JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. 1. These two appeals arise out of the award dated 04.05.2017, passed by the learned Commissioner under the Employee's Compensation Act, awarding compensation to Smt. Veena Devi on account of death of her husband. FAO No. 62 of 2018 has been preferred by the owner of the vehicle, whereas FAO No. 35 of 2021 has been filed by the insurer of the vehicle. Being inter-connected, these appeals are taken up together for decision. FAO No. 35 of 2021 2. Facts:- 2(i). Smt. Veena Devi (hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 1) filed a claim petition under Section 22 of the Employee's Compensation Act. She pleaded that she is widow of deceased Ishwar Singh. Her husband was employed as a driver by Ms. Sumitra (hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 2). Ishwar Singh was driving Vehicle No. HP-03C-1907 on 25.03.2010, when it met with an accident causing his death. The vehicle was owned by respondent No. 2. Ishwar Singh died during the course of his employment. He was 59 years of age at the time of accident. He was getting a salary of Rs. 8000/- per month. In all, a compensation of Rs. 15 Lakhs alongwith interest was claimed. 2(ii). Ms. Sumitra (respondent No. 2) opposed the claim petition. Her stand was that Ishwar Singh was not driving her vehicle in the capacity of driver. He was her husband and was driving the vehicle as her husband on 25.03.2010. She also pleaded that there was no relationship of employer and employee between her and the deceased. Alternatively, her case was that the vehicle in question was insured with the National Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the appellant). There was no breach of insurance policy, therefore, if at all the compensation is to be paid to the claimant/respondent No. 1, liability has to be fastened upon the appellant. 2(iii). The Insurance Company (appellant) in its reply to the claim petition admitted that the vehicle in question was insured with it, but it denied that the deceased was engaged as driver by respondent No. 2 and died during the course of such employment. 3. After considering the respective pleadings, evidence and contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties, the learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that the claimant/respondent No. 1 was legally wedded wife of Ishwar Singh. 3. After considering the respective pleadings, evidence and contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties, the learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that the claimant/respondent No. 1 was legally wedded wife of Ishwar Singh. Ishwar Singh was engaged as a driver by respondent No. 2. He died on 25.03.2010 while driving the Car bearing No. HP-03C-1907. The vehicle was owned by respondent No. 2. There was relationship of employer and employee between the deceased and respondent No. 2. The vehicle was insured with the appellant. The learned Commissioner determined the age of deceased Ishwar Singh at the time of accident as 63 years. His monthly income was assessed at Rs. 6000/-. In accordance with the provisions of the Employee's Compensation Act, as it existed prior to the amendment dated 25.03.2010, his monthly income was taken at Rs. 4000/-. As per the provisions of Section 4(1)(a) of the Act, 50% of the monthly wages (Rs. 2000/-) were multiplied with the corresponding relevant factor 106.52 keeping in view the age of the deceased at the time of accident. The payable compensation amount was worked out at Rs. 2,13,040/-. The claimant was also held entitled to interest @ 12% per annum w.e.f. 25.04.2010 on this amount. The interest was accordingly calculated as Rs. 2,06,648.8/-. The claimant, in all, was held entitled to total compensation of Rs. 4,19,688.8/-. Liability to pay the compensation amount of Rs. 2,13,040/- was fastened upon Ms. Sumitra (respondent No. 2) and liability to pay the interest component of Rs. 2,06,648.8/- was fastened upon the Insurance Company (present appellant). 4. Contentions:- Learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company contended that there was no relationship of employer and employee between respondent No. 2 and deceased Ishwar Singh. Ishwar Singh was residing with respondent No. 2 as her husband. He was driving the ill-fated vehicle on the date of accident in that capacity. Once there was no relationship of employer and employee, then, the Insurance Company could not have been held liable to pay either the compensation or the interest determined in the impugned award. To the similar effect is the submission made by learned counsel for Ms. Sumitra (respondent No. 2). Learned counsel submitted that the claimant did not reside with her husband Ishwar Singh. It was respondent No. 2, who was residing with Ishwar Singh. Both of them were living together as husband and wife. To the similar effect is the submission made by learned counsel for Ms. Sumitra (respondent No. 2). Learned counsel submitted that the claimant did not reside with her husband Ishwar Singh. It was respondent No. 2, who was residing with Ishwar Singh. Both of them were living together as husband and wife. Ishwar Singh was not employed by respondent No. 2 to drive her vehicle. The vehicle though was owned by respondent No. 2, but it was being driven by Ishwar Singh as her husband on 25.03.2010, when the vehicle met with an accident causing his death. Learned counsel for the claimant/respondent No. 1 argued that the appeals filed by the Insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle are not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 30 of the Act. No question of law is involved in these two appeals. The questions of fact being agitated by the insurer and the insured have been duly considered by the learned Commissioner after appreciating the entire evidence and material on record. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the case record. From the pleadings, evidence and respective contentions of the parties, following admitted factual position emerges:- (a). Claimant (respondent No. 1) was the lawfully wedded wife of deceased Ishwar Singh. (b). There was some matrimonial discord between the claimant and her husband Ishwar Singh. They were not residing together. The claimant while appearing as PW4, admitted that she was paid some kind of maintenance amount by her husband Ishwar Singh. (c). Ishwar Singh was aged around 63 years at the time of accident. Prior to his superannuation, he worked as a confirmed driver in Himachal Road Transport Corporation. Claimant/respondent No. 1 is the recipient of his pension. (d). Ishwar Singh was driving Vehicle No. HP-03C-1907 on 25.03.2010. This vehicle was owned by respondent No. 2 and insured by the appellant-Insurance Company. The vehicle met with an accident on 25.03.2010, resulting into Ishwar Singh's death. 5(i). It is the case of the claimant that her husband was in the employment of respondent No. 2. He was working as her driver and getting paid Rs. 8000/- per month in lieu of that. Claimant though has not produced any documentary evidence in that regard, but at the same time, respondent No. 2 has admitted the fact that the deceased was driving her vehicle on 25.03.2010. He was working as her driver and getting paid Rs. 8000/- per month in lieu of that. Claimant though has not produced any documentary evidence in that regard, but at the same time, respondent No. 2 has admitted the fact that the deceased was driving her vehicle on 25.03.2010. Her stand is that the vehicle was being driven by the deceased as her husband. No evidence has been led by her to prove that she was married with him. Learned Commissioner was justified in observing that the Act is a beneficial legislation, whereunder onus to prove is only in the nature of preponderance of evidence and the case is not required to be proved beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. In (2016) 11 SCC 201 , titled Jaya Biswal and others v. Branch Manager, IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Company Limited and another, Hon'ble Apex Court held that Employee's Compensation Act is a welfare legislation enacted to secure compensation to poor workmen, who suffer from injuries at their place of work. This legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependants in case of death of workman due to accident caused during and in the course of employment should be construed as such. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:- "20. The EC Act is a welfare legislation enacted to secure compensation to the poor workmen who suffer from injuries at their place of work. This becomes clear from a perusal of the preamble of the Act which reads as under: "An Act to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident." This further becomes clear from a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which reads as under: "......The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents. An additional advantage of legislation of this type is that, by increasing the importance for the employer of adequate safety devices, it reduces the number of accidents to workmen in a manner that cannot be achieved by official inspection. Further, the encouragement given to employers to provide adequate medical treatment for their workmen should mitigate the effects to such accidents as do occur. Further, the encouragement given to employers to provide adequate medical treatment for their workmen should mitigate the effects to such accidents as do occur. The benefits so conferred on the workman added to the increased sense of security which he will enjoy, should render industrial life more attractive and thus increase the available supply of labour. At the same time, a corresponding increase in the efficiency of the average workman may be expected." (emphasis supplied) 21. Thus, the EC Act is a social welfare legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependants in case of death of workman due to accident caused during and in the course of employment should be construed as such." 5(ii). The statement of the claimant/respondent No. 1 that the deceased was in employment with respondent No. 2 was not rebutted on behalf of the opposing respondents by leading any cogent evidence. Claimant is the legally wedded wife of the deceased and recipient of his pension. Fact of accident of the vehicle, fact of deceased's driving that vehicle and respondent No. 2's ownership of the vehicle are not in dispute. Under these circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the deceased was working as a driver under Ms. Sumitra (respondent No. 2) and he died while driving her Car bearing No. HP-03C-1907 on 25.03.2010. 5(iii). The insurer and the insured are agitating a finding of fact recorded by the learned Commissioner. It will be appropriate to extract Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, whereunder these appeals have been filed:- "30. Sumitra (respondent No. 2) and he died while driving her Car bearing No. HP-03C-1907 on 25.03.2010. 5(iii). The insurer and the insured are agitating a finding of fact recorded by the learned Commissioner. It will be appropriate to extract Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, whereunder these appeals have been filed:- "30. Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:- (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4-A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased [employee], or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees: Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: [Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.] (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of [the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)], shall be applicable to appeals under this section." In this regard, it will be appropriate to refer to (2014) 2 SCC 587 , titled T.S. Shylaja v. Oriental Insurance Company and another, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923, though provides for an appeal from the orders passed by the Commissioner as enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-Section (1), however, the proviso to Section 30(1) makes it abundantly clear that no such appeal shall lie unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. In the facts of that case, the deceased was employed as driver on a monthly salary of Rs. 6000/- by his own brother, owner of the vehicle. The Commissioner held the claimant entitled to the compensation. The High Court reversed the finding. Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Commissioner having appraised the evidence adduced before him, recorded a finding of fact that the deceased was indeed employed as a driver by the owner even if the owner happened to be his brother. That finding could not be lightly interfered with or reversed by the High Court. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:- "7. Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 no doubt provides for an appeal to the High Court from the orders passed by the Commissioner and enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) sub-Section (1) of Section 30. Proviso to Section 30(1), however, makes it abundantly clear that no such appeal shall lie unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b) unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees. 9. What is important is that in terms of the 1st proviso, no appeal is maintainable against any order passed by the Commissioner unless a substantial question of law is involved. This necessarily implies that the High Court would in the ordinary course formulate such a question or at least address the same in the judgment especially when the High Court takes a view contrary to the view taken by the Commissioner. 10. This necessarily implies that the High Court would in the ordinary course formulate such a question or at least address the same in the judgment especially when the High Court takes a view contrary to the view taken by the Commissioner. 10. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation had, in the case at hand, appraised the evidence adduced before him and recorded a finding of fact that the deceased was indeed employed as a driver by the owner of the vehicle no matter the owner happened to be his brother. That finding could not be lightly interfered with or reversed by the High Court. The High Court overlooked the fact that the respondent-owner of the vehicle had appeared as a witness and clearly stated that the deceased was his younger brother, but was working as a paid driver under him. The Commissioner had, in this regard, observed: "After examining the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relied upon by 2nd opponent it is seen that the owner of the vehicle being the sole witness has been unsuccessful in establishing his case but in this proceeding the owner of the vehicle has appeared before this Court even though he is a relative of the deceased, and has submitted in his objections, even evidence that even though the deceased was his younger brother he was working as a driver under him, and has admitted that he was paying salary to him. The applicant in support of his case has submitted Hon'ble High Court judgment reported in ILR 2006 KAR 518. The Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Yellappa Bheemappa Alagudi & Ors. which I have examined in depth which holds that there is no law that relatives cannot be in employer employee relationship. Therefore it is no possible to ignore the oral and documentary evidence in favour of the applicant and such evidence has to be weighed in favour of the applicant. For these reasons I hold that the deceased was working as driver under first opponent and driving Toyota Quails No. KA-02-C-423, that he died in accident on 03.09.2005, that he is a workman as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act and it is held that he has caused accident in the course of employment in a negligent fashion which has resulted in his death. 11. 11. The only reason which the High Court has given to upset the above finding of the Commissioner is that the Commissioner could not blindly accept the oral evidence without analysing the documentary evidence on record. We fail to appreciate as to what was the documentary evidence which the High Court had failed to appreciate and what was the contradiction, if any, between such documents and the version given by the witnesses examined before the Commissioner. The High Court could not have, without adverting to the documents vaguely referred to by it have upset the finding of fact which the Commissioner was entitled to record. Suffice it to say that apart from appreciation of evidence adduced before the Commissioner the High Court has neither referred to nor determined any question of law much less a substantial question of law existence whereof was a condition precedent for the maintainability of any appeal under Section 30. Inasmuch as the High court remained oblivious of the basic requirement of law for the maintainability of an appeal before it and inasmuch as it treated the appeal to be one on facts it committed an error which needs to be corrected." In (2017) 1 SCC 45 , titled Golla Rajanna and others v. Divisional Manager and another, it was held that under the scheme of the Act, the Commissioner is the last authority on facts. Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. In North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha, (2019) 11 SCC 514 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a Regular First Appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as under:- "9. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as under:- "9. At the outset, we may take note of the fact, being a settled principle, that the question as to whether the employee met with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the dependents of the deceased employee, the extent of disability caused to the employee due to injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and he/his LRs sue/s his employer to claim compensation under the Act. 10. The aforementioned questions are essentially the questions of fact and, therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon are regarded as the findings of fact. 11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner lie only against the specific orders set out in clause (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a further rider contained in first proviso to the Section that the appeal must involve substantial question of law. 12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a Regular First Appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case." In the instant case, learned Commissioner decided the questions of facts. He held the deceased to be an employee of respondent No. 2. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case." In the instant case, learned Commissioner decided the questions of facts. He held the deceased to be an employee of respondent No. 2. The factual assertion made by respondent No. 2 that deceased was her husband and was driving her vehicle in that capacity was turned down. All other relevant facts have been admitted by the parties. It is the admitted case that the claimant was legally wedded wife of the deceased. It was established that deceased was driving the vehicle of respondent No. 2 when it met with an accident causing his death. No cogent evidence or argument has been put forth to take a view different than the one taken by the learned Commissioner that deceased was driving the vehicle of respondent No. 2 as her employee. No substantial question of law is involved in the instant appeal. Therefore, no interference with the findings of facts recorded by the learned Commissioner is called for that Ishwar Singh had died in the course of his employment under Ms. Sumitra (respondent No. 2). The instant appeal filed by the Insurance Company, i.e. FAO No. 35 of 2021, is accordingly dismissed. FAO No. 62 of 2018 The findings recorded and observations made while deciding FAO No. 35 of 2021 are applicable to the instant appeal inasmuch as this appeal challenges the findings of learned Commissioner in respect to the relationship of employer and employee between the deceased Ishwar Singh and Ms. Sumitra (appellant herein). Learned counsel for the appellant Ms. Sumitra has raised an additional issue. Learned counsel contended that the vehicle in question was duly insured with the Insurance Company (appellant in FAO No. 35 of 2021). Learned Commissioner had determined Rs. 2,13,040/- as the compensation amount and Rs. 2,06,648.8/- towards the interest component on it. In terms of the impugned award, the liability to pay the compensation amount has been fastened upon the appellant (owner of the vehicle), whereas liability to pay the interest component has been fastened upon the Insurance Company (appellant in FAO No. 35 of 2021). Learned counsel argued that when the vehicle was duly insured with the Insurance Company, then the liability to pay the compensation amount also has to be fastened upon the Insurance Company. Learned counsel argued that when the vehicle was duly insured with the Insurance Company, then the liability to pay the compensation amount also has to be fastened upon the Insurance Company. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon (1997) AIR (SC) 3854, titled Ved Prakash Garg Vs. Premi Devi and others, in particular para 19 thereof, which is extracted hereinafter:- "19. As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that the question posed for our consideration must be answered partly in the affirmative and partly in the negative. In other words the insurance company will be liable to meet the claim for compensation along with interest as imposed on the insured employer by the Workmen's Commissioner under the Compensation Act on the conjoint operation of Section 3 and Section 4-A Sub-section (3)(a) of the Compensation Act. So far as additional amount of compensation by way of penalty imposed on the insured employer by the Workmen's Commissioner u/s. 4A(3)(b) is concerned, however, the insurance company would not remain liable to reimburse the said claim and it would be the liability of the insured employer alone." There can be no quarrel with the above statement of law that once the vehicle is duly insured and is being plied in accordance with the policy, then liability to pay the compensation amount has to be borne by the Insurance Company. It is not even the case of the Insurance Company that the vehicle was not being plied in accordance with the terms & conditions of the insurance policy. Under these circumstances, the liability to pay the compensation amount alongwith interest falls upon the Insurance Company. This submission of law is not even disputed by the learned counsel for Insurance Company (appellant in FAO No. 35 of 2021). Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The liability to pay the compensation amount alongwith interest component thereupon as determined in the impugned award shall be borne by the Insurance Company, i.e. appellant in FAO No. 35 of 2021. The appeal stands allowed in the above terms. The impugned award shall stand modified to that extent. With the aforesaid observations, the appeals stand disposed of.