ORDER : 1. The captioned civil revision petition is filed by the petitioner/defendant challenging the order dated 20.12.2018 passed in S.C.No.35/2015 by the III Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hubballi whereby the suit of the respondent/plaintiff is decreed directing the petitioner herein to vacate and handover the suit premises. 2. The facts leading to the case are as under: The respondent/plaintiff instituted a suit a for eviction of vacant possession of suit schedule property and also claimed mesne profits at the rate of Rs.5,000/-p.m. from the date of termination of tenancy till handing over of vacant possession of the suit schedule property. The respondent/plaintiff claims that he is the owner of the suit schedule property and plaintiff being a holy and spiritual institution is conducting various educational and religious activities for the welfare of the Society. It is further pleaded in the plaint that it owns educational institutions and commercial complex and has inducted tenants to run their business according to the agreements entered into by the parties. The respondent/plaintiff has specifically contended that the present petitioner/defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff-institution and he was inducted as a tenant in the suit property on 19.06.1987 on the basis of yearly rent of Rs.2,182/- payable to the respondent/plaintiff on or before expiry of three months of the next year. The respondent/plaintiff has alleged that the petitioner/defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the agreement and thereby has committed breach of contract. It is also contended that the petitioner/defendant has committed default in not paying arrears of rent. It is also stated that the respondent/plaintiff intends to develop and expand the area and needs additional space and therefore, requested the tenants to vacate and handover the suit property. It is also stated that since the petitioner/defendant refused to handover vacant possession, a legal notice was issued on 03.12.2011 terminating the tenancy. Since the petitioner/defendant showed no inclination to vacate and handover the suit schedule property, the present suit is filed. 3. On receipt of summons, the petitioner/defendant tendered his appearance and filed written statement and stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint. The petitioner/defendant contended that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. The petitioner/defendant disputed the description of the suit property. 3. On receipt of summons, the petitioner/defendant tendered his appearance and filed written statement and stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint. The petitioner/defendant contended that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. The petitioner/defendant disputed the description of the suit property. The present petitioner on the contrary specifically contended that he is regularly paying the rent to the respondent/plaintiff and it is the respondent/plaintiff who has been refusing to accept the rent tendered for the reasons best known to him and therefore, the petitioner/defendant has contended that if there is any violation, the same is on the part of the respondent/plaintiff. The petitioner has also specifically contended that there is no condition in the lease deed that the petitioner/defendant cannot sub-let the suit schedule property and therefore, the question of violation of lease deed would not arise at all. On these set of defence, the present petitioner/defendant sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. The learned Judge, based on the rival contentions, has formulated the following issues: 1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the tenancy of the defendant is properly terminated? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for order of eviction as prayed for? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits as sought for? 4) What order? 5. The respondent/plaintiff has prosecuted the suit through GPA holder who is examined as PW.1 and the documentary evidence adduced by the respondent/plaintiff are marked as per Exs.P-1 to P-4. The present petitioner/defendant examined himself as DW.1 and produced rebuttal documentary evidence as per Exs.D-1 to D-4. The learned Judge having examined the oral and documentary evidence has answered issue Nos.1 and 2 in the affirmative by holding that the respondent/plaintiff has proved that tenancy of the petitioner/defendant is lawfully terminated and the evidence on record clearly indicates that the respondent/plaintiff has established that he is entitled for eviction. The learned Judge after examining the ocular evidence of DW.1 was of the view that since the jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is not in dispute, the petitioner/defendant cannot be permitted to deny the title of landlord. The learned Judge has also perused Ex.D-3 which is a cheque issued by the petitioner/defendant in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. The learned Judge after examining the ocular evidence of DW.1 was of the view that since the jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is not in dispute, the petitioner/defendant cannot be permitted to deny the title of landlord. The learned Judge has also perused Ex.D-3 which is a cheque issued by the petitioner/defendant in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. The learned Judge having perused Ex.D-3 was of the view that there is a reference in Ex.D-3 wherein the plaintiff is addressed as landlord and therefore, the learned Judge has come to conclusion that respondent/plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises and the petitioner/defendant is the tenant. The learned Judge has also taken note of the fact that the respondent/plaintiff is in need of suit schedule property for his bonafide use and occupation. However, the learned Judge has answered point No.3 in the negative and has held that plaintiff is not entitled for mesne profits. On these set of reasonings, the learned Judge has decreed the suit directing the present petitioner to vacate and handover suit premises to the respondent/plaintiff. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant would vehemently argue and contend before this Court that admittedly the suit is filed under the provisions of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 and has claimed mesne profits at the rate of Rs.20,000/-p.m. and since suit was filed on 20.04.2012, the Court lacks jurisdiction having regard to the subject matter of the suit and therefore, the suit itself was not maintainable. He would further submit to this Court that mesne profits was claimed at the rate of Rs.20,000/-p.m. and the same was later restricted to Rs.5,000/-p.m. by amending the plaint. He would submit that even after amendment, the mesne profits claimed by the respondent/plaintiff at the rate of Rs.5,000/-is still not maintainable before the Small Causes Court since it exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. Learned counsel would further submit to this Court that admittedly, the lease deed clearly indicates that it is a yearly tenancy and therefore, the quit notice issued by the respondent/plaintiff granting 15 days time to handover vacant possession is illegal and therefore, there is no valid termination of lease and the present suit seeking eviction is not at all maintainable. 7. 7. Learned counsel would submit to this Court that even after amendment of the plaint, the value of the suit in view of prayer made by the plaintiff comes to Rs.2,27,182/-and therefore, the suit before the Small Causes Court is not at all maintainable. Therefore, he would contend before this Court that the Court of Small Causes would get jurisdiction in those matters where the value of the suit is less than Rs.1,00,000/-. He would also submit to this Court that the learned Judge has failed in not examining the provisions of Section 8 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 wherein it is clearly contemplated that the Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suit specified in the schedule and therefore, he would submit to this Court that the judgment and decree passed by the Small Causes Court suffers from serious infirmities. He would also submit to this Court that the lease in favour of the petitioner was created under registered lease deed and the period stipulated in the lease deed is 30 years and therefore, the quit notice issued before expiry of lease period is without authority and therefore, there is no valid termination of lease. He would also submit to this Court that the learned Judge has committed a serious jurisdictional error in not taking note of the fact that none of the conditions contained in clause (c) of Article 4 of Schedule II of Section 8 are satisfied and therefore, suit is not maintainable. On these set of grounds, he would submit to this Court that the judgment and decree of the Small Causes Court is not sustainable and therefore, the grounds urged in the revision petition would clearly displace the reasonings and conclusions arrived at by the Small Causes Court and therefore, he submits that the judgment and decree passed by the Small Causes Court would warrant interference at the hands of this Court. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would, however, support the judgment of the Small Causes Court. By placing reliance on paragraph 16 of the judgment under challenge, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submits that jural relationship is admitted and further, DW.2 is examined in support of his defence who has admitted that respondent/plaintiff is the owner. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would, however, support the judgment of the Small Causes Court. By placing reliance on paragraph 16 of the judgment under challenge, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submits that jural relationship is admitted and further, DW.2 is examined in support of his defence who has admitted that respondent/plaintiff is the owner. He would further submit to this Court that there is clinching evidence on record to demonstrate that the present petitioner/defendant is a chronic defaulter and there are absolutely no documents produced by the petitioner/defendant to show payment of rent insofar as quit notice is concerned. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would submit to this Court that the notice issued by the respondent/plaintiff is not countered by the petitioner/defendant by issuing a reply notice. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner/ defendant that the quit notice of 15 days is bad in law cannot be accepted. 9. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent. I have gone through the oral and documentary evidence as well as the pleadings of the parties. The relevant point that would arise for consideration in the light of the rival claims made by the parties before this Court are: 1) Whether the finding of the learned Judge that there is a valid termination of tenancy is perverse and contrary to the provisions of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882? 2) Whether the Court below was justified in ordering for eviction with a direction to the defendant to handover vacant possession? Re: Point Nos.1 and 2: 10. The respondent/plaintiff has filed the present suit before the Small Causes Court seeking eviction and vacant possession from the defendant. The averments made in paragraph 5 of the plaint would be relevant to examine the controversy between the parties. The said paragraph 5 of the plaint is culled out as follows: "5. That the defendant is inducted in possession of the suit property by the plaintiff on 19-06-1987 as a tenant and tenancy of the defendant commences from 27-06-1987 and ends on 19-06-1988 of the next year. The defendant has agreed to pay the yearly rental of Rs.2,182/-to the plaintiff on or before expiry of three months of the next year and further agreed to pay the enhanced rental and thereby has executed on lease deed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant has agreed to pay the yearly rental of Rs.2,182/-to the plaintiff on or before expiry of three months of the next year and further agreed to pay the enhanced rental and thereby has executed on lease deed in favour of the plaintiff. But the defendant has failed to pay the monthly rental promptly as and when the same has fallen due to further the defendant has sub the same to the various persons without consent and concurrence of the plaintiff and thereby has violated the terms of lease deed. It is submitted that the defendant inspirte of repeated requests and reminders has failed to pay the rental of the suit property regularly. Therefore, the defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit schedule property." 11. The respondent/plaintiff having instituted a suit for ejectment has however, not produced the registered lease deed. On the contrary the petitioner/defendant has produced the registered lease deed which is marked as Ex.D-1. It would be useful for this Court to cull out the relevant covenant of the lease deed which would have a bearing on the present suit: 12. If the averments made in paragraph 5 of the plaint are read together with the covenants of the lease deed at paragraphs 3 to 5, it would be clearly evident that the respondent/plaintiff has executed the registered lease deed in respect of vacant property and the ground rent is fixed at Rs.1,650/- payable annually and the period of lease is for 30 years. The recitals at paragraph 5 of the lease deed as per Ex.D-1 clearly indicate that the lease period would end as on 27.11.2016. If these relevant factors are taken into consideration, then this Court would find that the registered lease deed executed by the respondent/plaintiff is for a period of 30 years. Therefore, the petitioner/defendant had the benefit of secured term and it was also agreed between the landlord and tenant that the rent is to be paid annually. If Ex.D-1 which is a registered lease deed and the statutory requirement of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act are examined, then I would find that the quit notice issued by the respondent/plaintiff by invoking the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is bad in law. The learned Judge has not at all adverted to the statutory provisions. The learned Judge has not at all adverted to the statutory provisions. In fact, the learned Judge has also not referred to the nature of lease deed in the present case on hand. If there is a registered lease deed and the term is secured, then this Court is of the view that the lease deed in favour of the petitioner/defendant cannot be terminated by issuing a quit notice stipulating 15 days time. It would be useful for this Court to refer to Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the same is culled out as follows: "107. Lease how made.-A lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease immoveable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee; Provided that the State Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession." 13. On bare reading of Section 107, this Court would find that the learned Judge erred in holding that there is a valid termination of tenancy. The said reasoning is palpably erroneous. I have also gone through the covenants of the registered lease deed. The lease deed does not contemplate premature termination of lease. The question that would arise before this Court is whether respondent/landlord could have unilaterally terminated the lease which was determinable after a period of 30 years. The recitals in the registered lease deed does not give any right to the respondent/landlord to determine the lease in time before the term fixed. If a registered lease deed is executed and if no option is reserved to the landlord to determine the lease, in such cases, lease stands terminated by efflux of period mentioned therein and not at the unilateral option of the landlord. If a registered lease deed is executed and if no option is reserved to the landlord to determine the lease, in such cases, lease stands terminated by efflux of period mentioned therein and not at the unilateral option of the landlord. Even on reading of the lease deed and the language incorporated therein, it is clearly evident that the intention appears to be clear between the parties and unrestricted right of enjoyment for a period of 30 years was in fact conferred on the petitioner/defendant and therefore, in absence of a clause contemplating forfeiture/breach, landlord cannot reserve to himself right to terminate the same at his option at any time before the expiry of the period. 14. This Court would also find that on bare reading of the entire averments made in the plaint, it is not the case where the plaintiff has tried to bring his case under Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act which contemplates surrender of tenancy. It is also forthcoming from the registered lease deed that leased property was a vacant site and there is express covenant at paragraph 7 permitting the petitioner/defendant to put up construction in the vacant site under the registered lease deed. If all these relevant factors are taken into consideration, then I am of the view that the learned Judge has not at all adverted to all these material facts which would have a bearing on the decision of the suit. No reasons are forthcoming and there is absolutely no discussion while answering point No.1 in affirmative. Though learned Judge has come to conclusion that there is a valid termination of lease, however, no reasons are forthcoming to support the said document. This Court is unable to understand as to how the quit notice of 15 days in respect of a lease deed executed for a period of 30 years which would expire on 27.11.2016 to be valid in law. Admittedly, the present suit is filed on 20.08.2015 before the expiry of the lease period and therefore, this Court would find that the quit notice granting 15 days time could not have been issued by the respondent/landlord. 15. Admittedly, the present suit is filed on 20.08.2015 before the expiry of the lease period and therefore, this Court would find that the quit notice granting 15 days time could not have been issued by the respondent/landlord. 15. In view of bar to Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act, the lease in the present case on hand exceeds one year and further, since there is no dispute that the rent payable is annually, therefore, the lease shall be deemed to be yearly lease with the secured term of 30 years and therefore, the termination of lease can be made only by issuing a quit notice of six months and not 15 days. Suit is filed before expiry of lease period and objection in that regard is promptly taken by producing registered lease deed at Ex.D-1. Therefore, this Court is of the view that as per Ex.D-1 – registered lease deed, the terms of the lease deed are clearly binding on the respondent/landlord and therefore, the clause relating to the period of leasing the property for a period of 30 years was required to be examined by the learned Judge. The petitioner/defendant by producing the registered lease deed has proved that the period of lease was for a period of 30 years. Therefore, the provisions of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act which lays down rule of construction which is applicable when the parties have not specifically agreed as to whether the lease is yearly or monthly. What Section 106 does is, it prescribes the duration of period of different types of lease by legal fiction and lease for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be from year to year and all other lease shall be deemed to be from month to month. Existence of valid lease is prerequisite to invoke the rule of construction embodied under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. 16. In the present case on hand, the period contemplated under lease deed exceeds one year. To be more precise, the period is fixed for 30 years and therefore, the quit notice issued by the respondent/landlord by granting 15 days notice is contrary to Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act and therefore, there is no valid termination of lease in the present case on hand. To be more precise, the period is fixed for 30 years and therefore, the quit notice issued by the respondent/landlord by granting 15 days notice is contrary to Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act and therefore, there is no valid termination of lease in the present case on hand. The validity of impugned quit notice has to be judged and determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. The quit notice clearly offends the provisions of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. If there is no valid termination, then the judgment and decree passed by the Court below directing the petitioner/defendant to handover vacant possession is palpably erroneous and the same suffers from serious infirmities. 17. For the foregoing reasons, I pass the following: ORDER The civil revision petition is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 20.12.2018 passed in S.C.No.35/2015 is set aside and the ejectment suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is dismissed. However, the order passed by this Court would not come in the way of the respondent/plaintiff seeking possession in accordance with law.