JUDGMENT : Through a loan agreement executed inter se the deceased husband of the writ petitioner, on behalf of M/s Advid Drugs Private Limited, being its Director, and, the respondent corporation, certain financial assistances were purveyed to the borrower. The apposite loan agreement occurs at page 61 of the paper book. The afore loan agreement was executed by the deceased husband of the writ petitioner, one Anand Bhanwal, on behalf of M/s Advid Drugs Pvt. Ltd., with the respondent financial corporation. Since, defaults occurred in the liquidation(s) of borrowings made by the deceased husband of the writ petitioner. Consequently, the respondent financial corporation, through, its recoursing the mandate occurring in Section 32G of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter, issued a notice as becomes carried in Annexure P-9, hence upon, the surviving spouse of one Dr. Anand Bhanwal. In pursuance to Annexure P-9, the Collector Recovery, Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation issued Annexure P-10, upon, the writ petitioner, wherethrough, it made an order, upon, the writ petitioner to deposit principal borrowings carried in a sum of Rs. 1,45,43,345/- along with interest accrued thereon on or before 19.01.2016, in the office of H.P. Financial Corporation, Shimla. Provisions of Section 32G of the State Financial Corporations Act, read as under:- “32G. Recovery of amounts due to the Financial Corporation as an arrear of land revenue.—Where any amount is due to the Financial Corporation in respect of any accommodation granted by it to any industrial concern, the Financial Corporation or any person authorised by it in writing in this behalf, may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the amount due to it, and if the State Government or such authority, as that Government may specify in this behalf, is satisfied, after following such procedure as may be prescribed, that any amount is so due, it may issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, and the Collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.” 2. The petitioner becomes aggrieved from the issuance of the afore notices, respectively carried in Annexure P-9, and, in Annexure P10, and, hence, is led to institute the extant petition before this Court rather for seeking their annulment(s). The petitioner becomes aggrieved from the issuance of the afore notices, respectively carried in Annexure P-9, and, in Annexure P10, and, hence, is led to institute the extant petition before this Court rather for seeking their annulment(s). The loanee company, named, M/s Advid Drugs Pvt. Ltd., through its Director and authorised signatory one Mr. Anand Bhanwal, made borrowings from the H.P. Financial Corporation. The apposite loan document became executed in the year 1989. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues, that the surviving spouse of Dr. Anand Bhanwal, cannot become encumbered with the outstanding loan liability of her predeceased husband, nor can the respondent financial corporation issue the impugned annexures, upon, her. He erects the afore submission, on anvil of an agreement carried in Annexure P-2, hence executed inter se her predeceased husband, with one V.K. Rishi, and, wherethrough in paragraph No.8 thereof, para whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “8. That the FIRST PARTY shall stand absolved from all the liabilities of the company and the financial institutions and the banks as per the norms of the financial institutions AND the SECOND PARTY undertakes to replace the personal guarantees of the FIRST PARTY which have been given to the financial institutions and banks and from henceforth i.e. 10.04.1990, the SECOND PARTY indemnifies the FIRST party in respect of the said guarantees as per the norms of the financial institutions. The process for replacement of personal guarantees shall be started by the SECOND PARTY forthwith and shall be completed by the 15th June, 1990.” the afore V.K. Rishi undertook to absolve the predeceased husband of the writ petitioner from all the liabilities of the company (supra), as, arising from the financial institutions concerned, and, from the banks concerned. It is also disclosed in paragraph No.8 of Annexure P-2, that V.K. Rishi replaced the personal guarantees of Anand Bhanwal, as earlier given by the latter to the financial institutions, and, to banks, vis-a-vis, the respective borrowings, as, made therefroms by the afore. Furthermore, recitals are also carried therein, that one V.K. Rishi undertook to indemnify the first party in respect of all personal guarantees as became furnished to the financial institutions concerned. 3. The authenticity of Annexure P-2 remained not contested by the respondent corporation. Furthermore, recitals are also carried therein, that one V.K. Rishi undertook to indemnify the first party in respect of all personal guarantees as became furnished to the financial institutions concerned. 3. The authenticity of Annexure P-2 remained not contested by the respondent corporation. However, the respondent financial corporation attempted to rid off all the respective legal efficacies, if any, of Annexure P-2, on the ground, that it had not approved the mandate (supra) occurring in paragraph/clause No.8 of Annexure P-2. However, the afore made contention before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent corporation, carries no legal effect, as, a perusal of Annexure R-1(c) appended with the reply on affidavit furnished, to the writ petition, by the respondentcorporation, discloses that latter had rather approved the afore echoings occurring in paragraph/clause No.8, as becomes carried in Annexure P-2. Therefore this Court is constrained to conclude that the effect of the afore paragraph/clause No.8, occurring in Annexure P-2 did completely absolve the predeceased husband, of the writ petitioner from his borrowings as made from the financial institution concerned. As a corollary this Court also concludes that the personal guarantees, if any, as became furnished by Dr. Anand Bhanwal, the predeceased husband of the writ petitioner, would become unamenable for monetization, vis-a-vis, the apposite borrowings made by him, as a Director of the company, nomenclatured as M/s Advid Drugs Pvt. Ltd. Furthermore, the completest indemnity cover hence furnished by one Mr. V.K. Rishi, the executant of Annexure P-2, and, as occurs in paragraph No.8 thereof, does also did completely absolve the predeceased husband of the writ petitioner, from all the apposite liabilities, if any, vis-a-vis, all borrowings made from the financial corporation, and, also does completely absolve his surviving spouse, from hers hence indemnifying the financial institutions concerned, vis-a-vis, the apposite borrowings. 4. Be that as it may, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent corporation, has continued to make an argument with much vigour before this Court, that since the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh made an ex-parte decree, rather on 3.5.1999, vis-a-vis, the borrowings made by the entity or person concerned, rather from the H.P. Financial corporation. 4. Be that as it may, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent corporation, has continued to make an argument with much vigour before this Court, that since the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh made an ex-parte decree, rather on 3.5.1999, vis-a-vis, the borrowings made by the entity or person concerned, rather from the H.P. Financial corporation. Consequently, he argues that the writ petitioner, on hers stepping into the shoes of her predeceased husband, necessarily, given hers representing his estate, thereupon, becomes liable to ensure that the ex-parte decree as made by the learned Debut Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh, on 3.05.1999, being ensured to be actioned upon. However, there is no material existing on record rather suggestive as to the fate of the ex-parte decree nor also any material exists on record, hence suggestive whether it is recalled or set aside, on a motion being made by the writ petitioner or by other persons concerned. Also in the wake of the further factum, that the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, in making an ex-parte decree, in respect of the borrowings made by the person or entity concerned, hence, on 3.5.1999, hence evidently not becoming seized of Annexure P-2, Annexure whereof rather became accepted, through Annexure R-1(c) by the respondent corporation. Therefore, prima facie it appears, that there was active concealment of the afore factum, from the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh, by the respondent corporation, and, may be hence the afore ex-parte decree, as made by it on 3.5.1999 against the predeceased husband, of the writ petitioner, may hence render it to acquire the taint of it being void ab initio, besides obviously it being not enforceable against the predeceased husband of the writ petitioner, and, nor now against the writ petitioner. 5. Even otherwise, the impugned annexures are made through the respondent-corporation exercising the mandate carried in Section 32G of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Therefore, it appears that hence the respondent financial corporation has waived and abandoned its right, if any, as accrued to it, upon, the rendition, of, the afore order/ex-parte decree, as made by the learned Debut Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh hence on 3.5.1999. 6. Therefore, it appears that hence the respondent financial corporation has waived and abandoned its right, if any, as accrued to it, upon, the rendition, of, the afore order/ex-parte decree, as made by the learned Debut Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh hence on 3.5.1999. 6. However, this Court has to assess also the vigour of the further address made before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, that both the impugned Annexures are belatedly drawn since the occurrences of defaults, if any, on the part of the persons concerned, who made borrowings from the financial corporation, inclusive of the predeceased husband of the writ petitioner, who on behalf of M/s Advid Drugs Pvt. Ltd, made borrowings from the financial institution concerned. In gauging the impact of the afore submission, it has to be assessed from the foundational facts, as to when the apposite commencements occurred, or the right of the financial corporation to recover the loan from the predeceased husband of the petitioner, and, from others, hence spurred. In the afore context, it appears that the right of the financial corporation, to recover the borrowings made by all supra, commenced in proximity to the making of an ex-parte decree hence on 3.5.1999, by the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh. However, though, as aforestated, for reasons supra, the financial corporation is deemed to have waived and abandoned, its right of apposite recovery as accrued to it, from the date of rendition of afore ex-parte decree. Nonetheless, the drawings of Annexure P-9, and, Annexure P-10 in the year 2015, by the financial corporation, and, wherethrough it recoursed the mandate of Section 32G, of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, for reasons assigned hereinafter rather becomes the sheet anchor or the fulcrum, to rest the contest, whether Annexure P-9, and, Annexure P-10 become belatedly drawn from the year 1999, and, also thereafter this Court is to adjudicate, whether the strivings of the financial corporation to therethroughs recover the borrowings, as, made by the persons or by the entity concerned, hence is a valid endeavour or not. 7. 7. Though, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation, has submitted with much vigour, before this Court, that since the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 is a special statute, and, also when the recoursing, by it to the mandate (supra) cast in Section 32G thereof, does not, make the extant endeavour to be misconstituted or it being, a time barred endevour, as no period of limitation is prescribed therein. However, the efficacy of the afore made submission becomes completely eclipsed, and, faded in the light of a verdict drawn by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in a case tilted as Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs. Ashok K. Agarwal and others, reported in (2006)9 SCC 617 , the relevant paragraphs No.3 to 7 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- 3. The learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on Article 136 of the Limitation Act argued that the said Article prescribes a limitation period of twelve years in cases of execution of decrees and orders passed by civil courts and therefore, the courts below erred in rejecting the application as barred by limitation. Article 136 is reproduced below: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 136. for the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court. Twelve years When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making the payment of delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place; Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.” 4. The argument is that an application under section 31 is in the nature of execution proceedings, therefore, Article 136 applies which allows a period of twelve years for execution of decrees and orders and the application was thus within time. It was submitted that the courts have upheld the legal fiction that applications under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act are treated in the nature of execution proceedings. In support of this submission the learned counsel referred to Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufacturing Co.(P) Ltd. & Ors. 1979 (1) SCR 372 . It was submitted that the courts have upheld the legal fiction that applications under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act are treated in the nature of execution proceedings. In support of this submission the learned counsel referred to Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufacturing Co.(P) Ltd. & Ors. 1979 (1) SCR 372 . It was observed by this Court in this case that "the substantive relief in an application under Section 31 (1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree." 5. Sections 31 of the Act contains special provisions for enforcement of claims by State Financial Corporations. It is by way of a legal fiction that the procedure akin to execution of decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure has been permitted to be invoked. But one cannot lose sight of the fact that there is no decree or order of a civil court when we are dealing with applications under Section 31 of the Act. The legal fiction at best refers to a procedure to be followed. It does not mean that a decree or order of a civil court is being executed, which is a sine qua non for invoking Article 136. The proposition set out in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation (supra) found support in M/s. Everest Industrial Corporation and Others v. Gujarat State Financial Corporation 1987 (3) SCC 597 . Again in Maganlal etc. vs. Jaiswal Industries Neemach & Ors. 1989 (3) SCR 696 this court noticed that an order under Section 32 is not a decree stricto sensu as defined in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the financial Corporation could not be said to be a decree holder. This makes it clear that while dealing with an application under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act there is no decree or order of a civil court being executed. It was only on the basis of a legal fiction that the proceedings under Section 31 are treated as akin to execution proceedings. In fact this Court has observed that there is no decree to be executed nor there is any decree holder or judgment debtor and therefore in a strict sense it cannot be said to be a case of execution of a decree. In fact this Court has observed that there is no decree to be executed nor there is any decree holder or judgment debtor and therefore in a strict sense it cannot be said to be a case of execution of a decree. Article 136 of the Limitation Act has no application in the facts of the present case. Article 136 specifically uses the words "decree or order of any civil court". The application under Sections 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporation Act is not by way of execution of a decree or order of any civil court. 6. Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies in the facts of the present case. When Article 137 is applied, the application moved by the appellant- Corporation on 2nd January, 1992 for proceeding against the sureties i.e. the respondents herein, was clearly barred by time and the courts below were correct in holding so. To recall the facts of the present case, the notice demanding repayment of the amount of loan was issued against the borrower, that is, M/s. Crystal Marketing Private Limited on 8th March, 1983 and the application under Sections 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporation was filed against the said borrower on 25th October, 1983. The liability of sureties had crystalised then. 7. The amendment under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act which authorises the State Financial Corporations to take action under Section 31 of the Act for enforcing the liability against the sureties, was brought about in the year 1985 by introduction of sub-section (aa) in Section 31 (1) of the Act. Even after this amendment the appellant did not wake up to take any step against the sureties in the present case. Notice was issued to the sureties only on 7th December, 1991 and the application for enforcement of liability against them was filed on 2nd January, 1992. The application, therefore, was clearly barred by time and the decisions of the courts below cannot be faulted. The courts below rightly dismissed the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The appeal has no merit. The application, therefore, was clearly barred by time and the decisions of the courts below cannot be faulted. The courts below rightly dismissed the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The appeal has no merit. It is dismissed with no order as to costs.” In the afore verdict, a clear principle of law stand cast, that though therein Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, does not prescribe any period of limitation for the lending institution enforcing the outstanding borrowings against the borrowers concerned, besides in the afore extracted paragraphs, a further principle of law, has been cast that, Article 136 of the Limitation Act which becomes extracted hereinabove, is not applicable to the drawing of recovery proceedings by the financial corporation, and, as become rested upon the specially engrafted therein statutory provisions, (I) as, the bedrock for application of the mandate of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, is only, upon a decree or order of a Civil Court becoming pronounced. However, the relyings, upon, special statutory mechanism(s) hence for enforcing the debt liability against the borrowers, are only fictionally akin to execution proceedings, and, the afore statutory fiction as fastened to the recoursing, by the lending institution, vis-a-vis, the special statutory mechanism, for its hence recovering the apposite borrowings from the borrowers concerned/entity concerned, yet does not tantamount, to enforcements being made, vis-a-vis, a decree or order of a Civil Court. Therefore, it has been expostulated therein, that since the proceedings for recovery, as, become, drawn under the special statutory mechanism, do not have the trappings of a decree or order of a civil court, hence, Article 136 of the Limitation Act, prescribing a period of 12 years, for filing of execution petition, is not applicable to proceedings drawn under the Special Statutory mechanism. However, it has also been mandated therein, that yet Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies, vis-a-vis, the recoursings by the lending institutions, to the special statutory mechanism hence for enforcing the loan liability against the persons or entity concerned. Consequently, since Article 137 of the Limitation Act, makes prescriptions qua a period of three years being the valid period, within which valid recoursings by the State Financial Corporations, vis-a-vis, the mandate of Section 32 G of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, can be made. Consequently, since Article 137 of the Limitation Act, makes prescriptions qua a period of three years being the valid period, within which valid recoursings by the State Financial Corporations, vis-a-vis, the mandate of Section 32 G of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, can be made. Therefore, when the right to enforce the afore statutory mechanism accrued in the year 1999, whereas, it becoming recoursed much belatedly therefrom, inasmuch, as in the year 2015, does obviously, constrains this Court to conclude that the making of Annexures P-9, and, of Annexure P10, by the H.P. Financial Corporation, are, time barred recoursings by the respondent corporation. 8. For the fore going reasons, there is merit in the extant petition, and, it is allowed. Consequently, the impugned annexures, borne in Annexure P-9 to P-11 are quashed. No costs. All pending applications also stand disposed of.