JUDGMENT : 1. The Second Appeal has been preferred by the Original-plaintiff being aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Bharuch dated 22.07.1998 in Regular Civil Appeal No.24 of 1993 to the extent allowing the appeal of the respondents. 2. The brief facts leading to this Second Appeal are that the appellant filed the suit being R.C.S No.396/1987 for getting her share in movable as well as immovable properties namely the agricultural land bearing Block No. 523, 591, 469, 30, 73, 356 and one house bearing No.1/62 and the property no.1/63. It was the case of the appellant-plaintiff that the aforesaid properties were ancestral properties, in which her father viz Vithalbhai Motibhai had one share and she is only legal heir of the deceased father, who expired on 09.02.1986, the said share of her father should be given to her. 2.1. It was also contended that the house bearing No.1/59 being self acquired property of her father, she should be declared sole owner of the said property. 3. The defendants have denied the case of the appellant by filing written statement at Exh.12 and resisted the suit on all grounds. 3.1. It is contended by the defendants that the properties are not of a joint property and plaintiff has no any right in the suit properties. It is also contended that the entire properties, which were joint held by the father of the plaintiff as well as father of the defendants, who are real brothers have been partisan earlier and all the properties came to the share of defendant’s father. According to the defendants, they are in conscious possession of the suit properties for more than 20 years and therefore, even on the grounds of adverse possession, the plaintiff has now no legal right or title in the suit properties. They have prayed to dismiss the suit. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court has framed following issues, at Exh.13, in vernacular language, which on translation reads as under: [i] Whether plaintiff proves that she has one half shares in the suit properties? [ii] Whether plaintiff proves that the house property shown as lot B in plain paragraph No.1 is of the sole ownership of her father? [iii] Whether defendant proves that they have become ownership by adverse possession? [iv] Whether suit is barred by limitation? [ii] Whether plaintiff proves that the house property shown as lot B in plain paragraph No.1 is of the sole ownership of her father? [iii] Whether defendant proves that they have become ownership by adverse possession? [iv] Whether suit is barred by limitation? [v] Whether plaintiff is entitled to get mesne profit, if yes how much? [vi] What order? [vii] What decree? 5. After recording of evidence of both the sides and considering the submissions, the aforesaid issues have been answered as under by the Trial Court, in vernacular language, which on translation reads as under : [i] In affirmative. [ii] In affirmative. [iii] In negative. [iv] In negative. [v] In affirmative. [vi] As per the final order. [vii] As per the final order. Ultimately, the trial Court has passed the preliminary decree and ordered that the appellant-plaintiff has one share in all the properties. It has also appointed commissioner for deciding mesne profit as well as partition of all the properties by metes and bounds. 6. The defendants-respondents being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Bharuch, preferred R.C.A. No.24/93, whereas the appellant-plaintiff has filed her cross-objection at Exh.13 in the said appeal in respect of property bearing No.1/59.The learned Assistant Judge, Bharuch vide its judgment and order dated 22.07.1998 allowed the appeal of the respondents by modifying the decree passed by the learned Trial Court by declaring that the appellant has only one half share in the property shown as lot C and D and further set aside the decree in respect of the properties shown as lot A and C and also allowed the cross objections of the appellant by declaring that the appellant-plaintiff is absolute owner of the property bearing No.1/59. 7. The plaintiff-appellant has contended that the learned Appellate Court below has erred in not appreciating that the agricultural lands shown in lot A are ancestral properties and the same stood in the name of the undivided family. It is also contended that since no partition has taken place in the past, it could not have been owned by the respondents-defendants. 7.1. It is also contended that since no partition has taken place in the past, it could not have been owned by the respondents-defendants. 7.1. According to the appellant since respondents-defendants have failed to establish that the said properties were either purchased by them or it has come to their share by partition, the findings of the lower Appellate Court that the lands are owned by the respondents-defendants is perverse and untenable in the eyes of law. 7.2. The other point raised by the appellant is that the Appellate Court below has erred in not appreciating the facts that the names of the respondents were entered in the revenue record through their guardian viz. Vithalbhai Motibhai (father of the appellant), since their father Ranchodbhai Motibhai expired on 14.01.1950. It is also contended that merely because the names of the respondents appeared in the revenue record, it cannot be construed that they are absolute owner of the lands in question in absence of any evidence to establish their title. 7.3. It is also contended that the First Appellate Court has erred in holding that the respondents are in possession of the lands since last 20 years. Further it is contended that it is borne out from the record that the respondents were minor and the lands were being cultivated by the father of the appellant till he died in 1986 and therefore, the respondents were never in physical possession of the lands in question. 7.4. It is also averred that the Appellate Court has committed error in not appreciating that the adverse possession cannot be claimed by one co-owner against the other co-owner. 7.5. According to the appellant, the decision of the lower Appellate Court in holding that the appellant has no right in the movable property is erroneous. 7.6. It is also contended that the First Appellate Court has erred in quashing and setting aside the preliminary decree passed by the learned Trial court in respect of the properties shown as lot C notwithstanding the fact that in para No.17 of the judgment, the Appellate Court has categorically held that the properties shown in lot B and C both are ancestral properties and therefore, the appellant has one half share in property no.1/62 and property No.1/67. 8. The appellant has raised substantial questions of law in para 6 of the appeal memo. 8. The appellant has raised substantial questions of law in para 6 of the appeal memo. It appears from the record that no cross-appeal has been filed by the respondents/defendants. 9. Following substantial questions of law have been raised by this Court on 12.02.2021 : (i) Whether defence of adverse possession can be claimed by one co-owner against another? (ii) Whether in absence of any partition of ancestral property between the members of the family, ownership can be vested in any member till the shares are divided? (iii) Whether after partition of undivided joint Hindu family only right or title can vest in individual member of the family? 10. For the following reasons, my findings on the above questions of law, are as under : [i] In negative. [ii] In negative. [iii] In affirmative. Reasons: 11. Heard learned advocate Mr. D.M. Thakkar for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Chirag A. Patel for the respondents at length through video conferencing. 12. Learned advocate Mr. D.M. Thakkar for the appellant has made submission as under :- 12.1. Learned advocate Mr. Thakkar for the plaintiff-appellant has vehemently submitted that the plaintiff has filed suit for partition of ancestral properties. According to him, decree was passed by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. However, against that decree, the defendant has preferred appeal before the First Appellate Court, which has partly allowed the appeal and has modified the Trial Court’s decree. He has also submitted that cross-appeal was filed by the plaintiff against the finding of the Trial Court that plaintiff has only one half share in the house being lot No. 1/59. It is submitted by him that so far as the properties lot ‘A’ and ‘C’ are concerned, the modification made by the First Appellate Court in the decree passed in favour of the appellant by the Trial Court is erroneous. He has also submitted that except house No.1/59 all the properties are ancestral property. He has also submitted that there is no partition made between the parties regarding the joint properties. 12.2. He has also submitted that the agricultural land, which is mutated in the names of the defendant was mutated by her father as Karta and guardian of the minor - defendants and therefore, defendants cannot be treated as an absolute owner thereof. 12.3. Learned advocate Mr. 12.2. He has also submitted that the agricultural land, which is mutated in the names of the defendant was mutated by her father as Karta and guardian of the minor - defendants and therefore, defendants cannot be treated as an absolute owner thereof. 12.3. Learned advocate Mr. Thakkar has also submitted that findings of the First Appellate Court is against the evidence on record. He has also submitted that the plaintiff - appellant has one half share in the agricultural lands and therefore, the decree of the First Appellate Court be modified to that extent and necessary decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 12.4. He has also submitted that the entries in the revenue records are meant for fiscal purpose and no right or title devolves upon the person in whose name mutation entry is made in the Revenue Record. He has also contended that this very aspect has not been properly considered by the Appellate Court and therefore, the decree of the First Appellate Court deserves to be modified. He has prayed to modify the decree of the First Appellate Court to the extent the setting aside the decree of Trial Court from the properties shown as lot A and C and pass necessary decree in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. 13. Per contra, learned advocate Shri Chirag Patel appearing for the respondent-defendant has vehemently submitted that the decree passed by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court is preliminary decree and therefore, there is no need of filing present Second Appeal. He has also submitted that since there is no finality in disposing of the suit, the present appeal is not tenable. While referring to the documentary evidence on record, he has submitted that the name of the defendants are shown in the Revenue Records since 1964 and the plaintiff’s father has never objected the facts that the agricultural lands are shown in the name of the defendants. He has submitted that the plaintiff’s father has never filed any partition suit. According to him, the conduct of the plaintiff’s father clearly suggests that the agricultural lands were of ownership of the defendants and the same is not a joint property. 13.1. He has also submitted that plaintiff’s father has died on 9th February, 1986 and thereafter, the suit has been filed in the year 1987. According to him, the conduct of the plaintiff’s father clearly suggests that the agricultural lands were of ownership of the defendants and the same is not a joint property. 13.1. He has also submitted that plaintiff’s father has died on 9th February, 1986 and thereafter, the suit has been filed in the year 1987. He has submitted that the decree of the First Appellate Court is sustainable in the eye of law and he has prayed to dismiss the appeal. 14. He has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Bimal Kumar vs. Shakuntala Devi reported in 2012 (3) SCC 548 , especially para 25 thereof, which is as under : “25. In the said case, after referring to Civil Procedure Code by Mulla, this Court in Renu Devi case reported in (2003) 10 SCC 200 , while drawing a distinction between the preliminary and the final decree, has stated that a preliminary decree declares the rights or shares of the parties to the partition. Once the shares have been declared and a further inquiry still remains to be done for actually partitioning the property and placing the parties in separate possession of the divided property, then such inquiry shall be held and pursuant to the result of further inquiry, a final decree shall be passed. A preliminary decree is one which declares the rights and liabilities of the parties leaving the actual result to be worked out in further proceedings. Then, as a result of the further inquiries conducted pursuant to the preliminary decree, the rights of the parties are finally determined and a decree is passed in accordance with such determination, which is the final decree. Thus, fundamentally, the distinction between preliminary and final decree is that: a preliminary decree merely declares the rights and shares of the parties and leaves room for some further inquiry to be held and conducted pursuant to the directions made in the preliminary decree which inquiry having been conducted and the rights of the parties finally determined a decree incorporating such determination needs to be drawn up which is the final decree.” 15. Now, it is well settled that “Possession” implies dominion and control and the consciousness in the mind of the person having dominion over an object that he has it and can exercise it, whereas the “Occupation” implies only bare use of the land/immovable property without any right to retain it. The concept of “adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession, i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other’s right's but denies them. The principal of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. 15.1. Now, it is well settled that, adverse possession means, possession by a person holding the immovable property on his own behalf and on behalf of the some person other than the true owner having a right to immediate possession, provided the true owner is not under a disability or incapable of suing. Adverse possession is a possession that is hostile, under a claim or colour of title, actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous, continued for the required period of time thereby giving an indefeasible right of possession or ownership to the possessor by operation of the limitation of action. It is a settled law that if some-one wants to take a plea of adverse possession, it implies that initial entry was not under any right to possess the property but it must be commenced in wrong and is maintained against the right of the other. The basic ingredient of adverse possession theory is that the possession must be in hostile without any right of first entry thereof. Adverse possession in once sense is based on the theory of presumption that owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescences of the owner thereof to hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. At the same time, mere possession even of a trespasser will not constitute adverse possession unless accompanied by open assertion of hostile rider. 15.2. At the same time, mere possession even of a trespasser will not constitute adverse possession unless accompanied by open assertion of hostile rider. 15.2. Further, adverse possession is a method of acquisition of title to the property by possessing for a statutory period under certain conditions. It depends on intention of the occupant to claim and hold the land/property in opposition to the whole word, and also embodies the idea that the owner or person interested in the property have knowledge of the assertion of ownership by the occupant. It consist of actual possession with intent to hold solely by the possessor to the exclusion at all others and is denoted by the exercise of the act of dominion over the property including making of ordinary use and taking of ordinary usufructs of which the land/property is stumble in its present state. It is unilateral act and there is no question of any contract or agreement giving rise to adverse possession. 15.3. It is well-known that when the parties are co-owners to acquire prescriptive title there should be ouster, and limitation would start to run only from the date of ouster. If ouster is to be pleaded, the title has to be acknowledged. It is also well settled the mere entry of name in the mutation register, is not an indication of adverse possession. As it is well settled that one co-owner, in exclusive possession cannot render his possession adverse to other co-owners, not in possession, merely on the basis of a secret or hostile animus on his part. It is also needs to be observed that adverse possession cannot be established on the basis of mutation of name in revenue records without issuing notice to co-tenure holder. Further, merely paying property tax could not established that possession had become adverse to the co-owners. It is also settled that fundamental rule is that the entry and possession of property under the common title of co-owner will not be presumed to adverse to the others was ordinarily be held to be for the benefit of all. 15.4. The principles bearing on the nature of possession of one co-owner vis-a-vis the other co-owners and when the possession of one co-owner becomes adverse to the other co-owner were clearly enunciated by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in A.I.R. 1957 SC 314. 15.4. The principles bearing on the nature of possession of one co-owner vis-a-vis the other co-owners and when the possession of one co-owner becomes adverse to the other co-owner were clearly enunciated by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in A.I.R. 1957 SC 314. It was held in that case that it is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties, and that ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The Supreme Court emphasized further that “the possession of one co-heir is considered in law, as possession of all the co-heirs” and that” when one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title.” it was further observed that “the co-heir-in-possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir, not in possession, merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heirs title”. 16. At the same time, if there is no real partition of the ancestral property between members of the joint family, no ownership could be vested in any member till the shares of each other members of the joint family is divided. After partition of the ancestral property, the ownership can vest in particular person in whose share, certain property may devolve. If there is no partition, there is no question of individual’s ownership of any property of erstwhile joint family property. 17. In absence of partition of the joint family properties, the properties always remains as an ancestral property and the individual members cannot project him as an owner of the property either on the ground of adverse possession or any other grounds. 18. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that when any property is a joint family property than the co-sharer cannot take any defence of adverse possession in a suit filed for partition. If such defence is raised, then the person raising defence of adverse possession has to prove it. 19. 18. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that when any property is a joint family property than the co-sharer cannot take any defence of adverse possession in a suit filed for partition. If such defence is raised, then the person raising defence of adverse possession has to prove it. 19. Recently the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma reported in AIR 2020 SC 3717 has dealt with Section 6(1)(a) and proviso, which came to be amended by the Act 39 of 2005 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has ultimately para 129 has held as under : 129. Resultantly, we answer the reference as under: “(i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and liabilities. (ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004. (iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005. (iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class-I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal. (v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. (v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected out-rightly.” 20. Now Considering the pleadings of the parties as well as the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and the submissions made on behalf of both the sides, it emerges that there is no dispute regarding the relationship between the parties. There are also no dispute that the father of the plaintiff and father of the defendants were real brother. It is also an admitted fact that father of the respondents has died in the year 1950, whereas father of the plaintiff-appellant has died in the year 1986. It is also not in dispute that the suit for partition has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant in the year 1987 i.e. after the death of her father. 21. On perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court passed in Civil Suit, it appears that the Trial Court has allowed the suit of the plaintiff in toto while declaring that the plaintiff-appellant has one half share in the suit properties i.e. lot A, B, C, D and E and has directed to draw the preliminary decree. Against that judgment, the original defendants have preferred the appeal before First Appellate Court, wherein the plaintiff has also filed cross-appeal, which has been decided by the First Appellate Court modifying the order of the Trial Court to the extent that the plaintiff has only one half share of the properties shown in lot C and D. It has also declared that the plaintiff is an absolute owner of the property bearing No.1/59. Ultimately, the appellate Court has set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court to the extent declaring the property shown as lot A and C having one half share of the plaintiff. 22. Ultimately, the appellate Court has set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court to the extent declaring the property shown as lot A and C having one half share of the plaintiff. 22. It is worthwhile to reproduce the final order passed by the First Appellate Court, which is as under : “This appeal is hereby partly allowed. The judgment and preliminary decree passed by the Ld. 3rd Civil Judge (S.D.) Bharuch in R.C.S No. 296/87 is hereby modified. It is hereby declared that respondent - plaintiff has only half share of property shown as Lot No. C and D. It is hereby declared that plaintiff is an absolute owner of the property bearing No. 1/59 and for it, cross- objections are allowed. The judgment and preliminary decree is hereby set aside for the properties shown as Lot A and C and about declaring, plaintiff has half share in the suit property. Parties do bear their own costs. Decree be drawn accordingly.” 23. On perusal of the judgment and decree of the learned Trial court in Special Civil Suit, it appears that it has held that all properties are ancestral properties and plaintiff has one half share in all suit properties. 24. Now, on perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, it appears that the First Appellate Court has dealt with the various aspects of the matter in detail and has observed that Ranchhodbhai Motibhai and Vithalbhai Motibhai both were two brothers. 25. While discussing the submissions made on behalf of the learned advocates for the parties and considering the materials placed on record, the First Appellate Court has observed that when Ranchodbhai expired in 1950, at that time, all the defendants were minors and plaintiff’s father viz. Vithalbhai Motibhai was taking care of all the defendants and he was acting as guardian of the defendants. 26. Regarding the agricultural lands, the First Appellate Court has made following observation in para 14 of the judgment : “14……...From the revenue record, it appears that all the agriculture lands are running in the name of the defendants. One entry bearing No.1791 is produced at Exh. 116 in the record of the trial Court. From the said entry, it appears that all the agriculture lands mutated in the name of the defendants and at that time, Vithalbhai Motibhai was the guardian of the defendants. One entry bearing No.1791 is produced at Exh. 116 in the record of the trial Court. From the said entry, it appears that all the agriculture lands mutated in the name of the defendants and at that time, Vithalbhai Motibhai was the guardian of the defendants. Vithalbhai Motibhai is a father of the present plaintiff. So, in the present suit, plaintiff is claiming one of the share through Vithalbhai Motibhai but on dtd. 1.8.84, all the agriculture lands were running in the name of defendants and at that time, defendants represented through their guardian i.e. Vithalbhai Motibhai. So, Vithalbhai Motibhai had not taken any objection about defendants name are running on datd. 1.8.84. From Exh. 116, in appears that defendants’ name must be entered prior to dtd. 1.8.64. So, all the agriculture lands are running in the name of the defendants, in the knowledge of the plaintiff’s father i.e. Vithalbhai Motibhai, all the agriculture lands are in possession with the defendants through their guardian Vithalbhai Motibhai. Vithalbhai Motibhai has never taken any objection about the names and possession over the suit agriculture lands upto the date 9.2.86 i.e. death of the Vithalbhai Motibhai. So, it clearly appears that defendants are are in possession of the agricultural lands as a owner. Vithalbhai Motibhai had never any objection. Defendant’s name running in the revenue record and that fact is in knowledge of the Vithalbhai Motibhai. Defendant’s have enjoyed the possession more than 20 years and without any obstruction and in the knowledge of the Vithalbhai Motibhai. So, all the ingredients of the adverse possession appears in the present case. “…… but in the present case, defendants are not possessing the property as a co-owner. Defendant’s name running in the revenue record as a sole-owner and they possessed the sole-owner and not the co-owner.” 27. It is pertinent to note that there is consistent finding of fact regarding the property at lot C i.e. “gabhan” bearing No.1/63 and lot “D” i.e. house bearing No.1/62 as a joint property, wherein the plaintiff-appellant has one half share. These findings of facts is concurrent finding of facts by the Court below i.e. the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court, which is duly corroborated by the oral and documentary evidence on record. These findings of facts is concurrent finding of facts by the Court below i.e. the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court, which is duly corroborated by the oral and documentary evidence on record. Since this Court is sitting as a Second Appellate Court, this Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts by the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court. It is well settled that unless and until, it is shown that the Court below have misread the evidence or have not considered the evidence on record in arriving at the concurrent findings, the Second Appellate Court, cannot interfere with the finding of facts, which are based on the oral and documentary evidence on record. Now, in this case, both the Courts below have not committed any such errors of facts and law in arriving at the conclusion that properties at lot C and lot D are of the joint property and the plaintiff has one half share. Hence, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below in respect of properties at lot C and D needs to be confirmed. At the same time, there is no factual and legal error on the part of the First Appellate Court in interfering with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, so far as, properties of lot E is concerned. The First Appellate Court has rightly interfered with the decree of the Trial Court so far as the properties shown as lot E is concerned. 28. In the present case, there is no other oral and documentary evidence produced by the defendant – Respondent in support of his version that there was earlier partition of Agricultural lands between their father and appellant-plaintiff’s father. Further, it is the specific defence of the Respondent-defendant that they have become owner of the Agricultural lands by virtue of their possession for more than 20 years i.e. on the basis of adverse possession. Therefore, 29. Now, on perusal of the evidence i.e. oral and documentary, it is crystal clear that except bare words of the Respondent/Defendant and only on the facts that their names are mutated in Revenue Records, there is no other evidence produced by them to substantiate their version of their becoming absolute owner on the basis of adverse possession. Therefore, 29. Now, on perusal of the evidence i.e. oral and documentary, it is crystal clear that except bare words of the Respondent/Defendant and only on the facts that their names are mutated in Revenue Records, there is no other evidence produced by them to substantiate their version of their becoming absolute owner on the basis of adverse possession. Further in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma (supra), especially (v) of para 129 a plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and it is to be rejected out rightly. Hence, in absence of such evidence, it is to be presumed that the plaintiff-Appellant has one half shares in the property at lot “A” also. 29.1. Therefore, the reasons assigned by the First Appellate Court as referred to above to treat the suit property at lot “A” as absolute ownership of the Respondent-Defendant is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The First Appellate Court misdirected itself and has misread the evidence so far it relates to the suit properties at “Lot A” is concerned. Therefore, the portion of the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court declaring that the Plaintiff/Appellant has no right in the suit property at lot “A” is concerned, needs to be reversed and the judgment and decree of Trial Court in regard to lot “A” properties needs to be restored. 30. However, so far as the movable properties at Lot “E” is concerned, it appears from the record that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to prove that the same is ancestral property. Therefore, the observation and ultimate conclusion of the First Appellate Court in respect of property at lot “E” is sustainable. 31. However, there is some mistake in the ultimate order of the First Appellate Court, as in the ultimate order the lot “C” has been shown twice. Therefore, the observation and ultimate conclusion of the First Appellate Court in respect of property at lot “E” is sustainable. 31. However, there is some mistake in the ultimate order of the First Appellate Court, as in the ultimate order the lot “C” has been shown twice. At one stage, it is observed that plaintiff has only half share on the property shown as lot C and D and at the same time in the next paragraph, it is held that the plaintiff has no one half share in the property at lot C. However, considering the reasoning part of the judgment of the First Appellate Court, it appears that it has held that movable properties i.e. lot E is concerned, the plaintiff has no any right. It appears that instead of typing lot E, there is a typographical mistake in mentioning property at lot C, at later stage in the final order since in the reasoning part there is a clear mentioning of movable property at lot E. Therefore, necessary clarification needs to be made in the final order. 32. It is also pertinent to note that the property house bearing No.1/59 is concerned, the same stand in the name of the plaintiff’s-appellant’s father, this facts is clearly established from the documentary evidence and the oral evidence. Therefore, the observations made by the First Appellate Court regarding absolute ownership of the plaintiff-appellant regarding house bearing No.1/59 is concerned, the same is sustainable in the eyes of law. There is no factual or legal error committed by the First Appellate Court modifying the order of the Trial Court which declared that the plaintiff has only one half share in the suit property bearing No.1/59. 33. In view of the foregoing discussion, the following final order is passed :- Order (1) This appeal is hereby partly allowed with the observations that there is a mistake committed by the First Appellate Court in mentioning the property i.e. lot C twice. The reference made in the last portion of the judgment of the Appellate Court below where there is a reference of property lot C is made, same be treated as a lot E. (2) It is hereby declared that the plaintiff/appellant has one half share in the properties at lot “A” in addition to properties at lot “C” and “D”. The reference made in the last portion of the judgment of the Appellate Court below where there is a reference of property lot C is made, same be treated as a lot E. (2) It is hereby declared that the plaintiff/appellant has one half share in the properties at lot “A” in addition to properties at lot “C” and “D”. (3) The judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court dated 22.07.1998 in Regular Civil Appeal No.24/1993 is modified to the aforesaid extent and with the aforesaid clarification. (4) The Trial Court is hereby directed to take necessary measure for sending the copy of this judgment and decree to the learned Collector for actual partition of suit properties at lot “A”, “C” and “D” by metes and bounds. The Trial Court shall also appoint Receiver for taking account of mesne profit and disturbing the same amongst the parties. The Trial Court may fix the amount for remuneration of the Receiver. (5) The appellant-plaintiff will be entitled to take necessary recourse, in accordance with law, for getting possession of house bearing No.1/59. (6) Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Decree to be drawn accordingly in the present Appeal. (7) Along with the copy of this judgment and decree, R and P be sent back to the learned Trial Court.