JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal under section 374(2) Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment and order of conviction dated-26.11.2019, passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, West Kameng, District-Bomdila in Sessions Case No.112/2015, under Section 304 (A) IPC, read with Section 25 & 27(1) of the Arms Act, 1959. It is to be mentioned here that vide aforesaid judgment and order, the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila has convicted the accused Khilli Chiroju, under Section 304 (A) IPC read with Section 25 & 27 (1) (2) of the Arms Act and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 3 years under Section 25 of Arms Act and also to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- and 7 years under Section 27(2) of Arms Act and further sentenced to undergo SI for 1 year under Section 304 (A) IPC and also to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- in default of fine to suffer another 2 months and further directed to set off his previous custodial period from total period of conviction. 2. The factual background leading to filing of this appeal is adumbrated herein below:- “On 05.10.2015, one Khilli Chiroju, son of Sri Sasha Chiroju of village Nijung, P.S.-Nafra, West Kameng district was sleeping in his agricultural filed at Nijung. At around 3:30 AM he had noticed something moving in his field, and as wild bears used to cause mischief of his agricultural products, he thought it to be a wild bear and took out his country made gun and fired at it. But, he found that he shot one Sirin Khunjuju of the nearby agricultural field. He then tried to get him up but could not succeed as he became unconscious. Then, he rushed to his village and got some medicine for saving Sirin Khunjuju. But, in the meantime, Sirin Khunjuju succumbed to the injuries. He then surrendered before the O.C., Nafra police station at about 4 p.m. on 05.10.2015, and narrated the story to the Officer-in-Charge. Then, the O.C. reduced the same into writing and thereafter, he registered Nafra P.S. Case No. 06/2015, under Section 302 IPC read with Section 27(1) of Arms Act and investigated the same. He then surrendered before the O.C., Nafra police station at about 4 p.m. on 05.10.2015, and narrated the story to the Officer-in-Charge. Then, the O.C. reduced the same into writing and thereafter, he registered Nafra P.S. Case No. 06/2015, under Section 302 IPC read with Section 27(1) of Arms Act and investigated the same. During investigation he has visited the place of occurrence, examined the witnesses and got the dead body of Sirin Khunjuju post-mortemed and collected the report and also he found two guns from the house of accused Khilli Chiroju and seized the same preparing seizure list and sends the same to the Forensic Science Laboratory. Thereafter, he collected the report and obtained prosecution sanction from the District Magistrate, East Kameng district to prosecute the accused under the Arms Act. He also arrested the accused and forwarded him to the Court. Then on completion of investigation, the I.O. laid charge sheet against the accused Khilli Chiroju to stand trial in the Court under Section 304 (A) IPC read with Section 27 (1) of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. On commitment of the case by the ld. CJM, East Kameng district, Bomdila, the learned Sessions Judge, Bomdila has framed charge against the accused under Section 304(A) IPC read with Section 27(1), (2) & (3) of the Arms Act and had read and explained the same to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The learned Sessions Judge then examined as many as 5 witnesses, including the MO and IO, and after closing the prosecution evidence, examined the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and thereafter, hearing arguments of both sides convicted the accused/appellant as aforesaid. 4. Being highly aggrieved, the accused-appellant preferred this appeal on the ground – (i) That, the evidence on the record do not warrant conviction of the accused under section 304(A) IPC and 25/27(1) & (2) Arms Act; (ii) That, not a single independent witness is examined by the prosecution to establish that the accused caused death of the deceased by gunshot; (iii) That, the son of the deceased. Whom the prosecution side has examined as P.W.3 has testified that he only suspect that the accused is responsible for killing his father; (iv) That, the ld. Whom the prosecution side has examined as P.W.3 has testified that he only suspect that the accused is responsible for killing his father; (iv) That, the ld. Sessions Judge has based conviction of the accused on the basis of the evidence of the Investigating officer and who also testified on the basis of the statement of the accused recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C.; (v) That, the seizure of the gun from the possession of the accused is not proved; (vi) That, the circumstances relied upon by the ld. Court below have not been fully established and the same not consistent with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused and even if taken cumulatively, the same does not form a chain so complete to establish the guilt of the accused; (vii) That, none of the prosecution witnesses, even remotely stated that the accused fired the gun shot resulting death of the deceased; (viii) That the ld. Court below has convicted the accused only on presumption which is not permissible; (ix) That the muzzle loading gun, allegedly seized from the possession of the accused, is not a prohibited fire arm in terms of section 2(1) of the Arms Act. 5. We have heard Mr. D. Panging, the learned counsel for the accused/appellant and also heard Ms. L. Hage, ld. Addl. P.P. for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Also we have carefully gone through the evidence on the record. 6. Here in this case, the death of deceased Sirin Khunjuju, is not disputed by the defence side. Now, let it be seen as to how his death had happen and whether it was suicidal, homicidal or accidental in nature. 7. First, let the evidence of the Doctor be discussed. P.W. 4 is Dr. Landi Doilang has conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased Sirin Khunjuju on 06.10.2015, at the place of occurrence i.e. Nijung village of Nafra and found the following:- (i) One entry wound seen in the right thigh above 3 cm below and midway to the line joining the pubic symphysis and anterior superior iliac spine. The wound is around .5 X .5 cm2 in diameter. The femoral artery and femoral vein is ruptured along with the underlining tissues. (ii) One exit wound is seen behind the right thigh corresponding to the entry wound. Upon above finding, he opined that the deceased sustained bullet injuries. The wound is around .5 X .5 cm2 in diameter. The femoral artery and femoral vein is ruptured along with the underlining tissues. (ii) One exit wound is seen behind the right thigh corresponding to the entry wound. Upon above finding, he opined that the deceased sustained bullet injuries. But, he did not specify the age of the injury. He also opined that the cause of death is due to massive external haemorrhage resulting in hypotensive shock and circulatory failure from bullet injury in the right thigh and he submitted his record P/Ext.3. It is elicited in his cross-examination that he did not find bullet or pellet inside the body of the deceased during post-mortem examination and the entry and exit wounds reveal that the same was caused by gun shot. The weapon used in the offence appeared to be a shotgun, without riffling inside the barrel. It is also elicited that the deceased did not sustain injuries on his vital organ; however his blood vessels were damaged. It is further elicited that the deceased died due to excessive bleedings and had the deceased was administered first aid, his life could have been saved. 8. Thus, it appears that the deceased died as result of massive external haemorrhage, resulting in hypotensive shock and circulatory failure from bullet injury over the right thigh. The P.M. Report-P/Ext. 3, is also consistent with his version. But, the most disturbing fact is that the post mortem was conducted at place of occurrence i.e. the agricultural field of the accused. It is against the established norms. Whether adequate facilities of light and other facilities were available or not is also not placed on record by the prosecution side. 9. Now, let it be seen as to how the deceased sustained the bullet injury. Admittedly, there is no eye witness to the occurrence. The entire prosecution case rest upon the statement made by the accused before investigating officer on 05th October, 2019, which was reduced to writing and signed by the accused Shri Khilli Chiroju. The prosecution side has exhibited the same as P/Ext.12. Admittedly, there is no eye witness to the occurrence. The entire prosecution case rest upon the statement made by the accused before investigating officer on 05th October, 2019, which was reduced to writing and signed by the accused Shri Khilli Chiroju. The prosecution side has exhibited the same as P/Ext.12. A bare perusal of the same leaves no doubt in our mind that it is a statement which amounts to ‘confession’ as he admitted in no uncertain terms that he shot the deceased with his country made gun as he thought him to be a wild bear that infested his agricultural field continuously. Now, what left to be seen is how far this ‘confession’ that has been made to a police officer, is admissible in evidence. 10. Mr. D. Panging, the ld. Counsel for the accused/appellant, taking us through the evidence recorded by the learned Court below, has vehemently submitted that the FIR was registered on the basis of statement of the accused-appellant and as it was made before the police officer, it is not admissible in evidence and it cannot be proved being hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. In support of his submission Mr. Panging has referred two case laws (i) Aghunoo Nagesia Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119 , and (ii) Khatri Hemraj Amulakh Vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1972 SC 922 . 11. Having carefully gone through the case laws referred by Mr. Panging, the ld. Counsel for the accused/appellant, we find element of force in the same. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aghunoo Nagesia Vs. State of Bihar (supra) held that:- “10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal procedure provides for the recording of the first information. The information report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant under section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under section 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as a witness. If the first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a non confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under section 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant. If the first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a non confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under section 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant. See - Faddi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1850 , explaining Nisar Ali vs. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366 , and Dal Singh Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1917 PC 25 . But, a confessional information report to a police officer cannot be used against the accused in view of section 25 of the Evidence Act.” 12. In Khatri Hemraj Amulakh Vs. The State of Gujarat (supra), referring to Aghunoo Nagesia(supra) it has been held that:- “The confessional statement Ex.27, which was made by the accused to Sub-Inspector Rojia and which formed the basis of the first information report was not admissible in evidence as the same was hit by section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.” 13. We have already find and hold that herein this case the first information report P/Ext.12, was given by the accused to the police officer and it was reduced to writing, and it is a statement which amounts to ‘confession’ as he admitted in no uncertain terms that he shot the deceased with his country made gun as he thought him to be a wild bear that infested his agricultural field continuously. So, application of the ratio laid down in the case laws discussed above, will clearly reveal that the same is not admissible in evidence being hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. 14. However, the factum of recovery of the dead body and the gun consequent to the information given by the accused/appellant is admissible in view of section 27 of the Evidence Act, as submitted by the ld. Counsel for the accused/appellant. The case laws referred by Mr. Panging, in support of his submission i.e. (i) Aloknath Dutta and Another Vs. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230 , and (ii) Amritsingh Bhikamsingh Thakur vs. State of Maharastra, (2007) 2 SCC 310 , also fully supported him. 15. Counsel for the accused/appellant. The case laws referred by Mr. Panging, in support of his submission i.e. (i) Aloknath Dutta and Another Vs. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230 , and (ii) Amritsingh Bhikamsingh Thakur vs. State of Maharastra, (2007) 2 SCC 310 , also fully supported him. 15. Thus, having excluded the first information report which was registered on the basis of statement of the accused/appellant there is no evidence, let alone a convincing one, to show as to how the deceased sustained gunshot injury. The prosecution side has examined Sri Lakro Chiroju as PW1. He is not an eyewitness to the occurrence. He deposed that he has not remembered the date, month and year of the incident. But, he heard about death of Sirin Khunjuju in his farm land. He also confirmed his signature P/Ext.-1(A) and he knows the person standing at the dock of the Court and he does not know why he is standing there. In cross-examination he stated that he is not a literate person. 16. PW-2-Sri Karchung Chiroju testified that he knows accused Khilli Chiroju who is standing in the dock of the Court, but he does not know why he is there. He knows deceased Sirin Khunjuju, but he does not know his cause of death. He has not given his statement before police. PW-2 is not cross-examined. 17. PW-3 is Sri Dongru Khonjuju. He deposed that he knows accused Khilli Chiroju and he suspects him for killing his father, but he does not know the reason of killing of his father. He has not remembered the death, month and year of incident and he never lodged any complaint at the police station against the accused. He confirmed his signature P/Ext.-2(A) over the inquest report and police conducted inquest at the dead body of his father at his agricultural field. He did not try to find out the cause of death of his father. It is elicited in his cross-examination that though he read up to class-V, but he cannot read literature. He also does not know what is written in P/Ext.2 (A) and he never disclosed about his doubt of the death of his father to any person. 18. PW-5 is the I.O.-Sri Ashok Tayeng. It is elicited in his cross-examination that though he read up to class-V, but he cannot read literature. He also does not know what is written in P/Ext.2 (A) and he never disclosed about his doubt of the death of his father to any person. 18. PW-5 is the I.O.-Sri Ashok Tayeng. His evidence reveals that on 05.10.2015, in afternoon hours accused Khilli Chiroju surrendered at the Nafra P.S. and stated that accidently he shot dead the deceased-Sirin Khunjuju at his village. He then took him under preventive arrest and visited the place of occurrence, conducted the enquiry and found sufficient evidence of the incident, and thereafter, he registered a case against the accused and during investigation he has interrogated the accused and the witnesses brought to P.S. by the accused. Then on the basis of disclosure statement made by the accused, he seized two numbers of country made guns from his residence and he found one gun in working condition and the other one was dysfunctional and he confirmed Material Ext.-1 and Material Ext.-2, the guns which he had seized. He also confirmed the seizure list-P/Ext.-1, and on completion of investigation he laid charge-sheet-P/Ext.-4, against the accused. His evidence also reveals that he has drawn up sketch map of the place of occurrence-Ext.-5, and he also conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared report-P/Ext.-2, and thereafter, he obtained prosecution sanctioned-P/Ext-7, from the District Magistrate, Bomdila and he took photographs of the dead body of the deceased Material Ext.-3, 4, 5 and 6 and thereafter, he submitted supplementary charge-sheet-P/Ext.-8, on receipt of FSL report. He confirmed Exhibit-P/Ext.-9, the FSL report received from CFL, Calcutta and P/Ext.-12, is the information received from the accused and reduced into writing. It is elicited in his cross-examination that there is no eye-witness of the occurrence of the alleged incident and no witness saw the deceased with the accused before his death. It is further elicited that he has seized the weapon of offence in presence of two Gaonburas from the residence of the accused and he admitted that he did not take finger print on the seized weapon/guns and he further admitted that he cannot say as to what has been opined as to the recent firing from the seized gun. 19. What is transpired from the above discussion is that there is no eye-witness to the occurrence. 19. What is transpired from the above discussion is that there is no eye-witness to the occurrence. The FIR was registered on the basis of information received from the accused. It also appears that on the basis of disclosure statement made by he accused the IO has found the dead body in the field of the accused and also on the basis of the statement of the accused the IO recovered two muzzle guns, one of which was functional and the other one was dysfunctional, from his house. But, the I.O. has failed to record the disclosure statement so made by the accused on the basis of which he has recovered the dead body and the two guns, so as to become admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act. In the seizure list-P. Ext. 1 also the I.O. has not mentioned that pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the accused he has recovered the two guns. Besides, the seizure also could not be proved by the prosecution side, as the witnesses examined by it, has not supported the seizure. Thus, there is no legally admissible evidence to establish that the accused by means of the seized gun caused the injury to the deceased that caused his death. 20. Moreover, the I.O. has not sealed the gun at the place of seizure i.e. the house of the accused. Mr. D. Panging, the learned counsel for the accused appellant has submitted that since it was not sealed at the place of seizure, tampering of the same cannot be ruled out and in support of his submission he has referred one case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amarjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 217. Having carefully gone through the case law referred by the learned counsel for the accused appellant, and also considering the facts and circumstances herein this case, we find sufficient force in his submission. In the referred case law, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that non sealing of revolver at the spot is a serious infirmity because of the possibility of tampering with the weapon cannot be ruled out. Here, in this case, also it is apparent from the evidence of the I.O. that he did not seal the seized gun at the place of seizure. Here, in this case, also it is apparent from the evidence of the I.O. that he did not seal the seized gun at the place of seizure. And as such, tampering with the same cannot be ruled out and this circumstance also militates against the prosecution version. 21. However, Ms. L. Hage, the learned Additional P.P. has submitted that in the case in hand death of the deceased is not in dispute. And the medical evidence shows that he died of bullet injuries and the fired arm used for causing the injuries is also seized from the house of the accused and as such not only the offence under section 304(A) IPC, but also the offences under Section 325 and 326 IPC stands established here in this case. Ms. Hague further submitted that the accused implicated him and the FIR is lodged on the basis of his statement and he surrendered in the police station and the weapon of offence was recovered at his instance and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses confirmed the seizure. She, however, submits that PW-1 and PW-2 are not eyewitnesses of the occurrence, and there is no other eye witness also, but according her, the entire prosecution case rest on circumstantial evidence and the circumstances so brought on record by the prosecution sides unerringly point out the guilt of the accused and as such the learned Court below has rightly recorded the finding of guilt and convicted the accused under Section 304 (A) IPC read with Section 25 and 27 (1) of the Arms Act. Ms. Hague also submitted that the accused possessed two muzzle guns without any license and the forensic report reveals use of one of the muzzle gun and the medical evidence also corroborated the gun injury and therefore, the prosecution case, is proved beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore, prayed for upholding the conviction. Ms. Hage also referred three case laws - (i) Pawan Kumar @ Manu Mittal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7SCC 148, (ii) Gurjinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2011) 3SCC 5390, (iii) Tahir Vs. State (Delhi), (1996) 3SCC 338, in support of her submission. 22. But, in view of our discussions and finding in the foregoing para, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submission of Mr. Hage. It has already held that the seizure has not been proved by the prosecution witnesses. State of Punjab, (2011) 3SCC 5390, (iii) Tahir Vs. State (Delhi), (1996) 3SCC 338, in support of her submission. 22. But, in view of our discussions and finding in the foregoing para, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submission of Mr. Hage. It has already held that the seizure has not been proved by the prosecution witnesses. And except the statement made by the accused/appellant, which has been reduced into writing by the police and treated as FIR, there is no evidence either direct or indirect to show that the accused has caused the injury sustained by the deceased by means of the gun. It is a fact that some circumstances are there on the record such as -surrender of the accused at the Police Station, and disclosure statement made before police and subsequent recovery of the dead body by police and also recovery of two guns from the house of the accused and that the medical evidence also shows that the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by gunshot, yet the same not conclusive in nature and it failed to point out the guilt of the accused beyond doubt. We have carefully gone through the case laws referred by Ms. Hage and we find that the ratio laid down therein are not applicable in all force to the peculiar facts and circumstances herein this case. Therefore, we skip elaborate discussion upon the same. 23. The ld. Court below also relied upon above circumstances to record the finding of guilt. As noted and discussed above, the finding so arrived at by the ld. Court below is not based on sound principles of law and consequently the same is not sustainable. 24. Another disturbing feature is that the I.O. has laid charge sheet against the accused/appellant under section 27(1) of the Arms Act. The District Magistrate, East Kameng District also accorded prosecution sanction under section 39 of the Arms Act to prosecute him under section 27(1)(2) & (3) Arms Act only. But, the ld. Court below has without the accused being charge sheeted by the I.O. under section 25 of the Arms Act and also without framing charge against him under section 25 of the Arms Act, and also without prosecution sanction under section 25 of the Arms Act, convicted him under section 25 of the Arms Act and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for three years. 25. The Charge, so framed by the ld. Court below, read as under- Charge Single Head:- “That you, Khilli Chiroju, on or about 05.10.2015 at about 3300 hours at Nijung Village under Nafra Police Station shot at deceased Sirin Khunjuju with a country made gun and killed him, committed an offence punishable under Section 304 (A) of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 27 (1), (2) & (3) of the Arms Act and within cognizance of this Court”.” Sd/- Sessions Judge, East Kameng District, Bomdila 26. Thus, it appears that the learned Court below has not frame charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act. Moreover, the accused has been jointly charged for all the 3 offences under Section 304 (A) of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 27 (1), (2) & (3) of the Arms Act, which is not legally permissible. 27. This conviction as well as the sentence of the accused/appellant, under section 25 of the Arms Act, without there being charge and without there being prosecution sanction, to the considered opinion of this court is not only against the principles of ‘natural justice’ but also against the principles of criminal jurisprudence. In Union of India Vs. Tulshiram Pate, (1985) 3 SCC 398 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “The rule of natural justice, with which we are concerned in these Appeals and Writ Petition, namely the audi alteram partem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed should be informed of the allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of submitting his explanation thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against him and to inspect the documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used against him, to have the witnesses who are to give evidence against him, examined in his presence and have the right to cross-examine them and to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence.” 28. In the case in hand no charge is framed against the accused/appellant and he was not informed about the allegations and charge under section 25 of the Arms Act, and also not afforded an opportunity of submitting his explanation thereto, though he had the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against him and to inspect the documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used against him, to have the witnesses who are to give evidence against him. Therefore, the accused/appellant is prejudiced by the action of the court below. Therefore, conviction of the accused/appellant under section 25 of the Arms Act is illegal, and consequently unsustainable and liable to be set aside. It is to be mentioned here that section 25 and 27(1) (2) & (3) of the Arms Act are distinct offences and therefore, to the considered opinion of this court, sanction under section 25 of the Arms Act also necessary. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of this court in Bijon Mahanto and Anr. v. State of Assam and Anr., reported in (2009) 3 GLR 148, wherein it has been observed that:- "Though it has been alleged in the offence report that the accused-petitioners were found in possession of the arms and ammunitions, the offence report did not seek prosecution of the accused-petitioners for offences allegedly committed under the Arms Act. Even if such a prosecution was sought, such prosecution would have been impermissible in law, for, in the absence of sanction, as required under Section 39 of the Arms Act, the Court could not have taken cognizance of offences under the Arms Act. It needs to be pointed out that the accused-petitioners, in the light of the FIR, are alleged to have been found in possession of fire-arms or ammunitions in contravention of the provisions of Section 3 and such an offence is punishable under Section 25(1)(B) Arms Act. Essentially, therefore, Section 25(1) (B) prescribes only punishment for an offence, which a person commits by contravening the provisions of Section 3. Section 39 makes it clear that no prosecution can be instituted against any person in respect of any offence committed under Section 3 without previous sanction of the District Magistrate. Essentially, therefore, Section 25(1) (B) prescribes only punishment for an offence, which a person commits by contravening the provisions of Section 3. Section 39 makes it clear that no prosecution can be instituted against any person in respect of any offence committed under Section 3 without previous sanction of the District Magistrate. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the condition precedent for prosecuting the present accused-petitioners for any offence committed under the Arms Act, requisite sanction under Section 39 of the Army Act is necessary." 29. Moreover, sanction granted to prosecute the accused/appellant under section 27(1)(2) & (3) Arms Act also appears to be not proved in accordance with the law. The investigating officer has merely exhibited the sanction order as P/Ext-7. It is read as under:- PROSECUTION SANCTION No.BJ-1211/16 March 29, 2016 WHEREAS, the OC/Investigating Officer PS - Nafra of Nafra PS Case No. 29, 2016, u/s 302 IPC R/W 27(1) of Arms Act has submitted a prayer vide his letter No. NFA/PS/FIR-06/2015 dated 14th march 2016, for grant of sanction to prosecute the accused persons namely Khilly Chiroju, village – Najang PS/PO Nafra, West kameng District, AP for illegal possession of country made gun. AND WHEREAS, from the evidence collected/recorded by the I/O of the case of Nafra PS Case No. 06/2015, U/S 302 IPC R/W 27(1) of Arms Act and on perusal of the case Diary of aforesaid Nafra PS Case, it has been established prima-facie the accused person has committed the offence under section 302 IPC R/W 27(1) of the Arms Act; Therefore, as per provision of section 39 of the Arms Act, 1959, sanction is hereby accorded to prosecute the above named accused persons under section 27 (1) (2) and (3) of the Arms Act. Sd/- District Magistrate, West Kameng District Bomdila 30. There is nothing on the record to show that what are the documents the I.O. has sent to the District Magistrate and also there is nothing on the record to show what the Authority has considered at the time of granting sanction whether he has applied his mind or not is not on the record. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Tarachand Jain, 1973 Cri. L.J. 1396, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that- “The position of law is that the burden of proof that the requisite sanction had been obtained rests upon the prosecution. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Tarachand Jain, 1973 Cri. L.J. 1396, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that- “The position of law is that the burden of proof that the requisite sanction had been obtained rests upon the prosecution. Such burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given the sanction in reference to the facts on which the proposed prosecution was to be based. These facts might appear on the face of the sanction or it might be proved by independent evidence that sanction was accorded for prosecution after those facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority.” 31. In Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 637 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- The burden of proving that the requisite sanction has been obtained rests on the prosecution, and such burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given the sanction in reference to the facts on which the proposed prosecution was to be based; and these facts might appear on the face of the sanction or might be proved by extraneous evidence. In the present case the facts constituting the offence do not appear on the face of the letter Ex. P-10. It was consequently incumbent upon the prosecution to prove by other evidence that the material facts constituting the offence were placed before the sanctioning authority. This they did not attempt to do. In the instant case curiously enough the sanction was not proved. It is found that the facts that were placed before the sanctioning authority do not appear on the face of the sanction order found in the record. No evidence has been produced by the prosecution that the material facts were placed before the sanctioning authority for giving sanction for prosecution Under Section 39 of the Arms Act, That being the position it is not known whether the sanctioning authority at all considered the facts of the case before lie accorded the sanction. That apart, the sanction in the instant case appears to have been made as recommended by the S. R. P., which shows that it was simply a stereotyped order of the Additional District Magistrate without applying his mind to the facts of the case. 32. That apart, the sanction in the instant case appears to have been made as recommended by the S. R. P., which shows that it was simply a stereotyped order of the Additional District Magistrate without applying his mind to the facts of the case. 32. Having gone through the sanction order-P/Ext.12 in the case in hand, it cannot be said that the I.O. has placed all the relevant materials collected during investigation, relating to the commission of the offence and also it cannot be said that sanctioning authority has applied his mind to the said materials. Under the above circumstances, it is held that the sanction order, which appears in the record of the case, is not a sanction order as contemplated Under Section 39 of the Arms Act, and since there was no sanction in accordance with law the Court had no jurisdiction to try the accused at all and the conviction and sentence of the accused/petitioner must be quashed. 33. In the result, we find sufficient merit in this appeal and accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated-26.11.2019, passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, West Kameng, District - Bomdila in Sessions Case No. 112/2015, under Section 304 (A) IPC, read with Section 25 & 27(1), (2) & (3) of the Arms Act, 1959 stands set aside. The accused/appellant shall be released from the jail immediately if not warranted in any other case.