JUDGMENT : BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner Savitriben Mayarambhai Thakkar under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 16.7.2014 passed by the Principal Civil Judge, Radhanpur (hereinafter referred to as the “Executing Court”) below Exh.14 in Execution Petition No. 4 of 2013, whereby the Executing Court has rejected the said Application filed by the petitioner for impleading her as the party opponent in the Execution Petition. 2. The present petition has a checkered history. The short facts as necessary to decide the present petition are that the respondent No. 1 Pandya Harshkantbhai Dahyabhai had filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 68 of 1980 against the respondent No. 2 i.e. Patel Vasantlal Prabhulal and the father of the respondent No. 3 i.e. Ambaram Thakkar for redemption of the mortgage in respect of the suit property. A preliminary decree came to be passed in the said suit on 9.9.1983, against which an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1983 was filed by the respondent No. 2 and the father of the respondent No. 3 (original defendants-judgment debtors). On 22.1.1993, the father of the respondent No. 3 i.e. Ambaram expired and the name of the respondent No. 3 was entered in the City Survey record. The present petitioner purchased the suit property from the respondent No. 3 Shantaben Ambarambhai by executing a registered Sale Deed on 14.12.1995. On 5.4.1997 the Civil Appeal No. 87/1983 came to be dismissed by the appellate Court. On 28.7.1997 the respondent No. 1 (original plaintiff-judgment creditor) filed a Civil Misc. Application being No. 7 of 1997 before the trial Court for drawing up of final decree, wherein the respondent No. 3 was also joined. According to the petitioner, at that time the respondent No. 3 came to know about the passing of the preliminary decree in the suit and the dismissal of the first appeal, and therefore, the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 preferred a Second Appeal being No. 123/1997 before High Court on 5.9.1997 with the permission of the Court. The said second appeal came to be withdrawn by the petitioner and the respondent No. 3, as per the order dated 14.7.2011 with liberty to approach the trial Court. Thereafter, in the proceedings of Misc. The said second appeal came to be withdrawn by the petitioner and the respondent No. 3, as per the order dated 14.7.2011 with liberty to approach the trial Court. Thereafter, in the proceedings of Misc. C.A. No. 7 of 1997, the respondent No. 3 brought it to the notice of the trial Court in her reply that she had already sold out the suit property to the present petitioner, and therefore, the petitioner be joined as the party opponent in the said application, however, the trial Court refused to join the petitioner as prayed by the respondent No. 3. The final decree thereafter was drawn by the trial Court in accordance with the preliminary decree. On 10.5.2013 the respondent No. 1 filed an Execution Petition being No. 4 of 2013 before the Executing Court and also filed an application for issuance of the possession warrant under Order XXI Rule 35. The petitioner, therefore, filed a separate Regular Civil Suit being No. 14 of 2014 for permanent injunction and declaration on 14.4.2014 and simultaneously also filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC before the Executing Court for impleading her as the party opponent in the Execution petition. The petitioner also filed objections in the Execution petition under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Rule 98 to 103, however, the said objections were not taken on record by the executing Court in view of the earlier order passed by the Court below Exh.14 rejecting the application of the petitioner under Order I Rule 10(2). 3. The said Application Exh.14 came to be rejected by the Executing Court vide the order dated 16.7.2014 which is under challenge before this Court by way of the present petition. Thereafter the petitioner also filed objections in the Execution petition under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Rules 98 to 103, which objections were not taken on record by the Executing Court in view of the impugned order passed below Exh.14. The petitioner thereafter withdrew the suit which was filed by her being Suit No. 14 of 2014 on 8.3.2017 i.e. pending the present petition. 4. The learned Advocate Ms. The petitioner thereafter withdrew the suit which was filed by her being Suit No. 14 of 2014 on 8.3.2017 i.e. pending the present petition. 4. The learned Advocate Ms. Niyati Shah for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner being the transferee pendente lite was a necessary party in the Execution proceedings filed by the respondent No. 1 and the Executing Court had committed an error in not impleading her as the party opponent, recording the incorrect facts that the application filed by the petitioner was earlier rejected, whereas there was no application filed by the petitioner, but the application filed by the respondent No. 3 Shantaben for impleading the petitioner as party-opponent was rejected. Reliance is placed by Ms. Shah on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd. and Others, AIR 2013 SC 2389 to submit that a transferee pendente lite has to be added as the party respondent, if her interest was found to be substantial in the suit property. 5. However, the learned advocate Mr. Sanghavi for the respondent No. 1, relying upon the provisions contained in order XXI Rule 102 of CPC in the light of the decision of SC in the case of Usha Sinha vs. Dina Ram and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 144 , submitted that the transferee from a judgment debtor is presumed to be aware of the proceedings before a court of law and the doctrine of lis pendens recognized by the section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would be applicable to the transferee pendente lite. He also submitted that the petitioner, after the withdrawal of the second appeal from the High Court, had filed a separate suit. The respondent No. 3 who had sold the suit property to the petitioner, had also filed an application in the execution proceedings for impleading the petitioner as party, however, the said application was not accepted by the Executing Court. In any case, runs the submissions of Mr. The respondent No. 3 who had sold the suit property to the petitioner, had also filed an application in the execution proceedings for impleading the petitioner as party, however, the said application was not accepted by the Executing Court. In any case, runs the submissions of Mr. Sanghavi, the case of the petitioner falls within the mischief of Rule 102 of Order XXI, which states that the Rule 98 and 100 shall not apply to the resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed. 6. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties and perusing the record, it appears that the petitioner had indisputedly purchased the property after the passing of the preliminary decree in the suit in favour of the respondent No. 1 and therefore, was a transferee pendente lite. Therefore, the short question that arises for determination before this court is whether the petitioner, who is a transferee pendente lite had a right to resist or obstruct the Execution of decree passed by a competent Court? As such the said issue is no more res integra in view of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Usha Sinha vs. Dina Ram and Others (supra) relied upon by the learned Advocate Mr. Sanghavi. The relevant observations made therein may be reproduced hereunder:- “21. Referring to statutory provisions and case law, the Court negatived the contention, stating: “13. If such contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is to be accepted, then we are closing our eyes regarding the intention of the statute. It is obvious while interpreting the provisions of the statute, the court must give due weight to the intention of the statute in order to give effect to the provisions. If any narrow interpretation is given and thereby the purpose of the statute is being defeated, the courts must be careful to avoid such interpretations. It is obvious while interpreting the provisions of the statute, the court must give due weight to the intention of the statute in order to give effect to the provisions. If any narrow interpretation is given and thereby the purpose of the statute is being defeated, the courts must be careful to avoid such interpretations. If we look at Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and Rule 102 of Order 21 C.P.C. it is very clear that the intention of the Parliament with which the statute had been enacted is that the rights of one of the parties to the proceeding pending before the court cannot be prejudiced or taken away or adversely affected by the action of the other party to the same proceeding. In the absence of such restriction one party to the proceeding, just to prejudice the other party, may dispose of the properties which is the subject matter of the litigation or put any third party in possession and keep away from the court. By such actions of the party to the litigation the other party will be put to more hardship and only to avoid such prejudicial acts by a party to the litigation these provisions are in existence. When in spite of such statutory restrictions, for the transfer of the properties, which are the subject matter of litigation by a party to the proceeding, the courts are duty bound to give effect to the provisions of the statute.” 22. The above observations, in our opinion, lay down correct proposition of law. 23. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent Court. The doctrine of lis pendens prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject matter of suit. Lis pendens itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rule 98 or 100 of Order XXI. 24. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rule 98 or 100 of Order XXI. 24. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust, (1998) 3 SCC 723 , this Court held that where the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite, the scope of adjudication is confined to a question whether he was a transferee during the pendency of a suit in which the decree was passed. Once the finding is in the affirmative, the Executing Court must hold that he had no right to resist or obstruct and such person cannot seek protection from the Executing Court. The Court stated: “10. It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions “arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99” shall be determined by the executing court, if such questions are “relevant to the adjudication of the application.” A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.” 7. In view of the afore-stated legal position, on the interpretation of Rule 102 of the Order XXI of CPC, there is no shadow of doubt that the petitioner being transferee pendente lite, she had no right to raise any obstruction or resistance in the execution of the decree passed in favour of the respondent No. 1. In view of the afore-stated legal position, on the interpretation of Rule 102 of the Order XXI of CPC, there is no shadow of doubt that the petitioner being transferee pendente lite, she had no right to raise any obstruction or resistance in the execution of the decree passed in favour of the respondent No. 1. As stated herein above, the petitioner had already filed separate suit for declaration and permanent injunction being No. 14 of 2014, after the passing of the final decree in favour of the respondent No. 1 and the said suit came to be withdrawn by her on 8.3.2017 pending the present petition. The second appeal filed by the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 in the High Court against the dismissal of appeal arising out of the preliminary decree passed in the suit, was withdrawn by them with liberty to approach the trial Court, however, the petitioner had not filed any application in the execution proceedings and the application filed by the respondent No. 3 for impleading the petitioner as the party opponent in the execution proceedings was also rejected by the Executing Court. Hence, the Executing Court considering all the earlier proceedings has passed the impugned order rejecting the application of the petitioner for impleading her as party opponent in the executing proceedings, which order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. 8. In that view of the matter, the petition being devoid of merit is dismissed.