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2021 DIGILAW 595 (HP)

Bidhi Chand v. State Of Himachal Pradesh

2021-08-27

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2021
JUDGMENT : The plaintiffs/appellants instituted a Civil Suit bearing No. 145 of 1993 before the learned Senior Sub Judge, Hamirpur. In the afore drawn suit, the plaintiffs claimed, for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction being pronounced against the defendants, and, vis-à-vis, the suit khasra numbers. The afore Civil Suit became decreed by the learned trial Court. However, the decreeing of the plaintiffs’ suit, by the learned trial Court, was made subject to the plaintiffs becoming evicted from the suit land, in accordance with law. 2. The aggrieved defendant No.1/respondent herein carried there-against Civil Appeal No. 184 of 1998 before the learned District Judge, Hamirpur. Moreover the aggrieved plaintiffs also within the afore Civil Appeal preferred cross-objections No. 04 of 1999. Both the Civil Appeal and Cross-objections (supra) became cumulatively decided through a common verdict made thereons on 6.5.2004. Through the afore made verdict, the learned District Judge rejected the cross-objections, and, partly allowed the appeal of the aggrieved defendant to the extent, that the plaintiffs and proforma defendant No.2, being made amenable for eviction from the suit land, through recoursings by the defendant of the procedure constituted under law. 3. The plaintiffs become aggrieved from the verdict recorded by the learned first appellate Court, and, are led to institute there-against the instant appeal before this Court. 4. When the appeal came up for admission before this Court, this Court had admitted the same, on the here-in-after extracted substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the suit land could not have vested in the Panchayat and consequently in the State of Himachal Pradesh in view of the provisions of Sections 2 (g) and 4 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. 2. Whether the suit land could not have been defined as Shamlat Deh because it was in possession of the plaintiffs/predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs on the coming into force of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.” 5. A perusal of the jamabandi appertaining to the year 1954-1955, does vividly disclose, that therein a reference is made to mutation No. 68. A reading of the afore mutation No. 68 also does unveil, that the suit land was sanctioned as Nautor, vis-à-vis, one Shankar Dass, hence through an order made on 12.2.1954, by the Deputy Commissioner Kangra. A perusal of the jamabandi appertaining to the year 1954-1955, does vividly disclose, that therein a reference is made to mutation No. 68. A reading of the afore mutation No. 68 also does unveil, that the suit land was sanctioned as Nautor, vis-à-vis, one Shankar Dass, hence through an order made on 12.2.1954, by the Deputy Commissioner Kangra. However, though through the afore made order, the suit land became granted as Nautor, to one Shankar Dass, yet the tenure of the relevant grant became limited only for a period of five years. Upon expiry of afore tenure of the grant of the suit land, as made to the afore Shankar Dass, the defendants concerned through making hence on 12.12.1963 mutation No. 76, rather cancelled the grant of land, as made, by way of Nautor to the afore Shankar Dass. 6. Further more, through mutation No. 78 attested on 30.6.1964, the suit land became vested in the Gram Panchayat concerned. Subsequent to the making of mutation No. 78 hence on 30.6.1964, obviously in tandem therewith rather corresponding entries are made in the jamabandi(s) appertaining to the suit land. The plaintiffs for theirs ensuring, the decreeing of their suit, were enjoined to place on record the Nautor allotment rules, as were prevalent in contemporanity to the grant of suit land, being made in favour of Shankar Dass, hence through an order made by the Deputy Commissioner concerned on 12.2.1954, and, the afore rules also making candid bespeaking(s), that there occur no provisions therein, hence, reducing or curtailing the grant of land by way of Nautor to one Shankar Dass. Since only upon adduction of afore relevant rules, the plaintiffs could succeed in convincing this Court, that the restriction of the tenure of the apposite grant up to five years by the Deputy Commissioner, through his making an order of 12.2.1954, was invalid to the extent, that it breached the afore relevant rules, whereas, the tenure of the apposite allotment was not required to be curtailed rather the apposite grant to him was in perpetuity. 7. However, the afore relevant rules never came to be placed on record by the plaintiffs. Therefore, this Court concludes that the limited tenure of grant of land by way of Nautor, by the Deputy Commissioner, through his order made on 12.2.1954, was a valid order. 7. However, the afore relevant rules never came to be placed on record by the plaintiffs. Therefore, this Court concludes that the limited tenure of grant of land by way of Nautor, by the Deputy Commissioner, through his order made on 12.2.1954, was a valid order. Further more, this Court also concludes that on expiry of the afore tenure of grant, the rescission thereof, as made through mutation No.76, is valid, and, thereafters its being vested in the Panchayat through mutation No. 78, is also valid. 8. Since the grant of land to one Shankar Dass, by way of Nautor, does evidently comprise Shamlat land. Therefore, when in concurrence with Section 4 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961, as was in force at the time, of, the respective drawings of mutations No. 76 and 78, and, respectively wherethroughs the grant became rescinded, and, the land became vested in the Panchayat Deh. Consequently, the plaintiffs cannot claim that the afore orders are invalid. The only claim which could become raised, was that within the corners of a saving clause occurring in the statute (supra), rather the suit land was save-able from vestment. However, the afore plea become neither averred nor any evidence in consonance therewith became adduced. Thereupon, no benefit of the apposite saving clause can became conferred upon the plaintiffs. 9. Be that as it may, since the description of the suit land as carried in the apposite column of the jamabandi, is Shamlat land. Consequently, the afore description of the suit land, in the revenue records, does vest, in the estate right holders, whose name(s) occur in the list of Bartandaran, the right to use it, in the manner as enshrined in the apposite Wajib Ul Urz . Though the plaintiffs could claim exclusivity of user of the suit land. However, cogent evidence was required to the adduced by them, and, its displaying, that in the list of Bartandarans, as, appertaining to the suit land, only their name occurs, and, that the names of other estate right holders, do not occur therein. The adduction of the afore evidence could lead this Court, to dehors, its validating mutations (supra), to, may be render a decree of injunction against the defendants. However, even the afore evidence is grossly amiss. The adduction of the afore evidence could lead this Court, to dehors, its validating mutations (supra), to, may be render a decree of injunction against the defendants. However, even the afore evidence is grossly amiss. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot claim exclusivity of enjoying the suit land through the ouster of the other estate right holder in the Mohal concerned nor obviously any apposite injunction can be rendered. Further more, the effect of the plaintiffs not adducing the afore evidence, is that their name did not occur in the list of bartandarans, as, appertaining to the suit land concerned. 10. The afore made inference constrains this Court, to form a further sequel, that the plaintiffs, could not dehors, the afore valid order for vestment of the suit land, in the Panchayat concerned, hence claim any right of possession or user of the suit land by them, much less, to the exclusion of other legitimate estate right holders concerned. There is no merit in the appeal, and, the same is accordingly dismissed, and, the impugned verdict is maintained and affirmed. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. All pending applications stand disposed of accordingly. No costs.