JUDGMENT : S.N. PATHAK, J.:— Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner-Management has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the Award dated 22.02.2016, passed by learned Labour Court, Bokaro in Ref. Case No. 14 of 2008, whereby, it has been held that the workman is entitled for full back wages along with all consequential benefits w.e.f. 01.07.2003 to his actual date of superannuation i.e. 30.11.2006. 3. The facts of the case lies in a narrow compass. The workman-Sri. Dipti Ansari joined the services of petitioner-Management on 18.06.1981. Subsequently, he was dismissed from the services on 19.06.1986 on the ground of unauthorized absence from the work place. However, he was again appointed to the post of Casual Khalasi on 18.11.1991 with new Staff No. 687105. At the time of joining services on 18.11.1991, the workman submitted attestation form and P.D. form, wherein he disclosed his age as 45 years and date of birth as 04.06.1943. However, it was the case of the workman before the learned Labourt Court that as he failed to submit any certificate with regard to his date of birth, he was sent before the Medical Board for the purpose of assessment of his age and on the basis of assessment of his age by the Medical Board, he was supposed to superannuate from service on 30.11.2006 but petitioner-Management has prematurely retired him on 30.06.2003, changing his date of birth from 10.06.1951 to 04.06.1943. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner through his sponsoring Union raised an industrial dispute before the concerned Department of State Govt., which was referred to the Labour Court, Bokaro vide notification dated 03.07.2008 for adjudication by framing the following issue: “Whether pre-mature retirement of Sri. Dipti Ansari, T.O.F.C.R.M. (Mech.), Staff No. 687105, Bokaro Steel Plant by changing his age by the management is justified? If not, then what relief workman is entitled to?” 4. After receipt of the reference, the learned Labour Court issued notices to both the parties. Upon receipt of the notice, both parties appeared and filed their respective written statements and also adduced evidences in support of their cases. Thereafter, after hearing the parties and perusing the documents and evidences brought on record, the learned Labour Court answered the reference in favour of the workman and against the management. Upon receipt of the notice, both parties appeared and filed their respective written statements and also adduced evidences in support of their cases. Thereafter, after hearing the parties and perusing the documents and evidences brought on record, the learned Labour Court answered the reference in favour of the workman and against the management. The relevant portion of Award dated 22.08.2016 reads as under: “In the light of the discussion made above, it is established by preponderance of probabilities that the workman-Dipti Ansari was prematurely retired on 30.06.2003. Admittedly, he joined the service again on 18.11.1991. After considering the medical report, his date of retirement should have been determined on 30.11.2006. …………. …………… therefore, the workman is entitled for full back wages along with all consequential benefits w.e.f. 01.07.2003 to his actual date of superannuation i.e. 30.11.2006. The management is directed to implement the award within three months from the date of pronouncement of this Award. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner-management has knocked the door of this Court. 6. Mr. Bibhash Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-management vociferously argues that Award dated 22.08.2016 passed by learned Labour Court, Bokaro in Ref. Case No. 14 of 2008 is bad in law and perverse, hence, liable to be set aside by this Court. Learned Labour Court has misinterpreted the provisions contained in Rule-8(B) of the Standing Orders of the Management of BSL and thus, came to a wrong conclusion. Learned counsel further argues that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that as per the admitted case of the workman since he has disclosed his date of birth as 04.06.1943, while he was earlier in the service of the Management, therefore, on second occasion i.e. on 18.11.1991, when he joined service of petitioner-management there is no ground for application of Clause-8(b) of the Standing Orders. Learned Labour Court has misdirected itself while answering the question of competence of Management in bypassing the provisions of Standing Order as the learned Court below has failed to appreciate that allowing the terms of reference will amount to granting benefits to the workman for commission of its own fraud. Further, the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court is beyond the terms of reference, hence, the same will not stand in the eyes of law. Further, the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court is beyond the terms of reference, hence, the same will not stand in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that learned labour Court has committed gross illegality while allowing the full back wages in favour of the workman as it has failed to appreciate that there is neither any pleading nor any evidence adduced on behalf of the workman to the effect that he was not gainfully employed during the period between 2003 to 2006. Learned counsel further argues that the workman has raised industrial disputes for correction of his date of birth after his superannuation, and as per ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, no correction in the date of birth of an employee can be made at the fag end of service career. 7. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance on the following judgments: (I) Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh [ (2020) 3 SCC 411 ]; (II) Ajit Singh v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Jamshedpur, [W.P. (L) No. 1251 of 2010, dt. 05.10.2020, passed by this Court]. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the workman submits that though the workman declared his date of birth as 10.06.1951 but as the same was not accepted by the management, he was medically examined by the medical board, whose findings also tallies with his actual date of birth. Learned counsel further argues that the workman served the company till 30.06.2003 and thereafter, prematurely retired on the pretext of having attained the age of 60 years. Learned counsel further argues that workman never declared his date of birth or age as 04.06.1943 in any forms viz. PD Form/Attestation Form/LTC/LLTC and he was wrongfully and pre-maturely retired from services before the date of actual superannuation and hence, the workman is entitled for all back wages and other consequential benefits and there is no illegality or any infirmity in the Award passed by the learned Labour Court. PD Form/Attestation Form/LTC/LLTC and he was wrongfully and pre-maturely retired from services before the date of actual superannuation and hence, the workman is entitled for all back wages and other consequential benefits and there is no illegality or any infirmity in the Award passed by the learned Labour Court. Learned counsel draws the attention of the Court towards Issue No. 1 and submits that as per the findings of the learned Labour Court, which is reflected from the Award itself, the management was required to record the age as declared by the workman if the same is supported by the date of birth certificate but in absence of any such document, he should have been sent to the Medical Board for the purpose of assessment of his age and then as per the opinion of the medical Board, the age of workman ought to have been recorded in the service papers including P.D. Form and Attestation Form. As the workman was sent for assessment of his age by the Medical Officer, keeping the provisions of Rule 8(b)(ii) of the Standing Order, the age so assessed or opined by the Medical Officer ought to have been recorded in the service book and the workman should have been retired from the service on attaining the age of 60 years. Learned counsel further argues that no cogent reason has been assigned or any plausible explanation has been given as to why the age assessed by the Medical Officer was not considered or mentioned in the personal records of workman and why the provisions of Standing Orders were overlooked and bye-passed by the management. In absence of any valid document showing the date of birth as 04.03.1943, action of the management was not praiseworthy, rather, same was an attempt to frustrate the legal demand of the workman. Learned counsel further argues that for the aforesaid reasons, the case of the management is not tenable and the respondent-workman is entitled for entire benefits, as per the Award and no interference is warranted in the findings of facts derived by the learned Labour Court. 9. To strengthen his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent places heavy reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 . 10. 9. To strengthen his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent places heavy reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 . 10. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that the Award dated 22.08.2016, is fit to be quashed and set aside for the following facts and reasons: (I) The workman remained in services till 2003 and retired on 30.06.2003 and thereafter, for the 1st time demand for correction in the date of birth was made on 02.07.2003 that was admittedly after retirement of the workman. Even the dispute was referred for adjudication before learned Labour Court on 03.07.2008 i.e. 5 years after retirement and as such, it can comfortably be said that reference itself was belated and claim was stale one. As per the settled law, no correction can be made at the fag end of service career and the reference at the belated stage is bad in the eyes of law on the ground of delay as well as non-existence of an industrial dispute. (II) From perusal of the records it appears that the workman was earlier appointed on 18.06.1981 and terminated from service on 19.06.1986. The date of birth declared by the workman at the time of his earlier appointment was 04.06.1943 and further, in his fresh appointment, in the PD Form and Attestation Form, he mentioned his age 45 years and as such, his date of birth would be 04.06.1943. The contention of workman regarding date of birth disclosed as 10.06.1951 is not acceptable to this Court in absence of any documentary evidence. (III) The date of birth mentioned by the management was duly signed by the workman and accepted all along his service career, the same cannot be disputed at the fag end of service career and that also, after retirement. (III) The date of birth mentioned by the management was duly signed by the workman and accepted all along his service career, the same cannot be disputed at the fag end of service career and that also, after retirement. Before commenting on the findings of learned Labour Court regarding action of the management in bye-passing the relevant provisions of Standing Order, we have to look into the provisions enshrined in Rule-8 of the Standing Orders of the Management, which is quoted herein below: 8(a) Appointment : - Appointment of workman shall be made in the company solely at its discretion as and when such appointments are considered necessary by the Company. (b) Record of Age:— (i) The Personnel Department of the Company will record the age of every employee at the time of his employment and the entry of the age shall be attested by the employee. Employees should, for this purpose, produce any of the following document in proof of their age:— (a) Birth Certificate, (b) School Leaving Certificate, (c) Insurance Policy, (d) Horoscope provided by the management in its discretion consider it sufficient to establish its genuineness and the age of candidate. (ii) A workman who is unable to produce documentary evidence of his age shall state his age and make a declaration that the age as stated by him is correct. He shall be sent to the company's medical officer for examination whose opinion as the workman's age shall be final and binding on the workman. (iii) The age of a workman as recorded with the company at the time of his employment shall not, thereafter, be questioned by him.” The Award was in favour of the workman for the reasons that as per Rule-8(b)(ii), the opinion of the Medical Officer regarding workman's age shall be final and binding on the workman and as such, the same cannot be questioned. The said opinion of the learned Labour Court is perverse on the ground that learned Labour Court failed to consider Rule-8(b)(iii), wherein it is stipulated that the age of workman as recorded with the Company at the time of his employment shall not thereafter be questioned by him. The said opinion of the learned Labour Court is perverse on the ground that learned Labour Court failed to consider Rule-8(b)(iii), wherein it is stipulated that the age of workman as recorded with the Company at the time of his employment shall not thereafter be questioned by him. Admittedly, the age of the workman was mentioned twice as 04.06.1943 (45 years), i.e. in his 1st appointment in the year 1981 and also in the second appointment in the year 1991, which was duly signed and accepted by the workman, the workman is precluded to raise a dispute after accepting the same, at the fag end of his service career and that also after retirement. (IV) Reliance of workman on the medical certificate is of no help to him, as the same was a fitness certificate and not the assessment of age and it cannot be said that the age mentioned in the medical fitness certificate is the real age of workman. (V) The onus lies on the workman to prove his age. Further, petitioner was fully aware of the date of birth entered in the service record and he accepted the said date of birth all along her service career and it was only in the year 2003 i.e. after 12 years from the date of his appointment, he made an application for correction in the date of birth based on the so-called medical certificate. The Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of decisions has held that request for change of date of birth in service records at the fag end of service career is not sustainable. 11. In case of State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan, reported (1994) 6 SCC 302 , the Hon'ble Apex Court was clearly of the opinion that the government servant should not be permitted to correct the date of birth at the fag end of his service career. The Court, in very strong terms, observed as under:— “…..The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department v. R. Kirubakaran, reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155, has held as under: “7. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department v. R. Kirubakaran, reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155, has held as under: “7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion forever. …According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book.” 13. This Hon'ble Court dealing with the similar issue in case of Manik Chand Ghosh v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., reported in 2004 (1) JCR 51 , has held that, date of birth once recorded and entered in the service record, counter-signed by the government servant, he should not be permitted to challenge at the fag end of his service. 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble, reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 has held that: “16. 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble, reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 has held that: “16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [ (2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 96]. In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievances as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career. 17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal [ (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades.” 15. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterating the same view, in case of State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 664 has held as under:— “8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights. 12. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the delay of over two decades in applying for the correction of date of birth is ex facie fatal to the case of the respondent, notwithstanding the fact that there was no specific rule or order, framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application could be filed. It is trite that even in such a situation such an application should be filed which can be held to be reasonable. The application filed by the respondent 25 years after his induction into service, by no standards, can be held to be reasonable, more so when not a feeble attempt was made to explain the said delay. There is also no substance in the plea of the respondent that since Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code does not prescribe the time-limit within which an application is to be filed, the appellants were duty-bound to correct the clerical error in recording of his date of birth in the service book.” 16. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 411 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that, “request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable.” 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , dealing with the issue relating to stale claim, has held that, reference of the said dispute at a belated stage is bad in eyes of law both on the grounds of delay as well as on non-existence of an industrial dispute. 18. 18. Time and again it has been held that if government servants sleep over their right and are not vigilant, the Court cannot come to their rescue/aid and grant relief only because they were ignorant of the Rules. 19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction of date of birth at the fag end would be at the cost of large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the Court. 20. From perusal of the records of the case it also appears that workman was in habit of mentioning different date of birth in different documents of the service records. Not a single chit of paper or any document was produced by the workman to show that his actual date of birth was 10.06.1951 and it was the management, who changed the date of birth to 1943. In absence of any document produced before the Court below, no Court can come to a conclusion and form its opinion that the date of birth relied upon the by the workman can be said to be a gospel truth. Even taking into consideration that reference itself was made after eight years of dispute, was itself a stale claim as the dispute was not in existence after retirement and also in view of the settled law that no dispute can be raised at the fag end of service career. The issue is no more res-integra as has been held in plethora of judgments of this Court and that of Hon'ble Apex Court. 21. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is also of no help to him. The Court is fully cautious of the fact that normally no interference is warranted unless the orders are perverse and the material evidences have not been considered. 22. Learned counsel for the management has succeeded in pointing-out the perversity committed by the learned Labour Court and as such, the Award in question is fit to be quashed and set aside. 23. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the Award dated 22.08.2016 passed in Ref. Case No. 14 of 2008 is hereby quashed and set aside. 23. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the Award dated 22.08.2016 passed in Ref. Case No. 14 of 2008 is hereby quashed and set aside. However, the petitioner-management is directed to pay retiral dues of the workman, in accordance with law, if not paid till date, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 24. Resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed.