JUDGMENT : Ali Mohammad Magrey, J. Impugned in this appeal is Judgment dated 18th of November, 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner bearing WP(C) No. 2343/2021, whereby and whereunder the Petition of the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner stands dismissed. 2. The material facts leading to the filing of this appeal, as emerge from the pleadings on record, are that the Appellant/ Petitioner-firm claims to be a renowned Architectural-cum-Structural Consultancy, having expertise in the field. It is stated that in terms of communication No. PS/MD/7983-8005 dated 2nd of March, 2016, the Respondent-JKPCC empaneled as many as 23 Architectural and Structural firms for providing the Consultancy about the designs and structures, etc., of the buildings intended to be constructed by it, wherein the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner claims to have figured at Serial No.10. It is also pleaded that ever since the said empanelment, the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner provided Consultancy for Designs and Structural works undertaken by the Government in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (now Union Territory) in regard to series of buildings, although no formal orders for providing Consultancy were being issued, but, under the agreed arrangement, a specified percentage calculated on the basis of cost of construction works was being assessed and paid. It is averred that the process of Consultation by the Respondent-JKPCC with the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner as regards the work put to tender by medium of the impugned NIT dated 3rd of November, 2021 was already initiated way back in the year 2018 and that the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner was selected for providing and, accordingly, provided the Drawing and Structural Consultancy on the basis of his previous performance and comparative assessment of suitability among the approved Consultants who were empaneled along with the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner. In these circumstances, the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner, being aggrieved of the impugned tender notice, filed Writ Petition bearing WP(C) No. 2343/2021 seeking quashing of the impugned tender notice. Simultaneously, the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner had also sought a direction in the name of the Respondent-JKPCC to continue Consultancy allotted to it in respect of the construction tendered vide the impugned NIT; as well as to pay the amount already due towards the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner from the Respondent-JKPCC. Simultaneously, the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner had also sought a direction in the name of the Respondent-JKPCC to continue Consultancy allotted to it in respect of the construction tendered vide the impugned NIT; as well as to pay the amount already due towards the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner from the Respondent-JKPCC. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the Counsel for the parties, in terms of Judgment dated 18th of November, 2021, dismissed the Petition filed by the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner as being devoid of any merit. It is this Judgment of the learned Single Judge that has been assailed by the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner in this appeal on the grounds projected in the memo of appeal. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length; perused the pleadings on record; and have considered the matter. 4. At the first blush, what requires to be stated, herein this case, is that as per settled legal position, the tender issuing authority is the best judge of its interests/ needs and that it is always open to the said authority to suitably put the work required to be completed to tender as per the relevant terms and conditions so as to best serve its purposes. Whenever a particular work is put to tender, it might hurt the interests of someone or the other, but, for that reason, the said tendering process cannot be labelled as malafide or arbitrary. It needs no repetition that the Courts are expected to exercise judicial restraint in interfering with the administrative action, particularly in the matter of tender or contract. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the tender issuing authority ought not to be questioned, but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned, firstly, if the decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the Court can say that the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached or; second, if the process adopted or decision made by the authority is malafide or intended to favour someone or; third, if the public interest is affected. In the instant case, the decision of the Respondent-JKPCC in putting the work in question to tender vide the impugned NIT cannot be said to be one where they have acted in a manner in which no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with the relevant law would have acted. Furthermore, upon a bare perusal of the pleadings on record, we did not find any document/ material which would have shown that the decision made by the authority to put the work to tender is malafide or intended to favour someone. Likewise, the third ground of public interest is also not affected in the present case because by putting the work to tender, the Respondent-JKPCC has encouraged greater competition which is the essence of the scope of tendering process meant to favour public interest. The claim of the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner that since he had already provided Consultancy services with regard to the work put to tender in terms of the impugned NIT, as such, the work could not have been subjected to fresh tender cannot hold ground inasmuch as there is no formal allotment order issued in favour of the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner in this behalf. The Appellant/ Writ Petitioner has based his claim on some inter se communications, but no such communication can be construed as a formal allotment order in favour of the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner. 5. The principle of legitimate expectation qua the work in question cannot be applied in the instant case in view of the fact that the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner has not substantiated the execution of work in tune with the scheme of law in public largess. Merely because some Officer(s) of the Respondent-JKPCC, without any authority, may have asked the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner to execute the work does not, in any manner, entitle the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner to claim any right with regard to application of the principle of legitimate expectation. This apparent wrong committed by the Officer(s) concerned of the Respondent-JKPCC in asking the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner to provide Consultancy services without there being any process evolved for the same, as provided under law, cannot be allowed to come in the way of the Respondent-JKPCC to put the work to tender as per law/ rules governing the field. This apparent wrong committed by the Officer(s) concerned of the Respondent-JKPCC in asking the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner to provide Consultancy services without there being any process evolved for the same, as provided under law, cannot be allowed to come in the way of the Respondent-JKPCC to put the work to tender as per law/ rules governing the field. At the same time, it is also high time that the Respondent-JKPCC, being a public authority, sets its house in order in making sure that all the tendering processes involving public interest are initiated and taken to their logical conclusion as per the law/ rules governing the field and not on the whims and caprice of any Officer of the Corporation. In that context, the learned Writ Court has rightly not found favour with the contention of the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner in regard to the ‘Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation’ by holding that the said doctrine is not attracted in the case of the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner. 6. In a landmark judgment rendered in case titled ‘Tata Cellular V. Union of India: (1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 651’, the Supreme Court at Paragraph No.94, while dealing with the matters arising out of tender and contract, evolved the following principles: 1. “The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action; 2. The Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made; 3. The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible; 4. The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts; 5. The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts; 5. The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides; and 6. Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.” 7. In case titled ‘Sterling Computers Limited V. M&N Publications Ltd: (1993) 1 SCC 445 ’, the Apex Court, at Paragraph No.12, has laid down as under: “In contracts having commercial element, some more discretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter into contracts with persons, keeping an eye on the augmentation of the revenue. But even in such matters they have to follow the norms recognized by courts while dealing with public property. It is not possible for courts to question and adjudicate every decision taken by an authority, because many of the Government Undertakings which in due course have acquired the monopolist position in matters of sale and purchase of products and with so many ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always possible to act like a quasi-judicial authority while awarding contracts. Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measure of freedom of ‘play in the joints’ to the executive.” 8. Again, the Supreme Court, in case titled ‘Directorate of Education & Ors. V. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. & Ors: (2004) 4 SCC 19 ’, while applying the principles enunciated in Tata Cellular’s case (supra), at Paragraph No.12, observed, thus: “12. Again, the Supreme Court, in case titled ‘Directorate of Education & Ors. V. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. & Ors: (2004) 4 SCC 19 ’, while applying the principles enunciated in Tata Cellular’s case (supra), at Paragraph No.12, observed, thus: “12. It has been held in these decisions that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm of contract. That the Government must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender. It must have reasonable play in its joints as a necessary concomitant for an administrative body in an administrative sphere. The Courts would interfere with the administrative policy decision only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, malafide or actuated by bias. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by the particular circumstances. The Courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the Government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wise or logical. The Courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discretionary or malafide.” On an appreciation of the law laid down above, what comes to limelight is that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action and that the Court does not sit as a ‘Court of Appeal’, but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. It has also been declared that Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision and that if a review of the administrative decision is permitted, it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which, itself, may be fallible. Furthermore, fair play in joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere and quashing administrative decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. 9. It is thus settled that public authorities must be left with the same liberty as they have in framing the policies, even while entering into contracts because many contracts amount to implementation or projection of policies of the Government. 9. It is thus settled that public authorities must be left with the same liberty as they have in framing the policies, even while entering into contracts because many contracts amount to implementation or projection of policies of the Government. But, at the same time, it cannot be overlooked that unlike policies, contracts are legally binding commitments and they commit the authority which may be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India in many cases for years. It is for this reason that the Courts have impressed that even in contractual matters the public authority should not have unfettered discretion. In contracts having commercial element, some more discretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter into contracts with persons keeping an eye on the augmentation of the revenue. But, even in such matters, they have to follow the norms recognized by Courts while dealing with public property. It is not possible for the Courts to question and adjudicate every decision taken by an authority because many of the Government Undertakings, which in due course have acquired the monopolist position in matters of sale and purchase of products, and with so many ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always possible to act like a quasi-judicial authority while awarding contracts. Under some special circumstances, a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract by giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bonafide manner, although not strictly following the norms laid down by the Courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes that Courts, while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions, must grant certain measure of freedom of ‘play in the joints’ to the executive. Looking at the instant case in the above perspective, the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner has not been able to establish before the Court that the decision taken by the Respondent-JKPCC in putting the work in question to tender is an arbitrary exercise of power or that the same was/ is malafide in nature. Looking at the instant case in the above perspective, the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner has not been able to establish before the Court that the decision taken by the Respondent-JKPCC in putting the work in question to tender is an arbitrary exercise of power or that the same was/ is malafide in nature. In ‘Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa: (2007) 14 SCC 517 ’, at Paragraph No.22, the Supreme Court held, thus: “22. …. Therefore, a Court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; Or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226.” From a bare perusal of the pleadings placed on record, it is more than apparent that the decision taken by the Respondent-JKPCC in putting the subject work to tender in terms of the impugned tender notice was certainly not irrational in any manner whatsoever or intended to favour anyone. The claim of the Appellant/ Writ Petitioner, when appreciated in its true and correct perspective, is that the work in question stated to have been allotted to him on the directions of some Officer(s) of the Respondent-JKPCC in absence of any formal allotment order cannot be put to tender and, if the same is allowed, it would certainly amount to perpetuating the wrongful act done by the said Officer(s) of the Respondent-JKPCC. 10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as would warrant its interference from this Court. Consequently, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed, along with the connected CM.