ORDER : 1. This writ petition is directed against the order of detention dated 19.04.2021 (Annexure-A) and its confirmation thereof dated 29.04.2021 (Annexure-C) passed by respondent Nos. 3 and 1 respectively. 2. This writ petition came to be filed on 04.05.2021 and was listed for ‘Orders’ on 05.05.2021. On the said date, the High Court Government Pleader (for short ‘HCGP’) accepted notice for respondents. Coordinate Bench heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner and an interim order came to be passed as under: “In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the material on record and the decisions relied upon by the petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that pending decision in this petition, the impugned order of the detention dated 19.04.2021 at Annexure-A and the impugned order of confirmation dated 29.04.2021 at Annexure-C deserve to be stayed and the detenue Sri.Hariraj Shetty is to be directed to be released forthwith by the respondents, subject to the condition that he shall not indulge in any activities which are prohibited under said Act of 1985 henceforth or any other illegal activities and shall not leave the jurisdiction of respondent No. 3 - Police Authorities.” 3. Pursuant to above direction, detenue came to be released on 06.05.2021. An application under Section 151 CPC has been moved by the State on 27.05.2021 for vacating the interim order dated 05.05.2021, for the reasons assigned therein. On the same day, statement of objections to the writ petition has also been filed. 4. Though, Sri. V.S. Hegde, learned Special Public Prosecutor-II (for short SPP-II) initially insisted for application for vacating the stay being taken up, later agreed for the writ petition itself being disposed of, since learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner also agreed for the said proposition. Hence, we have heard the arguments of learned Advocates appearing for the parties namely, Sri. Ravi B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. V.S. Hegde, learned SPP-II appearing for the respondents-State. Learned SPP-II was directed to produce the original records and same has been tendered. We have perused the entire original records. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: 5. Ravi B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. V.S. Hegde, learned SPP-II appearing for the respondents-State. Learned SPP-II was directed to produce the original records and same has been tendered. We have perused the entire original records. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: 5. The Assistant Commissioner of Police, CCB, Special Enquiry, submitted a representation to third respondent requesting for passing an order of detention against the petitioner's husband under The Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video and Audio Pirates Act, 1985 (for short ‘Goonda Act’). Third respondent passed an order of detention on 19.04.2021 under the Goonda Act after opining that detenue with an intention of gaining money illegally, has indulged in conducting gambling dens and incited general public to involve in gambling activities, which is prohibited under law and as a result of it, innocent people of the Society had indulged in gambling and lost their money, properties and their families. It is also held thereunder the activities of detenue revealed that there are number of instances disclosing that he had been instrumental in causing financial loss to the general public. In sum and substance, it came to be held by the detaining authority that activities of the detenue is detrimental to the interest of the Society at large. Hence, third respondent after deriving subjective satisfaction, passed the order of detention on 19.04.2021 (Annexure-A). 6. The detenue was secured on 20.04.2021 from his residence and after being informed about the order of detention passed against him, he was brought to the Central Crime Branch - CCB and arrested. The order of detention along with grounds of detention and documents relied upon came to be served on the detenue. In token of having received the same, detenue has acknowledged the same. The counsel for detenue was also intimated about the arrest on being informed by the detenue, which is also acknowledged, who had come to collect the mobile phone of the detenue. The documents which were relied upon for passing the order of detention, have been produced by the respondent along with their statement of objections and receipt of same has been duly acknowledged by the detenue. Order of detention dated 19.04.2021 came to be confirmed by the first respondent on 29.04.2021 (Annexure-C). The documents which were relied upon for passing the order of detention, have been produced by the respondent along with their statement of objections and receipt of same has been duly acknowledged by the detenue. Order of detention dated 19.04.2021 came to be confirmed by the first respondent on 29.04.2021 (Annexure-C). During this interregnum period i.e. between 20.04.2021 to 29.04.2021 petitioner submitted a representation dated 26.04.2021 (Annexure-B) against the order of detention to the first respondent. 7. On order of confirmation being passed on 29.04.2021, writ petition came to be filed on 04.05.2021, as noted hereinabove. In fact, order sheet of this writ petition would disclose there were several office objections raised on the writ petitioner by the registry, which was required to be complied and on account of memo for posting having been moved before the Vacation Bench and as ordered by the Bench, matter came to be listed on 05.05.2021. As already noticed hereinabove, learned HCGP accepted notice for respondents and before counter affidavit or statement of objections could be filed, Coordinate Bench (Vacation Bench) heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and passed an interim order staying the operation of impugned orders namely, order of detention dated 19.04.2021 (Annexure-A) and its confirmation thereof dated 29.04.2021 (Annexure-B) and also ordered for release of the detenue forthwith. 8. On the ground that writ petition is not maintainable and it is premature amongst other grounds as urged in the interlocutory application namely, I.A. No. 1/2021, State has sought for vacating of the interim order passed on 05.05.2021. In fact, statement of objections to the writ petition has also been filed by the respondents. 9. We have heard Sri. Ravi B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri. V.S. Hegde, learned SPP-II appearing for the respondent-State. 10. Sri. Ravi B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that writ petition is maintainable and contention to the contrary is liable to be rejected. He submits that even before the detenue is taken into custody, writ petition can be filed as held by Apex Court as right of freedom of an individual will be at stake. He would support the interim order passed on 05.05.2021 by contending that it is akin to an unconditional bail order. He submits that even before the detenue is taken into custody, writ petition can be filed as held by Apex Court as right of freedom of an individual will be at stake. He would support the interim order passed on 05.05.2021 by contending that it is akin to an unconditional bail order. He would submit that on order of detention being served, representation was submitted by the detenue on 26.04.2021 to the State, which was required to be considered expeditiously and even till date same having not been considered, order of detention is illegal. He would also submit there is no explanation forthcoming for the delay in not considering the representation and as such order of detention is to be construed as illegal. Elaborating his submission he would contend that even the relied upon documents are not furnished to the detenue and as such, he is entitled to the relief sought for. By reiterating the grounds urged in the writ petition and placing reliance on the following judgments, he prays for allowing the writ petition and has sought for quashing of the impugned order of detention and its confirmation thereof: (i) Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 97 (ii) Jayanarayan Sukul vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 675 (iii) Pabitra N. Rana vs. Union of India and Others, 1990 (1) SCR 98 (iv) Dulal Roy vs. The District Magistrate, Burdwan and Others, AIR 1975 SC 1508 (v) Unreported Judgment of High Court of Karnataka Passed in W.P. Nos. 10601-10602/2018, dated 06.03.2019 (vi) Sadhu Roy vs. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 919 (vii) Smt. Dharmista Bhagat vs. State of Karnataka and Another, 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 155 (viii) Archana vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, W.P. No. 14680/2015, dated 26.06.2015 (ix) State of Bihar vs. Rambalak Singh, (1966) 3 SCR 344 (x) Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1999) 1 SCC 417 (xi) Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2008) 16 SCC 14 (xii) State of Maharashtra vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613 (xiii) Addl. Secretary to Govt. of India vs. Sri. Subhash Gadia, (1992) 1 SCC 496 11. Per contra, Sri. Secretary to Govt. of India vs. Sri. Subhash Gadia, (1992) 1 SCC 496 11. Per contra, Sri. V.S. Hegde, learned SPP-II appearing for the State would contend that under the Goonda Act petitioner has a remedy to go before the Government or before the Advisory Board for setting aside the detention order and even before taking such steps, he has invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this court and as such, writ petition is to be dismissed as not maintainable and premature. He would also contend that release of a detenue on parole after an order of detention is made, is the prerogative of State Government. He would contend that detenue is kept in custody to achieve the object of the legislature and as such release of detenue would be contrary to the purpose of statute. He would submit that detenue seeking the benefit of temporary release/relief, has to necessarily approach the Government under Section 15 of the Goonda Act and Court cannot usurp the function of the Government. He would also submit that this court would not sit as an Appellate Court over the order of detention and it would be unsafe to go into and assess the probative value of the evidence, which was available before the detaining authority. He would also contend that court cannot substitute its view or opinion for the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority. Hence, by relying upon the following judgments, he prays for vacating the interim order granted on 05.05.2021 and prays for dismissal of the writ petition: (i) Poonam Latha vs. M.L. Vadhawan and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 347 (ii) Smt. Aruna Kumari K. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1988) 1 SCC 297 (iii) Union of India and Another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad, AIR 2019 SC 3428 (iv) Unreported judgment passed in W.P. No. 94/2000 (HC) dated 31.07.2000 (v) Unreported judgment passed in W.P. No. 20/2010 dated 04.02.2010 (vi) Unreported judgment of High Court of Judicature of Madras passed in Crl. M.P. No. 5340/2020 in Crl. M.P. No. 3983/2020 dated 29.09.2020 12. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and after bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the bar and also on perusal of case laws relied upon by the respective learned Advocates, we are of the considered view that following points would arise for our consideration: (i) Whether writ petition is maintainable? Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and after bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the bar and also on perusal of case laws relied upon by the respective learned Advocates, we are of the considered view that following points would arise for our consideration: (i) Whether writ petition is maintainable? OR Is writ petition liable to be dismissed as premature? (ii) Whether the impugned orders would call for interference by this Court? DISCUSSION AND FINDING: 13. In the instant case, Assistant Commissioner, CCB, Special Enquiry, Bengaluru, has submitted a report to the Commissioner of Police requesting the said authority to pass an order of detention against the petitioner under Goonda Act. In the grounds of detention, the Commissioner of Police has taken note of the cases pending against the petitioner and has arrived at subjective satisfaction that in order to prevent the detenue from indulging in gambling activities and acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary for him to pass an order against detenue being detained. Hence, order of detention came to be passed. 14. One of the prime contentions raised is with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition. Sri. V.S. Hegde, learned SPP-II appearing for the State, as already noticed hereinabove, has contended that writ petition is not maintainable, since the detenue has a remedy of appearing before the Advisory Board and submit a representation and in the event of any order adverse to his interest is passed, challenging the same, he can file a writ petition before this Court. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Additional Secretary to Government of India vs. Alka Subhash Gadia, (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 496 while examining the maintainability of a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of a detenue against whom order of detention was passed, but could not be served on the detenue as he was absconding, has held pre-arrest petition is maintainable. In other words, challenge to the detention order before the order of detention was executed was held to be maintainable. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held to the following effect: “30. As regards his last contention......limited period. Thirdly, and this is more important, it is not correct to say that the courts have no power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held to the following effect: “30. As regards his last contention......limited period. Thirdly, and this is more important, it is not correct to say that the courts have no power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. The courts have the necessary power and they have used it in proper cases as has been pointed out above, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the courts have interfered with them at the pre- execution stage are necessarily very limited in scope and number, viz. where the courts are prima facie satisfied (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. The refusal by the courts to use their extraordinary power of judicial review to interfere with the detention orders prior to their execution on any other grounds does not amount to the abandonment of the said power or to their denial to the proposed detenu, but prevents their abuse and the perversion of the law in question.” 16. Thus, even at the pre-execution stage the order of detention can be challenged and courts would examine the validity of such order on being satisfied on the criteria prescribed by the Apex Court being satisfied. In the matter of State of Maharashtra vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, (2008) 2 SCC 613 Apex Court was examining the correctness of the order of High Court, which had allowed the writ petition by quashing the order of detention, on the ground it was at pre-arrest/detention stage. On review of the question of law, Apex Court while allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of High Court has held that interference at the pre-detention stage must be an exception to the rule. In other words, it has been held as a general rule, an order of detention passed by the detaining authority under relevant “preventive detention” law cannot be set aside by a court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the criteria prescribed in Alka Subhash Gadia's case are found. In other words, it has been held as a general rule, an order of detention passed by the detaining authority under relevant “preventive detention” law cannot be set aside by a court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the criteria prescribed in Alka Subhash Gadia's case are found. It has been further held: “63. From the foregoing discussion, in our judgment, the law appears to be fairly well-settled and it is this. As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a Detaining Authority under the relevant ‘preventive detention’ law cannot be set aside by a Writ Court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the Court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances specified in Alka Subhash Gadia. The Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that this is a suspicious jurisdiction i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken ‘with a view to preventing’ a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. Interference by a Court of Law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a Writ Court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order.” It has been further held to the following effect: “42. On this question.......this Court. Having gone through those decisions, we are of the view that normally and as a general rule, an order of detention can be challenged by the detenu after such order as also the grounds of detention have been received by him and the order is executed. In exceptional cases, however, a High Court or this Court may exercise extraordinary powers to protect a person against an illegal invasion of his right to freedom by protecting him while still he is free by issuing an appropriate writ, direction or order including a writ in the nature of mandamus questioning an order of detention and restraining the authorities from interfering with the right of liberty of an individual against whom such order is made.” 17. In the matter of Subhash Popatlal Dave vs. Union of India and Another, (2012) 7 SCC 533 it was held that 5 point criteria referred to in Alka Subhash Gadia's case was illustrative and challenge to the detention order need not be confined only to the grounds exclusively mentioned therein. 18. Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2008) 16 SCC 14 after noticing the earlier judgments of the Bhaurao Punjabrao, Alka Subhash Gadia and Alpesh Navinchandra Shah has held even where a person against whom a preventive order of detention has been passed comes to court at pre-execution stage and satisfies the court that detention order is clearly illegal, there is no reason as to why the court should stay its hands and compel the petitioner to go to jail even though he is bound to be released subsequently, as liberty of an individual is a precious fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and should not be lightly transgressed. It has been held by Apex court in Francis Coralie Mullin vs. U.T. of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 that: “4.....The power of preventive detention is a frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences affecting personal liberty, which is the most cherished and prized possession of man in a civilised society. It is a power to be exercised with the greatest care and caution and the courts have to be ever vigilant to see that this power is not abused or misused.” 19. It has also been held by Apex Court in Francis Mullin vs. W.C. Khambra, (1980) 2 SCC 275 to the following effect: “5......No freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty higher than to maintain it unimpaired.” 20. Apex court in Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 14 has held power of High Court are much wider than English Courts. It is also held: “20. The words “in the nature of” imply that the powers of this Court or the High Court are not subject to the traditional restrictions on the powers of the British courts to issue writs. It is also held: “20. The words “in the nature of” imply that the powers of this Court or the High Court are not subject to the traditional restrictions on the powers of the British courts to issue writs. Thus, the powers of this Court and the High Court are much wider than those of the British courts vide Dwarka Nath vs. ITO (vide AIR Para 4), Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani (vide AIR Paras 16 to 18), etc. 21. Secondly, what the petitioner really prays for is a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned detention order and/or a writ in the nature of mandamus for restraining the respondents from arresting him. Hence, even if the petitioner is not in detention a writ of certiorari and/or mandamus can be issued. 22. The celebrated writ of habeas corpus has been described as “a great constitutional privilege of the citizen” or “the first security of civil liberty.” The writ provides a prompt and effective remedy against illegal detention and its purpose is to safeguard the liberty of the citizen which is a precious right not to be lightly transgressed by anyone. The imperative necessity to protect those precious rights is a lesson taught by all history and all human experience. Our Founding Fathers have lived through bitter years of the freedom struggle and seen an alien government trample upon the human rights of our citizens. It is for this reason that they introduced Article 21 in the Constitution and provided for the writs of habeas corpus, etc.” 21. It can be noticed from aforesaid judgments that challenge to the order of detention was pre-arrest stage. Whereas in the instant case, impugned order of detention, which has been challenged by the wife of the detenue, is post-arrest namely, after order of detention came to be passed on 19.04.2021 and served on the detenue on 20.04.2021 and confirmed by the State Government on 29.04.2021. During the interregnum period namely between 20.04.2021 when detenue came to be arrested and writ petition came to be filed on 04.05.2021, a representation came to be submitted by petitioner to the first respondent on 26.04.2021. 22. The detenue would be entitled to challenge the order of detention by himself/herself or through a friend or relative. During the interregnum period namely between 20.04.2021 when detenue came to be arrested and writ petition came to be filed on 04.05.2021, a representation came to be submitted by petitioner to the first respondent on 26.04.2021. 22. The detenue would be entitled to challenge the order of detention by himself/herself or through a friend or relative. It is one thing to say that, writ petition itself would not be maintainable and another thing to say that, in the facts and circumstances obtained in a particular case, writ petition ought not to be entertained or power should not be exercised by the Constitutional Court. However, when the fundamental right of an individual is at stake and said precious fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be allowed to be transgressed. The power to be exercised by an authority for passing an order of “preventive detention” would have to be with greatest care and caution and it is solemn duty of the constitutional courts to ensure that such power is neither abused or misused. Article 21 of Constitution of India gives right to life and liberty and it is the most fundamental of all the fundamental rights of the Constitution. However, restrictions can be placed on these rights in the interest of public order, security of the State, as may be envisaged by the detaining authority to prevent such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public interest. However, they cannot be likely to be transgressed. In Ghani vs. Jones (QB at PAGE 709) Lord Denning, (1970) 1 QB 693 : (1969) 3 All ER 1700 has observed: “A man's liberty of movement is regarded so highly by the law of England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the severest grounds.” The aforesaid observation has been quoted by the Hon'ble Apex Court with approval in Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720 . 23. When a challenge can be laid to the order of detention even at the pre-arrest stage, it cannot be gainsaid by the State and its instrumentalities that post-arrest, order of detention cannot be challenged. This view is fortified from the authoritative principles laid by the Apex Court in Alka Subhash Gadia's case referred to herein supra. 23. When a challenge can be laid to the order of detention even at the pre-arrest stage, it cannot be gainsaid by the State and its instrumentalities that post-arrest, order of detention cannot be challenged. This view is fortified from the authoritative principles laid by the Apex Court in Alka Subhash Gadia's case referred to herein supra. Hence, we are for the considered view that a writ petition filed by the detenue or a friend or a relative, can be entertained or in other words, it would be maintainable. However, we would like to add a word of caution that as a matter of prudence exercise of such jurisdiction by this court would be in the rarest of rare circumstances for reasons more than one. Firstly, the detenue on being served with the order of detention and grounds of detention, would have a right to submit representation to the detaining authority explaning the circumstances under which said detention order is to be revoked. The constitutional mandate under Article 22(5) would indicate that such representation when submitted by the detenue requires to be considered expeditiously, as otherwise sub-article (5) of Article 22 would be rendered nugatory. Secondly, the detenue has a right to submit representation before the Advisory Board, which is required to be considered by said Board irrespective of fact whether representation of a detenue had been considered by the State Government or not. 24. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yusuf Rathar vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1979) 4 SCC 370 has held that detenue has 2 rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution namely, (1) To be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which order of detention is based, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation, which on being considered may obtain relief to him. 25. Yet another contention raised, relates to non consideration of the representation submitted by the detenue on 26.04.2021 (Annexure-B). The thrust of arguments canvassed by Sri. 25. Yet another contention raised, relates to non consideration of the representation submitted by the detenue on 26.04.2021 (Annexure-B). The thrust of arguments canvassed by Sri. Ravi B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is to the effect that representation submitted by the detenue subsequent to order of detention being served on 20.04.2021 and without any undue delay, it ought to have been considered and on account of said representation not having been considered till date, order of detention and its confirmation thereof is vitiated and is liable to be quashed. On the other hand, learned SPP-II appearing for the State has contended that on account of said representation having not reached the first respondent as on the date of confirmation of order of detention i.e. as on the date of 29.04.2021, said representation was not considered and even before consideration of said representation, order of stay came to be passed in this writ petition on 05.05.2021 and as such it has not been considered. He would also submit that even otherwise, under Section 10 of the Goonda Act representation if any made against the order of detention, can be forwarded by the State Government for being placed before the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 of the Goonda Act and on account of stay order operating till date, the State Government could not take any steps as it would have been in violation of the order dated 05.05.2021 passed by this Court. Thus, the incidental question which would arise for our consideration would be: Whether the detenue's representation will have to be considered by the State Government independent of constitution of Advisory Board? Or, the representation submitted by the detenue to the State Government without being considered can be forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration? 26. Hon'ble Apex Court and this court has consistently held that consideration of representation in an expeditious manner is a must. In the case of Smt. Masuma vs. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 3 SCC 566 it came to be held delay of 5 days in considering the representation cannot be held to be unreasonable. 26. Hon'ble Apex Court and this court has consistently held that consideration of representation in an expeditious manner is a must. In the case of Smt. Masuma vs. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 3 SCC 566 it came to be held delay of 5 days in considering the representation cannot be held to be unreasonable. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pabitra N. Rana vs. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 798 has held that constitutional right to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that the representation must be disposed of as quickly as possible and any unexplained delay would violate the constitutional guarantee guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It is also pointed out by the Apex Court that obligation of the detaining authority to take a decision on the representation filed by the detenue is quite apart and distinct from its obligation to constitute a Board and to send the representation to it. The detaining authority is not entitled to wait for the opinion of the Board but has to take its decision without the least possible delay. 27. In Abdul Karim vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 1028 the question that arose for consideration was whether the State Government is under an obligation to consider the representation of the detenue before forwarding it to the Advisory Board? In the said case, the detenue had submitted a representation to the State Government against the detention order, which came to be considered by the Advisory Board to sustain the order of detention. It was challenged before the Apex Court and it came to be held by Apex Court to the following effect: “Article 22(5) does not expressly say to whom the representation is to be made and how the detaining authority is to deal with the representation. But, it is necessarily implicit in the language of Article 22(5) that the State Government to whom there presentation is made should properly consider the representation as expeditiously as possible. The constitution of an Advisory Board under section 8 of the Act does not relieve the State Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu as soon as it is received by it. On behalf of the respondent.....detained even for a single day. The constitution of an Advisory Board under section 8 of the Act does not relieve the State Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu as soon as it is received by it. On behalf of the respondent.....detained even for a single day. The obligation of the detaining authority to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the Advisory Board to consider the representation later on at the time of hearing the reference.” In the light of aforesaid authoritative principles laid down by the Apex Court it has to be necessarily held that there is dual obligation on the appropriate Government and dual right in favour of detenue. Obligation of the appropriate government is to afford the detenue the opportunity to make representation and to consider the representation is distinct from the Government's obligation to constitute a Board and to forward the representation amongst other material to the Board to enable the Advisory Board to form its opinion. 28. The Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla vs. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 574 has held that representation submitted by the detenue must be considered and disposed of expeditiously. It is also been held that post confirmation consideration of representation would not be unconstitutional. Government can consider the representation after receipt of report of Advisory Board and confirmation of the detention order if the situation so warrants. In conclusion it has been held that Government has to consider the representation independent of the opinion of the Advisory Board. It is further held: “11. It is now beyond the pale of controversy that the constitutional right to make representation under clause (5) of Article 22 by necessary implication guarantees the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the representation. Secondly, the obligation of the government to afford to the detenu an opportunity to make representation and to consider such representation is distinct from the government's obligation to refer the case of detenu along with the representation to the Advisory Board to enable it to form its opinion and send a report to the government. It is implicit in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22 that the government while discharging its duty to consider the representation, cannot depend upon the views of the Board on such representation. It is implicit in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22 that the government while discharging its duty to consider the representation, cannot depend upon the views of the Board on such representation. It has to consider the representation on its own without being influenced by any such view of the Board. The obligation of the government to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the Board to consider the representation at the time of hearing the references. The government considers the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the law. The Board, on the other hand, considers the representation and the case of the detenu to examine whether there is sufficient case for detention. The consideration by the Board is an additional safeguard and not a substitute for consideration of the representation by the government. The right to have the representation considered by the government, is safeguarded by Cl. (5) of Article 22 and it is independent of the consideration of the detenu's case and his representation by the Advisory Board under Cl. (4) of Article 22 read with Section 8(c) of the Act. (See: Sk. Abdul Karim vs. State of West Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 433 : AIR 1969 SC 1028 , Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty vs. State of West Bengal, 1970 (1) SCR 543 : AIR 1970 SC 97 , Shayamal Chakraborty vs. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, 1969 (2) SCC 426 : AIR 1970 SC 269 , B. Sundar Rao vs. State of Orissa, 1972 (3) SCC 11 : AIR 1972 SC 739 , John Martin vs. State of West Bengal, 1975 (3) SCR 211 : AIR 1975 (2) SCR 161 : AIR 1975 SC 64 and Haradhan Saha vs. State of West Bengal, 1975 (1) SCR 778 : AIR 1974 SC 2154 ).” 29. In fact, the Coordinate Bench of this court in the matter of Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, ILR 2019 Kar. 1543 has referred to the judgments of the Apex Court with regard to the manner, mode and method in which the representation is to be considered and held that detaining authority has to consider the representation filed by the detenue and thereafter the detention order containing grounds and other material along with representation has to be forwarded to the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Goonda Act for consideration. It has been further held that irrespective of representation being filed to the detaining authority or government or to the Advisory Board, directly, it would not absolve the responsibility of the Government or the detaining authority, as the case may be, to consider the said representation. It has been further held: “44. Further it is to be remembered that, irrespective of the representation being filed to the detaining authority or Government or to the Advisory Board, directly, it will not absolve the responsibility of the Government or the detaining authority as the case may be to consider the said representation. In order to make it further clear that if the representation is made to the Government or to the detaining authority as the case may be, before sending the said representation to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority or the Government are duty bound mandatorily to consider the said representation for to serve a specific purpose. If the detaining authority or the Government as the case may be, considering the representation of the detenu decides not to continue the detention, there ends the matter, then there is no need for the detaining authority or the Government to send the papers to the Advisory Board for its opinion: 45. If the representation is directly made to the Advisory Board, though there was no opportunity to the Government or the detaining authority to consider the said representation prior to sending the matter to the Advisory Board, in such an eventuality, after the Advisory Board gives its opinion holding that there are sufficient reasons to detain the detenu then it becomes obligatory on the part of the Government to consider the representation and then pass appropriate orders either confirming the detention order to continue the detention of the person concerned or revoking the detention order. This discretion is in built under Section 12 of the Act itself. Therefore, it is clarified that even if the Advisory Board expresses the view that there is sufficient cause for detention, further discretion vests with the Government after considering the representation, it may revoke the detention for valid reasons. In view of the above said safeguards, which amounts to a constitutional safeguard has to be meticulously followed by the detaining authority. Therefore, it is clarified that even if the Advisory Board expresses the view that there is sufficient cause for detention, further discretion vests with the Government after considering the representation, it may revoke the detention for valid reasons. In view of the above said safeguards, which amounts to a constitutional safeguard has to be meticulously followed by the detaining authority. Certain guidelines came to be framed for passing the preventive detention order under the Goonda Act and insofar as consideration of the representation submitted by the detenue is concerned, it reads as under: “(7) If any representation is submitted by the detenu before the Detaining Authority, addressing the same to the Detaining Authority, addressing the same to the Detaining Authority, government, or to Advisory Board, irrespective of the fact that, to whom it is addressed, the same shall be as early as possible considered by the appropriate Government, before sending the papers to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government revokes the detention order and directs release of the detenu, there arises no question of sending the case papers to the Advisory Board. (8) The Government shall within three weeks from the date of the detention order, place the order before the Advisory Board along with all the materials, grounds, representation if any made by the detenu, along with any report by such office made under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act.” Thus, from the above analysis it would clearly emerge that an obligation is cast on the Government to consider the representation is different from, independent of and in addition to the obligation of the Advisory Board to consider it at the time of hearing the reference before giving its opinion to the Government. 30. Now turning our attention back to the facts on hand it would clearly emerge that detenue served with the order of detention on 20.04.2021 and was arrested on the same day and furnished with the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention including the documents relied there upon. A representation came to be submitted on 26.04.2021 (Annexure-B) to the first respondent through the prison authorities. The original records tendered by the SPP-II in a sealed cover has been perused by us would indicate that as on the date of confirmation of the detention order i.e. as on 29.04.2021 the representation of the detenue was not available with first respondent. The original records tendered by the SPP-II in a sealed cover has been perused by us would indicate that as on the date of confirmation of the detention order i.e. as on 29.04.2021 the representation of the detenue was not available with first respondent. The order sheet of the proceedings would indicate that it was put up on 05.05.2021, by which date there was already an order of stay of detention order passed by this court. We have also perused the original representation dated 26.04.2021 (Annexure-B) submitted by the detenue to the first respondent, which has been forwarded by the office of the Chief Superintendent, Central Prison, Parappana Agrahara, enclosing the representation of the detenue to the first respondent. It would clearly indicate that same has been received on 04.05.2021 and put up before the first respondent on 05.05.2021, on which date there was already an order of stay of execution of the detention order operating passed by this Court. Thus, question of consideration of said representation, did not arise. In other words, the hands of first respondent was tied from considering the representation. Even otherwise, under the Goonda Act, the State is required to forward the report to the Advisory Board as required under Section 10 within three (3) weeks from the date of detention of the person under the detention order. In the instant case, detenue came to be detained on 20.04.2021 and by excluding the said date for the period of three (3) weeks if reckoned or calculated, it would expire on 12.05.2021. Even before the expiry of said period, order of stay came to be passed by this Court on 05.05.2021 staying the order of detention as well as confirmation order dated 29.04.2021. Thus, on the ground of non-consideration of representation by the State, neither the order of detention nor its confirmation thereof, can be held to be violative of the right vested to the detenue under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Hence, said contention stands rejected. In that view of the matter, contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing of petitioner cannot be accepted and it stands rejected. 31. Hence, said contention stands rejected. In that view of the matter, contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing of petitioner cannot be accepted and it stands rejected. 31. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has very heavily relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter Rajammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1999) 1 SCC 417 to contend that impugned orders are liable to be quashed as there has been delay in consideration of representation and Apex Court in the facts obtained in the said case had held that there was no explanation forthcoming as to why said representation could not be dealt with by the Minister concerned from 09.02.1998 to 14.02.1998 and on account of this unexplained delay, it was held that order of detention was vitiated. It cannot go unnoticed by this Court that, in the very same judgment Apex Court has held that where delay is explained, which would have occasioned in the disposal of the representation, then court can examine whether such delay was occasioned due to permissible reasons or unavoidable causes. It has been held: “7. It is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenue submits his representation to consider the representation and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. The words “as soon as may be” occurring in Clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the Framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay. However, there can be no hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement, however, is that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal. 8. The position, therefore, now is that if delay was caused on account of any indifference or lapse in considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. In other words, it is for the authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing of the representation. 8. The position, therefore, now is that if delay was caused on account of any indifference or lapse in considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. In other words, it is for the authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing of the representation. It is not enough to say that the delay was very short. Even longer delay can as well be explained. So the test is not the duration or range of delay, but how it is explained by the authority concerned.” 32. In the instant case, we have noticed that even before the State could place its objections, counter or place the original records, an interim order came to be passed on 05.05.2021 staying the order of detention as well as confirmation order. The adoption of such a course of action would be unsafe and probably be hazardous. By way of illustration, it can be noted that in a given case if an interim order of this nature is passed and the detenue is ordered to be released and said detenue were to indulge in any activity that may be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order or effecting the security of the State or economy of the country or it results in any illegal act being perpetrated resulting in chaos in Society, then clock cannot be put back, particularly, if the writ petition were to be dismissed after the matter is heard. It would not be safe, sound or reasonable to make an interim order on the prima facie conclusion. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Rambalak Singh “Balak” and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1441 while examining the claim for grant of bail in a petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India has held that High Court has jurisdiction to grant bail, but the exercise of said jurisdiction is inevitably circumscribed by considerations which are special to such proceedings. It has been further held: “11. In dealing with writ petitions of this character, the Court has naturally to bear in mind the object which is intended to be served by the orders of detention. It has been further held: “11. In dealing with writ petitions of this character, the Court has naturally to bear in mind the object which is intended to be served by the orders of detention. It is no doubt true that a detenu is detained without a trial; and so, the courts would inevitably be anxious to protect the individual liberty of the citizen on grounds which are justiciable and within the limits of their jurisdiction. But in upholding the claim for individual liberty within the limits permitted by law, it would be unwise to ignore the object which the orders of detention are intended to serve. An unwise decision granting bail to a party may lead to consequences which are prejudicial to the interests of the community at large; and that is a factor which must be duly weighed by the High Court before it decides to grant bail to a detenu in such proceedings. We are free to confess that we have not come across cases where bail has been granted in habeas corpus proceedings directed against orders of detention under R. 30 of the Rules, and we apprehend that the reluctance of the courts to pass orders of bail in such proceedings is obviously based on the fact that they are fully conscious of the difficulties-legal and constitutional, and of the other risks involved in making such orders. Attempts are always made by the courts to deal with such applications expeditiously and in actual practice, it would be very difficult to come across a case where without a full enquiry and trial of the grounds on which the order of detention is challenged by the detenu, it would be reasonably possible or permissible to the Court to grant bail on prima-facie conclusion reached by it at an earlier stage of the proceedings. 12. If an order of bail is made by the Court without a full trial of the issues involved merely on prima facie opinion formed by the High Court, the said order would be open to the challenge that it is the result of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is essential to bear in mind the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and its proper exercise. Improper exercise of jurisdiction in such matters must necessarily be avoided by the courts in dealing with applications of this character. It is essential to bear in mind the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and its proper exercise. Improper exercise of jurisdiction in such matters must necessarily be avoided by the courts in dealing with applications of this character. Therefore, on the point raised by the learned Advocate- General in the present appeal, our conclusion is that in dealing with habeas corpus petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution where orders of detention passed under R. 30 of the Rules are challenged, the High Court has jurisdiction to grant bail, but the exercise of the said jurisdiction is inevitably circumscribed by the considerations which are special to such proceedings and which have relevance to the object which is intended to be served by orders of detention properly and validly passed under the said Rules.” 33. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613 has held: “57. From the foregoing discussion.....in the relevant detention law. Interference by a Court of Law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a Writ Court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order.” 34. In writ petitions of this character, this Court would bear in mind, the object of the Act which is intended to be served by the orders of detention. It is equally true that a detenue is detained without a trial and as such courts would be anxious to protect the individual liberty of a citizen on the grounds, which are justiciable and within the limits of their jurisdiction. However, it would not be safe to ignore the object, intent and purpose which the orders of detention would serve. The High Court of Judicature at Madras in the case of The Government of Tamil Nadu and Another vs. S. Indramoorthy, Crl. M.P. No. 5340/2020 in Crl. M.P. No. 3983/2020 and connected matters disposed of on 29.09.2020 has held: “21. However, it would not be safe to ignore the object, intent and purpose which the orders of detention would serve. The High Court of Judicature at Madras in the case of The Government of Tamil Nadu and Another vs. S. Indramoorthy, Crl. M.P. No. 5340/2020 in Crl. M.P. No. 3983/2020 and connected matters disposed of on 29.09.2020 has held: “21. Thus, it is amply clear that this Court while dealing with habeas corpus petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, wherein, the validity of the detention orders are sought to be questioned, has jurisdiction to grant interim bail, but the exercise of the said jurisdiction is inevitably circumscribed by the considerations which are special to such proceedings and which have relevance to the object which is intended to be served by orders of detention properly and validly passed under the Act 14 of 1982. 22. In view of above principle, we are constrained to state that though this Court on 15.06.2020, as an interim relief, granted the interim bail on certain terms, now the learned Additional Public Prosecutor urged the necessity to keep the detenu under preventive detention in order to intercept him from doing something. Having heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner at length, we are of the considered view that the order dated 15.06.2020 needs to be recalled and the grounds raised by the petitioner in challenging the validity or otherwise of the detention order dated 26.02.2020 could be considered at the time of hearing the Habeas Corpus Petition finally.” 35. We would only like to add that when habeas corpus petitions are filed it requires to be heard with utmost urgency as is being done in almost all such cases, for the simple reason that, fundamental right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be allowed to be nugated on account of any misuse or improper use of “preventive detention” law by the authorities administering the same. As such, we are of the considered view that order passed on 05.05.2021 not only requires to be recalled, but it also requires to be held that an error in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction had occasioned. 36. Though Sri. As such, we are of the considered view that order passed on 05.05.2021 not only requires to be recalled, but it also requires to be held that an error in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction had occasioned. 36. Though Sri. Ravi B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has made a valiant attempt to question the order of detention and its confirmation thereof by arguing the matter on merits, by way of judicial restraint we refrain from going into the merits on account of issues raised in the writ petition would be in the domain of consideration by the Advisory Board. At this juncture, it would appropriate to note the judgment of the Apex Court in Alka Subhash Gadia's case whereunder it has been held: “30. As regards his last contention, viz., that to deny a right to the proposed detenu to challenge the order of detention and the grounds on which it is made before he is taken in custody is to deny him the remedy of judicial review of the impugned order which right is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we find that this argument is also not well merited based as it is on absolute assumptions. Firstly, as pointed out by the authorities discussed above, there is a difference between the existence of power and its exercise. Neither the Constitution including the provisions of Article 22 thereof nor the Act in question places any restriction on the powers of the High Court and this Court to review judicially the order of detention. The powers under Articles 226 and 32 are wide, and are un-trammelled by any external restrictions, and can reach any executive order resulting in civil or criminal consequences. However, the courts have over the years evolved certain self-restraints for exercising these powers. They have done so in the interests of the administration of justice and for better and more efficient and informed exercise of the said powers. These self-imposed restraints are not confined to the review of the orders passed under detention law only. They extend to the orders passed and decisions made under all laws. They have done so in the interests of the administration of justice and for better and more efficient and informed exercise of the said powers. These self-imposed restraints are not confined to the review of the orders passed under detention law only. They extend to the orders passed and decisions made under all laws. It is in pursuance of this self-evolved judicial policy and in conformity with the self-imposed internal restrictions that the courts insist that the aggrieved person first allow the due operation and implementation of the concerned law and exhaust the remedies provided by it before approaching the High Court and this Court to invoke their discretionary extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 respectively. That jurisdiction by its very nature is to be used sparingly and in circumstances where no other efficacious remedy is available. We have while discussing the relevant authorities earlier dealt in detail with the circumstances under which these extraordinary powers are used and are declined to be used by the courts. To accept Shri Jain's present contention would mean that the courts should disregard all these time-honoured and well-tested judicial self-restraints and norms and exercise their said powers, in every case before the detention order is executed. Secondly, as has been rightly pointed out by Shri Sibal for the appellants, as far as detention orders are concerned if in every case a detenu is permitted to challenge and seek the stay of the operation of the order before it is executed, the very purpose of the order and of the law under which it is made will be frustrated since such orders are in operation only for a limited period.” 37. It would not be out of place to mention that in the representation submitted on 26.04.2021 the detenue has not sought for temporary release or bail being granted as provided under Section 15 of the Goonda Act. This Court cannot usurp the powers of the State as otherwise Section 15 of the Goonda Act would become otiose. Hence, we are of the considered view that order dated 05.05.2021 granting an interim order of stay of the detention is liable to be vacated. If for any reason, the detenue has to be released temporarily, it is always open for him to approach the State Government to get the release order subject to conditions prescribed under Section 15 of Goonda Act. If for any reason, the detenue has to be released temporarily, it is always open for him to approach the State Government to get the release order subject to conditions prescribed under Section 15 of Goonda Act. Said provision enables the State Government to temporarily release a detenue and it is in the competence of the Government to grant such prayer and there is no provision under the Act to grant interim bail. As such the contention of Sri. Ravi B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel which is to the effect that order of stay is to be construed as an unconditional bail order, is liable to be rejected and it is accordingly rejected. 38. For the cumulative reasons aforestated, we proceed to pass the following: ORDER: (i) I.A. No. 1/2021 filed for vacating stay, stands allowed for the reasons indicated hereinabove and State shall take the detenue into custody forthwith. (ii) Writ petition is dismissed subject to observations made hereinabove. (iii) Respondent-State is at liberty to take such steps as is permissible under the Goonda Act. (iv) We make it explicitly clear that observations made hereinabove would not prejudice the State Government or the Advisory Board while considering the representation/ reference.