JUDGMENT Sandeep K Shinde, J. - Plaintiffs in the Special Civil Suit No.72 of 2014 have preferred this appeals against the concurrent finding recorded by the two Courts below. FACTS: 2. Appellants (Plaintiffs instituted the suit for possession of the suit lands described in paragraph 1 of the plaint. Plaintiffs would assert that vide two agreements dated 19th Aprils 2001 and 7th Decembers 2001 they had agreed to sell the suit lands to the defendants on distinct terms conditions and for consideration stated therein. Vide agreement dated 19th Aprils 2001 possession of the land admeasuring 8 R and vide agreement dated 7th Decembers 2001s possession of the land admeasuring 0.02 R of Survey No.72/4 was handed over to the defendants. Vide Clause (11) and (14) of the agreements plaintiffs had agreed to secure requisite permissions for executing the sale deeds at their costs including the Nazrana or premium payable for conversion of occupancy class. Plaintiffs alleged breach of agreement terms and unauthorised use and illegal construction on the suit lands. On these grounds they sought decree of possession. Defendants made counterclaim and sought decree of specific performance of agreements dated 19th Aprils 2001 and 7th Decembers 2001. The Trial Court dismissed the suit; but decreed the counterclaim. Appellate Court confirmed the decree of the Trial Court on 4th Decembers 2009. Feeling aggrieved Plaintiffs have preferred this Second Appeal. 3. Mr. Hardas learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Courts below erred in dismissing the suit only on the ground that the Plaintiffs did not seek relief of cancellation of agreements dated 19th Aprils 2001 and 7th Decembers 2001. In support of this submissions Mr. Hardas learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah and Another, (1989) 3 SCC 612 . Facts of the said case were that suit for perpetual injunction was decreed by the Trial Court. However the First Appellate Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable as the relief claimed was limited to permanent injunction without seeking decree to declare the Plaintiffs' title. In the context of these facts it was held that suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that relief of declaration of title and possession has not been specifically mentioned in the plaint. In the context of these facts it was held that suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that relief of declaration of title and possession has not been specifically mentioned in the plaint. But to say plaint was clearly indicative of foundation of claim of the Plaintiffs which they have pleaded in express terms. In the case at hands defendants constructed house on the suit land nine years before and Plaintiffs vide letter dated 19th Januarys 2002 addressed to Electricity Board acknowledged construction of house and consented for installing electricity meter in the house. More so vide another letter addressed to Corporations Plaintiffs consented to supply water connection. So far as the pleadings in the plaints paragraphs 5 and 6 Plaintiffs would plead and assert that defendants have changed the user of the suit lands contrary to the terms of the agreements and also failed to perform agreements by declining to pay balance consideration. It appears from paragraph 6 that Plaintiffs were apprehensive that defendants would make additional construction on the suit lands. Whereas in paragraph 7s it is pleaded that on 13th Decembers 2019s defendants demanded thirty Lakhs from the Plaintiffs to hand over possession of the suit lands. On the affirmation of these facts Plaintiffs sought vacant possession of the suit lands. As stated above Plaintiffs did not seek relief of cancellation of the agreements. In facts it can be discerned from reading of the plaint that Plaintiffs were aggrieved either because defendants did not pay balance amount of consideration or they were likely to make additional construction. Herein evidence suggests defendants had constructed house on the suit lands in 2000-01 and it was within the knowledge of the Plaintiffs. For the reasons not known suit was instituted nearly after nine years and that too without seeking relief of rescission of agreements. Evidence also suggests that agreements were acted upon substantially by both the Plaintiffs and defendants soon after its execution. This could be one of the reasons as to why Plaintiffs did not seek relief of rescission of contracts. Be that as it may in the light of pleadings in my views exclusion of relief seeking cancellation of two agreements was not inconsistent with the pleadings. Yet if submissions of Mr. Hardas are accepted it would change the entire form and frame of the suit which is impermissible. Be that as it may in the light of pleadings in my views exclusion of relief seeking cancellation of two agreements was not inconsistent with the pleadings. Yet if submissions of Mr. Hardas are accepted it would change the entire form and frame of the suit which is impermissible. Resultantly upon reading the entire plaints I am of the view that the suit was necessarily fled to restrain the defendants from making the construction on the suit lands. In view of the reasons stated above the first contention of Mr. Hardas is rejected. 4. Mr. Hardas learned counsels would submit that there was no cogent and reliable evidence to grant specific performance of both the agreements in-as-much as the evidence does not show or establish that the defendants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. In support of this contentions he has pointed outs that out of total consideration for two agreements Rs.288000/- were due and payable as on the date of the institution of the suit. It is pointed out that out of Rs.288000/-s Rs.116000/- were paid but it was only against agreement dated 19th Aprils 2001. Submission is that as against the second said agreement dated 7th Decembers 2001s there is no evidence to establish that the defendants were ready and willing to pay balance consideration. In facts evidence is otherwise. Two Courts have recorded finding of 'fact'. Thus no interference is called for. 5. It is not in dispute that under the agreement dated 19th Aprils 2001 vide Clause (1) Plaintiffs had agreed to obtain requisite permissions from the authorities and pay Nazrana/ Premium for conversion of occupancy class. In the light of these stipulations in the agreements I do not see any reasons to interfere with the decree passed by the Courts below. 6. In consideration of the facts and for the reasons stated appeal does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Appeal is dismissed. 7. As the Second Appeal itself is disposed of nothing survives in the Civil Application therein and same is also disposed of.