ORDER : 1. Petitioner in Crl.P.No.6163/2017 is the husband of petitioner in Crl.P.No.6164/2017. Petitioner in Crl.No.6165/2017 is the daughter of the petitioners in Crl.P.Nos.6163/2017 and 6164/2017. 2. The particulars of the criminal cases out of which these petitions arise are set out in the table below. 3. The petitioners are being prosecuted in the aforesaid criminal cases for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ‘the N.I. Act’) on the basis of the complaints filed by the respondent against them. 4. The respondent is said to be registered company engaged in business of conducting chit transactions. The case of the respondent is as follows: Crl.P.No. C.C.No. Court 1) 6163/2017 (Moodalagiriyappa) 11702/2017 XXVII ACMM Bengaluru, 2) 6164/2017 (Jayamma) 11701/2017 “ 3) 6165/2017 (Leela) 11699/2017 “ The petitioners in Crl.P.Nos.6163/2017 and 6164/2017 were the chit subscribers and they received price amount of Rs.37,50,000/-each. The petitioner in Crl.P.No.6165/2017 was the surety for her parents for the said chit transactions and she had executed the required documents. They committed default in paying the subscription amount. The petitioners issued cheques towards payment of the amount due under the said chit subscription transactions. When those cheques were presented for realization, they were dishonoured for want of sufficient funds. The particulars of the cheques, the date of cheques, amount of cheques, the drawee bank, the date of dishonour and the chit ticket number are as follows: Crl.P.No. Ticket No. Cheque No. Cheque Date Amount Bank Date of dishonour 1) 6163/2017 G2M/128 Ticket No.11 231916 09.02.2017 Rs.40,15,600/- Janata Co-Op. Bank ltd., West of Chord Road 13.02.2017 2)6164/2017 G2M/128 Ticket No.9 564182 “ Rs.40,15,300/- Malleshwaram H.O. Branch 21.02.2017 3)6165/2017 Surety for Ticket No. 10 G2M/128 Ticket No.14 " 724303 “ Rs.80,30,600/- Canara Bank, Subramanyam Nagar Branch 14.02.2017 5. The respondent got issued statutory notices to the petitioners on 10.03.2017 calling upon them to pay the cheque amount or else to face the prosecution. The said notices were returned with the postal endorsement “addressee refused, hence returned to the sender”. Therefore, the respondent filed complaints against the petitioners before the trial Court seeking their prosecution for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The learned Magistrate by order dated 28.04.2017 took cognizance of the offence and summoned the petitioners to face the prosecution. 6. The petitioners are seeking quashing of the said proceedings under the above revision petitions on various grounds. 7. The learned Magistrate by order dated 28.04.2017 took cognizance of the offence and summoned the petitioners to face the prosecution. 6. The petitioners are seeking quashing of the said proceedings under the above revision petitions on various grounds. 7. Shri M.Veerabhadraiah, learned counsel for the petitioners reiterating the grounds of the petitions seeks to quash the impugned proceedings on the following grounds: i) The cheques and documents in issue not at all pertained to the chit transaction as claimed in the complaint. They were given for the chit transaction of the year 2009-2010. The dues under those transactions were cleared long back. ii) Despite such clearance, the cheques and documents were not returned to the petitioners. Misusing those documents, false complaints are filed. iii) The bank account of the petitioner in Crl.P.No.6165/2017 was non-operative since 2012. iv) The alleged chit transactions were contrary to Sections 6, 7, 10, 32 and 33 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 and Section 25 of the Madras Chit Funds Act, 1961, Rules 64 and 65 of the Chit Funds Rules. Therefore, there was no legally recoverable liability. v) For the same liability, respondent has initiated arbitration proceedings. The initiation of the criminal prosecution simultaneously with arbitration proceedings is abuse of the process of the Court. vi) Despite initiating prosecution against the principal borrowers, the respondent simultaneously sought the prosecution of the surety, Smt.Leela. Therefore, that is abuse of the process of the Court. vii) Signatory to the complaints is not competent to file the complaint. 8. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the following judgments: i) AIR 1992 SC 604 (State of Haryana and Others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others) ii) AIR 1992 SC 2206 (K.M.Mathew Vs.State of Kerala and another) iii) (2006) 6 SCC 39 (M.S.Narayana Menon Vs. State of Kerala and another) iv) (2015) 1 SCC 103 (Gunamala Sales Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Anu Mehta and others) v) Crl.A.No.1395/2018 (Supreme Court of India) (Anand Kumar Mohatta and another Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and another) DD 15.11.2018. vi) (2008) 3 KLJ 669 (LMJ International Ltd., Bangalore and others Vs. State by Kushalnagar Police Station and others) vii) Crl.P.No.1176/2008 (High Court of Karnataka) (Smt.Sashikala Vs. C.E.Raju) DD 04.03.2012. viii) I (2006) BC 273 (High Court of Kerala) (J.Daniel Vs. State of Kerala and others) ix) ILR 2013 KAR 559 (M/s Shriram Chits (K) Pvt. Ltd., Vs. vi) (2008) 3 KLJ 669 (LMJ International Ltd., Bangalore and others Vs. State by Kushalnagar Police Station and others) vii) Crl.P.No.1176/2008 (High Court of Karnataka) (Smt.Sashikala Vs. C.E.Raju) DD 04.03.2012. viii) I (2006) BC 273 (High Court of Kerala) (J.Daniel Vs. State of Kerala and others) ix) ILR 2013 KAR 559 (M/s Shriram Chits (K) Pvt. Ltd., Vs. the Addl. Registrar of Co-op. Societies and others x) CDJ 1999 MHC 287 (Crl.OP No.10634/1998 & Crl.M.P.No. 4408/1998) (High Court of Madras) (DD 31.08.1999) (M.Lakshman Vs. Shanmuga Textile Pvt. Ltd.,) xi) 2000 Comp. Cases (Vol. 100) 180 (Klen and Marshalls Manufacturing and Exporters Ltd. Vs. State of J & K. xii) (2011) 11 SCC 524 (State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers India Pvt. Ltd.) 9. Per contra, Shri Shivaprasad E., learned counsel for the respondent opposes the petitions on the following grounds: i) The petitioners did not dispute that the cheques pertained to their account and their signatures on the said cheques. They themselves claim that since 20092010, they were the chit subscribers. Therefore, at this length of time, they cannot question the constitution of the respondent or the validity of the chit transactions. ii) The complaint and the notices do contain the statement that the cheques were issued towards legally recoverable debt. iii) The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings shall be sparingly used. When the petitioners admit their signatures on the cheques and that the cheques pertain to their account, the legal presumption is that the cheques were issued towards legally recoverable debt. Therefore, they have to rebut the said presumption in the trial. iv) Whether the cheques were issued for the chit transaction in question or the cheques issued for some other purpose were misused may be a defence for the accused in the trial. On that count, they cannot seek the quashing of the proceedings. v) Similarly, whether there was compliance of the provisions of the Chit Funds Act is again a disputed question of fact. Therefore, on such ground, the complaints cannot be quashed. vi) Accused has no locus standi to question the competence of signatory to the complaint, when respondent company itself has no grievance about that. Again that is a disputed question of fact which needs to be decided in trial. 10. Therefore, on such ground, the complaints cannot be quashed. vi) Accused has no locus standi to question the competence of signatory to the complaint, when respondent company itself has no grievance about that. Again that is a disputed question of fact which needs to be decided in trial. 10. In support of his contention, he relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in RAJESHBHAI MULJIBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER, (2020) 3 SCC 794 . 11. It is settled proposition of law that this Court can exercise powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings, only if there is abuse of the process of the Court and to prevent the failure of ends of justice. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the latest judgment in M/S.NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD., VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (Criminal Appeal No.330/2021 DD 13.04.2021) has laid down certain guidelines for granting interim stay in the proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. That included the guidelines regarding quashing of the proceedings also. 12. For the purpose of this case, the conclusions in paragraph 23 (iv) to (vii), (x) to (xiii), (xv) of the judgment in M/S.NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD’S case referred to supra are relevant which read as follows: iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;. vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; x) Save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of963. investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; 9 xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; 9 xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court. xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. From the above judgment, it becomes clear that the FIR/complaint is not an encyclopedia. Since the case related to the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, the complainant was required to state the following facts in the complaint: i) The accused have issued the cheques in question towards discharge of their legal liability. ii) The particulars of the cheque. iii) The cheques were presented within the prescribed time and were dishonoured. iv) The statutory notice was issued and that was not complied. v) The complaint shall disclose that same is filed within the prescribed time. ii) The particulars of the cheque. iii) The cheques were presented within the prescribed time and were dishonoured. iv) The statutory notice was issued and that was not complied. v) The complaint shall disclose that same is filed within the prescribed time. Therefore, the complainant was not expected to narrate in the complaint the compliance of Sections 6, 7, 10, 32 and 33 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 and Section 25 of the Madras Chit Funds Act, 1961, Rules 64 and 65 of the Chit Funds Rules. 14. In the cases on hand, there is no dispute regarding the dates of the presentation of the cheques, their dishonour, issuance of statutory notice and compliance of the provisions of the N.I. Act with regard to the limitation. The petitioners do not even dispute that the cheques in question pertain to their account and they bear their signatures. They even do not dispute that the notices were issued to the address of their ordinary residence. 15. Under such circumstances, presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act that the cheques were issued towards discharge of legally enforceable liability arises. Of course, it is open to the respondent to rebut that presumption during the course of the trial. Whether the cheques were issued towards the chit transactions mentioned in the complaints or they related to some past chit transactions may be a defence for the accused in trial. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.’s, case referred to supra has clearly held that while examining the complaint, the quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. Therefore, at this stage, this Court cannot sit in trial as to the genuineness of the cheques. It was held that it would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint does not deserve continuation of prosecution. The Court is not required to consider on merits of the allegations with regard to the transactions. 17. The contention that the complaint does contain averments with regard to the issuance of cheque towards legally enforceable liability is incorrect. The Court is not required to consider on merits of the allegations with regard to the transactions. 17. The contention that the complaint does contain averments with regard to the issuance of cheque towards legally enforceable liability is incorrect. In paragraph 5 of the complaint in each case, the respondent has stated as follows: “the liability for which subject cheque has been drawn and issued by the accused to and in favour of complainant is legally enforceable and the same is legally recoverable debt.” Learned counsel for the petitioners it appears is oblivious of such clear statement in the complaint while claiming that there is no such averment to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. 18. In Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the similar matter in paragraph 20 of the judgment referring to the presumptions under Section 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act held that while quashing the complaint, the High Court did not keep in view that until the accused discharges his burden the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I.Act will continue to remain. It was held that it was for the accused to rebut the statutory presumption. It was further held that when disputed questions of facts are involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 19. The cases on hand are fully covered by the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel’s case and the judgment of the larger bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. 20. Though, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on host of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts suffice it to say that they cannot be justifiably applied to the facts of the present case. 21. This Court does not find any merit in the contention that the complaints do not prima facie make out the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to continue the prosecution. 21. This Court does not find any merit in the contention that the complaints do not prima facie make out the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to continue the prosecution. Since the accused/petitioners have the right of defence in the trial, this Court is not persuaded to accept that the continuation of the proceedings on the basis of the complaints in question amount to abuse of the process of the Court or lead to failure of ends of justice. 22. Therefore, the petitions are dismissed. The trial Court shall dispose of the matters as expeditiously as possible uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order.