ORDER : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the judgment, dated 25.11.2019, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Mandi, H.P., in Cr. Appeal No. 24/2018, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence, dated 23.07.2018 & 25.07.2018, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Mandi, H.P. in case N.I. Act No. 215-III/18/16, titled as Punjab & Sindh Bank vs. Pawan Kumar, whereby learned trial Court while holding petitioner-accused guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 70,000/- to the complainant. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerge from the record are that respondent/complainant/bank (hereinafter referred to as 'complainant') instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Mandi, H.P., stating therein that a Cash Credit Limit of Rs. 65,000/- was granted to the accused on 28.09.2015 and he was to repay the amount along with simple interest at monthly rests. Since, allegedly, accused was found irregular in operating the said Cash Credit Limit during process of regularization of his account, he issued cheque bearing No. 225723, dated 18.07.2016, amounting to Rs. 68300/-, drawn at State Bank of Patiala, Branch Bhiuli, Mandi Town, District Mandi, H.P. However, fact remains that on presentation of aforesaid cheque, the same was dishonoured on account of 'funds insufficient' in the bank account of the accused. After having received memo dated 18.07.2016, from the bank concerned, complainant issued legal notice dated 09.08.2016, calling upon the accused to make the payment good within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of legal notice. Since, accused failed to repay the amount within the time stipulated in legal notice, complainant instituted the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of law. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, held accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per description given hereinabove. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, held accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per description given hereinabove. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, accused preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Mandi, which was came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 25.11.2019. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant criminal revision, praying therein for his acquittal after setting aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, recorded by court below. 3. Vide order dated 03.01.2020, this Court while suspending the substantive sentence imposed by court below, directed the accused to deposit 50% of compensation amount and furnish personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 25,000/-, within a period of six weeks. However, fact remains that aforesaid order was not complied with and as such, vide order dated 24.07.2021, this Court while granting last opportunity to accused to do the needful, in terms of order dated 03.01.2020, categorically observed in the order that in case needful is not done within the time stipulated by this Court, interim protection granted vide order dated 03.01.2020, shall come to an end and complainant would be at liberty to get the judgment of trial Court executed, in accordance with law. Since, despite repeated opportunities, accused has failed to deposit the amount, this Court has no option, at this stage, but to decide the petition on its own merits. 4. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused the pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned by court below, while passing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, this Court finds no force in the submission of Mr. Abhimanyu Rathore, learned counsel representing the petitioner/accused, that courts below, have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather, this Court finds from the material available on record that accused has miserably failed to prove defence taken by him that cheque in question was not issued towards the discharge of lawful liability and the same was issued as a security. It is an admitted case of the parties, especially, accused that cheque in question was issued by him and it bears his signatures. Simple defence of the accused is that cheque in question was not issued towards discharge of lawful liability, rather same was issued as a security. However, accused has not led any cogent and convincing evidence to substantiate his claim that cheque was issued as a security. It is not in dispute that accused had taken Cash Credit Limit of Rs. 65,000/- from the complainant and he was supposed to repay such amount along with simple interest at monthly rests. Cash Credit Limit of Rs. 65,000/- was granted to accused on 28.09.2015, whereas, cheque in question, came to be issued in favour of complainant on 18.07.2016, i.e. approximately after ten months of grant of Cash Credit Limit in favour of the accused as such stand of accused that cheque in question was issued as a security is falsified on account of the fact that Cash Credit Limit was issued on 28.09.2015. Security cheque, if any, was to be taken by complainant, same could have been taken only at the time of granting Cash Credit Limit on 28.09.2015, but definitely not after 10 months of grant of Cash Credit Limit. As a matter of fact, account of accused became irregular and as such he on the insistence of complainant, with a view to discharge his lawful liability, issued cheque bearing No. 225723, dated 18.07.2016, amounting to Rs. 68,300/- and as such, it cannot be said that aforesaid cheque was issued as a security and same could not be used by complainant. To hold a person guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, complainant is necessarily required to prove that cheque in question was issued by accused and such cheque on presentation was dishonoured on account of 'funds insufficient'. Besides above, cheque in question, must have been presented before the bank concerned, within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within a period of its validity, whichever is earlier. Besides above, cheque in question, must have been presented before the bank concerned, within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within a period of its validity, whichever is earlier. Besides above, complainant before initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, should have issued legal notice in writing within 30 days of receipt of information with regard to 'funds insufficient' in the bank account of the accused and if accused fails to make the payment within 15 days of receipt of legal notice, complainant must within a period of one month after expiry of 15 days' period, file complaint in the competent court of law. 5. In the case at hand, material available on record, clearly suggests that all the ingredients, as have been discussed hereinabove, stand duly complied with by complainant before initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Act against accused and as such, no fault, if any, can be found with the action of the court below in as much as, acceptance of complaint is concerned. Petitioner/accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., though denied incriminatory evidence led against him and claimed innocence, but at no point of time, he denied factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as his signatures on the cheque and as such presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act became available to the complainant that cheque in question was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act, clearly provides that unless contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that holder of cheque received the cheque in discharge of any debt or liability. 6. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability. Similarly, Section 118 of the Act provides, unless contrary is proved, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque in discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. True, it is that to rebut aforesaid presumption accused can always raise probable defence either by leading some positive evidence or by referring to the material, if any adduced on record by the complainant. True, it is that to rebut aforesaid presumption accused can always raise probable defence either by leading some positive evidence or by referring to the material, if any adduced on record by the complainant. But in the case at hand, accused has miserably failed to raise probable defence much less sufficient to rebut the presumption applicable in favour of the complainant under Section 118 and 139 of the Act. 7. Complainant-bank with a view to prove its case, examined Ajeet Singh, Manager, Punjab & Sindh Bank, School Bazaar Mandi, H.P., who reiterated the contents of the complaint through his affidavit tendered in evidence as Ex. CW-1/A. Cross-examination conducted upon this witness, reveals that aforesaid witness stated that acknowledgement due and the notice were not received back, however, he self-stated that accused was informed telephonically by bank officials. This witness also stated in cross-examination that Cash Credit Limit is renewed every year. He also admitted that accused only deposited amount in Cash Credit Limit on 3-4 occasion and in total, he only deposited sum of Rs. 20,200/-. This witness also volunteered to say that accused also withdrawn amount from the Cash Credit Limit. Most importantly, this witness in his cross-examination categorically stated that Cash Credit Limit is granted against the stock, but no guarantee was taken from the accused. This witness specifically denied that blank cheques are not taken as security, at the time of granting of Cash Credit Limit. He denied that accused had given blank cheque to the complainant. This witness denied suggestion put to him that neither accused issued any cheque to the bank nor it was filled up by him, which otherwise is totally contrary to the defence taken by him. 8. Interestingly, if the cross-examination conducted upon the aforesaid witness, is perused in its entirety, it reveals that accused made an attempt to carve out a case that he had deposited substantial amount in Cash Credit Account, but at no point of time, he made an attempt to get the record of the bank concerned summoned in the Court to prove that he was not liable to pay the cheque amount to the complainant. Since, this witness in his cross-examination categorically denied suggestion put to him that accused had issued a blank cheque in favour of complainant-bank, response made by him to other suggestion that blank cheques are not taken as security while granting Cash Credit Limit, may not be of much relevance, as far as the case of the accused is concerned. At no point of time, suggestion, if any, ever came to be put to the aforesaid witness of the bank that accused had not issued any cheque, at any point of time, rather accused took contradictory defence, on the one hand accused tried to set up a case that he had issued a blank security cheque and on the other hand, he also took a defence that no cheque was issued by him in favour of complainant-bank. No doubt, presumption as available under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, are rebuttable by the accused, but there is no material led on record suggestive of the fact that accused was able to raise any probable defence to rebut the specific case of the complainant-bank that accused with a view to discharge his lawful liability, issued cheque in question and same was dishonoured on account of "funds insufficient'. Cheque Ext. CW-1/C, was issued on 18.07.2016 and same was dishonoured on the same day though memo Ext. CW-1/D. It also stands proved on record that cheque was presented within the period of its validity. Similarly, legal notice Ext. CW-1/E, was sent on 11.08.2016, through postal receipt Ext. CW-1/F. Bare perusal of aforesaid notice clearly proves that legal notice was sent within 30 days from receiving information of the dishonour of the cheque, i.e Ext. CW-1/C. Since, accused despite having received legal notice failed to pay the cheque amount, complainant-bank had no option but to institute the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act. Since, accused at no point of time, disputed that legal notice was not sent to him on the correct address, legal notice sent through registered post on the address available in the bank is deemed to be served. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s. Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) RCR(Cri) 260, has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s. Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) RCR(Cri) 260, has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No. 23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- "23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof". The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy." 10. After having carefully perused the entire record, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that complainant successfully proved on record that accused is guilty of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 11. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court and further upheld by learned Appellate Court and as such, same are upheld. 12. 11. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court and further upheld by learned Appellate Court and as such, same are upheld. 12. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any. Interim directions, if any, stand vacated. Petitioner is directed to surrender forthwith to serve the sentence imposed by the trial court vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence, dated 23.07.2018 & 25.07.2018.