JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Articles 14, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the following prayers :- A. Admit the present Special Civil Application. B. Allow the present Special Civil Application by way of issuing appropriate writ of mandamus or writ of certiorari or any other writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside the award dated 11.08.2008 passed by the Hon'ble Industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad in Approval Application (IT) No.330/06 in Reference (IT) No.37/2000 annexed as ANNEXURE-J by way of holding that the same is illegal, unjust, arbitrary, erroneous and contrary to the facts and evidence on record as well as the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and without jurisdiction in the interest of justice. C. Pending the admission, final hearing and disposal of the present Special Civil Application be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of the award dated 11.08.2008 passed by the Hon'ble Industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad in Approval Application (IT) No.330/06 in Reference (IT) No.37/2000 annexed as ANNEXURE-J in the interest of justice. D. Call for the record and proceeding of the case bearing Approval Application (IT) No.330/06 in Reference (IT) No.37/2000 from the Hon'ble Industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad by way of passing appropriate orders in the interest of justice. E. Pass such order and further orders as the nature and circumstances of the case may require, in the interest of justice. 2. Brief facts of the present case is that the petitioner – Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation had employed one Mr. Mahmadbhai Kureshi, in its employment and was serving as regular employee, who passed away while in service. Pursuant to death of Mr. Mahmadbhai Kureshi, the respondent herein, who was his son, was appointed on compassionate ground as a Helper with the School Leaving Certificate that he had cleared Standard 8th. It is contended that on the basis of the said certificate and other papers, the respondent was appointed on temporary, adhoc and daily wage basis as Helper and he was not employed as a permanent and regular employee on a permanent sanctioned post. It is further contended that it came to the notice of the management of the petitioner that the respondent has produced a bogus School Leaving Certificate, therefore, his statement was recorded on 17.05.2005, wherein, he has admitted that the said certificate dated 06.07.1998 was bogus. It is further contended that it came to the notice of the management of the petitioner that the respondent has produced a bogus School Leaving Certificate, therefore, his statement was recorded on 17.05.2005, wherein, he has admitted that the said certificate dated 06.07.1998 was bogus. It is also contended by the petitioner that thereafter it has forwarded the same to the higher authority and as per the school record, the said certificate was bogus one and, thereafter, the Principal of the school addressed a letter to the petitioner that the date of certificate was wrongly mentioned as 20.06.2006 instead of 20.06.2005 admitting that the certificate was bogus and the respondent was in a Municipal School, at Bhavnagar and has left the school while he was in Standard 6th. According to the petitioner, the charge-sheet was issued by the competent authority on 17.11.2005 and, thereafter, full-fledged departmental inquiry was held against the respondent and he was given full opportunity to represent his case and ultimately, the charge came to be proved. It is further contended that thereafter, the show-cause notice was issued on 22.06.2006 to the respondent on the quantum of penalty along with the report of the Inquiry Officer. 2.1 It is contended by the petitioner that the respondent herein has written a letter on 27.06.2006 and, thereafter, he was dismissed from the employment as he was working as Helper vide order dated 29.07.2006 and on the same day, the requisite amount of Rs.4885/- was paid to him and Approval Application (I.T.) No.330 of 2006 was preferred before the Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter be referred to as the “I.D. Act”). 2.2 It is contended by the petitioner that the said application came to be rejected by the Tribunal without taking into consideration the facts that the respondent was a daily wager and he was neither regular nor permanent employee and, therefore, it was not necessary to hold full-fledged departmental inquiry. It is contended that the Tribunal ought to have considered the fact that in the present case, the full-fledged inquiry was conducted and opportunity of being heared was provided to the respondent to defend his case. It is contended by the petitioner that the Tribunal has not considered the facts that the respondent has tried to get an employment by producing bogus school leaving certificate. It is contended by the petitioner that the Tribunal has not considered the facts that the respondent has tried to get an employment by producing bogus school leaving certificate. According to the petitioner, the production of the bogus School Leaving Certificate itself is misconduct and the management has properly dismissed the respondent from the employment. It is also contended that the Tribunal has not properly considered the provisions of Section 33 of the I.D. Act and has committed serious error of facts and law in rejecting the application. The petitioner has prayed to allow the present petition by quashing and setting aside the impugned award and to allow the approval application filed by the petitioner. 3. Heard Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Mrudul Barot, learned counsel for the respondent through video conferencing. 4. Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of petition. He has submitted that the entire case is based on the bogus certificate produced by the respondent herein. He has submitted that the nature of the service of the respondent is purely ad-hoc, temporary and daily wager and not of permanent in nature. He has submitted that the respondent has admitted in his statement that the School Leaving Certificate which he has produced is bogus one. He has also referred to the various documents including the charge-sheet and show-cause notice and the report of the Inquiry Officer and the contents of the approval application and has submitted that all these facts have not been properly appreciated by the Tribunal. According to him, when the respondent was daily wager, as admitted by him, there is no question of holding full-fledged departmental inquiry. According to him, in case of appointment of the person on daily wager, there is no necessity of holding any departmental inquiry, when the allegation is based on the bogus School Leaving Certificate, which is primary document for getting service. He has submitted that the respondent has also accepted the facts that he did not study in the school from which the School Leaving Certificate is produced, then, in that case there was no need of any departmental inquiry and on his admission, the petitioner might have dismissed him from the services straightway. He has submitted that the respondent has also accepted the facts that he did not study in the school from which the School Leaving Certificate is produced, then, in that case there was no need of any departmental inquiry and on his admission, the petitioner might have dismissed him from the services straightway. According to him, the petitioner has given him an ample opportunity of being heard in departmental inquiry and, therefore, the Tribunal ought to have granted permission and allowed the approval application. He has submitted that the departmental inquiry officer has no played duel role and no procedure of natural justice is defected in such inquiry. According to him, the appointment based upon bogus certificate itself is serious and it vitiated the appointment itself. He has submitted that the reporting officer has not interrogated the workman and departmental inquiry officer has submitted various reports. He has submitted that the impugned award of the Tribunal is erroneous one and it requires to be interfered with. He prayed to quash and set aside the impugned award and allow the present petition. 5. Per contra, Mr. Mrudul Barot, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the Tribunal has not committed any serious error of facts and law in rejecting the approval application as there was breach of statutory rules in the departmental inquiry itself. While referring to the various observations made by the Tribunal, he has submitted that the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner are not tenable in the eyes of law and no proper opportunity of being heard is given to the respondent. He has submitted that the impugned award cannot be branded as perverse one. He has submitted that the main reference itself is pending and non-granting of approval application will not affect the petitioner in any manner. He has submitted that the original reference can be proceeded further and, therefore, the present petition may be dismissed. 5.1 Mr. Barot, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following decisions; (1) Amymiyan Permian Kadri Vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and others, 1992 (2) GLH 21 ; (2) Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Kantilal Nandlal Dave and others, 1992 (1) GLH 463 ; 6. In the case of Amymiyan Permian Kadri, (supra), this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Barot, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following decisions; (1) Amymiyan Permian Kadri Vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and others, 1992 (2) GLH 21 ; (2) Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Kantilal Nandlal Dave and others, 1992 (1) GLH 463 ; 6. In the case of Amymiyan Permian Kadri, (supra), this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.N. Divecha) has observed in paras-14, 15 and 16 as under :- “14. It transpires from the record of the enquiry proceedings that the delinquent did not volunteer to give any oral testimony in the enquiry proceedings. It may be mentioned at this stage that he had no one as his defence assistant in the enquiry proceedings. If at all the delinquent wanted to give any oral testimony, his chief examination could have been recorded by himself. The so-called statement of the delinquent at Exh.22 shows that no chief examination of his is taken. What is mentioned therein that the delinquent was questioned by the Enquiry Officer. It would mean that the delinquent was required to give answers to the questions put to him by the Enquiry Officer. This makes one thing clear that the so-called statement at Exh. 22 can by no stretch of imagination be said to be his oral testimony in the enquiry proceedings. 15. The question then arises whether or not the Enquiry Officer could have recorded his explanatory statement in the manner it is recorded by the Criminal Court under xc the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on completion of the recording of the prosecution evidence. As aforesaid, the only provision made in that regard is in Clause (k) of Para 5 of the Appeal Procedure. Thereunder, the Enquiry Officer is invested with the limited power of giving a further opportunity to the delinquent of making a written or oral statement if desired by him. It would mean that, after completion of recording the evidence, the Enquiry Officer has to ascertain from the delinquent whether or not he has to say anything more with respect to the material on record. If the delinquent so desires, the option is given to him to make an oral or written statement in that regard. It thus becomes clear that such statement to be given by the delinquent after completion of the recording of the evidence should be out of his violation. If the delinquent so desires, the option is given to him to make an oral or written statement in that regard. It thus becomes clear that such statement to be given by the delinquent after completion of the recording of the evidence should be out of his violation. It is not open to the Enquiry Officer to compel him to give any such statement. If the Enquiry Officer does so, even if be in the nature of seeking explanation of the delinquent with respect to the material on record pointing the finger of guilt against the delinquent, the Enquiry Officer can be said to be transgressing his limits laid down in Clause (k) of Para 5 of the Appeal Procedure. 16. …...If the Enquiry Officer cross-examines the delinquent under the guise of recording his statement (which it would not be open to him to do under the Appeal Procedure), he dons the robe of the prosecutor while keeping the robe of the judge on his shoulder. It is a settled principle of law that no person can be both a prosecutor and a judge. If a person tries to be both, he can be said to be biased in conducting the enquiry proceedings. It is a well-known principle of law that a biased person is disqualified from conducting such enquiry proceedings. That is a settled principle of natural justice.” 7. In the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Kantilal Nandlal (supra), para-16 of the case of Amymiyan Permian Kadri has been followed. This Court in para-17 has observed that any decision or order based on any illegal and invalid proceedings has to be branded null and void. 7.1 Further, this Court has observed in paras-18 and 19 as under :- “18. It cannot be gainsaid that the Corporation is a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. This point has been concluded by this Court in its Division Bench ruling in the case of Amarsing Satansing Medatia v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Others 21 G.L.R. at page 500. The employee of the Corporation partaking the character of State for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India cannot be removed just at the sweet will of the appointing or the disciplinary authority. The employee of the Corporation partaking the character of State for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India cannot be removed just at the sweet will of the appointing or the disciplinary authority. They in that sense enjoy the status of irremovability like government servants enjoying protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India or workmen under the relevant industrial or labour legislation. If any disciplinary action contrary to law is taken against any such employee of such Corporation, he can successfully challenge such action in a court of law exercising civil jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code. 19. This point is concluded by the Division Bench ruling of this Court in its ruling in the case of Mohanlal Popatbhai Patel v. The Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Another reported in 1977 (1) Services Law Reporter at page 30. It has been held therein: “If an order of dismissal is passed by the respondent – Corporation in violation of principles of natural justice or in contravention of the relevant regulations [@ page 470] framed by the Corporation in this behalf, such an order can be declared as null and void and the Court can grant a declaration that the employee concerned continues in service.” 8. Having considered the contentions raised by learned counsel for both the sides coupled with the aforesaid decisions cited at the Bar and the materials placed on record, it is an admitted facts that the petitioner has appointed the respondent on compassionate ground as Helper. It is also an admitted facts that the reference is pending before the Tribunal being Reference (I.T.) No.37 of 2000. It is also an admitted facts that during the pendency of that reference, the order of dismissal has been passed by the petitioner and the petition has filed under the provisions of Section 33 of the I.D. Act for approval of dismissal of the respondent. The petitioner has heavily relied upon the entire departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent for producing false School Leaving Certificate at the time of his appointment. 9. The petitioner has heavily relied upon the entire departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent for producing false School Leaving Certificate at the time of his appointment. 9. On perusal of the impugned award passed in Approval Application No.330 of 2006 in Reference (I.T.) No.37 of 2000, it appears that the respondent has filed objection against the approval application and has contended that he was appointed on the permanent basis and he has served from 08.09.2003 till 29.07.2006 continuously and has served for 240 days in every calendar year. It is also contended by the respondent that the petitioner has issued charge-sheet on 07.12.2005 against him on false grounds and allegation. It appears that the respondent has also raised the contention that the departmental inquiry itself was illegal and the impugned award is also illegal. 10. It appears from the record that the petitioner has relied upon the report of the departmental inquiry as well as the charge-sheet and the notice issued thereof and payment of notice pay, whereas, the respondent has produced various documentary evidence on record. During the hearing of the approval application, the respondent has defended the same. It appears from the records that during the departmental inquiry, the same person has acted as prosecutor who himself has initiated the entire departmental inquiry. It also appears that the entire inquiry has been conducted by the same officer, who has initiated the inquiry and has issued the charge-sheet and has also carried out the cross-examination. 11. It appears that on the basis of the materials placed on record, the Tribunal has observed that no any representating officer has been appointed in the departmental inquiry. It has further observed by the Tribunal that considering the materials placed on record, the Inquiry Officer himself has asked the question to the respondent and instead of asking the respondent as to whether he wanted to give any statement or not, the Inquiry Officer has asked him direct question and recorded the statement thereof. While referring to Rule 5 of the Corporation regarding the disciplinary appeal procedure, the Tribunal has observed that in the present case, the Inquiry Officer himself has acted as a prosecutor and judge and, therefore, there is clear breach of principles of natural justice. While referring to Rule 5 of the Corporation regarding the disciplinary appeal procedure, the Tribunal has observed that in the present case, the Inquiry Officer himself has acted as a prosecutor and judge and, therefore, there is clear breach of principles of natural justice. It is further observed by the Tribunal that the entire exercise carried out by the petitioner and resultantly passing of the impugned order of dismissal is also required to be proved under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. On this observation, the petition can be dismissed. 12. Now, considering the observations made by this Court in the case of Amymiyan Permian Kadri (supra) and Kantilal Nandlal Dave (supra), when the same person acted as the prosecutor and the judge, then, it is clear breach of principles of natural justice and the inquiry itself would be nullity. On perusal of the record, it clearly transpires that in the present case, from the very beginning i.e. issuance of the show-cause notice, filing of the charge-sheet, holding of the departmental inquiry, filing of the report and passing of the order of dismissal, all these procedure have carried out by the one and same person. This very fact is sufficient to hold that the entire inquiry proceeding is nullity from the very beginning. Therefore, considering the decisions cited at the Bar, it appears that Tribunal has not committed any error of facts and law in rejecting the approval application. Therefore, the impugned award of the Tribunal is sustainable in the eyes of law. 13. In view of the above, the petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. The impugned award dated 11.08.2008 passed by the Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Approval Application (I.T.) No.330 of 2006 in Reference (I.T.) No.37 of 2000 is hereby confirmed. 14. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. No order as to costs.