JUDGMENT : JYOTI MULIMANI, J. 1. Sri. Varadarajan M.S. learned counsel for appellant and Sri. V. Rangaramu, learned counsel for proposed respondent No. 1 (1 to 4) have appeared through video conferencing. 2. This is an appeal from the Court of Senior Civil Judge and C.J.M. Chamrajnagar. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the trial Court. 4. A Suit was filed for a decree of permanent injunction with respect to the suit schedule property. 5. The plaint averments are as under: Plaintiff has stated that the suit schedule property originally belonged to his grandfather Venkatashetty. He had executed a sale deed on 23.06.1928 with respect to the suit property in favor of one Chennashetty. That there was also a re-conveyance agreement. Accordingly, Chennashetty executed a document on 06.06.1948. It is stated that Chennashetty returned the original sale deed dated 23.06.1928 to Venkatashetty and also received back the sale consideration amount mentioned in the sale deed from Venkatashetty and he was also put back in possession of the suit schedule property and the same was in the enjoyment of Venkatashetty. After the death of Venkatashetty, plaintiffs father came into possession of the suit property. That later plaintiff came into possession of the same and enjoying the same in his own right. When things stood thus defendant No. 1 approached the Commissioner, City Municipality, Chamarajanagar Town seeking Khata change in his favor. In spite of plaintiff filing objections, the Commissioner entered the name of defendant No. 1 as the Khathadar of the suit property. That the plaintiff’s attempt to get the same set aside before the higher authorities was of no avail. Therefore, plaintiff initiated action seeking appropriate reliefs. 6. In furtherance of issue of summons, defendants 1 and 2 filed written statement inter-alia contended that Venkatashetty is brother of Puttashetty. That one Subbamma was the wife of Venkatashetty. That Subbamma was a close relative of Yalakkappana Chennashetty. That at the request of Subbamma, Chennashetty’s daughter in law executed a Hakkupathra on 18.06.1983 in favor of Subbamma. It is also contended that Subbamma sold the property in question to Sarojamma through a registered sale deed 13.08.1987 and to the sale-deed, plaintiffs’ mother is an attestor. That plaintiff’s grandfather Venkatashetty and plaintiff’s father had retained property measuring 2 ankanas on the north west corners. It is also contended that Subbamma sold the property in question to Sarojamma through a registered sale deed 13.08.1987 and to the sale-deed, plaintiffs’ mother is an attestor. That plaintiff’s grandfather Venkatashetty and plaintiff’s father had retained property measuring 2 ankanas on the north west corners. That the exact measurement of the property so retained is east to west 18 feet and north to south 16 feet. The property was assigned assessment number 513/489. They also contended that out of this property, plaintiff and his mother Chinnamma and his brother Varadaraju have sold east to west 16 feet and north to south 16 feet to one Manikaymma wife of Najunda Shetty through a registered sale deed dated 07.11.1988. That Manikaymma in turn sold the said property i.e. 16 feet x 16 feet to the second defendant through a registered sale deed dated 18.05.2000. Therefore, plaintiff cannot claim to be the owner of the suit schedule property and the documents produced by him are concocted. In their written statement, they also made a reference to the suit filed by the plaintiff against Sarojamma in O.S. No. 39/1997 with respect to the suit schedule property which came to be dismissed. The first defendant in his written statement further asserted that, he has succeeded to the suit property through Chennashetty and that therefore Khata of the suit property is rightly changed in his favor. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 7. Based upon the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing the suit? 2. Whether the plaintiff further proves that the alleged interference are true? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for Permanent injunction as sought for? 4. What order and decree?” 8. During the trial of the suit, plaintiff examined himself as PW-1, produced documents and got marked as Exs.P1 to P27. Three witnesses were examined as PWs. 2 to 4. Basavashetty the GPA holder of defendant No. 2 was examined as DW-1, produced documents and got marked as Exs.D1 to D9 in support of the case of defendants 1 and 2. 9. On the trial of action, the suit came to be dismissed. On appeal the First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Basavashetty the GPA holder of defendant No. 2 was examined as DW-1, produced documents and got marked as Exs.D1 to D9 in support of the case of defendants 1 and 2. 9. On the trial of action, the suit came to be dismissed. On appeal the First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Therefore, this second appeal under section 100 of CPC. 10. Learned counsel Sri. M.S. Varadarajan appearing on behalf of appellant submitted that trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court could not have decided the way it was. Next, he submitted that both the Courts grossly erred in placing reliance on the judgment and decree passed in an earlier suit though defendants were not parties to the said suit. A further submission was made that both the Courts failed to appreciate that earlier suit was a title suit while the present suit, being one for only permanent injunction the question of title was hardly relevant. Counsel submitted that both the Courts committed an error in relying on an earlier sale deed said to have been executed by plaintiffs’ grandfather - Venkatashetty though the said sale deed had not been produced or exhibited by the defendants. In this context the Courts failed to appreciate that suit being one for permanent injunction, the alleged sale transaction hardly mattered, since plaintiff’s grandfather continued to be in possession of the property in question. Learned counsel vehemently urged that the Courts erred in placing reliance on Exs.D-2 and D-3 and also misinterpreted the recital in Ex.P-25. Lastly, he submitted that viewed from any angle the judgments and decrees of both the Courts are clearly perverse and are opposed to the facts and probabilities of the case. Therefore, he submitted that this second appeal may be admitted by framing substantial questions of law. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel Sri. V. Rangaramu justified the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. He submitted that the both the Courts have in extenso referred to the material on record and accordingly passed the judgment and decree. Lastly, he sought to sustain the judgment and decree of the Courts as being well merited, fully justified and not calling for any interference by this Court. He submitted that the both the Courts have in extenso referred to the material on record and accordingly passed the judgment and decree. Lastly, he sought to sustain the judgment and decree of the Courts as being well merited, fully justified and not calling for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, he submitted that the second appeal does not involve any substantial questions of law and therefore, the same may be dismissed at the stage of admission itself. 12. Heard the contentions urged on behalf of parties and perused the record with care. 13. The suit giving rise to this appeal was brought by the plaintiff for a decree of permanent injunction. 14. As could be seen from the nature of the lis between the parties, the suit is for bare injunction based on possession as on the date of suit. The right to injunction is based on prima-facie right. The specific plea of the plaintiff is that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property measuring 32 x 73 feet. But defendants denied the contention. It is pivotal to note that plaintiff had filed a suit against one Sarojamma in O.S. No. 39/1994 for a decree of declaration with respect of the suit schedule property. After contest, the suit came to be dismissed holding that plaintiff failed to prove his ownership and possession over the suit property. 15. In the present suit plaintiff has urged that he is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as on the date of the suit. On the trial of the action the trial Judge found that plaintiff has not produced any documentary records to evidence the possession. 16. It would be relevant to observe that in a suit for bare injunction, plaintiff is required to prove his/her lawful possession as on the date of the suit. On the basis of the material proof, the trial Judge held that plaintiff is not in possession of the schedule property. The First Appellate Court examined the evidence on record and re-appraised it. I am satisfied that it has been appreciated in right perspective. 17. It is perhaps well to observe here that after the 1976 amendment, the scope of Section 100 of CPC has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The First Appellate Court examined the evidence on record and re-appraised it. I am satisfied that it has been appreciated in right perspective. 17. It is perhaps well to observe here that after the 1976 amendment, the scope of Section 100 of CPC has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Court would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 of CPC only in a case where substantial question of law is involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. 18. No substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this second appeal. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal and accordingly, it is dismissed at the stage of admission.