JUDGMENT : KAILASH PRASAD DEO, J. 1. Heard, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Alok Lal in M.A. No. 2/2018 and learned counsel for the appellant/claimant, Mr. Vikas Pandey in M.A. No. 340/2019. 2. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. as well as claimant have preferred these two appeals assailing the same and common award dated 04.07.2017, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal, Hazaribag, in Claim Case No. 75/2011, whereby the claimant namely, Masomat Sunita Devi has been awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,25,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of framing of issues i.e. on 23.04.2014 to be paid within 30 days, failing which the award amount shall carry interest @ 9% per annum. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant, Mr. Vikas Pandey, has submitted that claimant has preferred the appeal for enhancement of the award and relied upon the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Chetan Malhotra vs. Lala Ram, (2016) SSC Online Del. 2981. Para 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71 of the aforesaid judgment may profitably be quoted hereunder: “65. Having regard to the fluctuating trends in CPI (IW), this court finds the Cost Inflation Index (CII) determined and notified by the Ministry of Finance in Government of India under Section 48 of Income Tax Act, 1961 for each financial year, to be a better method to off-set the effect of inflation on the real value of money. This approach, if followed, would ensure that there is no inconsistency in the awards of compensation in cases of death of children. [R.K. Malik (supra) and Balram Prasad vs. Kumar Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384 ]. Since the amount which requires to be subjected to correction was determined by decision in R.K. Malik wherein cause of action had arisen on 10.11.1997, the financial year 1997-98 is taken as the “base year.” 66. For ready reference, the rates of Cost Inflation Index (CII) notified by the government till date, to the extent necessary, are reproduced in the table given below: Financial Year CII Before 1.4.1981 100 1981-1982 100 1982-1983 109 xxx xxx 1997-1998 331 1998-1999 351 1999-2000 389 2000-2001 406 2001-2002 426 2002-2003 447 2003-2004 463 2004-2005 480 2005-2006 497 2006-2007 519 2007-2008 551 2008-2009 582 2009-2010 632 2010-2011 711 2011-2012 785 2012-2013 852 2013-2014 939 2014-2015 1024 2015-2016 1081 CONCLUSIONS 67. In the considered view of this Court, the cases for compensation on account of death of children in motor vehicular accident cases ought to be dealt with by considering the claim towards pecuniary damages (towards loss to estate), in accordance with the age-group wise categories as in R.K. Malik (supra); the first category being of children less than 10 years' in age, the second category being of children more than 10 years' and up to 15 years' in age, and the third category 3 of children more than 15 years' but not having attained the age of majority (18 years). The children in the third category would ordinarily be of such age group as is generally receiving formal school education or those that are (being) imparted special training so as to be equipped with requisite skills to be gainfully employed in a variety of trades. They are after all nearing adulthood and thus, on the threshold of becoming self-reliant. In such cases, the prospects of their employability and earnings in future or present, based on evidence adduced about their academic track record or training in special talents or skills, would need to be borne in mind. As in Lata Wadhwa (supra), the claim for pecuniary damages arising out of death of children of this age group cannot be at par with the lower age groups falling in the first and second category. Therefore, the pecuniary loss to estate due to their death would deserve to be worked out by applying a higher multiplier on the notional income (of non-earning persons) unless, of course, case is properly made out for higher considerations. Noticeably, in Sarla Verma (supra) the Supreme Court specified the multiplier of 18 for cases where the deceased was in the age-group of 15 years' to 20 years' old. For the first and second category, however, the multiplier of 10 and 15 respectively, as used in R.K. Malik (supra), would hold good. 68. Since in the claims arising out of death of children, generally speaking, (non-earning hands), the income is to be notionally assumed on the basis of the second schedule to the MV Act, the general practice of deduction of one-half (50%) towards personal and living expenses, as applied in case of bachelors above the age of 18 years would be unfair. Since in the claims arising out of death of children, generally speaking, (non-earning hands), the income is to be notionally assumed on the basis of the second schedule to the MV Act, the general practice of deduction of one-half (50%) towards personal and living expenses, as applied in case of bachelors above the age of 18 years would be unfair. Pertinently, the notional income specified for non-earning persons in the second schedule is very low as compared to the rates of minimum wages. Therefore, the deduction of one-third (1/3rd) on this account, as provided by the first note below the second schedule would only be appropriate. 69. The award of compensation must necessarily take into account non-pecuniary damages. In R.K. Malik (supra), Rs. 75,000/-awarded by this Court as the “conventional compensation” was enhanced by the Supreme Court by further similar amount (Rs. 75,000/-) as the “compensation for future prospects.” For the reasons set out earlier, in the context of pecuniary loss to estate, the composite sum of non-pecuniary damages of Rs. 1,50,000/-[as awarded in R.K. Malik (supra)] would deservedly be added, but with suitable correction so as to ensure that the deficiency in the real value of money is made good. As noted (in Para 46) earlier, the Supreme Court justified the addition of Rs. 75,000/- towards compensation for “future prospects” by noting that the said amount was “roughly half of the amount given on account of pecuniary damages.” Since the court had also upheld the award of similar sum (Rs. 75,000/-) by this court as “conventional compensation” both amounts of non-pecuniary damages, put together, account for roughly an amount equivalent to the sum computed as pecuniary loss to estate. Thus, this court is of the view that a composite sum equal to the amount computed as pecuniary loss to estate may be added as non-pecuniary damages (inclusive of conventional compensation and for future prospects) in such cases as at hand to arrive at the appropriate figure of ‘just compensation’. 70. It has been noticed by this Court that the tribunals have been assessing the compensation and awarding it to the last rupee, at times even in the fraction of a rupee, not bothering to follow the practice of rounding off. Awards in at least two of the cases from which the appeals at hand arise provide ready illustration. This seems to be not correct. Awards in at least two of the cases from which the appeals at hand arise provide ready illustration. This seems to be not correct. It must be added here that human misery cannot be calculated with such mathematical precision. Even otherwise for convenience of accounting, it is desirable that the amount of award is rounded off to the nearest (if not next) thousands of rupees. 71. Subject to all other requisite conditions being fulfilled, for the foregoing reasons, in order to bring about consistency and uniformity in approach to the issue, it is held that claims for compensation on account of death of children shall be determined as follows: (i) Till such time as the law is amended by the legislature, or the Central Government notifies the amendment to the Second Schedule in exercise of the enabling power vested in it by Section 163-A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and except in cases wherein the prospects of employability and earnings (in future or present) of the deceased child are proved by cogent and irrefutable evidence, this having regard, inter-alia, to the academic record or training in special talents or skills, for computing the pecuniary damages on account of the loss to estate, the notional income of non-earning persons (Rs. 15,000/- p.a.) as specified in the Second Schedule (brought in force from 14.11.1994), shall be assumed to be the income of the deceased child, and taken into account after it is inflation-corrected with the help of Cost Inflation Index (CII) as notified by the Government of India from year to year under Section 48 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by applying the formula indicated hereinafter. (ii) For inflation-correction, the financial year of 1997-1998 shall be treated as the “base year” and the value of the notional income relevant to the date of cause of action shall be computed in the following manner: Rs. 15,000/- x A ÷ 331 [wherein the figure of Rs. 15,000/- represents the notional income specified in the second schedule requiring inflation-correction; ‘A’ represents the CII for the financial year in which the cause of action arose (i.e. the accident/death occurred); and the figure of ‘331’ represents the CII for the ‘base year’] (iii) After arriving at an appropriate figure of the present equivalent value of the notional income (i.e. inflation-corrected amount), it shall be rounded off to a figure in next thousands of rupees. (iv) The amount of notional income thus calculated shall be reduced to two-third, the deduction to the extent of one-third being towards personal & living expenses of the deceased, the balance taken as the annual loss to estate (hereinafter also referred to as “the multiplicand”) (v) For assessment of the pecuniary damages on account of the death of children upto the age of 10 years, the loss to estate shall be calculated, capitalizing the multiplicand, by applying the multiplier of ten (10). (vi) For children of the age-group of more than 10 years upto 15 years, the loss to estate shall be calculated by applying the multiplier of fifteen (15). (vii) For children of the age-group of more than 15 years but less than 18 years, the loss to estate shall be calculated by applying the multiplier of eighteen (18). (viii) After the pecuniary loss to estate has been worked out in the manner indicated above, an amount equivalent to the amount thus computed shall be added to it as the composite non-pecuniary damages taking care of not only the conventional heads but also towards future prospects as awarded in R.K. Malik vs. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1 . (ix) The final sum thus arrived at, appropriately rounded off, if so required to the nearest (if not next) thousands of rupees, shall be awarded as compensation for the death of the child.” 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court passed in the case of R.K. Malik and Another vs. Kiran Pal and Others, (2009) 14 SCC 1 . Para 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 38 and 39 of which may profitably be quoted here: 29. In Lata Wadhwa Case (2001) 8 SCC 197 , wherein the accident took place on 3-3-1989, the multiplier method was referred to and adopted with approval. In cases of children between 5 to 10 years of age, compensation of Rs 1.50 lakhs was awarded towards pecuniary compensation and in addition a sum of Rs 50,000 was awarded towards “conventional compensation.” In the case of children between 10 to 18 years compensation of Rs. In cases of children between 5 to 10 years of age, compensation of Rs 1.50 lakhs was awarded towards pecuniary compensation and in addition a sum of Rs 50,000 was awarded towards “conventional compensation.” In the case of children between 10 to 18 years compensation of Rs. 4.10 lakhs was awarded including “conventional compensation.” While doing so the Supreme Court held that contribution of each child towards the family should be taken as Rs 24,000 per annum instead of Rs 12,000 per annum as recommended by Justice Y.V. Chandrachud Committee. This was in view of the fact that the company in question had an unwritten rule that every employee can get one of his children employed in the said company. 30. In M.S. Grewal vs. Deep Chand Sood, (2001) 8 SCC 151 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1426, wherein 14 students of a public school got drowned in a river due to negligence of the teachers, on the question of quantum of compensation, this Court accepted that the multiplier method was normally to be adopted as a method for assigning value of future annual dependency. It was emphasised that the court must ensure that a just compensation was awarded. 31. In M.S. Grewal Case (2001) 8 SCC 151 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1426, compensation of Rs 5. lakhs was awarded to the claimants and the same was held to be justified. Learned counsel for Respondent 3, however, pointed out that in the said case the Supreme Court had noticed that the students belonged to an affluent school as was apparent from the fee structure and therefore the compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs as awarded by the High Court was not found to be excessive. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court in the said case noticed that the students belonged to an upper middle class background but the basis and the principle on which the compensation was awarded in that case would equally apply to the present case. 35. In the present case, records show that the children were good in studies and studying in a reasonably good school. Naturally, their future prospects would be presumed to be good and bright. Since they were children, there is no yardstick to measure the loss of future prospects of these children. But as already noted, they were performing well in studies, natural consequence supposed to be a bright future. 36. Naturally, their future prospects would be presumed to be good and bright. Since they were children, there is no yardstick to measure the loss of future prospects of these children. But as already noted, they were performing well in studies, natural consequence supposed to be a bright future. 36. In Lata Wadhwa (2001) 8 SCC 197 and M.S. Grewal (2001) 8 SCC 151 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1426 the Supreme Court recognised such future prospects as the basis and factor to be considered. Therefore, denying compensation towards future prospects seems to be unjustified. Keeping this in background, the facts and circumstances of the present case, and following the decision in Lata Wadhwa (2001) 8 SCC 197 and M.S. Grewal (2001) 8 SCC 151 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1426, we deem it appropriate to grant compensation of Rs 75,000 (which is roughly half of the amount given on account of pecuniary damages) as compensation for the future prospects of the children, to be paid to each claimant within one month of the date of this decision. We would like to clarify that this amount i.e. Rs. 75,000 is over and above what has been awarded by the High Court. 38. This Court has observed as follows in State of Haryana vs. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7 SCC 484 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1671, SCC at p. 7, Para 487: “7. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense ‘damages’ which in turn appears to it to be ‘just and reasonable’. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be ‘just’ and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be ‘just’ compensation is a vexed question. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be ‘just’ and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be ‘just’ compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of ‘just’ compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression ‘which appears to it to be just’ a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression ‘just’ denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just.” 39. So far as the pecuniary damage is concerned we are of the considered view, both the Tribunal as well as the High Court has awarded the compensation on the basis of the Second Schedule and relevant multiplier under the Act. However, we may notice here that as far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, the Tribunal does not award any compensation under the head of non-pecuniary damages. However, in appeal the High Court has elaborately discussed this aspect of the matter and has awarded non-pecuniary damages of Rs. 75,000. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant has submitted that considering the same, the amount of compensation may be enhanced to the tune of Rs. 3,75,000/-along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application in view of Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and also in view of the judgment passed by the Apex Court passed in the case of Dharampal and Sons vs. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 2008 (12) SCC 208 . 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant has further submitted that this Court has taken a consistent view and presently the minimum compensation has been declared to be Rs. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant has further submitted that this Court has taken a consistent view and presently the minimum compensation has been declared to be Rs. 5,00,000/- in any accident cases of child less than 15 years of age. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant has further submitted that the appeal has been preferred with a delay of 738 days and for condonation of the same, I.A. No. 6555/2020 has been preferred. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has thus submitted that the compensation may be enhanced after condoning the delay. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company, Mr. Alok Lal has submitted that recently in the case of Rajendra Singh vs. National insurance Company Limited, (2020) 7 SCC 256 , the Apex Court has considered the compensation for the deceased below the age of 15 years to be Rs. 2,95,000/- and has submitted that compensation amount if enhanced, it may be Rs. 2,95,000/-. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant, Mr. Vikas Pandey has submitted that the judgment of Rajendra Singh (Supra) relied by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is with regard to death of a child of 12 years and has submitted that the Apex Court has not considered the future prospect of the deceased, who was a child of 12 years. Para 12 and 15 of the aforesaid judgment reads as follows: 12. The second deceased was a school going child aged about 12 years. She had a whole future to look forward in life with all normal human aspirations. She died prematurely due to the accident at a very tender age for no fault of hers even before she could start to understand the beauty and joys of life with all its ups and downs. The loss of a human life untimely at childhood can never be measured in terms of loss of earning or monetary loss alone. The emotional attachments involved to the loss of the child can have a devastating effect on the family which needs to be visualised and understood. Grant of non-pecuniary damages for the wrong done by awarding compensation for loss of expectation in life is therefore called for. 15. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satender, (2006) 13 SCC 60, the deceased victim of the accident was a nine year old school going child. Grant of non-pecuniary damages for the wrong done by awarding compensation for loss of expectation in life is therefore called for. 15. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satender, (2006) 13 SCC 60, the deceased victim of the accident was a nine year old school going child. Considering the claim for loss of future prospects in absence of a regular income, it was observed that the compensation so determined had to be just and proper by a judicious approach and not fixed arbitrarily or whimsically. The uncertainties of a young life were noticed in the following terms: (SCC p.64, Para 12) “12. In cases of young children of tender age, in view of uncertainties abound, neither their income at the time of death nor the prospects of the future increase in their income nor chances of advancement of their career are capable of proper determination on estimated basis. The reason is that at such an early age, the uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in career and thereafter advancement in life are so many that nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty. Therefore, neither the income of the deceased child is capable of assessment on estimated basis nor the financial loss suffered by the parents is capable of mathematical computation.” 11. In Para 12 and 15 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has held with regard to entitlement of enhancement of compensation on the ground of future prospect of the deceased and have given a finding that the same cannot be enhanced on said ground, but this Court is consistent in granting compensation where the deceased was less than 15 years of age to the tune of Rs.3,75,000/-along with interest @ 7.5% from the date of institution of the claim application, relying upon the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court based on the reasoning of price index in the case of Chetan Malhotra vs. Lala Ram, 2016 SCC Online Del. 2981 as well as the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Kishan Gopal and Another vs. Lala and Others, (2014) 1 SCC 244 , State of Haryana vs. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7 SCC 484 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satender and Others, (2006) 13 SCC 60. 12. 2981 as well as the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Kishan Gopal and Another vs. Lala and Others, (2014) 1 SCC 244 , State of Haryana vs. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7 SCC 484 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satender and Others, (2006) 13 SCC 60. 12. Under the aforesaid circumstances, considering the cost inflation index of the year, 2010-2011 as 711 divided by the cost inflation index of base year, 1997-1998 as 331 and the said chart of the cost inflation index notified by the Government up to the year, 2015-2016 is 1081 and for the year, 2016-2017 is 1125. Unfortunate accident took place on 06.06.2010 and considering the notional income of the deceased to be Rs. 15,000/- the calculation will be as Rs. 15,000 x A divided by 331 i.e. 15,000/- x 711 i.e. cost inflation index of 2010-11 divided by 331 then, Gross income comes to Rs. 32221, which is rounded off as Rs. 33,000/-. 13. After deducting 1/3rd of Rs. 33,000/-and applying the multiplier of 15, the pecuniary loss to estate is computed as Rs. 33,000 x 2/3 x 15 = Rs. 3,30,000/-. Adding towards composite non-pecuniary damages, the total compensation considered to be Rs. 3,75,000/- in view of the judgment passed in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Farzana, 2009 ACJ 2763 . In any cause of action arising on or after dated 10.05.2000, the amount of compensation shall not in any case be less than Rs. 3,75,000/- as it has been awarded in the case of Farzana (Supra). The amount of Rs. 3,75,000/- shall be paid along with interest @ 7.5% from the date of institution of the case in view of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Dharampal and Sons (Supra), as the compensation cannot be a wind full gain or bonanza, but it has to be just and fair compensation and not pittance. 14. Further in the case of Sayed Mohamad vs. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2011 (11) SCC 625 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held at Para-13 that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial legislation intended to place the claimant in the same position that he was before the accident and to compensate him for his loss thus it should be interpreted liberally so as to achieve the maximum benefit. Ltd. 2011 (11) SCC 625 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held at Para-13 that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial legislation intended to place the claimant in the same position that he was before the accident and to compensate him for his loss thus it should be interpreted liberally so as to achieve the maximum benefit. Para-13 of the aforesaid judgment is profitably quoted herein: 13. The Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 is a beneficent legislation intended to place the claimant in the same position that he was before the accident and to compensate him for his loss. Thus, it should be interpreted liberally so as to -8-achieve the maximum benefit. 15. This Court is taking consistent view in all the cases where the age of the deceased was less than 15 years and having no earnings capacity, as such, this Court in all such cases granting compensation to the claimant to the tune of Rs. 3,75,000/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of institution of the claim case. In the instant case, the deceased is a child, aged 11 years, as such, compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,75,000/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of institution of the claim case is just and fair. 16. The amount already paid by the Insurance Company shall be deducted and the balance amount shall be paid within a reasonable period as the occurrence is of dated 06.05.2010. 17. M.A. No. 340/2019 is allowed in aforesaid terms. 18. Accordingly, I.A. No. 6555/2020 is also allowed. M.A. No. 2/2018 19. So far M.A. No. 2/2018 is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Alok Lal has submitted that the appeal has been preferred with a delay of 85 days and for condonation of the same, I.A. No. 9866/2018 has been preferred. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Alok Lal has submitted that the Insurance Company has preferred the appeal on the ground that the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal with regard to Issue No. (IV) is contrary to the record, whereby the learned Tribunal has rejected the plea of the Insurance Company that private vehicle insured before the Insurance Company was used as commercial vehicle and as such, there is violation of terms and conditions of the Policy as envisaged under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 21. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Alok Lal has referred the evidence of the claimant, Most. Sunita Devi (CW-2), who has been cross-examined by opposite party no. 2 Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. and has elucidated in Para-14 and 15 of her cross-examination (photocopy of deposition has been sent by learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Alok Lal through e-mail, which is kept on record), which may profitably be quoted hereunder: 14- chek dEiuh dh vksj ,d vf/kdkjh esjs ?kj vk;s FksA eq>ls iwNrkN fd, FksA foiqy us Hkh iwNrkN fd, FksA eSa dkxt ij nLr[kr dh FkhA 15- 1400@& ;k 1500@& [kpZ fn;k x;k FkkA ÁR;sd O;fDr dk 600@& Mªkboj ekax FksA iSls dk Hkqxrku fd;k x;k FkkA 22. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant, Mr. Vikas Pandey has not disputed that in the cross-examination at Para-14, 15, 16 and 17, the claimant has stated that she has paid fare to the driver of the offending vehicle. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2/owner, Mr. Aman Kumar Rahul and Mr. Avishek Prasad assisted by learned counsel Mr. Rishi Chandan have also not disputed the fact, but have submitted that the vehicle was duly insured, so the right of recovery may not be granted in favour of the insurance company as evidence has been appreciated by the learned Tribunal. 24. So far delay of 85 days is concerned, no serious objection have been raised nor counter affidavit has been filed by respondent no. 2/owner of the vehicle, as such, delay is condoned. I.A. No. 9866/2018 is allowed. 25. Considering the rival submissions of the parties, looking into facts and circumstances, the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal with regard to Issue No. (IV) is contrary to the record, as such, this Court set aside the finding as there are ample evidence to prove, that the vehicle was used as a commercial vehicle. The driver of the vehicle himself taken fare from the claimant itself. It is sufficient evidence to prove that there is violation of terms and conditions of Policy. Accordingly, the Insurance Company is given right to recover after indemnifying the award to the claimant from the owner of the offending vehicle. 26. Accordingly, M.A. No. 2/2018 is hereby allowed. 27. The driver of the vehicle himself taken fare from the claimant itself. It is sufficient evidence to prove that there is violation of terms and conditions of Policy. Accordingly, the Insurance Company is given right to recover after indemnifying the award to the claimant from the owner of the offending vehicle. 26. Accordingly, M.A. No. 2/2018 is hereby allowed. 27. However, the statutory amount deposited by the appellant-Insurance Company at the time of preferring the appeal shall be remitted to the learned Tribunal by the learned Registrar General of this Court within a period of four weeks from today so as to indemnify the part of the award and same shall be disbursed to the claimant after due notice and verification and the balance amount shall be indemnified to the claimant by the Insurance Company within a reasonable period as the accident is of dated 06.05.2010.