ORDER : The present petitioner who is common in both the revision petitions is the accused No.3 in Special C.C.No.159/2021, pending on the file of the learned XXXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (NDPS), Bengaluru, CCH-33, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “the Special Court”), which criminal proceedings was initiated against ten accused persons including the present petitioner by the respondent through its complaint under Section 36A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “the NDPS Act”) for the offences punishable under Sections 8(C) read with Sections 22 (C), 27, 27A, 28, and 29 of the NDPS Act. 2. The summary of the case of the respondent in the Special Court is that, on 21-08-2020 at 5:50 p.m., the Intelligence Officer of the Narcotic Control Bureau, Bangalore Zonal Unit, Bangalore, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “the NCB), received an information that, one Mohammed Anoop (accused No.2), residing in Room Nos.205 and 206 of Royal Suites Hotel Apartment, situated at Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore, has purchased 100 grams of MDMA pills and if search is conducted, the same can be seized. In pursuance of the said information and upon authorisation, the Narcotic Officers conducted search of Room Nos.205 and 206 of Royal Suites Hotel Apartment, Kalyan Nagar, Bengaluru and found 60 grams of MDMA tablets and the same were seized under a panchanama from 10:10 p.m on 21-08-2020 to 00:10 a.m. on 22-08-2020 and arrested the said Mohammad Anoop (accused No.2). He was enquired about the remaining 40 grams of tablets, wherein he is said to have told the Narcotic Officers that, he has given the same to the present petitioner (accused No.3). It is further alleged in the complaint that, thereafter, the premises at flat No.52401, 24th Floor, Tower No.5, Nikoo Homes 1, Chokkana halli Village, Bengaluru, was searched by the NCB officials in the same intervening night of 21st and 22nd August 2020, where 40 grams/tablets of MDMA and 180 blots of LSD were found and the same were seized. The MDMA tablets were weighing 40 grams in total and LSD blotter papers were found to be weighing in net 2.9 grams. A panchanama was drawn in the spot in that regard. The MDMA tablets were weighing 40 grams in total and LSD blotter papers were found to be weighing in net 2.9 grams. A panchanama was drawn in the spot in that regard. It was at about 04:40 hours on 22-08-2020, the accused No.3 was issued summons under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, to appear before the NCB for his further enquiry in that regard. On 24-8-2020, the petitioner along with two others were produced before the Special Court in Crime No.NCB.F.No.48/1/14/2020/BZU and got remanded to judicial custody. 3. Thereafter, the investigation was continued by the respondent – NCB officials. On 18-02-2021, the Intelligence Officer, NCB, Bangalore Zonal Unit, Bangalore, filed a complaint before the Special Court against ten accused persons, including the present petitioner as accused No.3 for the alleged offences. The Special Court, by its order dated 20-02-2021 took cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 8(C) read with Sections 22 (C), 27, 27A, 28, and 29 of the NDPS Act, against all the accused persons. Thereafter, the present petitioner (accused No.3) filed an application before the Special Court under Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”), seeking his enlargement on bail in the said crime. However, his application came to be rejected by the order of the Special Court dated 05-03-2021. It is challenging the said order dated 05-03-2021, wherein his application under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. was rejected, the petitioner has filed the present Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021. Further, challenging the order of the said Court taking cognizance dated 20-02-2021 passed in the said Special C.C.No.159/2021, the petitioner has filed the present Criminal Revision Petition No.325/2021. Since both these revision petitions have arisen out of the same crime number and between the same parties, both these revision petitions are connected with one another. 4. The respondent -NCB is being represented by the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel. 5. Heard the arguments from the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent – NCB. Perused the materials placed before this Court including the impugned orders passed by the Special Court. 6. 4. The respondent -NCB is being represented by the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel. 5. Heard the arguments from the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent – NCB. Perused the materials placed before this Court including the impugned orders passed by the Special Court. 6. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties, the points that arise for my consideration in these two revision petitions are: [i] Whether the revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. is maintainable against the order passed rejecting the application filed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C.? [ii] Whether the order of the Special Court dated 05-03-2021 is perverse and illegal, warranting interference at the hands of this Court? [iii] Whether the order dated 20-02-2021 passed in Special C.C.No.159/2021 by the Special Court, taking cognizance for the alleged offences and allowing the entire proceedings is perverse, illegal and deserves to be set aside? Re-Point No.[i]: Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021 is filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. The said Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. read as below: “ 397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section(1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section(1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. “401. High Court's Powers of revisions.- (1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307 and, when the Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by section 392. (2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. (4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. (5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.” 7. The respondent herein, at the outset, took an objection regarding the maintainability of the Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021 contending that, the order passed on the application filed under Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. is not an interim order, but it is an order on default which order can be cancelled later. Therefore, the present revision is not maintainable. In his support, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel relied upon the following judgments:- [i] In the case of Raghubir Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1986) 4 Supreme Court Cases 481, the Hon’ble Apex Court in para-20 of its judgment was pleased to observe with respect to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. that, since release of bail under Proviso to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is deemed to be release on bail under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII, an order for release under the Proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is also subject to the provisions of Sections 437(5) and 439(2) and may be extinguished by an order under either of these provisions. Thereafter, in para-23 of the very same judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court was also pleased to hold that, the order for release on bail was not an order on merits but was what one may call an order-on-default, an order that could be rectified for special reasons after the defect was cured. [ii] In the case of Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another reported in (1977) 4 Supreme Court Cases 137, the Hon’ble Apex Court, with respect to Sections 397 and 482 of the Cr.P.C., was pleased to discuss the meaning of interlocutory order and was pleased to hold that under Section 397, the High Court has no power to revise the interlocutory order. [iii] In the case of Thakur V. Hariprasad Vs. [iii] In the case of Thakur V. Hariprasad Vs. State of A.P. reported in (1976) 2 AP L J 51, where the question before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a revision under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. was regarding the cancellation of the bail granted to the accused under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., the Andhra Pradesh High Court in para-10 of its Judgment was pleased to observe that, it cannot be held that the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge cancelling the bail granted to the petitioner by the Trial Court was an interlocutory order which does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused petitioner. It does not terminate the trial of the petitioner on the merits of the case. As such, no revision therefore lies against the order in view of the prohibition under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. [iv] In the case of Bhola and Others Vs. State reported in 1979 SCC OnLine All 130, wherein also, a revision petition was filed under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. challenging the order of cancellation of the bail by the Sessions Judge, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, after referring to Amar Nath’s case (supra) and other cases of the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to hold that, the phrase “passing orders for bail” used in Amar Nath’s case (supra) would include ‘granting, rejecting or cancelling bail’, as such, no revision would lie against such impugned order as it is an ‘interlocutory order’ within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code. [v] A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Nilu alias Prasanta Kumar Patjoshi and Others Vs. State reported in 1983 SCC OnLine Ori 149, wherein, after relying upon Amar Nath’s case (supra) and referring to Thakur V. Hariprasad’s case (supra), it was pleased to observe in para-4 of its judgment as below: “4. The learned Additional Government Advocate has invited our attention to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Thakur V. Hariprasad v. State of A.P. 1977 Cri LJ 471. In that case, the bail granted by the trial Magistrate had been cancelled by the Sessions Judge under Section 439(2) of the Code. The learned Additional Government Advocate has invited our attention to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Thakur V. Hariprasad v. State of A.P. 1977 Cri LJ 471. In that case, the bail granted by the trial Magistrate had been cancelled by the Sessions Judge under Section 439(2) of the Code. The question as to whether an order cancelling bail would or would not be an interlocutory one came up for consideration before Madhusudan Rao. J. After an elaborate discussion and keeping in mind the scope and import of the provision made in Sections 397(2) and 439(2) of the Code and referring to a number of reported cases of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, the learned Judge has held that the impugned order of the Sessions Judge cancelling bail is an interlocutory order which does not determine the guilty or innocence of the accused-petitioner and does not terminate the trial of the petitioner on the merits of the case and therefore, no revision lies against the order in view of the prohibition in Section 397(2) of the Code.” [vi] In the case of Surendra Kuwar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2015 SCC OnLine All 7137 wherein also, the question of maintainability of a revision against an order passed by a Sessions Judge under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. was involved, the Allahabad High Court after referring to various cases including Amar Nath’s case (supra) and Bhola’s case (supra) was pleased to hold that, an order of cancellation of bail is an interlocutory order, as such, revision is barred by Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. However, a petition can be entertained under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It is relying upon the above judgments, the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent contended that Crl.R.P.No. 324/2021 is not maintainable. 8. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in his arguments submitted that, the bail granted under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is not akin to a regular bail under Chapter XXXIII of the Cr.P.C., but it is a non-extension of the period of detention in judicial custody. He further submitted that, an order passed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. determines the right of an accused once for all and finally. He further submitted that, an order passed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. determines the right of an accused once for all and finally. Therefore, its correctness and legality can be challenged under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. He submitted that a petition for bail under Sections 437 and 439 of the Cr.P.C. can be repeatedly filed, whereas, an application under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. cannot. As such, since it finally determines the right of an accused on his bail application, it cannot be an interlocutory order, warranting a bar under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. In his support, he relied upon the following Judgments/ Orders:- [i] In the case of Balappa Karnal V. State of Karnataka, reported in ILR 1985 KAR 3098, the question before a Coordinate Bench of this Court was, whether the accused could have been remanded beyond a particular date by the Trial Court either in exercise of its power under Section 167 or under Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. Though the petition before the Court was filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., however, in para-12 of its order, this Court observed that, though the present petition was filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., and it was not challenged, however, exercising the power of the Court under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. for revision, the Court set aside that order also in the said proceeding. [ii] In the case of Sangappa Vs. The State of Karnataka in Criminal Revision Petition No.100250/2017 dated 15-09-2017 (unreported), a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had entertained a Criminal Revision Petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., challenging the order of the Sessions Judge, rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. [iii] Similarly in the case of Firoz Khan and another Vs. The State of Karnataka in Criminal Revision Petition No. 503/2020 dated 04-08-2020 (unreported), and in the case of Sri. Rajesh Nayak and others Vs. the State by Vitla Police in Criminal Revision Petition No.949/2017 dated 17-10-2017 (unreported), two Co-ordinate Benches of this Court had entertained criminal revision petitions challenging the order passed by the Sessions Judge on an application under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. [iv] In the case of Rajeev Chaudhary Vs. Rajesh Nayak and others Vs. the State by Vitla Police in Criminal Revision Petition No.949/2017 dated 17-10-2017 (unreported), two Co-ordinate Benches of this Court had entertained criminal revision petitions challenging the order passed by the Sessions Judge on an application under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. [iv] In the case of Rajeev Chaudhary Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi reported in (2001) 5 Supreme Court Cases 34, the facts of the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court was that, the appellant was arrested in connection with the offences punishable under Sections 386, 506 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “the IPC”). He was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate and was released on bail by the Magistrate on the ground that, the charge-sheet was not submitted within sixty days as provided under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. That order was challenged before the Sessions Court by filing a revision. The revision was allowed. The Additional Sessions Judge held that, for an offence under Section 386 of the IPC, the period of sentence could be upto ten years’ Rigorous Imprisonment. Hence clause (i) of Proviso(a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. would not be applicable. But the High Court set aside the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. Hence, appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is relying upon the said fact learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that in the said case also the Sessions Court had entertained a revision against an order passed under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel further submitted that the above Judgments relied upon by him would go to show that this Court on different occasions has entertained a revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. against an order passed on an application under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to a portion of the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para-6 of its Judgment in the case of Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande and Others Vs. Uttam and another reported in (1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 134 which reads as below:- “6. Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should, therefore, be exercised within the four corners of Section 397, whenever there has been miscarriage of justice in whatever manner. Uttam and another reported in (1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 134 which reads as below:- “6. Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should, therefore, be exercised within the four corners of Section 397, whenever there has been miscarriage of justice in whatever manner. Under subsection (2) of Section 397, there is a prohibition to exercise revisional jurisdiction against any interlocutory order so that inquiry or trial may proceed without any delay. But the expression "interlocutory order" has not been defined in the Code. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ( 1978(1) SCR 222 ), this Court has held that the expression "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense and merely denotes orders of purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties and any order which substantially affects the right of the parties cannot be said to be an "interlocutory order". In Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra ( 1978(1) SCR 749 ), a three Judge Bench of this Court has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. In V.C. Shukla vs. State ( 1980(2) SCR 380 ), this Court has held that the term "interlocutory order" used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi-final...........” With this, he submitted that the order of granting or rejecting bail to an accused under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. substantially affects the right of a party, it is an interim order. To substantiate that an order under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. substantially affects the right of a party, learned Senior Counsel also relied upon one more judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence reported in (2021) 2 Supreme Court Cases 485 and drew the attention of this Court to paragraphs 17.8 and 17.9 of the said judgment which are reproduced herein below:- “17.8. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence reported in (2021) 2 Supreme Court Cases 485 and drew the attention of this Court to paragraphs 17.8 and 17.9 of the said judgment which are reproduced herein below:- “17.8. We may also refer with benefit to the recent judgment of this Court in S. Kasi v. State, (2021) 12 SCC 1, wherein it was observed that the indefeasible right to default bail under Section 167(2) is an integral part of the right to personal liberty under Article 21, and the said right to bail cannot be suspended even during a pandemic situation as is prevailing currently. It was emphasised that the right of the accused to be set at liberty takes precedence over the right of the State to carry on the investigation and submit a charge-sheet. 17.9. Additionally, it is well-settled that in case of any ambiguity in the construction of a penal statute, the Courts must favour the interpretation which leans towards protecting the rights of the accused, given the ubiquitous power disparity between the individual accused and the State machinery. This is applicable not only in the case of substantive penal statutes but also in the case of procedures providing for the curtailment of the liberty of the accused.” Finally, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner referring to Amar Nath’s case (supra) submitted that, the phrase used ‘passing orders for bail” in para-6 of the said judgment is with respect to the bail under Chapter XXXIII of the Cr.P.C. and it does not include an order of bail either granted or rejected under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. With this, he submitted that the order passed on an application filed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order, as such, the prohibition under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is not applicable to the revision petition filed in 20 Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021, as such, the said revision petition is maintainable. 9. 9. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the order challenged in Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021 is an order passed by the Special Court, rejecting the application filed by the present petitioner under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. The said petition is filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. clearly mandates that the powers of revision conferred by sub-Section (i) of Section 397 shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceeding. Therefore, now the only point required to be considered is, whether the impugned order passed by the Special Judge can be termed as an interlocutory order. If the answer would be ‘yes’, then, the present Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021 would not be maintainable. 10. In Amar Nath’s case (supra) at para-6, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as below:- “ 6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of Section 397 against the historical background of these facts. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 code may be extracted thus: The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” (emphasis supplied by me) It is noteworthy that the Hon’ble Apex Court even after observing that any order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, still, was pleased to hold as for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. (emphasis supplied by me) Thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court did not consider the ‘passing of orders for bail’ as an order substantially affecting the right of the accused or deciding certain of his rights so as to exclude such an order from the category of interlocutory orders. 11. The question as to what is ‘revisable order’ and what is an ‘interlocutory order’ came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. 11. The question as to what is ‘revisable order’ and what is an ‘interlocutory order’ came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2017) 14 Supreme Court Cases 809. It also had an opportunity to analyse as to what is the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In that process, after referring to various of its previous judgments, including Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 13 Supreme Court Cases 35, Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1977) 4 Supreme Court Cases 551 and Amar Nath’s case (supra), with respect to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court referring to its previous judgment in the case of Pranab Kumar Mitra Vs. State of W.B. reported in AIR 1959 Supreme Court 144, it observed as below:- “11.....The Constitution Bench held that the revision jurisdiction of the High Court is a discretionary jurisdiction to be exercised in aid of justice. What is significant is that a litigant does not have a right to have a revisable order set aside. Whether the High Court chooses to exercise its revision jurisdiction in a particular case or not depends upon the facts of that case-hence, the reference to the revision jurisdiction as a discretionary jurisdiction. The revision jurisdiction of the High Court only conserves the power of the High Court to ensure that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence and that criminal courts subordinate to the High Court do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse the powers vested in them by the Criminal Procedure Code......” With respect to the categories of the orders which a Court can pass and exercise its revision jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the very same judgment [Girish Kumar Suneja’s case (supra)] at paragraph 16 was pleased to observe as below:- “16. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.” 12. Referring to Madhu Limaye’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at para-21 of its judgment [Girish Kumar Suneja’s case (supra)] was pleased to observe that, an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature, but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue. In the very same judgment [Girish Kumar Suneja’s case (supra)] at para-27, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as below:- “27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition–such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings....” The above judgment makes it very clear that, a final order or an intermediate order is revisable, but not the interlocutory orders. Though an intermediate order is an order which is interlocutory in nature, but when reversed has the effect of terminating the proceeding thereby resulting in a final order. 13. In the instant case, the order passed upon an application filed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. though it touches upon an accused of his personal liberty as to whether he is required to be enlarged on bail, but such an order, if reversed, can, at the best, may result in a finding on his right of appeal but would not result in culmination of a proceeding, resulting in a final proceeding thereby resulting in a final order. The case would continue though the accused, whether enlarged on bail or not. Similar would be the consequence with respect to the orders on bail under Chapter XXXIII of the Cr.P.C. also. There also, any order passed on an application under Sections 437 or 439 of the Cr.P.C. would affect the right of an accused of his liberty but it would not be an end to the main case. Thus it would not culminate into termination of the entire proceeding. The only difference between an order passed on an application filed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. and an order on an interlocutory application/petition filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. is that, as a default and as a matter of right, the accused is enlarged on bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., whereas same is not the case under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. Further, a single application would be generally entertainable under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. whereas, a successive or repetitive application(s)/ petition(s) can be filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. By that itself, it cannot be said that Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is totally a different type of bail order compared to the one under Chapter XXXIII of the Cr.P.C. It cannot be forgotten that Proviso (a)(ii) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. mentions that every person released on bail under that sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII of the Cr.P.C. for the purposes of that Chapter. It is keeping the said Proviso in mind and also the concept of ‘intermediate order’ and ‘interlocutory order’ as distinguished by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja’s case (supra), when we read the phrase “passing orders for bail” mentioned by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-6 of its judgment in Amar Nath’s case (supra), the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the said phrase excludes the order on bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., is not acceptable. Consequently the order either granting or rejecting the bail on an application filed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. would become an interlocutory order for the revision of which there is a bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. Though the Co-ordinate Benches of this Court in Firoz Khan’s case (supra), Sri. Rajesh 28 Nayak’s case (supra) and Sri. Sangappa’s case (supra) have entertained revision under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. against an order passed on an application filed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., but it has to be noticed that, in none of those petitions, the question regarding maintainability of the revision petition was raised, as such, those orders did not discuss the question of maintainability of the revision against an order passed on the application filed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 14. On the other hand, as observed above, various High Courts in Thakur V. Hariprasad’s case (supra), Bhola’s case (supra), Neelu @ Pankaj K.P. (supra) have held that, revision is not maintainable. Similarly, High Court of Gujarat at Allahabad in the case of Narendra K.Amin Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Guj 8611, also held that, against an order passed on an application filed under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., no revision under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. would lie. Therefore, it is clear that, since the petitioner has got a specific remedy to redress his grievance for challenging the order passed by the Special Judge on his application under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. under a different provision of law and the said impugned order being an interlocutory order, the bar under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. applies, as such, the revision is not maintainable. Re-Points No.[ii] & [iii]: 15. Re-Points No.[ii] & [iii]: 15. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in his argument submitted that, under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, the Central Government, may, by Notification published in the Official Gazette, invest any Officer of the Department of Narcotic Control Bureau (NCB) with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a Police Station for the investigation of the offences under this Act. As such, the complainant who has filed the complaint in this case is a Police Officer in-charge of the Police Station. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that, since the complainant is an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station for the purpose of the investigation under this Section, he has to file a Police report after completion of investigation, but not a complaint. Since he has filed a complaint, the same is bad in the eye of law. He submitted that, since the complainant has filed a complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., which is not a Police report, the Special Court ought not to have taken/accepted the said complaint but should have returned the same. Therefore, in the absence of any Police report being filed by the respondent within the statutory time of 180 days, the detention of accused No.3 has become illegal detention and therefore, he is entitled for a default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also drew the attention of the Court to Section 2(d) and 2(r) of the Cr.P.C. which defines ‘complaint’ and a ‘Police Report’ respectively. Learned Senior Counsel, in his support, mainly relied upon a case of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 882. Stating that the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court applies to all pending cases under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Maj. Genl.A.S. Gauraya and another Vs. S.N. Thakur and another reported in (1986) 2 Supreme Court Cases 709. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also raised several other points in his argument though not as substantial points. Genl.A.S. Gauraya and another Vs. S.N. Thakur and another reported in (1986) 2 Supreme Court Cases 709. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also raised several other points in his argument though not as substantial points. He submitted that though the lock-down period was going on at the time when the respondent was conducting the investigation in the matter, the lock-down cannot be a reason for non-filing of the charge sheet. He further submitted that, the charge sheet was required to be filed in a proper manner by the proper person and any variation in that regard would not make that report a proper report or a charge sheet, as such also, the accused was entitled for his bail and the entire criminal proceedings initiated against him deserves to be quashed. 16. However, the main thrust of argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner was on the aspect that, the respondent should have filed a report preferably a Police report but not a complaint in the matter. As such, the very initiation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner herein who is accused No.3 in the Special Court is bad in the eye of law, as such, the same deserves to be quashed. In his support, he relied upon several of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court which would be referred to at the relevant places herein afterwards. 17. Learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent – NCB, in his argument submitted that, the complaint filed in the matter is not filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., but it is filed under Section 36A of the NDPS Act. He further submitted that, NDPS Act is a self-sufficient Act and it need not rely upon the Code of Criminal Procedure in its entirety. The learned Standing counsel drawing the attention of the Court to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. submitted that, NDPS is a special law which has come into force subsequent to the Code of Criminal Procedure. As such, the application of Code of Criminal Procedure is very limited for any offence to be tried for the offences punishable under the NDPS Act. Learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel further submitted that, Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act is very clear and specific that, it allows filing of both the Police report as well a complaint. As such, the application of Code of Criminal Procedure is very limited for any offence to be tried for the offences punishable under the NDPS Act. Learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel further submitted that, Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act is very clear and specific that, it allows filing of both the Police report as well a complaint. It does not mandate that it is only a Police report that is required to be filed. A reading of the said Section would go to show that, the respondent Officer can file a Police report or a complaint depending upon the nature of the case and the circumstances. 18. Learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel while referring to Tofan Singh’s case (supra) submitted that, Tofan Singh’s case (supra) was with respect to a totally different question but it was not on the point whether an Officer under the NDPS Act is required to file necessarily a report but not a complaint, on the other hand, it was about the evidentiary value of the statement recorded under Section 25 of the Evidence Act by an Officer under the NDPS Act. As such, Tofan Singh’s case (supra) would not enure to the benefit of the petitioner. He further submitted that, still, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tofan Singh’s case (supra) no where has stated that, it is only the Police report that is required to be filed but not a complaint. He submitted that Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act is not displaced by Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, for an offence punishable under NDPS Act, Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. is not applicable, it is only Section 36A(1)(d) that is applicable. Learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent further submitted that, both the majority and minority view in Tofan Singh’s case (supra) have unanimously held that, the Officer under an NDPS Act can file either a report i.e. a Police report or a complaint. Therefore, filing of complaint was in accordance with law, as such, the order of taking cognizance is also in accordance with law. Therefore, filing of complaint was in accordance with law, as such, the order of taking cognizance is also in accordance with law. Since admittedly, the said complaint which is in pari materia with the Police report has been filed within the statutory period of 180 days, the petitioner is not entitled for default bail and also since the Special Court, after considering the materials placed before it, has taken congnizance of the offence in accordance with law, the revision petition, seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceedings also fails. To support his contention that the NDPS Act is a special enactment, and it over-rides the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherever the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code are contrary to the provisions NDPS Act, the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for respondent relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Rasheed and others Vs. State of Karnataka Through Santhpur Police reported in ILR 2007 KAR 1168. 19. It is not in dispute that, under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, the Central Government, after consultation with the State Government, may by Notification published in the Official Gazette, invest any Officer of the Department of Narcotics with the powers of an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station for the investigation of the offences punishable under the NDPS Act. 20. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the respondent herein who is the Intelligence Officer of the NCB ought to have filed a Police report but not a complaint. Section 2 (d) of the Cr.P.C. defines ‘complaint’ as below:- 2. Definitions – In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a).. (b).. (c).. (d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. The word ‘police report’ has been defined under Section 2(r) of the same Code in the following terms:- 2(r) “police report” means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 173. 21. In the light of the above definitions, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that, a ‘complaint’ is different from a ‘police report’, as such, in the instant case, the complaint cannot be considered as a Police report. 21. In the light of the above definitions, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that, a ‘complaint’ is different from a ‘police report’, as such, in the instant case, the complaint cannot be considered as a Police report. In his support, he relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Madhu Bala Vs. Suresh Kumar and others reported in (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases 476 wherein at para-8 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that, a complaint filed before a Magistrate cannot be a “police report” in view of the definition of “complaint” referred to earlier and since the investigation of a “cognizable case” by the Police under Section 156(1) of the Cr.P.C. has to culminate in a “police report” the “complaint” -as soon as an order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is passed thereon transforms itself to a report given in writing within the meaning of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. which is known as the First Information Report (FIR). As under Section 156(1) the Police can only investigate a cognizable case and it has to formally register a case on that report. At the outset itself, it has to be noticed that the present complaint in question is not the one filed under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. but it is filed under Section 36A of the NDPS Act read with Notification No.S.O.763(E) dated 27-09-1989 passed by the Ministry of Finance. The said Notification shows that by exercising the powers conferred under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, the Central Government has authorised several of the Officers mentioned therein including the Officer above the rank of the Inspector in the Department of Narcotics for filing of complaints relating to an offence under the NDPS Act before the Special Courts. By virtue of amendment to the said Notification vide its Notification No.S.O.585(E) dated 25-02-2016, the Ministry of Finance has substituted the Officers who were authorised with their different designation which substitution also includes Narcotics Control Bureau. Thus, it is not in dispute that the present respondent who is the complainant in the Special Court is an Officer under the NDPS Act. 22. Thus, it is not in dispute that the present respondent who is the complainant in the Special Court is an Officer under the NDPS Act. 22. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in his argument stating that as per Tofan Singh’s case (supra) the respondent ought to have filed a report, as such, he was required to do a certain act in the manner prescribed for it, but instead of filing the report since he has filed a complaint, the said act cannot be called as being an act in the manner prescribed for it, relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh and others reported in (1964) 4 SCR 485 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 7 and 8 was pleased to observe as below: “7. In Nazir Ahmed case LR 63 IA 372, the Judicial committee observed that the principle applied in Taylor V.Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426, 431 to a court, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, applied to judicial officers making a record under Section 164 and, therefore, held that the Magistrate could not give oral evidence of the confession made to him which he had purported to record under Section 164 of the code. It was aid that otherwise all the precautions and safeguards laid down in Sections 164 and 364, both of which had to be read together, would become of such trifling value as to be almost idle and that “it would be an unnatural construction to hold that any other procedure was permitted than that which is laid down with such minute particularity in the sections themselves”. 8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted.......” The said principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if any method has been laid down in doing an act, the said act has to be done in the method laid down, would apply, however, the petitioner is required to establish that the complainant ought not to have filed a complaint but ought to have filed a report, as such, he has not complied the method prescribed for the same. At the same time, it also cannot be ignored that, under Section 4 of the Cr.P.C., it is the offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which shall be investigated, inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The same Section further says that all offences under any other law shall be investigated and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions but subject to many enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiring into praying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Under Section 5 of the Cr.P.C., it is stated that nothing contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary affect any special or local law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction or power confirmed or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. Thus if a special statute prescribes any manner or method as to how the investigation has to be conducted and the procedure to be followed then, due regard is to be given to the provisions under the special law. In this regard, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel relied upon a judgment of a Co-ordinate bench of this Court in Rasheed and others Vs. State of Karnataka Through Santhpur Police (supra), wherein his Lordship Hon’ble Mr. In this regard, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel relied upon a judgment of a Co-ordinate bench of this Court in Rasheed and others Vs. State of Karnataka Through Santhpur Police (supra), wherein his Lordship Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohan Shantanagowdar, then the Judge of this Court was pleased to observe in para-4 of his judgment as below:- “4........The NDPS Act is enacted for the purpose of declaring law relating to narcotic drugs to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of the property derived from or used in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of international conventions of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and for the matters connected therewith. This is a special enactment covering the aforesaid subject and thus the provisions contained in NDPS act shall naturally override the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code wherever the provisions of Criminal Procedure code are contrary to the provisions of the NDPS Act..........” Therefore it is clear that where NDPS Act being a special Act which has come into force subsequent to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it has to be seen whether specific provision is there for filing the complaint under the Act. 23. In the instant case, as already observed, it has to be noticed that the complaint is filed not under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., but under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, which read as below. “36A. Offences triable by Special Courts.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), - (a).... (b).... (c).... (d) a Special Court may, upon perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act or upon complaint made by an Officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in his behalf, take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.” Therefore, by a cursory reading of the said Section, it goes to show that the said Section provides for filing of both a ‘police report’ as well a ‘complaint’. However, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, it is the police report alone which ought to have been filed by the present respondent in the Special Court, but not a complaint, though the same is filed under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act. In his support, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tofan Singh’s case (supra). 24. In Tofan Singh’s case and connected matters (supra), the appeals and the Special Leave Petitions had arisen by virtue of a reference order of a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported as Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2013) 16 SCC 31 . ‘Tofan Singh’, who was the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.152/2013 had challenged his conviction mainly on the ground that his conviction was based solely on the purported confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, which has no evidentiary value, since the statement was given to and recorded by an Officer who was to be treated as a “Police Officer” and is thus hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. He also raised a question that, no such confessional statement could be recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. The questions before their Lordships were:- [i] Whether an Officer “empowered under Section 42 of the NDPS Act” and/or “the Officer empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act” are “Police Officers” and therefore, statements recorded by such Officers would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act; and [ii] What is the extent, nature, purpose and scope of the power conferred under Section 67 of the NDPS Act available to and exercisable by an Officer under Section 42 thereof, and whether power under Section 67 is a power to record confession capable of being used as a substantive evidence to convict an accused? Earlier, the very same Hon’ble Apex Court in a Division Bench judgment in the case of Raj Kumar Karwal Vs. Union of India and others reported in (1990) 2 Supreme Court Cases 409 on a similar question, was pleased to hold that, Officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence who have been invested with the powers of an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are not “Police Officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, a confessional statement recorded by such Officer in the course of investigation of a person accused of an offence under the NDPS Act was admissible in evidence as against him. It was also observed that an Officer appointed under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, other than a Police Officer was not entitled to exercise “all” the powers under Chapter XII of the Code including the power to submit a charge sheet under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. However, in Tofan Singh’s case (supra), the very same question which was heard and decided by the bench of Hon’ble three judges by their majority judgment, answered the first question holding that the Officers who were invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are “Police Officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which, any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act. 25. The second question was answered holding that, a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. With the said answer, the Hon’ble Apex Court over-ruled its previous judgments in the case of Kanhaiyalal Vs. Union of India reported in (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 668 and also Raj Kumar Karwal’s case (supra) holding that, they do not state the law correctly, however, the minority judgment held that Raj Kumar Karwal’s case (supra) does not require reconsideration so also the judgment in Kanhaiyalal’s case (supra). In paragraph 134 of its judgment in Tofan Singh’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court differentiated from the judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal’s case (supra) by giving reasons. However, at paragraph 38 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to hold that, read with Sections 4(2) and 5 of the Cr.P.C., the scheme of the NDPS Act seems to be that the Cr.P.C. is generally followed, except where expressly excluded, or applied with modifications. Paragraphs 140 and 141 of the judgment in Tofan Singh’s case (supra) are very important and very much relevant for the present case. The observations made in these two paragraphs are re-produced here below:- “140. Paragraphs 140 and 141 of the judgment in Tofan Singh’s case (supra) are very important and very much relevant for the present case. The observations made in these two paragraphs are re-produced here below:- “140. What is clear, therefore, is that the designated officer under section 53, invested with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station, is to forward a police report stating the particulars that are mentioned in section 173(2) CrPC. Because of the special provision contained in section 36A(1) of the NDPS Act, this police report is not forwarded to a Magistrate, but only to a Special Court under section 36A(1)(d). Raj Kumar Karwal (supra), when it states that the designated officer cannot submit a police report under section 36A(1)(d), but would have to submit a “complaint” under section 190 of the CrPC misses the importance of the non obstante clause contained in section 36A(1), which makes it clear that the drill of section 36A is to be followed notwithstanding anything contained in section 2(d) of the CrPC. It is obvious that section 36A(1)(d) is inconsistent with Section 2(d) and section 190 of the CrPC and therefore, any complaint that has to be made can only be made under section 36A(1)(d) to a Special Court, and not to a Magistrate under Section 190. Shri Lekhi’s argument, that the procedure under section 190 has been replaced only in part, the police report and complaint procedure under section 190 not being displaced by section 36A(1)(d), cannot be accepted. Section 36A(1)(d) specifies a scheme which is completely different from that contained in the CrPC. Whereas under section 190 of the CrPC it is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence, under section 36A(1)(d) it is only a Special Court that takes cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Secondly, the “complaint” referred to in section 36A(1)(d) is not a private complaint that is referred to in section 190(1)(a) of the CrPC, but can only be by an authorised officer. Thirdly. section 190(1)(c) of the CrPC is conspicuous by its absence in section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act – the Special Court cannot, upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon its own knowledge, take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Thirdly. section 190(1)(c) of the CrPC is conspicuous by its absence in section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act – the Special Court cannot, upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon its own knowledge, take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Further, a Special Court under section 36A is deemed to be a Court of Session, for the applicability of the CrPC, under section 36C of the NDPS Act. A Court of Session under Section 193 of the CrPC cannot take cognizance as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate. However, under section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, a Special Court may take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act without the accused being committed to it for trial. It is obvious, therefore, that in view of section 36A(1)(d), nothing contained in section 190 of the CrPC can be said to apply to a Special Court taking cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. 141. Also, the officer designated under Section 53 by the Central Government or State Government to investigate offences under the NDPS Act, need not be the same as the officer authorised by the Central Government or State Government under the Section 36A(1)(d) to make a complaint before the Special Court. As a matter of fact, if the Central Government is to invest to an officer with the power of an officer in charge of a police station under sub-section(1) of section 53, it can only do so after consultation with the State Government, which requirement is conspicuous by its absence when the Central Government authorises an officer under Section 36A(1)(d). Also, both section 53(1) and (2) refer to officers who belong to particular departments of Government. Section 36A(1)(d) does not restrict the officer that can be appointed for the purpose of making a complaint to only an officer belonging to a department of the Central/State Government. There can also be a situation where officers have been designated under section 53 by the Government, but not so designated under section 36A(1)(d). Section 36A(1)(d) does not restrict the officer that can be appointed for the purpose of making a complaint to only an officer belonging to a department of the Central/State Government. There can also be a situation where officers have been designated under section 53 by the Government, but not so designated under section 36A(1)(d). It cannot be that in the absence of the designation of the officer under section 36A(1)(d), the culmination of an investigation by a designated officer under section 53 ends up by being an exercise in futility.” In para-140 of its judgment, which is extracted above, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that Section 36-A(1)(d) is inconsistent with Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore any complaint that has to be made can only be made under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act to a Special Court and not to a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. The Hon’ble Apex Court has not stated that the designated Officer cannot file a complaint, but what is stated is, he can file a “Police report” but if he files a complaint, then, it is not before the Magistrate, but the same would be before the Special Court. At the same time, the Hon’ble Apex Court did not discus in the said paragraph as to, when a designated Officer is required to file a ‘Police report’ and when he is required to file a ‘complaint’, since the same was not the point for reference before it. It has to be noticed that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the same paragraph i.e. para-140 has also observed that under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, a Special Court may take cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act without the accused being commited to it for trial. Therefore, in view of Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, nothing contained in Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. can be said to apply to a Special Court taking cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. Therefore, in view of Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act, nothing contained in Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. can be said to apply to a Special Court taking cognizance of an offence under the NDPS Act. It cannot be forgotten that, in the case on hand, the so-called complaint has been filed under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act but not under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. The observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para141 of the above judgment in Tofan Singh’s case (supra), is also equally important for the reason that, the Officer designated under Section 53 of the NDPS Act by the Central Government or the State Government to investigate the offences under the NDPS Act need not be the same as the Officer authorised by the Central Government or State Government under Section 36A(1)(d) to make a complaint before the Special Court. 26. In the instant case, the complainant Officer who is the Intelligence Officer has been authorised by the Central Government under Notification No.S.O.763(E) dated 27-09-1989 and as amended by the Notification No.S.O.585(E) dated 25-02-2016 to file a complaint under Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act. As such also, he has been authorised to file a complaint, which he has done by filing the complaint which is the subject matter of this case. The minority judgment in Tofan Singh’s case (supra), in para.284 has observed as below: “284. Section 36A(1)(d) enables the police to file a report, before the Special Court, of facts constituting an offence under the NDPS Act, which, as per the definition of police report in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., means a report forwarded under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C.. Such a police report is deemed to be a complaint. Such police report can be filed after an investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. There is no provision in the NDPS Act, which makes it incumbent upon the concerned officers who make any inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act, to prepare or file any report.” 27. From the above, it clear that, as held by the minority judgment that, the provisions under the NDPS Act which makes it incumbent upon the concerned Officers who make an enquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act, to prepare or file any report. From the above, it clear that, as held by the minority judgment that, the provisions under the NDPS Act which makes it incumbent upon the concerned Officers who make an enquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act, to prepare or file any report. As already observed above, the majority judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tofan Singh’s case (supra), does not specifically say that the complaint cannot be filed by the concerned Officer. Further as observed above, the question referred to the Hon’ble Apex Court was not as to whether the concerned Officer under the NDPS Act invariably should file a Police report but not a complaint, on the other hand, the question was, as observed above, whether an Officer empowered under Section 42 of the NDPS Act and/or the Officer empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are “Police Officers” and therefore, the statements recorded by such Officers would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Thus, when majority view has not categorically and specifically stated that invariably the concerned Officer should file a ‘police report’ only, and that he cannot file a complaint, on the other hand, the minority judgment has held that, there is no provision in the NDPS Act, which makes it incumbent upon the concerned Officer who make any enquiry/investigation under the NDPS ct, to prepare or file any report, it is clear that though the majority as well as the minority view has any difference on the point that the concerned Officer can file either a ‘Police report’ or a ‘complaint’. Therefore, the main argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that, the Intelligence Officer of the respondent ought to have filed a ‘police report’ but not a ‘complaint’ in the matter, as such, it has to be taken that within the prescribed period of 180 days, no report has been filed entitling the petitioner for a default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. and also the taking of cognizance on such complaint would not hold good in the eye of law, is not acceptable. 28. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also raised few more points in support of his arguments, which could have sustained, had his argument on the point of the incumbency upon the respondent to file a police report been accepted. 28. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also raised few more points in support of his arguments, which could have sustained, had his argument on the point of the incumbency upon the respondent to file a police report been accepted. One such point canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner was that, a defective charge sheet or a report is not a charge sheet at all, as such also, the accused was entitled for his enlargement on bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. In his support, he relied upon two judgments, first of which was in the case of Gurpal Singh and another Vs. State of Punjab reported in 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 9587 wherein though a charge sheet was filed, but the same was without a test (chemical examination) report, it was held that it is not a legally valid report. The accused was entitled for the bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 29. The second judgment is in the case of Achpal Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2019) 14 Supreme Court Cases 599 wherein noticing that though the charge sheet was filed within the time, but the Magistrate had returned the same for technical fault, the Hon’ble Apex Court held, in such a case, the appellants are entitled for default bail, though they could be rearrested any time for cogent reasons. Since it has been observed above that the respondent was not mandated to file a police report and the complaint filed by him cannot be called as illegal or unsustainable, the above two judgments with respect to the default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would not enure to his benefit. 30. From the petitioner’s side, a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Maj.Genl.A.S. Gauraya and another Vs. S.N. Thakur and another (supra) was also relied upon wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to Article 141 of the Constitution of India was pleased to hold that, Article 141 mandates every Court subordinate to the Supreme Court to accept the law laid down by it. There is nothing like any prospective operation alone of the law laid down by the Supreme Court; but such law applies to all pending proceedings as well. There is nothing like any prospective operation alone of the law laid down by the Supreme Court; but such law applies to all pending proceedings as well. The said settled principle since is not disputed in these revision petitions by the respondent, the said judgment also does not give any additional advantage to the petitioner. 31. The petitioner also relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S. Kasi Vs. State through the Inspector of Police, Samaynallur Police Station, Madurai District reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 529 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court at para-26 of its judgment was pleased to hold that, restrictions which had been imposed by the Government during the lock-down would not operate as any restriction on the rights of an accused as protected by Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. regarding his indefeasible right to get a default bail on non-submission of the charge sheet within the time prescribed. Since in the instant case, the question of non-filing of charge sheet within the period has not arisen as the same is analysed above and the complaint which is in pari materia of a police report is filed within 180 days, the judgment in S. Kasi’s case (supra) also would not enure to the benefit of the petitioner. 32. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon an unreported order of a co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Shivaraj Urs Vs. Union of India in Criminal Petition No.6322/2020 dated 17-12-2020 and submitted that Tofan Singh’s case (supra) and Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. were considered and applied by this Court in the said matter. The said judgment also would not give any additional advantage to the petitioner nor improve his case any further for the reason that, the applicability of the judgment in Tofan Singh’s case (supra) to NDPS Act is not at all in dispute in the matter and so also the entitlement of a person for default bail on an application filed under Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. provided, the ingredients of Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. are made out. However, in the instant case, since it has been observed above that the Police have filed a complaint within the statutory period of 180 days and which complaint is in pari materia to that of a report, the order passed in Shivraj Urs’s Case (supra) relied upon by the petitioner also would not give any additional advantage to the petitioner. 33. The above analysis would go to show that even though the petition in Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021 was not maintainable, however, assuming that the revision petition is maintainable, still, no merit can be found in the case. Similarly the other petition, i.e. Criminal Revision Petition No.325/2021 also is proved to be devoid of any merit. The Special Court has also taken cognizance of the offence alleged against the accused which order cannot be found fault with. As such I proceed to pass the following: ORDER ; The Criminal Revision Petition No.324/2021 is dismissed as not maintainable as well as devoid of merit and Criminal Revision Petition No.325/2021 is dismissed as devoid of any merit. In view of disposal of main petitions, I.A.No.1/2021 for interim bail in Crl.R.P.No.324/2021 and I.A.No.1/2021 for stay in Crl.R.P.No.325/2021, since having become infructuous, stand disposed of. Registry to transmit a copy of this order to the Court of the learned XXXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (NDPS), Bengaluru, CCH-33, immediately.