reference to Section 54.......It follows that on execution and registration of the sale-deed, the ownership title and all interests in the property pass to the purchaser unless a different intention is either expressed or necessarily implied which has to be proved by the party asserting that title has not passed on registration of the sale-deed. Such intention can be gathered by intrinsic evidence, namely, from the averments in the sale-deed itself or by other attending circumstances subject, of course, to the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” Ext.B1 sale-deed inter-alia would show that the plaintiff sold the plaint property to the defendant for consideration of Rupees six lakh and the plaintiff had put the defendant in possession and occupation of the property vended thereunder. The above recitals unmistakably indicate conveying of title to the property absolutely for consideration. These factors satisfy all the requirements of an absolute sale. No recital in Ext.B1 indicates any contra intention. 16. The non-delivery of possession by the plaintiff to the defendant does not by itself or other facts cumulatively pointed out by the plaintiff, would lead to the conclusion that the transaction between the parties was not sale of the suit property, but was a mere loan transaction. So also the defendant waited to claim possession of the suit property from the plaintiff has no bearing on the defendant's title to the suit property or their right to claim possession in accordance with law. 17. The defendant is the true owner of the property. So also the defendant waited to claim possession of the suit property from the plaintiff has no bearing on the defendant's title to the suit property or their right to claim possession in accordance with law. 17. The defendant is the true owner of the property. A suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the true owner from trespassing into the plaint schedule property is clearly unsustainable after the execution of Ext.B1 sale-deed in his favour. The title was passed thereunder. The only contention of the appellant/plaintiff is that he is in possession of the property subsequent to Ext.B1 sale-deed and he has rented out the building therein to a tenant. It is unnecessary to decide the above contention for the purpose of this appeal. 18. An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of the document is a question of law. In the case on hand, there is no misconstruction of Ext.B1 or wrong application of a principle of law in construing Ext.B1. The two courts below concurrently decided the matter following the accepted principles of law. The first appellate court, which is the final court of facts, examined the evidence on record and then arrived at a reasoned conclusion that the respondent-defendant was the owner of the plaint schedule property pursuant to Ext.B1. This finding is based on cogent and binding documents of title, including tax receipts. The conclusion of the first appellate court with respect to the title in favour of the respondent/defendant pursuant to Ext.B1 does not warrant interference in a second appeal. 19. In a second appeal, the jurisdiction of this court is being confined to a substantial question of law, a finding of fact that the title was passed over to the respondent pursuant to Ext.B1 sale-deed is not open to challenge in a second appeal even if the appreciation of evidence is wrong and the finding of fact is incorrect. The general rule is that the High court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts rendered by the courts below. Both the trial court and the first appellate court have considered the material evidence on record and rendered a finding based on evidence. No substantial questions of law are involved in this case. Hence, this R.S.A. is liable to be dismissed. 20. Both the trial court and the first appellate court have considered the material evidence on record and rendered a finding based on evidence. No substantial questions of law are involved in this case. Hence, this R.S.A. is liable to be dismissed. 20. In the result, this R.S.A. is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstance, there will be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.