JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard with the consent of learned counsel for the parties through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual quality. I.A. No. 6316 of 2020 Perused the office note. As per the office note, this appeal, in view of different orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as recorded therein passed in suo motu Writ (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 as well as order dated 27.04.2021 passed in Misc. Application No. 665 of 2021 in suo motu Writ (Civil) No. 3 of 2020, is not time barred. There is no reason for not accepting the aforesaid note of the office. Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, learned Addl. AG-I, seeks leave to withdraw the limitation petition being I.A. No. 6316 of 2020, because the office has reported that the appeal is not time barred. Accordingly, I.A. No. 6316 of 2020 is permitted to be withdrawn. L.P.A. No. 382 of 2020 The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause-10 of Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 08.07.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 5272 of 2019, whereby and whereunder, the orders passed by the Administrative Authority dated 20.10.2011 and 07.01.2015, by which, recovery of Rs. 2,15,381/- has been directed to be made from the writ petitioner have been quashed with a direction upon the respondents that the amount so recovered, if any, be refunded in favour of the writ petitioner with a further direction to make payment of arrears of salary and arrears of 6th Pay Revision and other admissible dues, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 2. The brief facts of the case required to be enumerated which reads as hereunder: The writ petitioner was appointed as Junior Assistant vide office order as contained in memo no. 108 dated 31.01.1984. The writ petitioner has joined and started discharging his duty from 14.02.1984. He was granted Junior and Senior Selection Grade vide office order as contained in memo no. 1195 dated 09.11.1999. According to the writ petitioner, even though, he has rendered a considerable period of service, entitling him the benefit of grant of Junior and Senior Selection Grade and accordingly, he was granted the same w.e.f. 14.02.1989 and 14.02.1994 vide office order as contained in memo no. 1195 dated 09.11.1999. 1195 dated 09.11.1999. According to the writ petitioner, even though, he has rendered a considerable period of service, entitling him the benefit of grant of Junior and Senior Selection Grade and accordingly, he was granted the same w.e.f. 14.02.1989 and 14.02.1994 vide office order as contained in memo no. 1195 dated 09.11.1999. The Finance Department of Government of Bihar came out with a resolution dated 08.02.1999 for implementation of the recommendation of the 5th Pay Revision which contains a Clause as under Clause-11 which clearly stipulates that all time bound promotions as well as the selection grade granted to the employees stand cancelled in the new pay scales. The respondent authority has come out with a decision as contained in memo no. 1381 dated 20.10.2011, whereby and whereunder, the date of grant of junior selection has been modified and senior selection grade granted to the writ petitioner has been cancelled with a direction to recover the excess due to such promotions and accordingly, a sum of Rs. 2,15,381/- has been directed to be recovered from the writ petitioner in 40 installments. The writ petitioner has approached to this Court on the basis of the fact that one Sanat Kumar Das in similar circumstances has approached to this Court by filing the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 149 of 2012 and Coordinate learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the writ petition vide order dated 12.12.2017 and in pursuant to the directions of this Court, the recovered amount has been paid vide letter as contained in letter no. 1438 dated 04.12.2018. In another similar writ petition preferred by one Srikant Prasad Suman who has also preferred writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 888 of 2012, similar direction/order has been passed vide order dated 14.08.2018 as was passed in W.P. (S) No. 149 of 2012. The learned Single Judge after considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter and taking into consideration the fact that the writ petitioner has also made a representation to that effect on 26.07.2019 but no decision has been taken, has allowed the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 5272 of 2019, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 3. Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, learned AAG-I appearing for the State-appellant has raised the question of delay caused by the writ petitioner in preferring the writ petition in the year 2019. 3. Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, learned AAG-I appearing for the State-appellant has raised the question of delay caused by the writ petitioner in preferring the writ petition in the year 2019. According to her, the cause of action arose to the writ petitioner in the year 2011 and 2015 but he has not approached to the Court of Law and only after the order passed by this Court in W.P. (S) No. 149 of 2012 and W.P. (S) No. 888 of 2012, the writ petition has been filed and the learned Single Judge without appreciating the issue of delay and laches, has quashed the decision taken by the authority in this regard and therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of Law. 4. Counsel for the Accountant General and the writ petitioner have appeared. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted that there is no question of delay and laches as because the writ petition has been filed in the year 2019, while the order has been passed by the competent authority for recovery of the amount as in the Month of January, 2015 in pursuant to the decision of the authority dated 20.10.2011 and since the recovery of an amount of Rs. 2,15,381/- has been made which has been directed to be recovered in 40 installments and therefore, even the writ petition has been filed after lapse of about three years, the same cannot be said to be barred by principle of delay and laches. Further, the writ petitioner has made representation on 26.07.2019 but the authority concerned has not taken any decision, therefore, the writ petitioner has approached to this Court against the appellants for their inaction for taking no decision on the basis of the law laid down by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 149 of 2012 and W.P. (S) No. 888 of 2012. He further submits that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration these aspects of the matter and rejected such objection as would be evident from the impugned order. He further submits that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration these aspects of the matter and rejected such objection as would be evident from the impugned order. He further submits by referring to the decision of the State Government in the circular issued by the Finance Department of the erstwhile State of Bihar dated 08.02.1999, wherein, it has been decided that payment of arrears in the existing scale in pursuant to the grant of benefit of time bound promotions and selection grades would be made only upto 31st December, 1995 after which, the promotion deemed to have been automatically terminated and therefore, it cannot be said that anything was required to be recovered from the writ petitioner. This Court has already adjudicated upon the issue in the said writ petition, therefore, the authorities ought to have been taken decision by recalling the order of recovery passed against the writ petitioner. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 7. Before proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned decision, the admitted fact is required to be referred herein which reads hereunder as: The writ petitioner has been appointed on 14.02.1984 and when he has not been granted any regular promotion under the Scheme of grant of upgradation in the pay scale by way of time bound promotion (1st and 2nd) and the Junior and Senior Selection Grade, his case was considered by the Committee and he has been found eligible and thereafter, the Junior and Senior Selection Grade has been granted in his favour w.e.f. 14.02.1989 and 14.02.1994 respectively vide office order as contained in memo no. 1195 dated 09.11.1999. 1195 dated 09.11.1999. The erstwhile State of Bihar has come out with a resolution through its Finance Department dated 08.02.1999 in the backdrop of the fact that the resolution for revision of scale of pay based upon the recommendation of the Fitment Committee, one of the Clause as under Clause-11 reads hereunder as: “The State Government have decided to abolish the existing facilities of Time Bound Promotions and Selection Grades, discussed in Paras 10 and 12 of F.D. Resolution No. 6021 dated 18th December, 1989 and they shall cease to be applicable with effect from 1st January, 1996 and thereafter in the existing pay scales, if any such promotion, however, is due under the Rules before 1st January, 1996, it shall be given and the payment of arrears in the existing scale shall be made only upto 31st December, 1995 after which the promotion would be deemed to have been automatically terminated. While fixing pay in the revised scales, such promotions given after 31st December, 1995 will not be taken into consideration. If such promotions have been given after 31st December, 1995 then the question of adjustment of such additional emoluments obtained in the process, will be decided after the Fitment Committee submits its recommendations on Promotion Policy. Promotion to any vacancy of a post identified as need based post would be admissible, the Procedure for identification of such need based posts has been set out in Paragraph 12.” It is evident from the aforesaid decision that the State Government has decided to abolish the existing facilities of Time Bound Promotions and Selection Grades and accordingly, it has been ceased to be applicable w.e.f. 1st January, 1996 and thereafter in the existing pay scales, if any such promotion, however, is due under the Rules before 1st January, 1996, it shall be given and the payment of arrears in the existing scale shall be made only upto 31st December, 1995 after which the promotion would be deemed to have been automatically cancelled. While fixing pay in the revised scales, such promotions given after 31st December, 1995 will not be taken into consideration. If such promotions have been given after 31st December, 1995 then the question of adjustment of such additional emoluments obtained in the process, will be decided after the Fitment Committee submits its recommendations on Promotion Policy. While fixing pay in the revised scales, such promotions given after 31st December, 1995 will not be taken into consideration. If such promotions have been given after 31st December, 1995 then the question of adjustment of such additional emoluments obtained in the process, will be decided after the Fitment Committee submits its recommendations on Promotion Policy. Thus, it is evident that whatever benefit by way of time bound promotion or the Selection Grade was to be given i.e. only upto the period of 31st December, 1995. Further, it appears that if anybody has not been granted such benefit, it has been decided to be granted but the financial benefit would only upto the period of 31st December, 1995. Herein, the respondent authorities of the State of Jharkhand has taken decision vide order as contained in memo no. 1195 dated 09.11.1999, by which, the writ petitioner has been granted benefit of Junior and Senior Selection grade w.e.f. 14.02.1989 and 14.02.1994 respectively. The said decision has been taken in pursuant to the decision of the Finance Department in its resolution dated 08.02.1999 to the effect that the benefit of Junior/Senior Selection Grade or Time Bound Promotions, if not given in favour of one or the other employees who are eligible, the same is to be given but the financial benefit would only upto the period of 31st December, 1995. It is evident from the order passed by the authority dated 20.10.2011 appended as Annexure-4 to the writ petition, wherein, the concerned authority has taken decision for cancellation of the benefit of upgradation in pay scale in the light of the Government Circular No. 660/V. dated 08.02.1999 but the question herein is that when the government itself has taken decision for cancellation of such upgradation in pay scale either by way of Time Bound Promotion or by way of granting Junior and Senior Selection Grade whether it was required for the State authority to come out with a fresh decision as per the order dated 20.10.2011. According to our considered view, there was no requirement to come out with such decision by the authority concerned in view of the fact that the Government Resolution, which is by way of executive instruction, has already come out for deemed cancellation of such benefit on or after 31st December, 1995. According to our considered view, there was no requirement to come out with such decision by the authority concerned in view of the fact that the Government Resolution, which is by way of executive instruction, has already come out for deemed cancellation of such benefit on or after 31st December, 1995. It further appears that the concerned authority has not only cancelled such benefits rather the direction has also been passed for recovery of excess amount but the question is that when the Government has taken a policy decision for deemed cancellation of promotion by way of executive instruction which is through the Cabinet and assented by the Governor of the State, the Chief Engineer cannot be allowed to sit over such decision by passing order of recovery of the amount. We are coming to such conclusion as, if there would have been any intention of making recovery, it would have been stipulated in the resolution dated 08.02.1999 as contained in resolution no. 660/V. but there is no such stipulation of recovery of excess amount and that cannot be, because there is no fault on the part of one or the other employees, if any benefit of upgradation in pay scale has been given in favour of one or the other employees and if the government is coming out with a policy decision by cancelling the earlier benefits and if in such circumstances, if there would have been any order or decision of the State Government of recovery, then the question would be why such recovery, when there is no fault on the part of concerned employee and that is the reason, in the government resolution, there was no stipulation of making any recovery rather only stipulation that the benefit of upgradation would be admissible only upto the period of 31st December, 1995 and it will be ceased to be applicable w.e.f. 1st January, 1996 and further the employees who have not been granted such benefits, it has been decided, in the said policy decision, to extend such benefit making it effective so far as the financial benefits are concerned only upto the period of 31st December, 1995. The learned Single Judge while passing such order has considered the order passed by the Coordinate Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 149 of 2012, wherein, the order has been passed deprecating the stand of the State Government of recovery by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab vs. Rafiq Masih, (2015) 4 SCC 334 and another order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 888 of 2012. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State has raised the issue of delay and laches, which according to her has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge but we, on consideration of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge has found that even the ground of delay and laches has been considered by the learned Single Judge and the same has been rejected on the ground that delay of two or three years cannot be a good ground to throw the writ petition. We cannot come to a conclusion about any infirmity in such finding for the following reasons: (i) The State Government being a welfare State if has come out with a policy decision, it has to be followed in entirety but the government has failed in discharging its duty, for the reason that when the resolution dated 08.02.1999 stipulates to grant benefit of upgradation upto 31st December, 1995 but such benefit has not been granted which is the gross laches on the part of the authority. (ii) The principle of fence sitter can only be made applicable when there is delay and laches on the part of the concerned employee but when policy decision has been taken by the State Government, it is the requirement on the part of the State Government to follow the said policy decision uniformly to all concerned. But herein the policy decision dated 08.02.1999 has not been followed scrupulously and uniformly upon all otherwise the benefit of upgradation has been granted in favour of the writ petitioner. But herein the policy decision dated 08.02.1999 has not been followed scrupulously and uniformly upon all otherwise the benefit of upgradation has been granted in favour of the writ petitioner. The issue of fence sitter has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 347 , wherein, at paragraph 18 and 19, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold: “18.......in U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 where the issue was pertaining to entitlement of the employees of U.P. Jal Nigam to continue in service up to the age of 60 years. In Harwindra Kumar vs. Chief Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300 this Court had earlier held that these employees were in fact entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60 years. After the aforesaid decision, a spate of writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court by those who had retired long back. The question that arose for consideration was as to whether the employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement orders, and accepted the same, and had collected their post-retirement benefits as well, could be given relief in the light of the decision delivered in Harwindra Kumar (2005) 13 SCC 300 . The Court refused to extend the benefit applying the principle of delay and laches. It was held that an important factor in exercise of discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is laches and delay. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces into the situation, his writ petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to him as was granted to the persons similarly situated who were vigilant about their rights and challenged their retirement. In Para 7, the Court quoted from Rup Diamonds (1989) 2 SCC 356 . In Para 8, S.M. Kotrayya (1996) 6 SCC 267 was taken note of. 19. Some other judgments on the same principle of laches and delay are taken note of in Paras 9 to 11 which are as follows: “9. In Para 7, the Court quoted from Rup Diamonds (1989) 2 SCC 356 . In Para 8, S.M. Kotrayya (1996) 6 SCC 267 was taken note of. 19. Some other judgments on the same principle of laches and delay are taken note of in Paras 9 to 11 which are as follows: “9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) “The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Union of India vs. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 . The appellants’ desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage.” 10. In Union of India vs. C.K. Dharagupta, (1997) 3 SCC 395 it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, Para 9) “9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi vs. Union of India gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief.” 11. In Govt. of West Bengal vs. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 , Their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-360, Para 34) “34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-360, Para 34) “34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in State of West Bengal vs. Debdas Kumar, (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 138. The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law.” In view of the aforesaid ratio and in the facts and circumstances of the principle of fence sitter, is not applicable herein. (iii) The writ petitioner has made a representation before the concerned authority on the basis of two orders passed by the writ Court in W.P. (S) No. 149 of 2012 and W.P. (S) No. 888 of 2012, but the appellants have cared not to take any decision either way which cannot be appreciated, it is for the reason that if any grievance is being raised by one or the other employees based upon the cogent cause supported by the order passed by the writ Court, it is incumbent upon the concerned authority to take decision either rejecting or allowing but in no stretch of imagination, the same can be kept pending for years together but herein the representation filed by the writ petitioner has not been responded which led the writ petitioner to approach to this Court by invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, on this ground also the writ petition should not have been thrown out by the learned Single Judge and rightly been entertained by the learned Single Judge. 9. We after taking into consideration the facts as discussed hereinabove in entirety, are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference. 10. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed. 11. In consequent thereto, I.A. No. 6317 of 2020 stands disposed of.