JUDGMENT : This intra Court appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 has been filed against the order dated 19.11.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge by which writ petition preferred by the appellant has been partly allowed and the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' for short) has been modified and the appellant has been held entitled to a compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-instead of relief of reinstatement in services. 2. Facts leading to filing of this appeal briefly stated are that the appellant was employed as a messenger in the establishment of the respondent initially from 25.03.1982 for a period of 91 days and on 23.06.1982 the services of the appellant were terminated by the management. The appellant again was appointed as messenger w.e.f. 19.07.1994 till 27.03.1996 and on the aforesaid date, the services of the appellant were terminated by the management. It is the case of the appellant that since he has worked for a period of more than 240 days in each of the calendar year as defined under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short), the termination amounts to retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Act as there was non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Central Government, under Section 10 of the Act, referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Tribunal: "Whether the contention of the workman Shri M.Kannabiran that the action of the management of State Bank of India in refusing employment to him amounts to violation of Section 25(F), 25(G) and 25(H) of the ID Act, 1947 and the same amounts to retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the said Act, is legal and justified? If so, to what relief the same workman is entitled?" 3. The management, in the counter statement, inter alia, admitted that the appellant was employed at its overseas branch as temporary messenger for 91 days on purely temporary basis against a leave vacancy of a permanent employee. It was further pleaded that the appellant was neither selected nor appointed for any permanent post and for the appointment to the permanent post, the management is governed by the Bipartite Settlement dated 17.11.1987 which does not provide for absorption of service of a temporary workman. It was further pleaded that the appellant was neither selected nor appointed for any permanent post and for the appointment to the permanent post, the management is governed by the Bipartite Settlement dated 17.11.1987 which does not provide for absorption of service of a temporary workman. It was denied that at any point of time the appellant had worked for a period of 240 days and in any case, did not work for a period of 240 days within a period of 12 calendar months. It was further averred that services of the appellant was terminated as the post was filled up after recruitment and the same cannot be said to be a case of either termination or retrenchment. 4. The Tribunal, after recording the evidence of the parties, by an award dated 16.06.2006, on the basis of certificates namely Ex.W7 and W8 issued by the Branch Manager of the respondent, held that between the period from July 1994 to June 1995, the appellant was in continuous service of the management for a period of 287 days and therefore, the appellant fulfilled the requirement of Section 25B of the Act. It was further held that admittedly the services of the appellant were terminated without compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 25F of the Act and therefore, the action of the respondent in terminating the services of the appellant was held to be illegal. The Tribunal further held that keeping in view the temporary nature of services rendered by the appellant and the period for which the appellant rendered the service, as well as on account of the fact that the appellant was provided employment by the Bank subject to availability of the work, it was held that the ends of justice would be met if the appellant is paid compensation to the extent of Rs.60,000/-on account of full and final settlement of his claim in lieu of his claim for reinstatement, backwages and consequential benefits. 5. The appellant assailed the validity of the aforesaid order in a writ petition before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated 19.11.2012, inter alia held as follows: "4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed by the respondent-Bank. The appellant assailed the validity of the aforesaid order in a writ petition before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated 19.11.2012, inter alia held as follows: "4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed by the respondent-Bank. It is also not in dispute that, he had worked for 240 days in a calendar year. Further, it is not in dispute that he was refused employment without following the procedure under Section 25(F) of the Act." The learned Single Judge inter alia held that appellant was refused employment in March 1996 and the reference was made in the year February 1999. Thus, there was a delay of 3 years in seeking the reference and after a period of 13 years, taking into account the fact that the nature of employment of the appellant was temporary, no ground is made out to direct the respondent to reinstate the appellant. However, it was held that compensation of Rs.60,000/-is on the lower side and the same was enhanced to Rs.1,50,000/-. Accordingly, the award passed by the Tribunal was modified and the writ petition preferred by the appellant was partly allowed. In the aforesaid factual background, the appellant has filed this appeal. 6. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that admittedly there was a violation of Section 25F of the Act and the relief of reinstatement could not have been denied to the appellant merely on the ground of delay and the plea of delay has to be raised by the employer as a matter of fact and the real prejudice is required to be shown and not merely as a hypothetical defence. It is further submitted that in case of a wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and backwages is the normal rule. However, the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have ignored the aforesaid well settled legal principles. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in 'HARJINDER SINGH Vs. PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION' (2010) 3 SCC 192 , 'DEEPALI GUNDU SURWASE Vs. KRANTI JUNIOR ADHYAPAK MAHAVIDYALAYA' (2013) 10 SCC 324 AND 'JASMER SINGH Vs. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in 'HARJINDER SINGH Vs. PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION' (2010) 3 SCC 192 , 'DEEPALI GUNDU SURWASE Vs. KRANTI JUNIOR ADHYAPAK MAHAVIDYALAYA' (2013) 10 SCC 324 AND 'JASMER SINGH Vs. STATE OF HARYANA' (2015) 4 SCC 458 . 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant did not render 240 days of service in a calendar year. It is also submitted that the provisions of Section 25F of the Act do not apply to the fact situation of the case as the appellant had not rendered continuous service for a period of one year. It is further submitted that the nature of employment of the appellant was temporary and therefore, the appellant is not entitled to the relief of reinstatement. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in 'HARI NANDAN PRASAD Vs. EMPLOYER I/R TO MANAGEMENT OF FCI AND ANNOTHER' AIR 2014 SC 1848 . 8. We have considered the submissions made on both sides and have perused the record. The Tribunal, on the basis of meticulous appreciation of evidence on record, has recorded a finding of fact that the appellant had rendered service for a period of 240 days in a calendar year. The aforesaid finding was not assailed by the respondent and the stand taken by the appellant that he has rendered service for a period of 240 days in a calendar year was admitted by the respondent before the learned Single Judge which is evident from paragraph 4 of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. It is also admitted by the respondent that the services of the appellant were terminated in violation of Section 25 of the Act. Therefore, the respondent in this appeal cannot be permitted to deviate from the admitted position. 9. The only issue which survives for consideration in this appeal is with regard to the relief to be granted to the appellant namely whether the appellant is entitled to relief of reinstatement with backwages or the amount of compensation awarded to the appellant is just and proper. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note of the legal principles while dealing with the issue of relief of reinstatement in case of daily wage employees. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note of the legal principles while dealing with the issue of relief of reinstatement in case of daily wage employees. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of Supreme Court in 'JAGBIR SINGH Vs. HARYANA STATE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD AND ANR.' AIR 2009 SC 3004 , the relevant extract of which reads as under: 14. In Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula, it was observed: "6. Such termination of service, having regard to the fact that he had completed 240 days of work during a period of 12 months preceding the said date, required compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. An order of retrenchment passed in violation of the said provision although can be set aside but as has been noticed by this Court in a large number of decisions, an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. 7. The factors which are relevant for determining the same, inter alia, are: (i) whether in making the appointment, the statutory rules, if any, had been complied with; (ii) the period he had worked; (iii) whether there existed any vacancy; and (iv) whether he obtained some other employment on the date of termination or passing of the award. 8. The respondent is a local authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a local authority without following the provisions of the recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity. 9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularised. 10. Applying the legal principles, as noticed hereinbefore, the relief granted in favour of the appellant by the Labour Court is wholly unsustainable. The same also appears to be somewhat unintelligible. 11. 10. Applying the legal principles, as noticed hereinbefore, the relief granted in favour of the appellant by the Labour Court is wholly unsustainable. The same also appears to be somewhat unintelligible. 11. The High Court, on the other hand, did not consider the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant was entitled to compensation, notice and notice pay. 12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that in a situation of this nature instead and in place of directing reinstatement with full back wages, the workmen should be granted adequate monetary compensation. (See M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban [ (2007) 9 SCC 748 ].) 13. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that as the appellant had worked only for a short period, the interest of justice will be subserved if the High Court's judgment is modified by directing payment of a sum of Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) by way of damages to the appellant by the respondent. Such payment should be made within eight weeks from this date, failing which the same will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum." 15. It would be, thus, seen that by catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and back wages in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to suffer from any legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and back wages in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to suffer from any legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages. As a matter of fact, in all the judgments of this Court referred to and relied upon by the High Court while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages, this Court has awarded compensation." 10. Thus, it is evident that while dealing with the issue of grant of relief in case of termination of services of a temporary employee, the nature of employment, the period for which an employee may have rendered services has to be taken into account and merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, the relief of reinstatement cannot be granted. In the instant case, the appellant was employed on a temporary basis as sweeper-cum-water boy for a period from 19.07.1994 till 03.01.1995 and between a period from April 1995 to August 1995, worked for a period of 30 days and between July 1994 to June 1995, the appellant worked for a period of 287 days. Thus, taking into account the nature of employment as well as the period for which the appellant has rendered services and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in JAGBIR SINGH, supra, in our considered opinion, the appellant has rightly been held to be not entitled to the relief of reinstatement and suitable compensation has been awarded to him. It is pertinent to note that similar view has been taken in 'INCHARGE OFFICER AND ANOTHER Vs. SHAKAR SHETTY' (2010) 9 SCC 126 and SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT, TELEGRAH (TRAFFIC), BHOPAL Vs. SANTOSH KUMAR SEAL & ORS.' AIR 2010 SC 2140 , 'STATE OF M.P. AND ANOTHER Vs. VINOD KUMAR TIWARI' (2016) 16 SCC 610 and in case of termination of services of daily wage employees who have rendered service for a period of 2 years, compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-was awarded instead of reinstatement. 11. SANTOSH KUMAR SEAL & ORS.' AIR 2010 SC 2140 , 'STATE OF M.P. AND ANOTHER Vs. VINOD KUMAR TIWARI' (2016) 16 SCC 610 and in case of termination of services of daily wage employees who have rendered service for a period of 2 years, compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-was awarded instead of reinstatement. 11. Sofar as reliance placed by learned Senior counsel for the appellant in the case of JASMER SINGH, supra is concerned, the Tribunal had granted the relief of reinstatement and the order passed by the High Court, by which it was held, was set aside on the ground that workman cannot be allowed to approach the Labour Court after 3 years after termination of his service was set aside. The aforesaid decision has no application to the facts of the case. In HARJINDER SINGH, supra the need to keep goals set out in preamble and Part IV of the Constitution, while considering social welfare legislation has been emphasized. The aforesaid decisions are of no assistance to the appellant in the facts of the case. 12. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The same fails and is hereby dismissed.