Srinath S/o Late G. Krishnappa v. State Of Karnataka By Its Principal Secretary Revenue Department Vikasa Soudha, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Veedhi Bengaluru
2021-05-05
S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : In this petition, petitioner has sought for the following reliefs: " i) Issue WRIT of MANDAMUS or any appropriate direction to the 2nd respondent to take immediate steps to restore the land in the name of the petitioner as per the Order passed by the 1st respondent, bearing Sl.No. KE.43718/BSB.2012 dated: 0.10.2012, as per Annexure--M in respect of the schedule property in the interest of justice and equity. ii) Grand Such Other Reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant on the facts and circumstances of the case , in the interest of justice and equity." 2. Heard the learned counsel for petitioner, learned AGA for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and learned counsel for respondent No.3 and perused the material on record. 3. In addition to re-iterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the documents produced by the petitioner and the written submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the earlier order passed by this Court in W.P.No.48603/2013 dated 21.09.2015 in order to point out that though the challenge to the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule property bearing Sy.No.1/1B measuring 1 acre 12 guntas situated at Hosahalli village, Uttarahalli hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, was rejected by this Court, liberty was reserved in favour of the petitioner to file a fresh petition seeking a writ of mandamus and as such, the petitioner is before this Court by way of the present petition. 4. Per contra, learned AGA for respondents 1 and 2 and learned counsel for respondent No.3, in addition to reiterating the various contentions put-forth in their respective statement of objections and referring to the documents produced by them and the written synopsis, submits that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 6. The material on record indicates that on 23.09.1988, the State Government issued the impugned preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the said Act of 1894') proposing to acquire 41 acres 11 guntas of land in Hosahalli Village for the purpose of respondent No.3-Society.
6. The material on record indicates that on 23.09.1988, the State Government issued the impugned preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the said Act of 1894') proposing to acquire 41 acres 11 guntas of land in Hosahalli Village for the purpose of respondent No.3-Society. The original records produced by the learned AGA indicate that the respondent No.3-Society had not only pay the estimated cost of acquisition but also deposited a further sum of Rs.25,00,000/-in the Treasury. 7. On 11.10.1989, the Final Notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued in respect of the entire extent of lands including the schedule property. Pursuant thereto, notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the said Act of 1894 were issued culminating in an award dated 14.12.1990. The possession of the schedule property was taken over on 25.11.1992 followed by the Notification dated 03.12.1992. Subsequently, the State Government handed over possession of the lands to respondent No.3 -Society which submitted a plan to the BDA for approval, which was approved on 07.11.1992 by the BDA, who issued an Endorsement dated 17.11.1992 in favour of the Society in this regard. 8. The revenue records in respect of the entire extent of land including schedule property were mutated into the name of the society, which formed a layout comprising of sites and allotted the same to its members and executed registered Sale Deeds in their favours. Further, the original records produced by the learned AGA also indicates that that Society has paid all requisite charges demanded by the BDA and has also executed registered relinquishment dated 23.02.2012 in favour of the BDA in respect of CA sites, parks, etc. 9. The material on record also indicates that in W.P.No.48603/2013 dated 21.09.2015, petitioner had challenged the acquisition proceedings; in addition thereto, petitioner had also sought for a mandamus pursuant to a letter at Annexure-M dated 03.11.2012 written by the respondent No.1 to the respondent No.2 regarding alleged restoration of the schedule property to the petitioner. It is an undisputed fact that this Court rejected the claim of the petitioner insofar as the challenge to the acquisition proceedings are concerned.
It is an undisputed fact that this Court rejected the claim of the petitioner insofar as the challenge to the acquisition proceedings are concerned. However, since liberty was reserved in favour of the petitioner to file a fresh petition seeking a writ of mandamus, petitioner has filed the present petition for a direction to the respondent No.2 to take steps to restore the schedule property to the petitioner as per the letter at Annexure-M dated 03.11.2012 referred to supra. 10. In my considered opinion, having regard to the undisputed fact that the acquisition proceedings have attained finality coupled with the fact that the challenge put forth by the petitioner to the acquisition proceedings has been expressly rejected by this Court in W.P.No.48603/2013 dated 21.09.2015, leading to the resultant position that the petitioner does not have any manner of right, title, interest or possession over the schedule property, the present petition deserves to be dismissed for the following reasons:- (i) A perusal of Annexure-M dated 03.11.2012 relied upon by the petitioner will clearly indicate that the said document is merely a letter addressed by the respondent No.1 to the respondent No.2 with reference to a request dated 12.07.2012 made to the State Government putting forth complaints against the respondent No.3 -Society. By the said letter dated 03.11.2012, the respondent No.1 has merely stated that the said complaint/request dated 12.07.2012 has been forwarded to the respondent No.2 along with the said letter dated 03.11.2012. The contention of the petitioner that Annexure-M dated 03.11.2012 is an order passed by the respondent No.1 to the respondent No.2 directing restoration of schedule property to the petitioner is clearly misconceived, untenable, baseless and contrary to the contents of the said document which is merely a letter dated 03.11.2012 address by the respondent No.1 to the respondent No.2. Under these circumstances, in the light of the contents of Annexure-M, which clearly cannot be described, treated or construed as an order as sought to be erroneously contended by the petitioner, the claim of the petitioner that directions have to be issued to the respondent No.2 pursuant to Annexure-M deserves to be rejected. (ii) It is well settled in the absence of any legal right, it is impermissible to issue a mandamus in favour of party as held by the Apex Court in the case of Khatoon vs. State of U.P. - (2018) 14 SCC 346 .
(ii) It is well settled in the absence of any legal right, it is impermissible to issue a mandamus in favour of party as held by the Apex Court in the case of Khatoon vs. State of U.P. - (2018) 14 SCC 346 . In the instant case, the challenge to the acquisition of the schedule property by the petitioner having been rejected expressly by this Court in W.P.No.48603/2013 dated 21.09.2015, the petitioner does not have any legal right over the schedule property which enables him to seek issuance of a writ of mandamus and consequently, the present petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground also. (iii) In the case of V.Chandrasekaran vs. Administrative Officer - (2012) 12 SCC 133 , the Apex Court has held that upon completion of acquisition proceedings and taking of possession under Section 16 of the said Act of 1894, restoration of possession to the erstwhile land owners was impermissible in law having regard to the fact that the schedule property stood vested absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances by virtue of Section 16 of the said Act of 1894 and the petitioner ceased to have any manner of right, title, interest or possession over the schedule property particularly when his challenge to the acquisition was expressly rejected by this Court in W.P.No.48603/2013 dated 21.09.2015; consequently, the question of issuing any direction for restoration of the schedule property to the petitioner does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. During the pendency of this petition, petitioner has filed I.A.1/2020 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the petition by incorporating grounds and prayers with reference to lapsing of the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule property under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the said Act of 2013'). The said application has been opposed by the respondents by filing their statement of objections. 12. Petitioner has contended that by virtue of the said Act of 2013, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule property has stood lapsed since possession of the schedule property has not been taken from him.
The said application has been opposed by the respondents by filing their statement of objections. 12. Petitioner has contended that by virtue of the said Act of 2013, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule property has stood lapsed since possession of the schedule property has not been taken from him. In this context, it is relevant to state that apart from the fact that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings by the petitioner has already been negatived by this Court in W.P.No.48603/2013 dated 21.09.2015, the material on record clearly indicates that the petitioner has received compensation and also the possession of the schedule property has been taken by the respondents 1 and 2, who have also issued the requisite notification under Section 16(2) of the said Act of 1894. Further, as held by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & others - (2020) 8 SCC 129 , the twin/two fold requirement of payment of compensation to the land loser and taking of possession of the schedule property have been satisfied and fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the instant case in relation to the schedule property. 13. Under these circumstances, in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority's case (supra), I am of the considered opinion that no reliance can be placed upon Section24(2) of the said Act of 2013 by the petitioner in order to contend that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule property have stood lapsed and consequently, even this contention of the petitioners deserves to be rejected. 14. In this context, it is relevant to state that in Indore Development Authority's case (supra), the Apex Court has summarized its conclusions at paragraph 366 of its judgment as under: "366.In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under: 366.1.Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 366.2.In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed. 366.3.The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 366.4.The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. 366.5.In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1).
366.5.In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 366.6.The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b). 366.7.The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 366.8.The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 366.9.Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition". 15.
It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition". 15. As can be seen from point No.366.9 (supra), the Apex Court has clearly held that Section 24(2) of the said Act of 2013 does not give rise to a new cause of action so as to enable the petitioners to question the legality of the concluded proceedings of land acquisition; it also does not revive stale and time barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow land owners (sic 'land losers') to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of Court to invalidate acquisition. 16. In the facts of the instant case, as stated earlier, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule property having been concluded in the year 1991 itself, no reliance can be placed upon Section 24 (2) of the said Act of 2013 and consequently, the contention of the petitioner in this regard deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, since the petitioner seeks to place reliance upon Section 24(2) of the said Act of 2013 by way of proposed amendment, in view of the facts and circumstances narrated above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no merit in the application and accordingly, I.A.1/2020 is hereby rejected. 17. In view of the discussion made above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be rejected.