JUDGMENT : With the consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and/or video quality. 2. The instant intra-Court appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 05.11.2020 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2448 of 2018 and analogous cases whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the memorandum of charge by dismissing the writ petition leaving it open to the petitioner to demonstrate the points before the departmental proceeding. 3. The brief facts of the case which require to be enumerated herein, read as under :- One Mukhlal Hari was a permanent employee working on the post of Sweeper in Bokaro Colliery under Respondent No.1 since 1957. The said Mukhlal Hari was issueless and accordingly, in or around the year 1970, he adopted the writ petitioner when he was aged about 5 years, after performing prevalent ceremony in their custom in the society. The date of birth of the writ petitioner is 21.10.1965 and, therefore, he has made an application for appointment on compassionate ground after the death of his adoptive father in harness on 15.11.1985 in view of the provision of 9.4.2 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA)-III and after proper verification of his application followed by interview held on 02.08.1986, appointment letter was issued in his favour on 04.11.1986 to the post of Category-I Sweeper and accordingly, he was posted in Sanitation Section at No.3 Area and he started discharging his duty. He was promoted to the post of Category-II sometime in the year 2012. But all of a sudden, a memorandum of charge was issued on 31.07.2017 on the allegation that the petitioner applied as adopted son of Mukhlal Hari, Ex-Sweeper, on compassionate ground and accordingly, he was appointed on 05.11.1986 but on scrutiny of the records it was revealed that there was no adoption deed to substantiate his claim and his biological father namely Mahabir Hari, is continuing in illegal occupation of Quarter No.214 which is adjacent to Quarter No.213 of the writ petitioner basis upon which the allegation has been leveled against the writ petitioner about commission of misconduct as per the provision of Clause 26.9, 26.22 and 26.41 of the Certified Standing Order of the Central Coalfields Limited. It was the case of the writ petitioner that said memorandum of charge was issued after a lapse of 31 years and prior to that no such allegation has ever been levelled against the writ petitioner and further, under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act there is no provision that the adoption must be by a registered document and, therefore, according to the writ petitioner, the memorandum of charge is without any basis and foundation hence the same is fit to be quashed and, therefore, writ petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the same by dismissing the writ petition, however, leaving it open to the writ petitioner to raise the valid points in the departmental proceeding which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 4. Mr. A.K.Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact about applicability of the registered deed for adoption which was not required at all at the time of appointment of the writ petitioner on compassionate ground after the death of Mukhlal Hari, in harness. He has also submitted that the learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact that the memorandum of charge has been issued after delay of 31 years i.e., at the fag end of service, therefore, interference should have been made by quashing the memorandum of charge but having not done so, gross error has been committed by the learned Single Judge. 5. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent C.C.L., has submitted that the writ petitioner has participated in the enquiry proceeding as also he has cross examined the witnesses and produced the witnesses in his defense and when the enquiry was about to conclude, writ petition has been filed and therefore, whatever points were available or are available to the petitioner, the same ought to have brought it to the notice of the Enquiry Officer for its consideration. He submits that the learned Single Judge, after considering the fact that the memorandum of charge has been issued in order to adjudicate about the commission of fraud on the part of the writ petitioner, has rightly not interfered with the charge as the writ court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot go on adjudicating the issue on fact by acting as an Enquiry Officer and, therefore, according to him, if the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the memorandum of charge, it cannot be said to suffer from an error and accordingly, the order impugned may not be interfered with. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 7. The sole issue involved in this case is as to whether the High Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can interfere with the memorandum of charge? The law is settled that the memorandum of charge can be interfered with by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the same is without jurisdiction i.e., if issued by the incompetent authority as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [ (2006) 12 SCC 28 ], at paragraph 14 which is quoted hereunder :- “14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.” In Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, [ (2012) 11 SCC 565 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so and further that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereunder :- “10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court. 11. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court. 11. In State of Orissa v. Sangram Keshari Misra [ (2010) 13 SCC 311 ] this Court held that normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that to determine correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings.” 8. We have examined the factual aspect involved in this case on the basis of the admitted facts i.e., the writ petitioner has been appointed in the capacity of adopted son of Mukhlal Hari who has died in harness on 15.11.1985. He has been allowed to continue in service for a period of 31 years and thereafter a memorandum of charge has been issued for misleading the employer i.e., C.C.L. Management herein, which amounts to misconduct in view of the provision of Clause 26.9, 26.22 and 26.41 of the Certified Standing Order of the Central Coalfields Limited. He has been allowed to continue in service for a period of 31 years and thereafter a memorandum of charge has been issued for misleading the employer i.e., C.C.L. Management herein, which amounts to misconduct in view of the provision of Clause 26.9, 26.22 and 26.41 of the Certified Standing Order of the Central Coalfields Limited. The further admitted fact herein is that the writ petitioner has appeared before the Enquiry Officer and cross examined the management witnesses as also put forth his defence and at the stage when the written submissions were to be exchanged, the writ petition has been filed before this Court invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The grounds for assailing memorandum of charge are that the deed of adoption is not required to prove the adoption for getting appointment on compassionate ground and the charge has been issued after a delay of 31 years. 9. According to this Court, the charge has not been assailed either on the ground of incompetency of the authority who has issued the memorandum of charge or on its vagueness rather the charge has been assailed on the ground of requirement of the adoption deed and the proceeding has been initiated after a delay of 31 years, therefore, it has been assailed on the factual aspects which require adjudication on the basis of the facts produced before the Enquiry Officer for its appreciation. It is settled position of law that the High Court cannot act as an Enquiry Officer rather the enquiry is to be conducted by the duly appointed Enquiry Officer to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the charge, which has been levelled against the delinquent employee, has been proved or not for which the requirement of law is to produce evidence before the Enquiry Officer and the witnesses be examined and cross examined. Herein, the issue of applicability of the adoption deed is required in the matter of appointment or not or delay in initiation of proceeding in a case of alleged commission of fraud as has been alleged, require adjudication of fact for which the Enquiry Officer has been appointed before whom the writ petitioner had appeared and cross examined the witnesses as also put forth his defence and, as such, at this juncture, where the factual dispute is to be adjudicated by the Enquiry Officer, it will not be proper for this Court to exercise the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the memorandum of charge by issuing the writ of certiorari since the principle of issuance of writ of certiorari as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan [ AIR 1964 SC 477 ] is only restricted for showing interference if any error on the fact is apparent or the order passed by the authority is without jurisdiction but such grounds are not available herein. In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal, has been please to place reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 , wherein at para 17 it has been held:- “14. While discussing the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution interfering with the facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal, this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [ (1986) 4 SCC 447 ], held as under: (SCC pp. 458-59, para 17) “17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 458-59, para 17) “17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta [ (1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297 ] where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at AIR p. 1301 of the Report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “7. The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] (AIR p. 217, para 14) that the “power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee [ AIR 1951 Cal 193 ], to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors”. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division [ AIR 1958 SC 398 ] and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: (AIR p. 413, para 30) “30. … It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. … It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 10. The learned Single Judge, after considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter and taking into consideration the fact that the element of fraud requires adjudication, has refused to interfere with the memorandum of charge, which according to our considered view, cannot be faulted with. Further, the learned Single Judge has even granted liberty to the writ petitioner to raise all the points in the departmental proceeding which can well be availed by the writ petitioner. 11. In view thereof, showing interference with the memorandum of charge by interfering with the order passed by the learned Single Judge will not be proper. 12. Accordingly, we are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference, hence the instant appeal stands dismissed.