JUDGMENT Criminal Petition No.36 of 2019 has been filed by the petitioner under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the entire criminal proceedings initiated under FIR Case No.3(4) 2019 of TBL DAM Police Station registered under Section 353/509/34 IPC, non-existent and superseded Section 3(i)(x) of SC & ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 and Section 131(1)(b)(2) of RP Act, 1951, as the same is unconstitutional and unwarranted and is gross misuse and miscarriage of justice. 2. Anticipatory Bail Application No.9 of 2019 has been filed by the petitioner under Section 438 Cr.P.C. to grant him anticipatory bail in FIR Case No.3(4) 2019 of TBL DAM Police Station. 3. Since the First Information Report involved in these petitions is one and the same, both the petitions were heard together and disposed of by this common order. 4. The case of the prosecution is that on 18.4.2019 at about 12.20 p.m. while the complainant was performing his duty at the Polling Station No.7/40, Nongpok Keithelmanbi Primary School, one unknown person came to him and called him out to meet one MLA who was sitting with his associates at the community hall located nearby the area. As informed, the complainant went to meet the MLA as guided by the person. When the complainant reached there, one person who later identified as K.Meghachandra, MLA of Wangkhem Assembly Constituency criminally intimidated the complainant in the presence of the public without any reason. The MLA even threatened the complainant to put under suspension from his service. The complainant belongs to Scheduled Tribe community and the petitioner insulted the complainant with an intent to humiliate him before the public and the petitioner acted in a disorderly manner so as to interfere with the working of the police personnel deployed at the said Polling Station. Based on the complaint lodged by the Head Constable Gaipuilin, FIR Case No.3(4)2019 was registered by the Thoubal Dam Police Station against the petitioner. 5. Heard Mr. BP Sahu, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lenin Hijam, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents. Criminal Petition No.36 of 2019: 6. Mr. BP Sahu, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a Member of the Legislative Assembly from 32-Wangkhem Assembly Constituency and belongs to Indian National Congress Party, which is in opposition in the State. Lenin Hijam, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents. Criminal Petition No.36 of 2019: 6. Mr. BP Sahu, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a Member of the Legislative Assembly from 32-Wangkhem Assembly Constituency and belongs to Indian National Congress Party, which is in opposition in the State. He would submit that based on the complaint lodged by the Head Constable K.Gaipuilin of Noney Police Station, who was detailed at the Polling Station No.7/40, Nongpok Keithelmanbi Primary School for Phase-II of Lok Sabha Election, 2019, FIR case No.3(4)2019 was registered against the petitioner under Section 353/506/34 IPC and Section 3(i)(x) of SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Section 131 (1) (b) (2) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. 7. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner received information that some BJP workers and sympathizers had forcibly obstructed some voters to enter into the Polling Station No.7/40 to cast their votes and that even the authorized polling agent of the Congress had not been allowed to enter into the Polling Station even after starting of the casting of votes. The learned senior counsel submitted that it was also informed that the Congress candidate Oinam Nabakishore Singh, who was present at the said Polling Station, was gheroad and threatened by BJP workers. On 18.4.2019 at 11.25 a.m., the Congress candidate submitted an application for stopping the election and requested re-poll to the Presiding Officer and after that the petitioner left the Polling Station. 8. The learned senior counsel then submitted that when the petitioner reached the Polling Station, he stayed outside the community hall away from the Polling Station and asked the Head Constable on duty to come to him. When he saw that the said Head Constable was not performing his duty, he said to the constable as to why he was not discharging his duties to allow the genuine voters to enter into the Polling Station and conducting free and fair poll and as to why he allowed BJP party flags to be hoisted within the booth area and he further said to get him removed from his service by filing a complaint to the Election Commission of India. The learned senior counsel submitted that at the relevant time, the petitioner did not see the name of the Head Constable and that he did not know or have any reason to believe that the said Head Constable belonged to Scheduled Tribe community. Further, the petitioner did not say anything or did anything to insult or intimidate or humiliate the Head Constable at or near the Polling Station, within the public view or otherwise as alleged. In fact, the Officer-in-charge of Thoubal Dam Police Station, who had visited the spot, without any material facts, registered the FIR case against the petitioner by misusing his powers and by invoking the non-existent, repealed/superseded provision of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 9. The learned senior counsel next submitted that the petitioner had never assaulted or used any criminal force to deter the complainant from discharging his duties at the Polling Station as alleged in the FIR and that the petitioner only advised the complainant to discharge his duties in an orderly manner and to allow all the genuine voters to enter into the Polling Station. 10. The learned senior counsel then submitted that the petitioner had never acted against the provisions of Section 131 of the Representation of People Act in any disorderly manner so as to cause annoyance to any person. On the other hand, the women folk and the workers of BJP obstructed some voters, who were holding voter slips to exercise their franchise to vote after knowing that they belonged to the rival parties. 11. Coming to the legal aspects involved in the petition, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the charge under Section 353 IPC is wholly illegal and is thus liable to be quashed since the complainant himself did not submit in his complaint that any act of such nature had been committed on him. Secondly, Section 506 IPC has multiple ingredients that needs to be mandatorily satisfied in order to attract on an act. The ground on which Section 506 IPC has been allegedly attracted on the petitioner is that the petitioner while allegedly stating that he would get the complainant dismissed from service, threatened to injure his reputation. Secondly, Section 506 IPC has multiple ingredients that needs to be mandatorily satisfied in order to attract on an act. The ground on which Section 506 IPC has been allegedly attracted on the petitioner is that the petitioner while allegedly stating that he would get the complainant dismissed from service, threatened to injure his reputation. Admittedly, the petitioner never said that he would dismiss the complainant from service and that the petitioner only said that he would complaint to the Election Commission of India in respect of his omission of duty being committed by him and pray for complainant’s dismissal from service. 12. The learned senior counsel then submitted that nowhere in the complaint nor in the FIR, it has been mentioned that the alleged acts have been committed by several persons and that the complaint only speaks about the alleged commission of the alleged acts by the petitioner. While that being the case, how can Section 34 IPC be attracted when it specifically sets out that the acts must have been committed by several persons. 13. The learned senior counsel next submitted that Section 3 of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has already been repealed with effect from 20.1.2016 vide an order dated 18.1.2016 and that even otherwise the complainant has not made a single allegation against the petitioner in such regard and in fact, the said Section has been invoked to victimize the petitioner at the behest of some interested persons due to political rivalry and to settle the personal score. There is not even an allegation that the petitioner did anything because the complainant belonged to Scheduled Tribe community. 14. The learned senior counsel further submitted that Section 131 of the Representation of People Act could not be attracted since under any circumstances, such an act could not have been committed by the petitioner as it is an admitted fact that the petitioner was taking shelter in a community hall which was not in the vicinity of the Polling Station. In support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the following decisions: (i) Manik Taneja and another v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 : 2015 Legal Eagle (SC) 40. (ii) Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 4 SCC 207 * : 2019 Legal Eagle (SC) 514. In support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the following decisions: (i) Manik Taneja and another v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 : 2015 Legal Eagle (SC) 40. (ii) Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 4 SCC 207 * : 2019 Legal Eagle (SC) 514. (iii) Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharastra, (2000) 3 SCC 557 : 2000 Legal Eagle (SC) 406. (iv) Dinesh alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771 : 2006 Legal Eagle (SC) 159. (v) Khuman Singh v. State of MP, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1104 : 2019 Legal Eagle (SC) 932. (vi) Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarkhand and another, (2020) 10 SCC 710 : 2020 Legal Eagle (SC) 660. * Correct Citation is (2019) 14 SCC 207 15. Per contra, Mr. Lenin Hijam, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent State, submitted that this is a clear case where the police personnel was abused, humiliated and shown down only for being a Scheduled Tribe during the election duty of the victim. He would submit that group of persons said to be of Congress party along with the petitioner went to the community hall lying on the southern side of the Polling Station and remained there and that the complainant continued his duty near the entrance of the room. 16. The learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that while the complainant was on duty, one person came and called the complainant asking to come near the petitioner, who was sitting in the community hall and when the complainant went to the community hall and gave salute to the petitioner, the petitioner started to scold the complainant saying that do you know polling booth/election rules and is it allowed to erect BJP flags and then the petitioner told his workers to take photos of the complainant with an intention to humiliate him in front of the entire public and that the petitioner also threatened the complainant that he will terminate him from service and that the petitioner obstructed and interfered in the duties of the complainant and other police personnel. In fact, the petitioner criminally intimidated the complainant in the presence of the public without any reason. 17. In fact, the petitioner criminally intimidated the complainant in the presence of the public without any reason. 17. The learned Additional Advocate General argued that after registration of the FIR, the investigation was mooted and after thorough investigation, the respondent Police have filed the charge sheet. Since the petitioner criminally intimidated and the complainant was humiliated by the petitioner, the criminal proceedings in the FIR Case No.3(4)2019 on the file of TBM DAM Police Station cannot be quashed. To fortify his submissions, the learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance upon the following decisions: (i) State of Karnataka v. M.Devendrappa and another, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 Legal Eagle (SC) 50. (ii) Mariya Anton Vijay v. State, (2015) 9 SCC 294 : 2015 Legal Eagle (SC) 515. (iii) Saranya v. Bharathi and another, Criminal Appeal No.873 of 2021, dated 24.8.2021 : 2021 Legal Eagle (SC) 421. 18. This Court considered the submissions raised by both the counsel and also perused the materials available on record. 19. The grievance of the petitioner is that he is a Member of the Legislative Assembly from 32-Wangkhem Assembly Constituency belonging to the Congress party. On 18.4.2019, while polling to Lok Sabha Election, 2019 to Keithelmanbi for Phase-II was started at about 11.45 a.m., a group of persons said to be of Congress party came to 7/40 Polling Station, Nongpok Keithelmanbi Primary School in about 20 vehicles and they tried to enter the Polling Station forcibly, probably to hijack the polling booth. The complainant K.Gaipuilin of Noney Police Station was detailed at the said Polling Station No.7/40, Nongpok Keithelmanbi Primary School and he failed to perform his duties, as a result of which, large number of unruly persons had seized the polling booth, thereby facilitating proxy votings and restraining the genuine voters from casting their votes after identifying them to be belonging to the rival camp. 20. 20. The further grievance of the petitioner is that when the petitioner reached the Polling Station, he stayed outside the community hall away from the Polling Station and asked the Head Constable, who is on duty to come to him and after the Head Constable came, he asked the Head Constable to discharge his bounden duties to allow the genuine voters to enter into the Polling Station and conducting free and fair poll and the petitioner had also asked him as to why he was allowing BJP party flags to be hoisted within the booth area and also the petitioner said to get him removed from his service by filing a complaint to the Election Commission of India. The petitioner did not say anything or did anything to insult or intimidate or humiliate the Head Constable at or near the Polling Station within the public view or otherwise. While so, the Head Constable lodged a complaint before the Officer-incharge of Thoubal Dam Police Station, who had visited the spot, without any material facts, registered the instant FIR against the petitioner by misusing his powers and by invoking the non-existent provisions of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 21. According to the petitioner, he had never assaulted or used any criminal force to deter the complainant from discharging his duties at the Polling Station No.7/40, Nongpok Keithelmanbi Primary School as alleged in the FIR. In fact, the petitioner advised the Head Constable to discharge his duties in an orderly manner and to allow all the genuine voters to enter into the Polling Station for free and fair poll. 22. In the complaint, the complainant Gapuilin, has stated as under: “I am to report that I have been detailed at the Polling Station No.7/40, Nongpok Keithelmanbi Primary School, Keithelmanbi for Phase-II poolls duty for the Lok Sabha Election, 2019. Today i.e. 18/04/2019 at about 12.20 pm while I was performing my duty at the said polling station, one unknown person came to me and called me out to meet one MLA who was sitting with his associates at the Community Hall located nearby the area. As informed I went to meet the MLA as guided by the person. When I reached there, one person who later identified as K.Meghachandra, Hon’ble MLA of Wangkhem A/C criminally intimidated me in presence of the public within any reason. As informed I went to meet the MLA as guided by the person. When I reached there, one person who later identified as K.Meghachandra, Hon’ble MLA of Wangkhem A/C criminally intimidated me in presence of the public within any reason. He even threatened me to put under suspension from my service. I belongs to a member of Scheduled Tribe and he insulted me with intent to humiliate before the public. He acted in a disorderly manner so as to interfere with the working of Police personnel deployed at the Polling Station.” 23. It is the say of the petitioner that it is the complaint who had failed to perform his duty of maintaining the law and order in the Polling Station in question during the poll on 18.4.2019 and in fact, the Indian National Congress candidate of 1-Inner Manipur Parliamentary Constituency had made a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Imphal West and the Superintendent of Police, Imphal East District to take action against the complainant. However, the said police authorities have not taken any action on the complainant, instead registered the case against the petitioner. 24. On the other hand, the respondent State contended that the act of the petitioner to call out by giving instruction to the complainant while in duty and consequent scolding of the complainant with threats of terminating him from his service is itself an act of deterrence to discharge of duty of the complainant. Accordingly, the offence of Section 353 IPC has been disclosed by the report of the complainant of the instant FIR. 25. Taking through the complaint, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no mention of usage of any criminal force or assault on the complainant in the complaint dated 18.4.2019 and in the absence of any such act that constitutes assault or use of criminal force, Section 353 IPC would not attract. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner, taking through Section 503 IPC also, submitted that Section 503 has multiple ingredients that need to be satisfied in order to attract on an act. According to Section 503 IPC, the injury must be to the person, his reputation or property. The ground on which Section 503 IPC has been allegedly attracted on the petitioner is that the petitioner while allegedly stating that he would get the complainant dismissed from service, threatened to injure his reputation. According to Section 503 IPC, the injury must be to the person, his reputation or property. The ground on which Section 503 IPC has been allegedly attracted on the petitioner is that the petitioner while allegedly stating that he would get the complainant dismissed from service, threatened to injure his reputation. All throughout the incident, the petitioner had been requesting to the complainant to perform his duty of ensuring the conduction of free and fair election and since the complainant was not paying any heed to the same, the petitioner asked the complainant to perform his duty and not the opposite party. 26. Placing reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Manik Taneja (supra), the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of Sections 503 and 506 IPC. 27. In Manik Taneja (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “10. So far as the issue regarding the registration of FIR under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by posting a comment on the Facebook of the traffic police, the conviction under that Section could be maintainable. Before considering the materials on record, we may usefully refer to Section 353 IPC which reads as follows:- "353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” A reading of the above provision shows that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out. 11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under:- "503. Criminal Intimidation.- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.” A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.” 28. It is admitted by the petitioner that sitting at the community hall, he called the complainant and when the complainant came near him, the petitioner scolded the complainant. When the complainant was on security duty at the Polling Station in question and was discharging his duties as per the instructions of his higher authorities, there was no occasion of not allowing the genuine voters to enter the Polling Station for casting their votes and there was no occasion for hosting any BJP flags within the booth area as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, these are all matter of evidence and the same will be proved and established only during the trial. Therefore, at this premature stage, this Court cannot come to the conclusion that the petitioner never scolded the complainant and the petitioner only requested the complainant to discharge his duties. 29. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that it is surprising to note that the petitioner, who is a sitting MLA, did not know that the complainant belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community. 29. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that it is surprising to note that the petitioner, who is a sitting MLA, did not know that the complainant belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community. The learned Additional Advocate General argued that the video recorded at the relevant time would show that the petitioner asking the name of the complainant specifically and moreover, it is well known that a man belonging to the Scheduled Tribe can easily be perceived merely on seeing his appearance and the accent he speaks in Manipuri/Meitei language and that a Meitei can easily differentiate such a man of Scheduled Tribe at the first sight of such a person. This Court finds some force in the said submission of the learned Additional Advocate General. As rightly stated by the respondent police, there is every possibility of the petitioner to insult or intimidate or humiliate the complainant at or near the Polling Station within the public view in view of the situation created at the Polling Station as narrated by both the petitioner and the respondent State. 30. The plea of the petitioner that Section 3 (1) (x) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has already been repealed and the said Section has been invoked to victimize the petitioner at the behest of some interested persons due to political rivalry and to settle the personal score. 31. It is the say of the respondent police that Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has been substituted by Section 3(1)(r) by the Amendment Act 1 of the said Act. Though Section 3(1)(x) was inadvertently mentioned in the FIR due to oversight, the same has been rectified later on incorporating as Section 3(1)(r) on 21.4.2019 and such minor error cannot be rendered the instant FIR as nullity. Whether or not Section 3(1)(x) of the Act has been inadvertently mentioned in the FIR and the same has been subsequently corrected and its legality can be gone through only during trial and not at this stage. 32. Nothing on record to show that without any material, the Officer-in-charge of Thoubal Dam Police Station registered the case against the petitioner. Whether or not Section 3(1)(x) of the Act has been inadvertently mentioned in the FIR and the same has been subsequently corrected and its legality can be gone through only during trial and not at this stage. 32. Nothing on record to show that without any material, the Officer-in-charge of Thoubal Dam Police Station registered the case against the petitioner. Since the petitioner himself admitted that the Officer-in-charge of Thoubal Dam Police Station visited the spot after hearing the situation at the Polling Station, the petitioner cannot contend that the Officer-incharge has registered a false case against the petitioner. Registering case on the basis of a report disclosing cognizable offence cannot be said to misuse the power by the Officer-incharge of a particular police station. 33. A Head Constable on duty is a public servant and the alleged act of the petitioner to call out by giving instruction to the Head Constable on duty and consequent scolding of the Head Constable with threats of dismissing him from service is itself an act of deterrence to the discharge of duty of the Head Constable. 34. According to the respondent State, the investigation reveals that there was use of force by the petitioner and his men while attempting to enter into the Polling Station despite the repeated request and endeavour of the complainant for allowing to enter the Polling Station by only the authorized persons of the group led by the petitioner but to prevent the entry by all the members of the group led by the petitioner in an unauthroised manner. Considering the factual situation, the said plea of the respondent State cannot be slightly thrown out. 35. In the complaint, the complainant clearly stated that the MLA of Wangkhem A/C criminally intimidated him in the presence of the public without any reason; the MLA threatened the complainant to put under suspension from his service; the complainant belongs to a member of Scheduled Tribe and the MLA insulted the complainant with an intent to humiliate before the public. Prima facie, the wordings appear in the complaint though not particularly mention the details of facts, it clearly mentions the fact that the complainant is a Scheduled Tribe and the complainant was humiliated before the public by the petitioner. 36. Prima facie, the wordings appear in the complaint though not particularly mention the details of facts, it clearly mentions the fact that the complainant is a Scheduled Tribe and the complainant was humiliated before the public by the petitioner. 36. The respondent State contended that the petitioner leading a group came to the Polling Station and tried to enter the Polling Station forcibly due to which a ruckus occurred between them and the voters who were on queue to cast their votes. The ruckus was called down and the police controlled the situation created by the petitioner and his men. The said aspect of the matter cannot be gone into at this stage and the same will be decided only after the trial. 37. Nothing has been produced by the petitioner to show that there was previous enmity between the petitioner and the complainant and only in order to humiliate and disrespect the petitioner with an ulterior motive and political vengeance of the opposite party, the complainant has lodged a false complaint. 38. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that in the case on hand charge sheet has been filed and even if the charge sheet had been filed, the High Court has power to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner. Taking through the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta (supra), the learned senior counsel submitted that there is nothing in the words of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of Court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is also the argument of the learned senior counsel that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. even when the discharge application is pending with the trial Court. 39. Section 482 Cr.P.C. envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (1) to give effect to an order under the Code; (2) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (3) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. While exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. While exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. 40. It is settled that it would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it initiated/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to asses what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 41. It is also settled that the scope of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 42. The legal position is also well settled that if an offence is disclosed, the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed and if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should be permitted. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interest of justice. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. 43. For the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the First Information Report or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same. 43. For the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the First Information Report or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same. Of course, the High Court has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. 44. In Mariya Anton (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “66. In other words, none of the aforementioned questions were capable of being answered without the aid of evidence to be adduced by the parties, by mere reading of FIR, Final report, charge sheet, for the first time by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Similarly, the High Court had no jurisdiction to appreciate the materials produced like an appellate court while hearing the petition under Section 482 of the Code or/and Revision Petition under Section 397 abid. 67. As rightly argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the law laid down by this Court in S.B. Johari's case (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the case in hand in favour of the State. 68. S.B. Johari's case (supra) was also a case where the High Court had quashed the charge at the instance of accused persons in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction by appreciating the material filed by the prosecution along with charge-sheet. The High Court therein had held that no case was made out on the basis of the contents of the charge sheet and the material filed in support thereof as in the opinion of the High Court, it was insufficient to frame the charge against the accused for their prosecution for commission of offence punishable under Section 5(1)(d) and (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The accused were accordingly discharged by the High Court without compelling them to face the trial on merits. 69. In an appeal filed by the State against the order of the High Court, this Court allowed the State's appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and upheld the charge sheet and the charges which were framed by the trial court and laid down the law which we have reproduced in para 88 above. 70. 69. In an appeal filed by the State against the order of the High Court, this Court allowed the State's appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and upheld the charge sheet and the charges which were framed by the trial court and laid down the law which we have reproduced in para 88 above. 70. Coming back to the facts of this case, the High Court committed the same error which was committed by the High Court in S.B. Johari's case (supra) because in this case also the High Court went into the questions of fact, appreciated the materials produced in support of charge sheet, drawn inference on reading the statements of the accused, and applied the law, which according to the High Court, had application to the facts of the case and then came to a conclusion that no prima facie case had been made out against any of the accused for their prosecution under the Arms Act. This approach of the High Court, in our considered view while deciding petition under Section 482 of the Code was wholly illegal and erroneous.” 45. When the investigation officer spends considerable time to collect the evidence and places the charge sheet before the Court, further action should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise of inherent power to quash the charge sheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. 46. It is to be noted that the police officer receiving an information or FIR disclosing cognizable offence has no option other than registration of the same and setting the investigation into motion thereof. In the present case, upon the receipt of the complaint and after thorough investigation, the respondent police filed a charge sheet as the offence had been made out. Thus, on an overall analysis of the case on hand, it is clear that the FIR discloses a cognizable offence and the investigation completed going into the merits of the FIR and the charge sheet has also been filed. Therefore, quashing of the FIR in question at this stage cannot be normally done and also not appropriate. 47. Thus, on an overall analysis of the case on hand, it is clear that the FIR discloses a cognizable offence and the investigation completed going into the merits of the FIR and the charge sheet has also been filed. Therefore, quashing of the FIR in question at this stage cannot be normally done and also not appropriate. 47. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the High Court should be extremely cautious to interfere with the investigation or trial of a criminal case and should not stall the investigation, save and except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of offence and that continuance of the criminal prosecution would amount to abuse of process of the Court. As discussed earlier, even going by the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR, this Court is of the view that the ingredients of the alleged offences are prima facie satisfied and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just to allow the process of the Court to be continued against the petitioner. It is reiterated that there is no abuse of process of law in continuing with the instant criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner. Resultantly, there is no merit in the petition and accordingly, the Criminal Petition No.36 of 2019 is liable to be dismissed. Anticipatory Bail Application No.9 of 2019: 48. Coming to Anticipatory Bail Application No.9 of 2019, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the complaint itself does not disclose the commission of any such offence and that the custodial interrogation is not at all required in this case. He would submit that arrest may be justified only if there is apprehension that the petitioner may tamper with the evidence and/or that he may abscond. Since the petitioner is a public figure and that there is not even the slightest apprehension of his absconding and also there is no question of tampering of witnesses, the petitioner may be granted anticipatory bail. 49. Countering the arguments of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent State submitted that there is ample evidence that the petitioner committed the offence, including the offence under the provisions of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 49. Countering the arguments of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent State submitted that there is ample evidence that the petitioner committed the offence, including the offence under the provisions of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. He would submit that the petitioner has failed to show how the FIR case is connected to political rivalry and that the question of arrest should arise as per the circumstances and that the investigating officer of the FIR case has power and competency to arrest the accused, if necessary arises. 50. This Court considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side. 51. It appears that earlier the petitioner approached the Sessions Judge, Imphal East and filed Criminal Miscellaneous (AB) Case No.36 of 2019 under Section 438 Cr.P.C. for grant of anticipatory bail coupled with a prayer for ad-interim bail. By the order dated 25.4.2019, the learned Sessions Judge, dismissed the petition holding as under: “I has also gone through the case law cited by the ld. moving counsel. It is seen that the applicability of Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. in the said case was brought into life only when it was clear that the allegations made against the appellant was unclear as to whether the public humiliation, intimidation etc., was indeed involved. In the present FIR case, however, there is prima facie indication that the accused/petitioner had intentionally and publicly intimidated and insulted the complainant. Situated thus, I find no compelling reason for granting the prayers of the accused/petitioner as the case law cited by the ld. moving counsel is not applicable. Hence, his prayer is rejected and the petition is dismissed.” 52. While dealing with the Criminal Petition No.36 of 2019 seeking to quash the FIR in question in the earlier paragraphs, this Court held that there was no necessity to quash the said FIR and there is no abuse of process of law in continuing with the criminal proceedings. In the instant case, between the dismissal of the anticipatory bail petition by the learned Sessions Judge and the date of approaching this Court seeking anticipatory bail, there is change of circumstances i.e., the investigation completed and the charge sheet has been filed. In the instant case, between the dismissal of the anticipatory bail petition by the learned Sessions Judge and the date of approaching this Court seeking anticipatory bail, there is change of circumstances i.e., the investigation completed and the charge sheet has been filed. In such view of the matter, there is no hesitation in considering the prayer of the petitioner made in the Anticipatory Bail Application. Moreover, the petitioner is an MLA and the question of absconding does not arise. That apart, as stated supra, dismissal of the Criminal Petition No.36 of 2019 will in no way be a hurdle to grant anticipatory bail sought by the petitioner. 53. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. It should necessarily depend on facts and circumstances of each case in consonance with the legislative intention. Refusal to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner would definitely attract the right to life of the petitioner as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the given facts and circumstances of the case. 54. It is pertinent to mention that by the order dated 30.4.2019, the petitioner was granted an order of interim bail and the same was continued till date and as against the said interim bail granted to the petitioner, the respondent State has not preferred any appeal. Therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, this Court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 55. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Anticipatory Bail Application No.9 of 2019 filed by the petitioner is allowed and the petitioner is granted anticipatory bail in the event of his arrest in FIR Case No.3(4)2019 on the file of the TBL Dam Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 353/506/34 IPC, Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Section 131(1)(b)(2) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, subject to the following conditions: (i) This Anticipatory Bail No. 9 of 2019 is allowed. (ii) The petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) with two sureties for the like sum to the satisfaction of the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal East. (iii) The petitioner shall surrender before the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal East within fifteen days from today, failing which the anticipatory bail order shall automatically stand cancelled. (ii) The petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) with two sureties for the like sum to the satisfaction of the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal East. (iii) The petitioner shall surrender before the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal East within fifteen days from today, failing which the anticipatory bail order shall automatically stand cancelled. (iv) The petitioner shall co-operate with the Investigating Officer, if required, and he shall also co-operate with the trial Court. (v) The petitioner shall not tamper with the prosecution witnesses in any manner. (vi) If the petitioner violates anyone of the conditions, the prosecution is at liberty to file a petition for cancellation of the anticipatory bail. (vii) It is made clear that the views expressed hereinabove are the prima facie views of this Court in dealing with the quash petition and the anticipatory bail petition and either the petitioner or the respondent State cannot take advantage of the same during trial. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case and defend the petitioner as accused during the trial. 56. In the result, Criminal Petition No.36 of 2019 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 57. Registry is directed to issue copy of this order to both the parties through their WhatsApp/e-mail.